J.F. v. San Diego County Unified School

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 J.F., a minor, individually and on behalf of Case No.: 19-CV-2495-CAB-LL a proposed class, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO v. AMEND 14

SAN DIEGO COUNTY UNIFIED 15 SCHOOL DISTRICT, [Doc. No. 15] 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendant San Diego Unified School District’s 19 (“SDUSD”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. The motion has been 20 fully briefed and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 21 without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, 22 the motion to dismiss is granted. 24 Plaintiff J.F. is a minor who qualifies as an individual with a disability under the 25 Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. [Doc. No. 13 26 at ¶ 5.] Plaintiff is enrolled as a public-school student at Defendant SDUSD’s Gage 27 Elementary School and alleges that as far back as 2017, SDUSD has known that its staffing 28 and funding for special education services was inadequate when it was reported that the 1 school board cut the department’s budget significantly. [Id. at ¶¶ 15—18.] 2 Plaintiff suffers from autism spectrum disorder and has speech issues. [Id. at ¶ 27.] 3 SDUSD and Plaintiff’s parents developed an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for 4 Plaintiff which entitles him to, among other things, a 1:1 aide. [Id. at ¶¶ 27—30.] In 5 October 2018, Plaintiff’s mother learned that the 1:1 aide was being removed from 6 Plaintiff’s classroom, so she wrote to the school principal that removal of the aide would 7 be detrimental to Plaintiff’s education. [Id. at ¶ 31.] After repeated attempts contacting 8 school officials and board members to follow up on the issue and the failure to provide an 9 updated IEP through April 2019, Plaintiff finally received a 1:1 aide in May 2019, but only 10 for the remaining three weeks of the school year. [Id. at ¶¶ 32—40.] Throughout the 2019- 11 2020 school year, SDUSD has again failed to consistently provide Plaintiff with the 1:1 12 aide, which has resulted in an escalation of problematic behaviors and unnecessary 13 difficulties, ultimately denying Plaintiff of a proper education. [Id. at ¶¶ 41—46.] 14 On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff J.F., by and through his guardians ad litem, 15 individually and on behalf of a proposed class, filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 16 alleging: (1) violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 17 U.S.C. § 1400; (2) civil rights violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violations of the Americans 18 with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and (4) violations of Section 504 of the 19 Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 701. [Doc. No. 13.] On February 24, 2020, 20 Defendant SDUSD moved to dismiss the FAC without leave to amend. [Doc. No. 15.] 22 A. Motion to Dismiss 23 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain 24 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 25 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the 27 complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 28 nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 1 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal 2 conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Lee v. City of 3 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Conclusory allegations of law are 4 insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss”). Nor is the Court “required to accept as true 5 allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or . . . allegations that are 6 merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels- 7 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 8 Generally, when dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court should 9 deny opportunity to amend only if amendment would be futile. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 10 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate if 11 amendment “could not possibly cure the deficiency”), amended, 856 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 12 1988). 13 B. Exhaustion Under the IDEA 14 “Judicial review under the IDEA is ordinarily available only after the plaintiff 15 exhausts administrative remedies.” Doe By & Through Brockhuis v. Arizona Dep’t of 16 Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)). So too, “a 17 plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in 18 certain circumstances—that is, when ‘seeking relief that is also available under’ the 19 IDEA—first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 20 137 S. Ct. 743, 750 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). However, “this exhaustion 21 requirement is not a rigid one, and is subject to certain exceptions.” Hoeft v. Tucson 22 Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1992). 23 The exhaustion of such administrative remedies is not required when “resort to the 24 administrative process would be futile or inadequate,” or when “an agency has adopted a 25 policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law.” Id. at 26 1303-04 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)). “Administrative 27 remedies are generally inadequate where structural, systemic reforms are sought.” Id. at 28 1309. “[A] claim is ‘systemic’ if it implicates the integrity or reliability of the IDEA 1 dispute resolution procedures themselves, or requires restructuring the education system 2 itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act; but that it is not ‘systemic’ if it 3 involves only a substantive claim having to do with limited components of a program, and 4 if the administrative process is capable of correcting the problem.” Doe, 111 F.3d at 682. 5 “In determining whether these exceptions apply, [a court’s] inquiry is whether pursuit of 6 administrative remedies under the facts of a given case will further the general purposes of 7 exhaustion and the congressional intent behind the administrative scheme.” Hoeft, 967 8 F.2d at 1303. 9 The Ninth Circuit has read the exhaustion requirement of IDEA to “appl[y] 10 differently to class actions than to suits brought by individuals, inasmuch as each class 11 member need not exhaust before a suit is brought.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309. However, 12 “the mere fact the complaint is structured as a class action seeking injunctive relief, without 13 more, does not excuse exhaustion.” Id. at 1309. 14 C. Exceptions to the Exhaustion Requirement 15 Exhaustion may be excused when: “(1) use of the administrative process would be 16 ‘futile,’ (2) the claim arises from a policy or practice ‘of general applicability that is 17 contrary to law,’ or (3) it is ‘improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing 18 administrative remedies (e.g. the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief 19 sought).’” Paul G. by and through Steve G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 933 20 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303-04). However, futility 21 or inadequacy is not established simply because the body hearing the administrative appeal 22 lacks jurisdiction to provide all or some of the relief requested. See Paul G., 933 F.3d at 23 1002 (futility or inadequacy did not exist even though OAH did not have jurisdiction to 24 order “structural and systemic statewide relief” because the “principal purpose of requiring 25 administrative exhaustion, however, is to ensure the agency has had an opportunity to rule 26 on a claim before a plaintiff goes to court,” on a claim seeking both damages and injunctive 27 relief). 28 Under the second exemption, a claim is systemic, and “therefore entitled to the 1 general applicability exception, if it concerns ‘the integrity or reliability of the IDEA 2 dispute resolution procedures themselves, or requires restructuring the education system 3 itself in order to comply with the dictates of the Act.’” Paul G., 933 F.3d at 1101-02 4 (quoting Doe, 111 F.3d at 682). 6 SDUSD moves to dismiss the FAC primarily contending that Plaintiff failed to 7 exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies. The parties do not dispute that the IDEA’s 8 exhaustion requirements apply equally to each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. However, 9 Plaintiff avers that he and the class satisfy all three of the exceptions to be excused from 10 exhaustion. 11 A. Futile and Inadequate 12 Plaintiff argues that exhaustion in this case is both futile and inadequate because 13 SDUSD had already agreed to provide a 1:1 aide to Plaintiff and the class but fails to 14 provide the aides. Therefore, Plaintiff contends that the best outcome he and the class 15 would receive from an administrative proceeding is mere confirmation that SDUSD failed 16 to provide the 1:1 aides. 17 Plaintiff has not shown that the administrative process in this case would be futile or 18 inadequate. “[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the administrative process is adequately 19 equipped to address and resolve the issues presented.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309. The relief 20 the plaintiffs sought in Hoeft included an injunction requiring the school district “to 21 develop ‘appropriate criteria . . . for evaluating each child’s need for [services]’ [and] to 22 afford parents all the procedural rights to which they [were] entitled under the IDEA,” yet 23 the Ninth Circuit stated “[t]he issues in [Hoeft] consist[ed] primarily of questions of 24 substantive educational policy, issues which the administrative process was specifically 25 designed to address. Moreover, even though injunctive relief is unavailable, the 26 administrative process has the potential for producing the very result plaintiffs seek, 27 namely, statutory compliance.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1302, 1309. Similarly, the Court finds 28 that the administrative process has the potential for producing the results Plaintiff and the 1 class seek in this case. Ultimately, Plaintiff and the class seek consistent 1:1 aides as 2 entitled by each of their IEP’s. Whether that involves additional funding or resources 3 remains in question and the administrative process should be able to resolve such issues. 4 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the administrative process in this case would be 5 futile or inadequate. 6 B. Facially Illegal Policy 7 Plaintiff also argues that his complaint presents a facially illegal policy and purely 8 legal question. The purported policy is SDUSD’s failure to comply with Plaintiff’s and 9 the class members’ IEP’s—specifically, the failure to allocate adequate funding and 10 resources to provide 1:1 aides. 11 Even where local school policies appear on their face to violate the IDEA, 12 administrative exhaustion may be necessary to give the state a reasonable opportunity to 13 investigate and correct such policies. See Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1492 (9th 14 Cir.1986) (parents must give state officials “adequate notice of the local agency’s 15 noncompliance, and the state must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to compel local 16 compliance”), modified on other grounds sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 17 Challenging an individualized education program by recourse to the IDEA’s procedural 18 scheme affords the state such an opportunity. Although hearing officers lack power to 19 adjudicate questions of statutory compliance, they are empowered to order the provision 20 of an appropriate education program for an individual child, as guaranteed by the IDEA. 21 Cf. Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1271, 1274–75 (4th Cir.1987) (school 22 district’s failure to implement hearing officer decision ordering private placement where 23 services not available in district is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as deprivation of 24 right secured by federal law). 25 Plaintiff’s characterization of a systemic policy by SDUSD failing to allocate 26 enough resources to provide 1:1 aides appears overstated to overcome the exhaustion 27 requirements. As discussed above, Plaintiff contends that SDUSD fails to provide aides as 28 prescribed by each students’ IEP. However, it is not ascertainable to what extent each 1 students’ IEP prescribes a 1:1 aide with respect to purpose, duration, educational needs, 2 etc. This requires specific factual inquiry which the administrative courts are well 3 equipped to analyze to develop the necessary factual record. The purported policies 4 challenged by Plaintiff in this case are “the kind of technical questions of educational 5 policy best resolved with the benefit of agency expertise and a fully developed 6 administrative record.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305 (citations omitted). Further, even if the 7 failure to allocate adequate resources appears on its face to violate the IDEA, the Ninth 8 Circuit has held that administrative exhaustion may still be necessary to give the state a 9 reasonable opportunity to investigate and correct such policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 10 not shown that this case presents a facially illegal policy such that administrative 11 exhaustion should be excused. 12 C. Furthering the Purpose of the Exhaustion Doctrine 13 The Court is also not persuaded by Plaintiff’s contention that requiring exhaustion 14 in this case would serve none of the purposes of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. “The 15 exhaustion doctrine embodies the notion that ‘agencies, not the courts, ought to have 16 primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.’” 17 Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). 18 “Exhaustion of the administrative process allows for the exercise of discretion and 19 educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical 20 educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes 21 judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in 22 their educational programs for disabled children.” Id. (emphasis added). As the Supreme 23 Court has observed, “courts lack the ‘specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to 24 resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,’” and Congress shared that 25 view when it adopted the IDEA. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) 26 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)). 27 Accordingly, the Court finds that the administrative process can address Plaintiff’s 28 and the class members’ disputes and, if Plaintiff and the class remain aggrieved after 1 ||exhaustion of the administrative process, they can bring a civil action at that time. As 2 ||stated by the Ninth Circuit, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “recognizes the 3 traditionally strong state and local interest in education, as reflected in the statute’s 4 ||emphasis on state and local responsibility.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. Thus, it would be 5 ||inappropriate for the Court to consider this matter before Plaintiff and the class give state 6 || and local interests the opportunity. 8 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant SDUSD’s motion to dismiss the FAC is 9 ||GRANTED. Plaintiff's FAC is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Clerk of 10 Court shall CLOSE this case. 11 It is SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: April 7, 2020 (ib 13 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28