J.H. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles

138 F.4th 1347

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 25-3472
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: J.H. No. 25-3472 _________ D.C. No. 24CR-00527 Central District of California, J.H., Los Angeles Petitioner. ORDER

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES,

Respondent.

TREVOR JAMES KIRK; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Real Parties in Interest.

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Gabriel P. Sanchez, and Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner J.H. is a victim of excessive force carried out by a Los Angeles

Deputy Sheriff (“Defendant”). A jury returned a guilty verdict against Defendant

for a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, finding that he deprived J.H. of her

constitutional right to be free from excessive force under color of law. Before

sentencing, the district court granted the Government’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss the allegations in the indictment that made

Defendant’s crime a felony, rather than a misdemeanor. Petitioner opposes the

reduction. She filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court pursuant to the

Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

The CVRA grants victims of crimes certain enumerated rights and provides

a vehicle for asserting those rights in criminal proceedings. See id. § 3771(a),

(d)(3). If a district court denies a victim’s motion asserting a right enumerated in

the CVRA, the statute permits the victim to challenge such denial in this court

through a petition for a writ of mandamus. Id. § 3771(d)(3). In reviewing CVRA

mandamus petitions, “we apply the ordinary standards of appellate review,” that is,

“de novo review for legal conclusions, clear-error review for factual findings, and

abuse-of-discretion review for discretionary judgments.” In re Doe, 57 F.4th 667,

672–73 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th

Cir. 2006) (explaining that “we need not balance the usual Bauman [v. U.S. Dist.

Ct., 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977)] factors . . . in ruling on mandamus petitions

brought under the CVRA”).

The CVRA codifies important “[r]ights of crime victims,” including “[t]he

right to be reasonably heard” in certain proceedings and “[t]he right to be treated

with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity . . . .” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771(a)(4), (8). Here, however, Petitioner has not shown, and the record before

2 25-3472 us does not reflect, that the district court denied her any right enumerated in the

CVRA. See id. § 3771(a)(1)–(10). Petitioner’s counsel filed a victim impact

statement that included objections to and legal arguments against the

Government’s Rule 48(a) motion, and Petitioner acknowledges that the district

court read the statement. Petitioner also addressed the district court at the May 19,

2025 hearing. See id. § 3771(a)(4) (affording the “right to be reasonably heard at

any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or

any parole proceeding”); Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016 (holding that this right “give[s]

crime victims the right to speak at proceedings covered by the CVRA”). Though

Petitioner challenges the legal basis of the district court’s order granting the Rule

48(a) motion, the CVRA’s mandamus procedure does not permit victims to

challenge—and does not empower a court of appeals to address—matters other

than a district court’s denial of the rights enumerated in that statute. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771(d)(3).

We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

We also deny the motion (Dkt. No. 14) to strike the answer.

DENIED.

3 25-3472