Jesus Ruben Gonzales v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 8, 2008
• Docket: 14-07-00434-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion of February 7, 2008 Withdrawn; Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed April 8, 2008

Opinion of February 7, 2008 Withdrawn; Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed April 8, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-07-00434-CR

JESUS RUBEN GONZALES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law # 11

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1426522

S U B S T I T U T E   M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

After reviewing appellant=s petition for discretionary review, we withdraw our opinion of February 7, 2008 and substitute this opinion in its place.  See Tex. R. App. P. 50.

Appellant Jesus Ruben Gonzales challenges his conviction for driving while intoxicated on the grounds that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the conviction.   We affirm.

                        I.  Factual and Procedural Background

While driving home from a local bar on January 4, 2007, Appellant struck the back of another vehicle.  Appellant approached the driver of the second vehicle after the accident and offered his insurance information and driver=s license.  The driver of the second vehicle did not actually see Appellant hit the back of her vehicle.  The police were called and an officer performed various field sobriety tests on Appellant, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the Romberg test, the walk and turn test, the one leg stand test, and the nose touch test.  Based on the results of those field sobriety tests, Appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated.  He pleaded not guilty and the case was tried to a jury.  

Appellant and the State presented conflicting evidence on the amount of alcohol consumed by Appellant.  The State presented testimony from the bartender who served Appellant that evening.  She remembered Appellant drinking two beers and two or three shots of alcohol before leaving the bar.  The State also presented testimony from two police officers that Appellant=s movements were slow, his speech was slurred, his eyes were red, and that Appellant smelled of alcohol.  The jury also heard testimony from the driver of the second vehicle that Appellant approached her vehicle immediately after the accident and offered his insurance information.  No one else claimed to be driving, and as far as complainant could tell, no one else had been in Appellant=s car.  A police officer who arrived at the scene testified that Appellant identified himself to the officer as a driver.  After Appellant=s motion for an instructed verdict was denied, Appellant and his friend both testified that Appellant had consumed only two beers.  Appellant further testified that he was driving and that he accidentally hit the complainant=s vehicle when he noticed that the light was green and the vehicle in front of him failed to move.

The jury found Appellant guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to one year in the Harris County jail and assessed a fine of one thousand dollars plus court costs, but suspended the sentence and placed him on community supervision for two years.  Appellant timely filed this appeal.

                                           II.  Issue and Analysis

Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for an instructed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant was operating a motor vehicle.  We will address the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.

A challenge to the denial of a motion for an instructed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.  McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  When evaluating legal sufficiency challenges, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.  King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  We do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact.  See Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  We view all of the evidence admitted at trial, and resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict.  Id. 

Appellant argues that there was no evidence offered by the State to show that he was in or near a vehicle at the time of the incident, or that he was the driver of the motor vehicle that rear-ended the complainant.  We disagree.  The State offered testimony from the complainant that Appellant approached her vehicle immediately after the collision and offered to provide insurance information.  The complainant further testified that no one else claimed to be the driver and that as far as she could tell, no one else had been in the other vehicle.  The State also offered testimony from a police officer at the scene to whom Appellant identified himself as a driver.  Because the denial of an instructed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and because we examine all evidence admitted at trial when evaluating a legal sufficiency challenge, we may also consider Appellant=s testimony after the trial court denied Appellant=s motion for an instructed verdict.  See McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 613; see also Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421.  Appellant=s own testimony at trial, that he was driving and accidentally hit the complainant=s vehicle, supports our conclusion that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict.  However, Appellant=s brief did not inform this court that Appellant gave a confession in court.  Instead, Appellant=s brief left out this pertinent fact, in violation of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f).

Although Appellant Ais reluctant to lob defensive theories into the void in a vain effort to see if something sticks,@ Appellant should have cited relevant and correct authority to support his own defensive lobs.  Appellant cites one case supporting his contention that an accused=s out of court statements, in and of themselves, cannot establish that Appellant operated a motor vehicle.  Threet v. State, 250 S.W.2d 200, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).  However, Threet did not testify at trial, and his conviction for driving while intoxicated was predicted on the testimony of one patrolman to whom appellant admitted that he was the driver of a pick-up truck that had overturned.  Threet is easily distinguishable from the present case.  In our case, Appellant took the stand and admitted that he was the driver who rear-ended the complainant.  Appellant=s conviction was not solely predicated on his out of court statements.  Rather, his conviction was predicated on a combination of evidence, including Appellant=s out of court statements, the testimony of the complainant and officers at the scene, and Appellant=s own in-court judicial confession.  Appellant incorrectly cites one additional case for his contention that the State must present additional evidence beyond Appellant=s out of court statements in order to establish corpus delecti: Neischwietz v. State, 2006 S.W.3d; (Tex. App.).  However, this court was unable to decipher Appellant=s incorrect citation, which again violates the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g).  We reject Appellant=s argument that the State failed to establish corpus delecti, and conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict. 

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.  See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  We then ask whether the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder=s determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the conviction that the fact-finder=s determination is manifestly unjust.  Id.; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  To reverse under the second ground, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the verdict.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 408. 

We may set the verdict aside if: (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15.  Although we may disagree with the jury=s conclusions, we must exercise appropriate deference to avoid substituting our judgement for that of the jury, particularly in matters of credibility.  Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799; see also Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414 (stating that a court should not reverse a verdict it disagrees with, unless the verdict represents a manifest injustice even though supported by legally sufficient evidence). 

Appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that he was the driver of the vehicle that rear-ended the complainant.  We disagree.  Using the same facts recited from the record in the discussion of legal sufficiency, we conclude that this evidence is not so weak that the fact-finder=s determination is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.  Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury=s verdict.

III.  Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/      Ross Sears

Senior Justice

Judgment rendered and Substitute Opinion filed April 8, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Guzman, and Sears.^[1]

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  Senior Justice Ross Sears sitting by assignment.