JEWEL CRUTCHFIELD v. AJA JOHNSON & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-1215
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1215

JEWEL CRUTCHFIELD

vs.

AJA JOHNSON & another1.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The appellant tenant, Jewel Crutchfield (the tenant),

applied for a temporary restraining order against the

appellees/landlord, Woodview Village and Aja Johnson (the

landlord) based on allegations that the landlord did not repair

unsanitary conditions alleged to exist in her apartment.2

Appellate courts do not "entertain appeals from action on a

prayer for a temporary restraining order unless the temporary

restraining order meets the requirements for being treated as a

preliminary injunction." Addison v. Belay, 440 Mass. 1010, 1010

1 Woodview Village.

2 The application actually asked for repair of conditions "as cited by [the] Randolph Board of Health," as will be discussed below. No citation by the Board of Health had been issued. (2003), quoting Royal Dynasty, Inc. v. Chin, 37 Mass. App. Ct.

171, 172 (1994). This is because temporary restraining orders

last for only ten days, proceedings concerning applications for

temporary restraining orders are often "of the improvised sort,"

and orders on these matters are often based on "greatly

abbreviated records . . . often made ex parte, with little

opportunity for the respondent to work up a carefully

considered, let alone well-documented, response." Royal

Dynasty, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 172-173. In contrast, where

both parties have had an opportunity to make a full presentation

and the party seeking the temporary restraining order has

"arrived at the end of the line," meaning that no further

proceedings are contemplated, Addison, 440 Mass. at 1010-1011,

quoting Royal Dynasty, Inc., supra at 173, a reviewing court may

treat the resulting decision as dealing with a preliminary

injunction, rather than a temporary restraining order.

Here, the tenant filed only an application for a temporary

restraining order; she did not file a complaint seeking any

other type of relief. As such, when the judge denied the

tenant's application, she had reached "the end of the line."

Addison, 440 Mass. at 1010, quoting Royal Dynasty, Inc., 37

Mass. App. Ct. at 173. As to the level of presentation, the

judge held a hearing, which both the tenant and the landlord's

2 counsel attended. The judge considered exhibits submitted by

both sides and did not issue the order until almost a week after

the hearing. See id. at 1011 (distinguishing Royal Dynasty

because, in that case, judge denied application on same day it

was filed). The proceedings below, therefore, did not exhibit

all the hurriedness characteristic of proceedings with respect

to temporary restraining orders. See Royal Dynasty, Inc., 37

Mass. App. Ct. at 173. Accordingly, we treat the judge's denial

of the temporary restraining order as a denial of a preliminary

injunction, and have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

To receive a preliminary injunction, the applicant must

show "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that

irreparable harm will result from denial of the injunction; and

(3) that . . . the risk of irreparable harm to the [moving

party] outweighs the potential harm to the [nonmoving party] in

granting the injunction." Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., Yarmouth

Lodge #2270 v. Board of Health of Yarmouth, 439 Mass. 597, 601

(2003), quoting Tri-Nel Mgt., Inc. v. Board of Health of

Barnstable, 433 Mass. 217, 219 (2001). This is the standard

applied by the motion judge.

In this case, the tenant had complained to the town's board

of health that the conditions in her apartment were unsanitary.

After an inspection, the board of health concluded that there

3 were no sanitary code violations in the apartment and declined

to issue any citations.

Before the motion judge, the tenant submitted photographs

that, she asserts, demonstrate that the board of health was in

error and that unsanitary conditions exist. The judge denied

the application for a restraining order.

In this proceeding, the tenant's appeal, she argues that

the judge's decision was in error in light of the photographs

which, she says, demonstrate the board of health's error.

We review the motion judge's decision only for abuse of

discretion. Garcia v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480

Mass. 736, 746 (2018). This means that, even if we would have

ruled differently, we may reverse the judge's decision only if

"we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in

weighing the factors relevant to the decision such that the

decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives."

(citations and quotations omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

Because the photographs by themselves are only evidence

that may support a factual finding that there was an error in

the board of health's conclusion, and because the board of

health's inspection reports are evidence that may support a

factual finding that the board was correct, there was no abuse

4 of discretion in the judge's conclusion that there was not a

likelihood the tenant would succeed on the merits of a claim

that the board of health was in error. Additional evidence

would have to be taken at an evidentiary hearing or a trial to

determine the significance of the photographs, and thus the

correctness of the board of health's conclusions. The

significance even of photographs that the tenant says show

violations that may not have been considered by the board of

health would require additional testimony to determine.

The judge's order does not mean that the tenant could not

perhaps demonstrate at a trial that the board of health's

conclusions were incorrect, it means only that the judge

concluded that success was not likely. Given that there was

competing evidence on the question -- the inspection reports of

the board of health on the one hand and the photographs on the

other -- it was within the judge's discretion, even if not

compelled, for the judge to reach this conclusion.

5 The order denying the motion for a temporary restraining

order is affirmed.3

Order denying motion for temporary restraining order affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Desmond & Singh, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 1, 2024.

3 The landlord has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot on the ground that the tenant has now vacated the premises. In the absence of any finding of fact in the trial court on that point, we deny the motion to dismiss.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.