J.H. v. N.F.
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Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-709
J.H.
vs.
N.F.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant appeals from an order of a District Court
judge extending a harassment prevention order issued pursuant to
G. L. c. 258E (258E order or order) for ten years.1 He argues
that (1) the original order should be vacated, (2) the judge
abused his discretion in extending the order, and (3) he was not
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. We affirm the
1The plaintiff filed a complaint for protection from harassment on January 9, 2020. After a hearing, a judge issued an ex parte 258E order. After being served with the order, the defendant failed to appear for the extension hearing, and it was extended until January 22, 2021. The defendant was again served in hand with the extended order. An extension hearing was held by videoconference on January 22, 2021, at which the defendant did not appear, and the order was extended until January 20, 2023. The defendant was served in hand with the extended order. extension of the 258E order but vacate so much of the order that
extended it for ten years. We remand the case to the District
Court to revise the extension period from ten years to two years
from January 20, 2023, and to schedule a further hearing for
January 20, 2025, with notice to both parties.
Discussion. 1. Original 258E order. The defendant first
argues that the original 258E order was improperly issued and
should be vacated because the plaintiff did not offer evidence
of three separate acts of harassment. See G. L. c. 258E, § 1.
However, because the defendant did not appeal from the issuance
of the original 258E order, that issue is not before us, and we
decline to address it. See Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App.
Ct. 139, 140 n.2 (2006).
2. 258E extension order. The defendant next claims that
the judge abused his discretion in both extending the order and
issuing it for ten years.
a. Allowance of extension. At an extension hearing, the
defendant is not permitted to challenge the evidence underlying
the original order, and the plaintiff is not required to
reestablish the facts sufficient to support the initial order.
See Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005). However, the
plaintiff must establish a continuing need for the order to
protect him from further harassment. See id. at 739. "It is
the totality of the conditions that exist at the time that the
2 plaintiff seeks the extension, viewed in light of the initial
[258E order], that govern." Id. at 741. We give the judge's
credibility determinations "the utmost deference" (citation
omitted). Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664
(2020).
Here, the judge considered both the plaintiff's original
affidavit and the supplemental affidavit filed the day of the
extension hearing. The judge heard testimony from both parties,
including that the defendant made telephone calls and sent
"notes" to staff at the plaintiff's place of work while the
order was in effect.2 The judge credited the plaintiff's
testimony including that he was still in fear of the defendant.
In addition, during the defendant's testimony, the defendant
lost his temper and swore at the judge. The judge properly
considered, among other factors, the evidence underlying the
initial order and "the parties' demeanor in court." Yasmin Y.
v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 258 (2022), quoting
Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740. See Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App.
Ct. 929, 930 (1999) (proper to consider defendant's agitated
2 The defendant's contention that the lack of direct contact between the parties in the three years since the issuance of the original order is evidence that the plaintiff was not in need of continuing protection is unavailing, as "obedience alone is not a ground for refusing an extension of the initial order." Iamele, 444 Mass. at 738. Defendants subject to 258E orders are expected to comply with them. See MacDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 388-389 (2014).
3 conduct and emotionally charged statements at hearing). We
discern no "clear error of judgment in weighing the factors
relevant to the decision" (quotations and citations omitted),
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), and
conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
extending the order.
b. Duration of order. Once a determination to extend a
258E order is made, the duration of the extended order must be
"reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff" from future
harassment. G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d). See Iamele, 444 Mass. at
737-738. Here, the judge did not make findings as to why an
extension of ten years was necessary, and the plaintiff's
testimony did not support such a duration. On this record, we
cannot conclude that ten years is a reasonably necessary period
to protect the plaintiff from further harassment. Cf. Moreno v.
Naranjo, 465 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2013). Accordingly, we vacate so
much of the order that extended it for ten years, and remand to
the District Court to revise the expiration date to two years
from January 20, 2023 (the last extension date).
3. Extension hearing. The defendant next argues that he
was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because he
was not able to cross-examine the plaintiff or offer evidence,
4 and because he participated in the hearing remotely.3 An
extension hearing must comport with the requirements of due
process. See R.S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.4
(2019). This includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the
right to testify, the right to present evidence, and the right
to cross-examine witnesses. See Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass.
App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022). We review for an abuse of discretion
or other error of law. See Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App.
Ct. 315, 318 (2020).
Here, the judge told the defendant that he would have an
opportunity to present arguments and question the plaintiff.
Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record that the defendant
was afforded considerable time to present his case; however, the
defendant voluntarily left the hearing prior to its conclusion
and before questioning the plaintiff. It was the defendant's
own actions that prevented him from cross-examining the
plaintiff, and not a lack of fair hearing. There was no error.
Conclusion. We vacate so much of the January 20, 2023
extension order that granted a ten-year duration for the
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