UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.G.G., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
LIYANARA SÁNCHEZ, as next friend on behalf of FRENGEL REYES MOTA, et al., Civil Action No. 25-766 (JEB) Petitioners-Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Respondents-Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On December 22, 2025, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion finding that the
Government had denied due process to a class of Venezuelans it deported to El Salvador last
March in defiance of this Court’s Order. See J.G.G. v. Trump, 2025 WL 3706685, at *19
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2025). The Court offered the Government the opportunity to propose steps that
would facilitate hearings for the class members on their habeas corpus claims so that they could
“challenge their designations under the [Alien Enemies Act] and the validity of the [President’s]
Proclamation.” Id. Apparently not interested in participating in this process, the Government’s
responses essentially told the Court to pound sand. See ECF Nos. 229 (Gov. Resp.), 239 (Gov.
Reply). Believing that other courses would be both more productive and in line with the
Supreme Court’s requirements outlined in Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025), the
Court will now order the Government to facilitate the return from third countries of those
1 Plaintiffs who so desire. It will also permit other Plaintiffs to file their habeas supplements from
abroad.
I. Background
Given that the background of this case has featured in numerous prior Opinions, see, e.g.,
J.G.G. v. Trump, 772 F. Supp. 3d 18 (D.D.C. 2025), the Court will not retread old ground. It
notes simply that some of the 137 Venezuelans who were deported to the Center for Terrorism
Confinement (CECOT) in El Salvador and subsequently released into Venezuela as part of a
prisoner swap seek to further press their habeas claims. At this week’s hearing on remedies,
even Plaintiffs’ counsel could not represent how many of the 137 are still in Venezuela and how
many wish to proceed with habeas. Counsel nonetheless did inform the Court that at least a
handful desire to go forward at this point.
Understanding that the situation in Venezuela remains in flux — given the United
States’s recent “law-enforcement action” there — and crediting the Government’s assertion that
these matters implicate foreign affairs, see, e.g., Gov. Resp. at 2 (“[T]he Secretary of State has
determined that either path that the Court has suggested would risk material damage to U.S.
foreign policy interests at this delicate juncture.”), Plaintiffs have commendably sought
measured steps from the Court. See ECF No. 234 (Pl. Resp.) at 1.
As explained at the hearing, they are asking only that they be permitted to file
supplemental habeas pleadings on behalf of certain of the 137 deported individuals, that those
individuals in third countries — i.e., not Venezuela or the United States — could proceed with
potential remote hearings if necessary, and that the Government provide at its expense returns to
the U.S. from third countries for those so desiring. Plaintiffs acknowledge, as they must, that
anyone who is flown back or paroled into the United States after arriving at a port of entry will
2 be taken into U.S. custody during the pendency of further proceedings and would also potentially
be subject to redeportation at the conclusion of their legal challenges.
Plaintiffs’ prudent approach has not been replicated by their Government counterparts.
Although the Supreme Court in Abrego Garcia upheld Judge Paula Xinis’s order directing the
Government “to facilitate and effectuate the return of” that deportee, see 145 S. Ct. at 1018,
Defendants at every turn have objected to Plaintiffs’ legitimate proposals without offering a
single option for remedying the injury that they inflicted upon the deportees or fulfilling their
duty as articulated by the Supreme Court. See Gov. Resp. at 2 (“Defendants do not believe there
is any feasible way to allow class members to file habeas petitions at this time.”). After extended
questioning at the hearing, the Government finally represented that it prefers the return of the
deportees (not, however, on its dime) to remote hearings, given its concerns with logistics and
other evidentiary issues at such hearings.
II. Analysis
Our starting point is the Court’s prior finding that the deportees were denied due process,
J.G.G., 2025 WL 3706685, at *18 (“By any measure, the detainees surely fell victim to
constitutionally inadequate process.”), a conclusion that it has reached more than once and one
consonant with the Supreme Court’s earlier analysis of the issue. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605
U.S. 91, 94–95 (2025). In such an instance, again according to the Supreme Court in the
analogous case of Abrego Garcia, the Government must “ensure that [their] case is handled as it
would have been had [they] not been improperly sent to El Salvador.” 145 S. Ct. at 1018. In
other words, it is up to the Government to remedy the wrong that it perpetrated here and to
provide a means for doing so. Were it otherwise, the Government could simply remove people
from the United States without providing any process and then, once they were in a foreign
3 country, deny them any right to return for a hearing or opportunity to present their case from
As Justice Sotomayor’s separate Statement pointed out: “[T]he proper remedy is to
provide Abrego Garcia with all the process to which he would have been entitled had he not been
unlawfully removed to El Salvador. That means that the Government must comply with its
obligation to provide Abrego Garcia with ‘due process of law,’ including notice and an
opportunity to be heard, in any future proceedings.” Id. at 1019 (statement of Sotomayor, J.)
(citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). Indeed, she noted that “it has been the
Government’s own well-established policy to ‘facilitate [an] alien’s return to the United States if
. . . the alien’s presence is necessary for continued administrative removal proceedings’ in cases
where a noncitizen has been removed pending immigration proceedings.” Id. (quoting U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directive 11061.1, Facilitating the Return to the United
States of Certain Lawfully Removed Aliens, § 2 (Feb. 24, 2012)).
Against this backdrop, and mindful of the flagrancy of the Government’s violations of the
deportees’ due-process rights that landed Plaintiffs in this situation, the Court refuses to let them
languish in the solution-less mire Defendants propose. The Court will thus order Defendants to
take several discrete actions that will begin the remedial process for at least some Plaintiffs, as
the Supreme Court has required in similar circumstances. It does so while treading lightly, as it
must, in the area of foreign affairs. See Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. at 1018 (recognizing
“deference owed to the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign affairs”).
Respecting the Government’s preference, as indicated at the most recent hearing, the
Court will require it to parole into United States custody any Plaintiff who appears at a U.S. port
of entry. This number, at least according to Plaintiffs, would likely be very small if not zero. In
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
J.G.G., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
LIYANARA SÁNCHEZ, as next friend on behalf of FRENGEL REYES MOTA, et al., Civil Action No. 25-766 (JEB) Petitioners-Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Respondents-Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On December 22, 2025, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion finding that the
Government had denied due process to a class of Venezuelans it deported to El Salvador last
March in defiance of this Court’s Order. See J.G.G. v. Trump, 2025 WL 3706685, at *19
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2025). The Court offered the Government the opportunity to propose steps that
would facilitate hearings for the class members on their habeas corpus claims so that they could
“challenge their designations under the [Alien Enemies Act] and the validity of the [President’s]
Proclamation.” Id. Apparently not interested in participating in this process, the Government’s
responses essentially told the Court to pound sand. See ECF Nos. 229 (Gov. Resp.), 239 (Gov.
Reply). Believing that other courses would be both more productive and in line with the
Supreme Court’s requirements outlined in Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017 (2025), the
Court will now order the Government to facilitate the return from third countries of those
1 Plaintiffs who so desire. It will also permit other Plaintiffs to file their habeas supplements from
abroad.
I. Background
Given that the background of this case has featured in numerous prior Opinions, see, e.g.,
J.G.G. v. Trump, 772 F. Supp. 3d 18 (D.D.C. 2025), the Court will not retread old ground. It
notes simply that some of the 137 Venezuelans who were deported to the Center for Terrorism
Confinement (CECOT) in El Salvador and subsequently released into Venezuela as part of a
prisoner swap seek to further press their habeas claims. At this week’s hearing on remedies,
even Plaintiffs’ counsel could not represent how many of the 137 are still in Venezuela and how
many wish to proceed with habeas. Counsel nonetheless did inform the Court that at least a
handful desire to go forward at this point.
Understanding that the situation in Venezuela remains in flux — given the United
States’s recent “law-enforcement action” there — and crediting the Government’s assertion that
these matters implicate foreign affairs, see, e.g., Gov. Resp. at 2 (“[T]he Secretary of State has
determined that either path that the Court has suggested would risk material damage to U.S.
foreign policy interests at this delicate juncture.”), Plaintiffs have commendably sought
measured steps from the Court. See ECF No. 234 (Pl. Resp.) at 1.
As explained at the hearing, they are asking only that they be permitted to file
supplemental habeas pleadings on behalf of certain of the 137 deported individuals, that those
individuals in third countries — i.e., not Venezuela or the United States — could proceed with
potential remote hearings if necessary, and that the Government provide at its expense returns to
the U.S. from third countries for those so desiring. Plaintiffs acknowledge, as they must, that
anyone who is flown back or paroled into the United States after arriving at a port of entry will
2 be taken into U.S. custody during the pendency of further proceedings and would also potentially
be subject to redeportation at the conclusion of their legal challenges.
Plaintiffs’ prudent approach has not been replicated by their Government counterparts.
Although the Supreme Court in Abrego Garcia upheld Judge Paula Xinis’s order directing the
Government “to facilitate and effectuate the return of” that deportee, see 145 S. Ct. at 1018,
Defendants at every turn have objected to Plaintiffs’ legitimate proposals without offering a
single option for remedying the injury that they inflicted upon the deportees or fulfilling their
duty as articulated by the Supreme Court. See Gov. Resp. at 2 (“Defendants do not believe there
is any feasible way to allow class members to file habeas petitions at this time.”). After extended
questioning at the hearing, the Government finally represented that it prefers the return of the
deportees (not, however, on its dime) to remote hearings, given its concerns with logistics and
other evidentiary issues at such hearings.
II. Analysis
Our starting point is the Court’s prior finding that the deportees were denied due process,
J.G.G., 2025 WL 3706685, at *18 (“By any measure, the detainees surely fell victim to
constitutionally inadequate process.”), a conclusion that it has reached more than once and one
consonant with the Supreme Court’s earlier analysis of the issue. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605
U.S. 91, 94–95 (2025). In such an instance, again according to the Supreme Court in the
analogous case of Abrego Garcia, the Government must “ensure that [their] case is handled as it
would have been had [they] not been improperly sent to El Salvador.” 145 S. Ct. at 1018. In
other words, it is up to the Government to remedy the wrong that it perpetrated here and to
provide a means for doing so. Were it otherwise, the Government could simply remove people
from the United States without providing any process and then, once they were in a foreign
3 country, deny them any right to return for a hearing or opportunity to present their case from
As Justice Sotomayor’s separate Statement pointed out: “[T]he proper remedy is to
provide Abrego Garcia with all the process to which he would have been entitled had he not been
unlawfully removed to El Salvador. That means that the Government must comply with its
obligation to provide Abrego Garcia with ‘due process of law,’ including notice and an
opportunity to be heard, in any future proceedings.” Id. at 1019 (statement of Sotomayor, J.)
(citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). Indeed, she noted that “it has been the
Government’s own well-established policy to ‘facilitate [an] alien’s return to the United States if
. . . the alien’s presence is necessary for continued administrative removal proceedings’ in cases
where a noncitizen has been removed pending immigration proceedings.” Id. (quoting U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directive 11061.1, Facilitating the Return to the United
States of Certain Lawfully Removed Aliens, § 2 (Feb. 24, 2012)).
Against this backdrop, and mindful of the flagrancy of the Government’s violations of the
deportees’ due-process rights that landed Plaintiffs in this situation, the Court refuses to let them
languish in the solution-less mire Defendants propose. The Court will thus order Defendants to
take several discrete actions that will begin the remedial process for at least some Plaintiffs, as
the Supreme Court has required in similar circumstances. It does so while treading lightly, as it
must, in the area of foreign affairs. See Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. at 1018 (recognizing
“deference owed to the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign affairs”).
Respecting the Government’s preference, as indicated at the most recent hearing, the
Court will require it to parole into United States custody any Plaintiff who appears at a U.S. port
of entry. This number, at least according to Plaintiffs, would likely be very small if not zero. In
4 addition, the Government shall offer a boarding letter to any Plaintiff in a third country who
requests commercial air travel to the United States. See Directive 11061.1, ¶ 3.1 (defining
“Facilitate an Alien’s Return” as “[t]o engage in activities which allow a lawfully removed alien
to travel to the United States (such as by issuing a Boarding Letter to permit commercial air
travel) and, if warranted, parole the alien into the United States upon his or her arrival at a U.S.
port of entry”); see also Application to Vacate Injunction at 17, Noem v. Abrego Garcia, No.
24A949 (S. Ct. Apr. 7, 2025) (acknowledging such actions are “entirely within the United States’
control”). Once again, at this point, we are not talking about a substantial number of people —
particularly because the Court, mindful of the previously mentioned foreign affairs concern, does
not extend this requirement to deportees remaining in Venezuela — and such individuals would
be detained upon arrival.
Plaintiffs also request that such boarding letter include Government payment of the cost
of the air travel. Given that the Court has already found that their removal was unlawful — as
opposed to the situation contemplated by the cited Directive, which notes that “[f]acilitating an
alien’s return does not necessarily include funding the alien’s travel,” Directive 11061.1, ¶ 3.1
(emphasis added) — the Court deems that a reasonable request. It is unclear why Plaintiffs
should bear the financial cost of their return in such an instance. See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immig. &
Customs Enf’t (“ICE”), 2026 WL 313340, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (requiring Government
to “bear the expense of returning these family units to the United States” given that “[e]ach of
the removals was unlawful, and absent the removals, these families would still be in the United
States”). It is worth emphasizing that this situation would never have arisen had the Government
simply afforded Plaintiffs their constitutional rights before initially deporting them.
5 Plaintiffs in third countries or in Venezuela may also file supplemental habeas pleadings
seeking to show that the Proclamation under which they were deported unlawfully invoked the
Alien Enemies Act and/or that they are not members of Tren del Aragua and thus not subject to
the Proclamation. Whether hearings will be required and the logistics of such hearings may be
determined at a future date. In addition, to the extent that the Government contends that such
pleadings are independent habeas petitions for which the Court has no jurisdiction given
Plaintiffs’ current lack of custody, it may offer such arguments in opposition to any forthcoming
filing by a Plaintiff. The Court, however, need not address this question today.
III. Conclusion
The Court, accordingly, ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiffs shall file under seal (but not ex parte) by February 20, 2026, a Notice
indicating which Plaintiffs are currently in which third countries;
2. Plaintiffs shall by February 27, 2026, file a Notice noting the number of Plaintiffs
who wish to travel independently to a U.S. port of entry or who wish to be flown
from a third country to the United States for their court proceedings, understanding
that in both scenarios they will be detained upon arrival. Plaintiffs shall
simultaneously file a separate Notice under seal listing the names of such individuals;
3. Plaintiffs shall by March 9, 2026, file a Notice giving the number of Plaintiffs (in
Venezuela or third countries) who wish to file supplements to their habeas class
petition, including challenges to the Proclamation or their identification as TdA
members. Plaintiffs shall likewise file a simultaneous Notice under seal listing those
individuals’ names;
4. The Government shall promptly return to Plaintiffs upon written request by their
6 current counsel all passports and identification documents that any agency currently
retains, and it shall make good-faith efforts to obtain any of Plaintiffs’ passports or
identification documents that were transferred to El Salvador; and
5. The Government shall file a Status Report by March 13, 2026, explaining how and
when it will transport any Plaintiff seeking return to the United States from a third
country. In that Status Report, the Government shall also inform the Court as to the
feasibility of returning Plaintiffs still in Venezuela who wish to return for their
proceedings. It shall also describe the steps taken to obtain any passports or
identification documents from El Salvador.
/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge
Date: February 12, 2026