Jibri Caleb Coleman v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 29, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-01113-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

DISMISS and Opinion Filed February 29, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-01113-CR

JIBRI CALEB COLEMAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-76038

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Smith Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness Jibri Caleb Coleman appeals his conviction for murder. Appellant pleaded

guilty before the trial court pursuant to a plea bargain, and the trial court followed

the plea bargain and sentenced appellant to seventeen years’ imprisonment. We

conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss the appeal.

On November 1, 2023, appellant signed a plea agreement stating he would

plead guilty to the charged offense of murder and be sentenced to a “Term of

Confinement in penitentiary for 17 years” with an affirmative finding that he “used

or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: Firearm.” The trial court’s written admonitions to appellant included, “If the punishment assessed does not exceed the

agreement between you and the prosecutor, the Court must give its permission to

you before you may appeal on any matter in this case except for those matters raised

by written motions prior to trial.” The plea agreement also included written waivers

of appellant’s rights, including: “With the Court’s approval, the defendant herein

states that he/she: 11. Waives the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals.”

During the plea hearing, the trial court told appellant, “Your lawyer has

explained to you I have followed this plea agreement and you have no rights to

appeal? You understand that?”; and appellant answered, “Yes.” The trial court’s

certification of defendant’s right of appeal states, “I certify that this criminal case:

is a plea bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal; the defendant has

waived the right of appeal.”

A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal as set out in the Code

of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a). Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides the following

related to appeal rights in plea bargain cases:

In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,

(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or

–2– (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A)–(C). When an appellant waives the right to appeal as

part of a plea bargain agreement with the State, a subsequent notice of appeal fails

to “initiate the appellate process,” Lundgren v. State, 434 S.W.3d 594, 599, 600

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and “no inquiry into even possibly meritorious claims may

be made.” Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When an

appeal from a plea bargain is not authorized by Rule 25.2, “[a] court of appeals,

while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is

permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without

further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.” Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

In this case, the record shows appellant and the State agreed appellant would

plead guilty in exchange for a specific recommended punishment. The documents

appellant signed admonished appellant he would have no right of appeal if the trial

court followed the punishment recommendation except for matters raised by written

motion and ruled on before trial or if the trial court granted appellant permission to

appeal. The clerk’s record does not contain any motion ruled on before trial, and the

certification of appellant’s right of appeal shows the trial court did not grant

appellant permission to appeal. Therefore, under Rule 25.2(a), appellant has no right

of appeal. See Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

Rule 25.2(d) also requires the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal if there is

no certification from the trial court showing the defendant has the right of appeal. –3– TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). Here, the certification affirmatively shows appellant did not

have the right to appeal, and the certification is supported by the record. Therefore,

we must dismiss the appeal. Id.; see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005).

We requested letter briefs from appellant and the State addressing the

jurisdictional issue. Appellant’s counsel filed a letter brief analyzing the record, the

statutes, and the case law governing this case, and counsel concluded, “In light of

the record and the law applicable to the appeal of a plea bargain agreement, it does

not appear that Appellant has a right of appeal in this case.”

We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the appeal is from

a plea-bargained conviction from which appellant does not have the right of appeal

and because appellant waived the right of appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this

appeal for want of jurisdiction.

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/ ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE

Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 231113F.U05

–4– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

JIBRI CALEB COLEMAN, On Appeal from the Criminal District Appellant Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-76038. No. 05-23-01113-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Partida- Kipness. Justices Nowell and Smith THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered February 29, 2024

–5–