J.G. v. Lausd

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-55579
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J.G., No. 23-55579

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01268-JGB-E

v. MEMORANDUM* LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 5, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, CALLAHAN, and WALLACH, ** Circuit Judges.

Appellant J.G. appeals from the Central District of California’s denial of his

motion for reasonable attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and 29 U.S.C. §

794a(b). We presume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and do not discuss

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. them in detail here except as needed to provide context. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act allow a

court to award reasonable attorney’s fees only to a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. §

12205; 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). A plaintiff is “prevailing” where the court’s judgment

“modif[ies] the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.”

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). However, the modification must

force the defendant to do something it otherwise would not have to do. Id. at 113.

For example, “[a] judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or

nominal, modifies the defendant’s behavior for the plaintiff’s benefit by forcing the

defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay.” Id. Injunctive

relief similarly satisfies this requirement by forcing a defendant to change its

behavior. See Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). A

declaratory judgment can also “constitute relief, for purposes of [prevailing party

status], if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.”

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).

1. J.G. argues that the declaratory judgment allowed him to prevent the

Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) from re-segregating him for the

remainder of his time in the district, and thus affected LAUSD’s behavior towards

him sufficient to establish prevailing party status. It did not. The judgment was

2 entirely retrospective and said nothing about J.G.’s entitlements going forward. Cf

Weissburg v. Lancaster School District, 591 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 2010)

(finding prevailing party status because the judgment “entitle[d]” the student to a

specific remedy).

J.G.’s placement at Lowman was based on a series of evaluations and

assessments conducted on a periodic basis. As the record indicates, J.G.’s

placement at Lowman was proper at one point, until it was not. If the assessments

and evaluations were to again indicate that Lowman is the proper place for J.G.,

then LAUSD could again place J.G. there. The district court’s declaratory

judgment does not change this fact and thus is insufficient to make J.G. a

prevailing party.

2. J.G. also argues that the district court’s declaratory judgment will

serve a collateral estoppel function in a pending state court action with LAUSD

and thus constitutes a material alteration in the parties’ legal relationship.

However, the cases J.G. relies on indicate that the collateral estoppel effect of a

judgment becomes relevant only after the court has determined that the plaintiff

prevailed, when it is considering what amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable.

See, e.g., Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1994).

3. J.G. further argues that the declaratory judgment achieves important

public goals, but this also fails because when issued it did not allow J.G. to force

3 LAUSD to do anything it would not otherwise be required to do. See Farrar, 506

U.S. at 111–13. Further, whether the declaratory judgment achieves “important

public goals” has been found to be relevant to determining the amount, if any, of

attorney’s fees to award after the plaintiff has attained prevailing party status, see

Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010), and is not a basis

by itself to establish that the plaintiff is a “prevailing party.”

AFFIRMED.