[Cite as Jeter v. Kruz 'N' Kleen, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4165.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Danielle Jeter Court of Appeals No. L-23-1070
Appellant Trial Court No. CI0202101740
v.
Kruz ‘N’ Kleen, LLC, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellees Decided: November 17, 2023
*****
Gregory S. Reichenbach, for appellant.
SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} In this accelerated appeal, appellant Danielle Jeter appeals the judgment of
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, awarding her reasonable attorney fees and
expenses in the amount of $8,004.63. Because the trial court considered the appropriate
factors and determined an award that was within the range of reasonableness, its decision
is not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. I. Factual Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In September 2020, Jeter purchased a vehicle from a car dealership known
as Kruz ‘N’ Kleen.1 By November 2020, Jeter was behind on her payments and Kruz ‘N’
Kleen repossessed her vehicle.
{¶ 3} On April 7, 2021, Jeter initiated the present matter when she filed a
complaint against Kruz ‘N’ Kleen, alleging a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices
Act (“CSPA”) and two violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). Jeter
sought monetary and declaratory relief, as well as reasonable attorney fees provided
under the CSPA.
{¶ 4} The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Jeter and set
the matter for a hearing on damages. Following that hearing, the trial court found that
Jeter suffered $6,149.00 in damages on her claim for violation of the CSPA. Finding that
damages must be trebled pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(B), the court ordered Kruz ‘N’ Kleen
to pay $18,447.00. The court further found that Jeter suffered $450.00 in damages on
one of her claims for violation of the UCC. Jeter voluntarily dismissed the other claim
for violation of the UCC. The trial court entered judgment accordingly on December 20,
2022.
1 It was later discovered that Kruz ‘N’ Kleen was operated by appellee S.L.A.V.N., LLC. Also named as defendants, and appellees herein, were George Hicks and Darius Hicks who were agents of S.L.A.V.N., LLC, and who operated Kruz ‘N’ Kleen. For ease of discussion, this decision will refer to appellees collectively as “Kruz ‘N’ Kleen.”
2. {¶ 5} On January 5, 2023, Jeter moved for an award of attorney fees and expenses
pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F)(2) of the CSPA. Jeter sought attorney fees for 49.1 hours at
the rate of $475.00 per hour for a total of $23,322.50, as well as reasonable expenses of
$644.63. Jeter supported her motion with reports showing the rate for consumer law
attorneys in the Toledo area with 16-20 years of experience is $475.00 per hour. Kruz
‘N’ Kleen opposed the motion, and Jeter filed a reply in support.
{¶ 6} On March 3, 2023, the trial court entered its judgment granting Jeter’s
motion for attorney fees, but awarding only $7,360.00 plus expenses of $644.63. In
reducing the award from the requested amount, the trial court engaged in a detailed
analysis examining: (1) the time and labor involved in maintaining the litigation; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the professional skill required to
perform the necessary legal services; (4) the attorney’s inability to accept other cases; (5)
the fee customarily charged; (6) the amount involved and the results obtained; (7) any
necessary time limitations; (8) the nature and length of the attorney/client relationship;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; and (10) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent.
{¶ 7} Upon consideration of all of the factors, the trial court determined that an
award of attorney fees at the rate of $475.00 per hour was not reasonable. Remarking
that the matter was “a relatively simple case where an apparently uninformed small car
dealership failed to give notices after repossessing the vehicle,” the trial court stated that
3. a fee in line with the hourly fee for an attorney in general practice was reasonable. Based
on the Ohio State Bar Association fee survey submitted by Jeter, the trial court concluded
that the reasonable rate was $200.00 per hour. Furthermore, the trial court determined
that since Jeter dismissed one of her four claims, “a reasonable amount of time spent on
this matter is three-fourths of the amount requested, or 36.8 hours.” The trial court then
reached the reasonable fee award of $7,360.00 by multiplying the $200.00 hourly rate by
36.8 hours.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} Jeter has timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and now asserts one
assignment of error for review:
1. The trial court erred by awarding attorney fees at an average
hourly rate for a general practice attorney in Ohio, and not taking into
account the average rates in the geographical area where the case was
litigated, for attorneys with a similar amount of experience handling
consumer cases.
III. Analysis
{¶ 9} At the outset, Jeter expressly does not challenge the trial court’s reduction of
the requested hours. Thus, this analysis will focus solely on the hourly rate of
compensation.
4. {¶ 10} Jeter acknowledges that attorney-fee awards under the CSPA are generally
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
It is well settled that where a court is empowered to award attorney fees by
statute, the amount of such fees is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless the amount of fees determined is so high or so low as to
shock the conscience, an appellate court will not interfere. The trial judge
which participated not only in the trial but also in many of the preliminary
proceedings leading up to the trial has an infinitely better opportunity to
determine the value of services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case
before him than does an appellate court.
Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 146, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991),
quoting Brooks v. Hurst Buick-Pontiac-Olds-GMC, Inc., 23 Ohio App.3d 85, 91, 491
N.E.2d 345 (12th Dist.1985).
{¶ 11} An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a
reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” In
re Trust of Tary v. Seiple, 2022-Ohio-3773, 199 N.E.3d 230, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.), quoting In
re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-138, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991).
5. {¶ 12} Jeter first contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it used
the old procedure for determining attorney fees under Bittner, rather than the new
procedure under Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 160
Ohio St.3d 32, 2020-Ohio-1056, 153 N.E.3d 30.
{¶ 13} In Bittner, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[w]hen awarding reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F)(2), the trial court should first calculate the
number of hours reasonably expended on the case times an hourly fee, and then modify
that calculation by application of the factors listed in [Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)].”2 Bittner at
syllabus. Those factors include:
the time and labor involved in maintaining the litigation; the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved; the professional skill required to
perform the necessary legal services; the attorney’s inability to accept other
cases; the fee customarily charged; the amount involved and the results
obtained; any necessary time limitations; the nature and length of the
attorney/client relationship; the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorney; and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Bittner at 145-146.
{¶ 14} In that case, Bittner settled her CSPA claim for $3,500.00. She then sought
attorney fees under R.C. 1345.09(F) in the amount of $10,200.00, plus expenses of
2 Bittner referred to DR 2-106(B), which has been superseded by the substantially similar Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). Phoenix Lighting at ¶ 12.
6. $811.98. After a hearing, the trial court awarded $7,615.00, plus expenses of $885.00.
On direct appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding that the amount of attorney fees
was unconscionably high when compared to the amount of the settlement. Id. at 143-
144. The appellate court held that “one of the most important factors to consider when
determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the relationship of the fee award to the
amount recovered.” Id. at 144.
{¶ 15} On further appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s
holding, reasoning that requiring a direct relationship between the attorney fees awarded
and the amount of the judgment on the claim would frustrate the purpose of the CSPA.
Id.
{¶ 16} The court then set forth the procedure for determining a proper fee award.
The court stated, “[T]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by
a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make
an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” Id. at 145, quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The trial court
should then adjust the fee upward or downward depending on application of the factors
listed in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). Id. at 145-146.
{¶ 17} In Phoenix Lighting, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its holding in
Bittner. Consistent with Bittner, the court stated that “[t]he beginning point for
7. determining the award of attorney fees is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the
number of hours worked, a calculation that is sometimes referred to as the ‘lodestar.’”
Phoenix Lighting, 160 Ohio St.3d 32, 2020-Ohio-1056, 153 N.E.3d 30, at ¶ 1. The Ohio
Supreme Court then reaffirmed Bittner “to the extent that it held that a lodestar can be
modified,” but clarified “that the lodestar is presumptively reasonable and that
enhancements to the lodestar should be rarely granted and allowed only when the
prevailing party has presented evidence that enhancement is necessary to provide
reasonable compensation, that is, if the lodestar does not take into consideration any
factor that may be properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Id. at ¶ 2.
{¶ 18} Phoenix Lighting was awarded approximately $5.3 million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages on its claims for tortious interference with a business
relationship, misappropriating trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. Phoenix Lighting also
sought an award of attorney fees. During the hearing on attorney fees, the trial court
established a lodestar of approximately $2 million dollars, which “accurately represents
the amount of attorney fees * * * that would have been charged to Phoenix under a
standard hourly rate agreement.” Id. at ¶ 6. The trial court then applied a multiplier of
two to the lodestar based upon its determination that
the case was “quite complex, both factually and legally,” that the case took
up so much of counsel’s time that they were hindered “from accepting and
pursuing other cases and clients,” that Phoenix’s attorneys “obtained a
8. highly favorable outcome,” that the hybrid hourly fee and contingent nature
of the compensation “forced Phoenix’s counsel to assume a great financial
risk,” and that all of the attorneys involved in this case were “of high
caliber,” were “highly experienced, and maintained excellent reputations.”
Id. at ¶ 6. On direct appeal, the Ninth District concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in applying a multiplier of two to the lodestar. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 19} On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the court noted that its decisions on
reasonable attorney fees “have been guided by decisions issued by the United States
Supreme Court.” Id. at ¶ 10. Since Bittner, the United States Supreme Court has
“backed away from enhancements based on factors like those contained in Prof.Cond.R.
1.5(a).” Id. at ¶ 13. The court reasoned, “It is simple economics that an attorney charges
an hourly rate that takes into account the difficulty of the question involved, the
opportunity cost, the time limitations imposed by the client, the skill requisite to perform
a legal service, the attorney’s professional relationship with the client, and the fee
customarily charged in the jurisdiction for similar legal services.” Id. at ¶ 17. “‘A
reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant community * * * given
the complexity of the issues and the experiences of the attorney * * *.’” (Internal citation
omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 156 Ohio St.3d 296, 2018-
Ohio-5109, 126 N.E.3d 1068, ¶ 4. “Thus, the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), including
the results obtained, are subsumed within the lodestar; they do not enhance the lodestar.”
9. (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 17, citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900, 104 S.Ct. 1541,
79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The Ohio Supreme Court held,
[T]here is a strong presumption that the reasonable hourly rate multiplied
by the number of hours worked, which is sometimes referred to as the
“lodestar,” is the proper amount for an attorney-fee award. Enhancements
to the lodestar should be granted rarely and are appropriate when an
attorney produces objective and specific evidence that an enhancement of
the lodestar is necessary to account for a factor not already subsumed in the
lodestar calculation.
Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 20} Applying its holding to the facts before it, the Ohio Supreme Court
determined that the trial court’s reasoning for enhancing the lodestar was based on factors
that were subsumed within its determination of a reasonable rate in the lodestar
calculation. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that there should have been
no enhancement to the lodestar. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶ 21} Turning to the present case, Jeter asserts that the trial court used the old
procedure under Bittner by first calculating a lodestar and then adjusting that number
downward. Jeter’s assertion, however, is incorrect. Rather than determining a lodestar
and then adjusting that number, the trial court’s analysis focused on determining the
reasonable hourly rate in the first instance. In so doing, the trial court considered the
10. Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors and concluded that the reasonable hourly rate was $200.00.
The court then used that hourly rate to determine the lodestar of $7,360.00. No further
adjustments to the lodestar were made. Thus, the trial court used the correct procedure as
set forth in Phoenix Lighting.
{¶ 22} Alternatively, Jeter argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the
reasonable hourly rate was $200.00. In her brief, Jeter considers each of the factors in
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and argues that they support a reasonable hourly rate of $475.00
consistent with the average rate for a consumer law attorney in Toledo, Ohio. Those
factors will be discussed in turn.
{¶ 23} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(1), the factor to be considered is “the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly.” The trial court found that the matter “did not
require any extraordinary efforts beyond what is otherwise required in a typical or
ordinary case in Common Pleas” and it did not involve any “novel or unusual questions
of law or fact.” Further, the trial court found that the matter “did not require any
extraordinary professional skill to perform the necessary legal services above those of an
average competent attorney.” Jeter, on the other hand, argues that the areas of
commercial law involved in the case were complex, requiring an understanding of the
interaction between the UCC, the retail installment sales act, and the CSPA, each of
which can be difficult to navigate on their own. Jeter also argues that this case involved
11. an unusual damages calculation, requiring a higher level of professional skill, and that
counsel demonstrated his skill when he proved those damages using a defense witness
and documents in the record after Jeter was unexpectedly absent at the hearing. Thus,
Jeter suggests that this factor supports at least the average hourly rate for a consumer law
attorney, not a reduction.
{¶ 24} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(2), the factor to be considered is “the likelihood,
if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer.” The trial court found that the matter did not involve
any novel or unusual questions of law or fact. In addition, the court noted that counsel
spent an average of 2.4 hours per month on this case over the 20 months from the filing
of the complaint to judgment, which “should not have had a significant effect upon
Plaintiff’s counsel’s ability to accept other cases.” Jeter argues, however, that counsel
has worked at full capacity since 2006 and that if he did not take this case, he likely
would have accepted another one.
{¶ 25} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(3), the factor to be considered is “the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” The trial court found that
the median hourly fee for all attorney specialty practice areas is $250.00 and the median
hourly fee for general practice attorneys is $200.00. For consumer law attorneys, the
median hourly rate is $475.00 in the Toledo area and $435.00 statewide. Jeter argues that
12. the starting point for the trial court’s calculations should have been the hourly rate for
consumer law attorneys.
{¶ 26} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(4), the factor to be considered is “the amount
involved and the results obtained.” The trial court found that the actual damage amount
was $6,149.00 and the mandatory treble damages awarded was $18,447.00. Jeter
contends that this is a very favorable result supporting an increase in the hourly rate
because she went from defaulting on her car contract and being liable for a deficiency to
owing nothing on her contract and recovering damages of over $18,000.00.
{¶ 27} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(5), the factor to be considered is “the time
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.” The trial court found that
there were no extraordinary time limitations in the case. Jeter agrees and argues that this
factor is neutral and does not justify a lower hourly rate.
{¶ 28} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(6), the factor to be considered is “the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client.” The trial court found that this was
the sole matter in which counsel represented Jeter. Again, Jeter agrees and argues that
this factor is neutral and does not justify a lower hourly rate.
{¶ 29} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(7), the factor to be considered is “the
experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.”
The trial court found that it “ha[d] no reason to doubt” counsel’s experience, good
reputation, and ability in practicing consumer law. Given counsel’s experience, good
13. reputation, and ability, Jeter suggests that this factor supports a higher hourly rate, not a
lower one.
{¶ 30} Finally, under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(8), the factor to be considered is
“whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” The trial court found that while the attorney fee
agreement was not provided to the court, counsel’s affidavit established that the fee was
contingent upon success and upon the amount of attorney fees recovered under R.C.
1345.09(F). Jeter argues that this is the most significant factor because attorneys who are
paid only if they win are at risk of not being paid at all and therefore are justified in
receiving a higher rate.
{¶ 31} Examining all of the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors, Jeter concludes that many
of the factors support awarding a higher-than-average hourly rate for consumer law
attorneys, not a rate that is less than 50 percent of the average. Thus, Jeter urges this
court to find that the trial court’s determination of a reasonable hourly rate of $200.00 is
an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 32} Upon review, it cannot be said that the trial court’s decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. The trial court diligently considered each of
the factors and gave particular weight to the simple nature of the case, noting that it
involved an apparently uninformed small car dealership failing to give notices after
repossessing a vehicle. Whether or not this court would have made a different decision,
it is the trial judge who “has an infinitely better opportunity to determine the value of
14. services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case before [her].” Bittner at 146, quoting
Brooks v. Hurst Buick-Pontiac-Olds-GMC, Inc., 23 Ohio App.3d 85, 91, 491 N.E.2d 345
(12th Dist.1985). Because the trial court determined that the value counsel provided in
this case was commensurate with a general practice attorney, the $200.00 hourly rate was
within the range of reasonableness and not so low as to “shock the conscience” thereby
warranting this court’s interference. Id..
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s judgment is not an abuse of
discretion and Jeter’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Jeter is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, P.J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
15. This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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