J.H. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servics, Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CA-1527, 1528
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 30, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1527-ME

J.H. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JENNIFER R. DUSING, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-AD-00008

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; H.N.H., A MINOR CHILD; AND N.L.D. APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2024-CA-1528-ME

N.L.D. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JENNIFER R. DUSING, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-AD-00008

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; H.N.H., A MINOR CHILD; AND J.H. APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

JONES, L., JUDGE: N.L.D. (Mother) and J.H. (Father) (collectively Parents) filed

separate appeals from the November 14, 2024 order of the Boone Family Court

terminating their parental rights (TPR) to daughter, H.N.H. (Child).1 In accordance

with A.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App.

2012), counsel for both Parents filed Anders2 briefs contending that no meritorious

assignment of error exists to present to this Court. Accompanying their briefs,

counsel for Mother and Father filed motions to withdraw.

Counsel for Mother and Father also certified they had informed their

respective clients of their right to file supplemental pro se briefs. In accordance

with A.C., this Court entered orders in each respective appeal, granting both

Mother and Father thirty days to file a supplemental brief and passing the motions

1 To protect the privacy of the minor child, we will refer to the child and her natural parents by their initials or “Mother,” “Father,” and “Child.” 2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

-2- to withdraw to this merits panel.3 Neither Mother nor Father filed any

supplemental brief. With all briefs submitted, this Court is charged to “fully

examine the record and decide whether the appeal is wholly frivolous[.]” A.C., 362

S.W.3d at 371. Having independently reviewed the record, as well as having fully

considered the briefs, we affirm the Boone Family Court. By separate orders, we

also grant both motions to withdraw.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Child was born September 15, 2018. The Cabinet for Health and

Family Services (Cabinet) became involved with Parents and Child in February

2019 after receiving reports of substance misuse by Parents. Moreover, Mother

tested positive for illegal substances while pregnant with Child. On April 29, 2019,

the Cabinet filed a Juvenile Dependency, Neglect, or Abuse (JDNA) Petition in

Boone Family Court, alleging that Child was a dependent child4 due to substance

misuse by Parents. On May 2, 2019, temporary custody of Child was granted to

C.F., Mother’s uncle.5 On May 30, 2019, both parents stipulated to neglect. On

June 13, 2019, both parents were given disposition plans, which included

3 See A.C., 362 S.W.3d at 371 (“Upon receiving counsel’s motion to withdraw and accompanying Anders brief, this Court shall enter an order granting the indigent parent thirty days to file a pro se brief and deferring counsel’s motion to withdraw to the merits panel.”). 4 The petition was later amended to allege that Child was a neglected child. 5 Two other children of Parents were removed and placed in C.F.’s care. Both of those children had become adults by the time the TPR petition in the present case was filed.

-3- submitting to random drug screens, completing substance abuse assessments and

following recommendations, and completing mental health assessments and

following all recommendations. At some point, Mother was allowed to reside in

C.F.’s home with Child, but all contact between Mother and Child was to be

supervised.

Due to Parents’ non-compliance with their case plans, the Cabinet

closed their cases in August 2021. At a review hearing on November 18, 2021, the

Family Court ordered the Cabinet to re-engage with the family. Parents’ progress

on their case plans remained inconsistent. Furthermore, in addition to pleading

guilty to several misdemeanor offenses, Father was granted felony diversion on

one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree.

On September 12, 2022, the Cabinet filed a second JDNA petition

alleging that C.F. allowed Mother to be unsupervised with Child, and that Mother

was non-compliant with her case plan, including missing drug screens.6 The

petition further alleged that at her last drug screen several months earlier, she

tested positive for substances not prescribed to her. On September 15, 2022, the

first court appearance after filing the second JDNA petition, Mother was ordered to

leave C.F.’s home and have her parenting time supervised by the Cabinet.

6 There were no allegations against Father in this petition. Mother stipulated to a finding that the Child was dependent.

-4- A third JDNA petition was filed just over a week later, on September

23, 2022. That petition alleged that C.F. reported he was unable to care for Child

without help, that he knew of Mother’s non-compliance with court orders and her

case plan, and that he failed to inform the Cabinet. The petition further alleged that

C.F. had allowed other adults (specifically Mother’s adult daughter and boyfriend)

to use drugs in his home.7 Child was removed from C.F. and placed with the

Cabinet. Child was committed to the Cabinet on November 17, 2022. Parents were

granted supervised visitation every other week and consistently exercised that

visitation.

After Child was committed to the Cabinet, Parents’ progress with

their case plans remained inconsistent at best. Prior to the filing of the TPR

petition, Parents were discharged from BrightView (a substance addiction

treatment facility) multiple times for non-compliance. Both parents were also

discharged from UK TAP8 for non-compliance. In addition, she missed random

drug screenings and tested positive for illegal substances at some screenings she

did complete. Mother also failed to complete a mental health assessment as

ordered. Mother also made threats against a Cabinet worker, Madison Evans.

7 No allegations were made against either Mother or Father in this JNDA petition. C.F. stipulated to a finding that the Child was dependent. 8 University of Kentucky Targeted Assessment Program.

-5- Father refused to meet with the Cabinet worker, and was in arrears for support

obligations for Child, despite his lottery winnings.

On January 30, 2024, the Cabinet filed a petition for involuntary

termination of parental rights. The family court held a bench trial on TPR on

September 24, 2024 and October 16, 2024. Both parents were present with

counsel. The Cabinet’s sole witness was Ms. Evans. Ms. Evans testified about how

the Cabinet originally became involved in the case, how the Child came into the

Cabinet’s care, the case plans developed for Parents, and Parents’ inconsistent

progress in those plans.

Ms. Evans noted that neither parent had participated in the care of

Child for at least ninety days nor had either Parent provided support. Ms. Evans

also testified that the Cabinet made reasonable efforts for Child to return to

Parents, but such services were unsuccessful due to Parents’ actions and that more

services would not be reasonable. Ms. Evans further testified that Child was doing

well in her current placement, that Child would likely be adopted, and that Child

had formed an attachment to the prospective adoptive family.

At the TPR hearing, Mother testified that after the filing of the TPR

petition, she had engaged with BrightView again and was now attending therapy.

Mother also testified that she began parenting classes in September 2024. Mother

testified that she was taking Suboxone and admitted to having used Suboxone in

-6- the past without a prescription. Mother also admitted to being discharged from UK

TAP several times for non-compliance. Regarding housing and income, Mother

testified that she took side jobs cleaning but was seeking full-time employment and

that she resided with a family friend.

Mother also offered the testimony of Eileen Moore, a therapist with

Cultivate Behavioral Health, and Skyler Dreyer, Mother’s case manager at

BrightView. Ms. Moore testified that she had diagnosed Mother with anxiety and

depression and that Mother was attentive and engaged in therapy. Ms. Dreyer

testified that Mother had made progress at BrightView during her latest attempt at

the program and that her attendance was good, though Ms. Moore testified that

Mother tested positive to a controlled substance to which she was not prescribed on

September 19, 2024.

Father testified that he was also enrolled at BrightView, being treated

for substance use disorder of opiates. Father testified that he was drug screened

monthly by BrightView, though admitted to testing positive for gabapentin that he

had obtained from a friend for a headache. Father testified that he was not in any

therapy because it had not been recommended by BrightView and that he had not

attended any AA or NA meetings. Father further claimed to have completed UK

TAP in May 2024.

-7- Father also acknowledged he had received a net payout of $177,000

for a lottery winning in February 2022. Rather than use that money to support

Child, Father used the fund to take several months off work, purchase vehicles for

various family members (including Mother), and make a down payment on a home

in 2024. By the time of the TPR hearing, none of the lottery funds remained and he

had child support arrears.

On November 14, 2024, the family court entered extensive, well-

written and well-reasoned findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that

pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 625.090 Child was an abused and

neglected child, that termination of parental rights of Mother and Father was in

Child’s best interest, and that: (1) Parents, for a period of not less than six months,

had repeatedly failed or refused to provide or had been substantially incapable of

providing essential parental care and protection of Child, and there was no

reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering

the age of the child; (2) Parents had, for reasons other than poverty alone,

continuously or repeatedly failed to provide essential food, clothing, shelter,

medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-

being and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in

Parents’ conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of

Child; and (3) Child had been in foster care under the responsibility of the Cabinet

-8- for fifteen cumulative months out of the forty-eight months preceding the filing of

the TPR petition. Along with its findings, the family court entered a written order

terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. Both made a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

KRS 625.090 governs TPR. Before parental rights may be terminated

under that statute, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a

tripart test has been satisfied: “(1) the child is found or has been adjudged to be an

abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1); (2) termination of the

parent’s rights is in the child’s best interests; and (3) at least one of the termination

grounds enumerated in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-[(k)] exists.” Cabinet for Health and

Fam. Services v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Ky. 2014).

As observed by a prior panel of this Court in M.E.C. v. Cabinet for

Health and Family Services, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008):

[A]lthough termination of parental rights is not a criminal matter, it encroaches on the parent’s constitutional right to parent his or her child, and therefore, is a procedure that should only be employed when the statutory mandates are clearly met. While the state has a compelling interest to protect its youngest citizens, state intervention into the family with the result of permanently severing the relationship between parent and child must be done with utmost caution.

Even so, “[b]ecause termination decisions are so factually sensitive,

appellate courts are generally loathe to reverse them, regardless of the outcome.”

-9- D.G.R. v. Cabinet for Health and Fam. Services, 364 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Ky. 2012).

Indeed, “[t]his Court’s standard of review in a termination of parental rights action

is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR[9] 52.01 based upon clear and

convincing evidence[.]” M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114,

116 (Ky. App. 1998). In reviewing whether or not the trial court’s factual findings

are clearly erroneous, this Court looks at “whether or not those findings are

supported by substantial evidence.” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.

2003). “[S]ubstantial evidence is [e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept

as adequate to support a conclusion and evidence that, when taken alone or in the

light of all the evidence, . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in

the minds of reasonable men.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[T]he findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there exists no

substantial evidence in the record to support its findings.” M.P.S., 979 S.W.2d at

116. Furthermore, “[t]he trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining

whether the child fits within the abused or neglected category and whether the

abuse or neglect warrants termination.” Id.

That being said, the best interest of the child prong of the tripart test is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health and Fam. Services,

350 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Ky. App. 2011). “Absent a showing that a decision was

9 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-10- arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles, a [trial]

court’s determination [regarding best interests of the child] will not be an abuse of

discretion and will be sustained.” Id.

ANALYSIS

We conclude after our independent view of the record that the family

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not erroneous. Under the first

prong, the family court noted that both parents admitted to neglect in the first

JDNA petition, leading the family court to make a finding that the Child was

neglected. Such finding satisfies the first prong of the tripart test. See KRS

625.090(1)(a).

In determining whether TPR would be in the Child’s best interests,

KRS 625.090(3) as it existed at the time of TPR10 provided six factors for the

family court to consider:

(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time;

(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1) toward any child in the family;

10 KRS 625.090(3) was amended in 2025 after TPR proceedings were complete. See 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 26, § 6 (eff. Jun. 27, 2025). None of those amendments would apply to Parents.

-11- (c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents unless one or more of the circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a written finding by the District Court;

(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child;

(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and

(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.

KRS 625.090(3).

The trial court analyzed those factors in its findings regarding the best

interest of Child and took into account the reasonable efforts of the Cabinet for

unification, the failure of Parents to make progress on their case plans, the lack of

financial support by either parent (especially Father, given his lottery winnings),

Child’s progress in her placement as well as her attachment to the prospective

adoptive parents, and the likelihood that additional services would not bring about

parental adjustments to allow return of the Child within reasonable time. The trial

-12- court concluded that TPR would be in Child’s best interest, and we find no abuse

of discretion in the trial court’s findings.

Finally, before parental rights can be terminated, at least one of eleven

statutory grounds under KRS 625.090(2) must be established by clear and

convincing evidence. The family court found three of those grounds existed,

namely that: (1) Parents had for a period of not less than six months continuously

or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or had been substantially incapable of

providing essential parental care and protection for the Child and there is no

reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering

the age of the Child (KRS 625.090(2)(e)); for reasons other than poverty alone,

Parents had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or were incapable of

providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably

necessary and available for Child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable

expectation of significant improvement in Parents’ conduct in the immediately

foreseeable future, considering the age of Child (KRS 625.090(2)(g)); and Child

had been in foster care under the responsibility of the Cabinet for fifteen

cumulative months out of forty-eight months preceding the filing of the TPR

petition (KRS 625.090(2)(j)). As set forth, supra, there is substantial evidence to

support all three findings.

-13- CONCLUSION

While we note that both Mother and Father took some steps towards

their case plan and improving themselves after the TPR petition was filed, our task

is not to determine whether we would come to a different conclusion. Rather our

task is to determine whether the family court’s decision was supported by

substantial evidence. Upon our independent review, we are satisfied that the family

court’s conclusions are sound. We view any remaining contentions of error as

moot, unpersuasive, unpreserved, or without merit. Thus, for the foregoing

reasons, the judgment of the Boone Family Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT J.H.: BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF Matthew M. Woods KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR Ft. Wright Kentucky HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES: BRIEF FOR APPELLANT N.L.D.: Leslie M. Laupp Erin M. Melcher Beam Covington, Kentucky Cynthiana, Kentucky

-14-