Jesus Vega-Reynoso v. Loretta E. Lynch

650 F. App'x 351
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 17, 2016
Docket13-73408
StatusUnpublished

This text of 650 F. App'x 351 (Jesus Vega-Reynoso v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jesus Vega-Reynoso v. Loretta E. Lynch, 650 F. App'x 351 (9th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Petitioner Jesus Benjamin Vega-Reyno-so appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the petition.

Vega-Reynoso argues that the agency erred in finding that the Government met its burden to show that his conviction under Nevada Revised Statute § 453.321 qualifies as an aggravated felony. We disagree. The Immigration Judge and the BIA properly relied on the judgment and indictment to find that he had been convicted of unlawful sale of a controlled substance. See Descamps v. United States, —. U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2281, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). Contrary to Vega-Reynoso’s argument that the judgment was ambiguous as to which statutory subsection he was convicted under, the judgment explicitly identified that Vega-Rey-noso was guilty of “unlawful sale of a controlled substance.” The judgment also specified that Vega-Reynoso had pled guilty to the crime “charged in the Information,” and the Information in turn clarified that the charge was for possession and sale of methamphetamine. Cf. United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (declining to consider the indictment in order to clarify the offense to which the defendant pled guilty because the judgment did not contain “the critical phrase ‘as charged in the Information”’ (quoting Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2004))),

Because, as the BIA correctly found, the judgment did not merely recite the title of the statute of conviction, Vega-Reynoso’s reliance on Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1088, is unavailing. Instead, the record of conviction documents relied on by the agency establish that Vega-Reynoso’s conviction corresponds to the generic definition of a drug trafficking crime, see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53-54, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006); United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d 679, 692 (9th Cir.2012), and thus qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). See Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 975-76 (9th Cir.2008).

Petition DENIED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Related

Lopez v. Gonzales
549 U.S. 47 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Chung Ping Li v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
389 F.3d 892 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Jorge Valdavinos-Torres
704 F.3d 679 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Descamps v. United States
133 S. Ct. 2276 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Rendon v. Mukasey
520 F.3d 967 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Vidal
504 F.3d 1072 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
650 F. App'x 351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jesus-vega-reynoso-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2016.