In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00091-CV
JESUS CHRIST OPEN ALTAR CHURCH, LLC, Appellant
V.
CITY OF HAWKINS, ALVIN FLYNN, DONNA JORDAN, MIKE MAYBERRY, TOM PARKER, HOWARD COQUAT, WAYNE KIRKPATRICK, NORMAN OGLESBY, CODY JORGENSON, STEPHEN LUCAS, MATTHEW TODD EDDINGTON, AND CLARA KAY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 402nd District Court Wood County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-300
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens Concurring Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jesus Christ Open Altar Church, LLC (the Church), appeals the trial court’s take-nothing
judgment in its lawsuit against the City of Hawkins, City Attorney Alvin Flynn, City Secretary
Donna Jordan, Public Utilities Director Mike Mayberry, Mayor Tom Parker, Howard Coquat,
Wayne Kirkpatrick, Norman Oglesby, Cody Jorgenson, Stephen Lucas, Matthew Todd
Eddington, and Clara Kay. Because the arguments raised on appeal by the Church either raise
unpled issues or are inadequately briefed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
As a result of a prior lawsuit, the 402nd Judicial District Court of Wood County, Texas,
entered a final judgment declaring that the City held an easement on the Church’s property
described as an undeveloped portion of “Ash St. lying south of Old U.S. Highway 80 (currently
Blackbourn St.).” The Church appealed that ruling, arguing that the trial court erred by
determining that the City retained an easement on Church property. See Jesus Christ Open Altar
Church, LLC v. City of Hawkins, No. 12-17-00090-CV, 2017 WL 6523088, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Dec. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). In 2017, the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s finding. See id. at *5. The Church did not seek review of that decision with the Texas
Supreme Court. After our sister court’s ruling was issued, the City began contemplating
improvements on Ash Street, including the construction of a “two-lane concrete road.”
In 2021, the Church sued Appellees. Its live pleading included a cause of action for
violating the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) since a “July 9, 2018[,] closed meeting led to a
decision to close Blackbourn Street, and to remove the Jesus sign causing damage to Church
2 property.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.002. The Church also asserted causes of action
for: (1) violation of the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) because Appellees failed to
respond to the Church’s requests for public records, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001;
(2) unlawful seizure of Church property that violated freedom of worship and religious service
protections, see TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 6-a, 9; (3) violation of Section 311.008 of the Texas
Transportation Code; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty. In response, the Appellees alleged that
the Church’s suit was barred by governmental immunity.1 Accordingly, Appellees filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and both a no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment as to each
cause of action.
In support of its summary judgment motion on the Church’s TOMA claim, the Appellees
showed that a special city council meeting was held on July 9, 2018, after Jordan posted the
notice of the meeting “on July 6, 2018, at 3:20 p.m., on the City of Hawkins Bulletin Board at
the front of the building and on the glass back door of the City Hall, facing the outside.”
Appellees provided evidence attached to Jordan’s affidavit confirming those facts and showing
that the July 9 meeting was an open meeting, not a closed session. The evidence also shows that
the minutes memorialized the City Council’s unanimous vote to approve the road. Appellees
also showed that, on May 20, 2019, the City Council reviewed submitted bids and voted to
award the Ash Street improvement contract, which was engineered by KSA Engineers, to
Construction Companies Group, LLC. Notice of those meetings, and the meeting minutes were
1 Although Eddington did not join in filing his answer to the lawsuit along with the other Appellees, he established that he was never a City employee, agent, or elected official, had never been a city council member, and did not owe any duties to the Church. As a result, the trial court granted Eddington’s motion for summary judgment against the Church, and the Church does not appeal any ruling as to Eddington. The term “Appellees” as used in this opinion, does not include Eddington. 3 also attached as summary judgment evidence. As a result, Appellees argued that the Church had
no evidence to support their TOMA cause of action because there were no closed or secret
sessions.
As for the TPIA claim, Appellees asserted that they responded to the ten requests sent by
the Church and “produced [to the Church] every responsive document that it found or received”
and that the Church’s claim was moot. They also argued that the Church had no evidence that
Appellees either failed to respond to the Church’s requests or refused to supply public
information.
Next, Appellees argued that they did not unlawfully seize any Church property. They
argued that, in preparation for the construction of the new road, the City removed impediments,
including the electric pole and the Church’s sign, and that the Church had refused to pick up the
sign, which was still available. Appellees argued that the Church had no evidence that the City
did not own the easement over the Property or that any Church property was removed illegally.
As for the Church’s allegation that Appellees violated Section 311.008 of the Texas
Transportation Code, Appellees noted that that section only requires “a petition signed by all the
owners of real property abutting the street or alley” if a city has chosen to “vacate, abandon, or
close a street,” and that no street was vacated, abandoned, or closed. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 311.008. Appellees attached Mayberry’s affidavit and an affidavit from Walter F. Hicks, III, a
professional engineer for KSA Engineers, stating that Blackbourn Street had not been closed at
any time. Lastly, Appellees argued there was no evidence of a waiver of governmental
immunity for the Church’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
4 The trial court granted the Appellees’ and Eddington’s motion for summary judgment
and Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction.
II. The Church’s Arguments Either Raise Unpled Issues or Are Inadequately Briefed
We first note that, in its brief, the Church agrees that the Texas “Tort Claims Act releases
the individual defendants from the lawsuit and that they must be dismissed.” Even so, the
Church argues that the City is liable for compensation and damages caused by its agents,
employees, and officers. Yet, the Church presents no cogent argument regarding either the plea
to the jurisdiction or the summary judgment. As a result, Appellees argue that the Church has
waived all issues on appeal. We agree.
In the summary of argument section, the Church argues that Chapter 216 of the Texas
Local Government Code, concerning the regulation of signs by municipalities, prevented the
City from removing the sign without compensation. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 216.005. However, the Church pled no cause of action under Chapter 216, which contains
administrative remedies that must be exhausted, including the filing of a verified petition for a
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In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00091-CV
JESUS CHRIST OPEN ALTAR CHURCH, LLC, Appellant
V.
CITY OF HAWKINS, ALVIN FLYNN, DONNA JORDAN, MIKE MAYBERRY, TOM PARKER, HOWARD COQUAT, WAYNE KIRKPATRICK, NORMAN OGLESBY, CODY JORGENSON, STEPHEN LUCAS, MATTHEW TODD EDDINGTON, AND CLARA KAY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 402nd District Court Wood County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-300
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens Concurring Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jesus Christ Open Altar Church, LLC (the Church), appeals the trial court’s take-nothing
judgment in its lawsuit against the City of Hawkins, City Attorney Alvin Flynn, City Secretary
Donna Jordan, Public Utilities Director Mike Mayberry, Mayor Tom Parker, Howard Coquat,
Wayne Kirkpatrick, Norman Oglesby, Cody Jorgenson, Stephen Lucas, Matthew Todd
Eddington, and Clara Kay. Because the arguments raised on appeal by the Church either raise
unpled issues or are inadequately briefed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
As a result of a prior lawsuit, the 402nd Judicial District Court of Wood County, Texas,
entered a final judgment declaring that the City held an easement on the Church’s property
described as an undeveloped portion of “Ash St. lying south of Old U.S. Highway 80 (currently
Blackbourn St.).” The Church appealed that ruling, arguing that the trial court erred by
determining that the City retained an easement on Church property. See Jesus Christ Open Altar
Church, LLC v. City of Hawkins, No. 12-17-00090-CV, 2017 WL 6523088, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Dec. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). In 2017, the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s finding. See id. at *5. The Church did not seek review of that decision with the Texas
Supreme Court. After our sister court’s ruling was issued, the City began contemplating
improvements on Ash Street, including the construction of a “two-lane concrete road.”
In 2021, the Church sued Appellees. Its live pleading included a cause of action for
violating the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) since a “July 9, 2018[,] closed meeting led to a
decision to close Blackbourn Street, and to remove the Jesus sign causing damage to Church
2 property.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.002. The Church also asserted causes of action
for: (1) violation of the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) because Appellees failed to
respond to the Church’s requests for public records, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001;
(2) unlawful seizure of Church property that violated freedom of worship and religious service
protections, see TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 6-a, 9; (3) violation of Section 311.008 of the Texas
Transportation Code; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty. In response, the Appellees alleged that
the Church’s suit was barred by governmental immunity.1 Accordingly, Appellees filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and both a no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment as to each
cause of action.
In support of its summary judgment motion on the Church’s TOMA claim, the Appellees
showed that a special city council meeting was held on July 9, 2018, after Jordan posted the
notice of the meeting “on July 6, 2018, at 3:20 p.m., on the City of Hawkins Bulletin Board at
the front of the building and on the glass back door of the City Hall, facing the outside.”
Appellees provided evidence attached to Jordan’s affidavit confirming those facts and showing
that the July 9 meeting was an open meeting, not a closed session. The evidence also shows that
the minutes memorialized the City Council’s unanimous vote to approve the road. Appellees
also showed that, on May 20, 2019, the City Council reviewed submitted bids and voted to
award the Ash Street improvement contract, which was engineered by KSA Engineers, to
Construction Companies Group, LLC. Notice of those meetings, and the meeting minutes were
1 Although Eddington did not join in filing his answer to the lawsuit along with the other Appellees, he established that he was never a City employee, agent, or elected official, had never been a city council member, and did not owe any duties to the Church. As a result, the trial court granted Eddington’s motion for summary judgment against the Church, and the Church does not appeal any ruling as to Eddington. The term “Appellees” as used in this opinion, does not include Eddington. 3 also attached as summary judgment evidence. As a result, Appellees argued that the Church had
no evidence to support their TOMA cause of action because there were no closed or secret
sessions.
As for the TPIA claim, Appellees asserted that they responded to the ten requests sent by
the Church and “produced [to the Church] every responsive document that it found or received”
and that the Church’s claim was moot. They also argued that the Church had no evidence that
Appellees either failed to respond to the Church’s requests or refused to supply public
information.
Next, Appellees argued that they did not unlawfully seize any Church property. They
argued that, in preparation for the construction of the new road, the City removed impediments,
including the electric pole and the Church’s sign, and that the Church had refused to pick up the
sign, which was still available. Appellees argued that the Church had no evidence that the City
did not own the easement over the Property or that any Church property was removed illegally.
As for the Church’s allegation that Appellees violated Section 311.008 of the Texas
Transportation Code, Appellees noted that that section only requires “a petition signed by all the
owners of real property abutting the street or alley” if a city has chosen to “vacate, abandon, or
close a street,” and that no street was vacated, abandoned, or closed. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 311.008. Appellees attached Mayberry’s affidavit and an affidavit from Walter F. Hicks, III, a
professional engineer for KSA Engineers, stating that Blackbourn Street had not been closed at
any time. Lastly, Appellees argued there was no evidence of a waiver of governmental
immunity for the Church’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
4 The trial court granted the Appellees’ and Eddington’s motion for summary judgment
and Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction.
II. The Church’s Arguments Either Raise Unpled Issues or Are Inadequately Briefed
We first note that, in its brief, the Church agrees that the Texas “Tort Claims Act releases
the individual defendants from the lawsuit and that they must be dismissed.” Even so, the
Church argues that the City is liable for compensation and damages caused by its agents,
employees, and officers. Yet, the Church presents no cogent argument regarding either the plea
to the jurisdiction or the summary judgment. As a result, Appellees argue that the Church has
waived all issues on appeal. We agree.
In the summary of argument section, the Church argues that Chapter 216 of the Texas
Local Government Code, concerning the regulation of signs by municipalities, prevented the
City from removing the sign without compensation. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 216.005. However, the Church pled no cause of action under Chapter 216, which contains
administrative remedies that must be exhausted, including the filing of a verified petition for a
writ of certiorari within twenty days after a board decision. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 216.014; see also Lamar Corp. v. City of Longview, 270 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2008, no pet.); Allen v. City of Baytown, No. 01-09-00914-CV, 2011 WL 3820963, at
*4, *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Also, in the
“summary of the argument” section, the Church argues that the trial court’s action is contrary to
Article I, Section 17, of the Texas Constitution, which expressly prohibits the State from taking
one’s property under its sovereign powers without consent or adequate compensation. See TEX.
5 CONST. art. I, § 17. However, the Church never pled any constitutional takings claim. We will
not reverse a judgment based on issues not raised by the Church’s live pleading.
Next, the Church’s entire argument merely states,
If the immunity law prevents enforcement of Texas constitutional law, [L]ocal [G]overnment [C]ode, and Transportation Code safety, resulting in churches being prevented from having functions on church property, and allowing the destruction of church property without compensation, then the Texas legal system has utterly failed the Church making it necessary to have federal litigation which will be very costly to the church and the city, and could result in punitive damages being increased unnecessarily.
This argument, which mentions neither the plea to the jurisdiction nor the summary
judgment, is wholly inadequate.
“The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to provide ‘a clear
and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities
and to the record.’” In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d 83, 96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, pet.
denied) (quoting In re J.Y., 528 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.)
(quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)). “Bare assertions of error, without argument or
authority, waive error.” Id. (quoting McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478, 484 n.5
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins.
Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994) (“discussing ‘long-standing rule’ that point
may be waived due to inadequate briefing”))); see Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Chestnut,
694 S.W.3d 226, 230 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). “The appellate court has no duty to brief
issues for an appellant.” In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d at 96 (quoting In re A.E., 580 S.W.3d
211, 219 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. denied). Although we “construe briefing
6 requirements reasonably and liberally, . . . a party asserting error on appeal still must put
forth some specific argument and analysis showing that the record and the law support
[its] contentions.” Id. (quoting In re A.E., 580 S.W.3d at 219).
Here, the Church’s argument contains no citation to law and no citations to the
record. It fails to address the reasons why the trial court entered the take-nothing
judgment and fails to bring any non-conclusory argument as to why the trial court erred
in either granting the plea to the jurisdiction or in entering summary judgment in
Appellees’ favor. As a result, we overrule the Church’s point of error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur. The trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction brought by the City of
Hawkins, Alvin Flynn, Donna Jordan, Mike Mayberry, Tom Parker, Howard Coquat,
Wayne Kirkpatrick, Norman Oglesby, Cody Jorgenson, Stephen Lucas, and Clara Kay.
By so ruling, the trial court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction: “A plea to the
jurisdiction challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction; that is, the court’s
power to decide the case.” Herrera v. Mata, 702 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. 2024)
(per curiam). As noted, the Church’s argument “mentions neither the plea to the 7 jurisdiction nor the summary judgment.” I would focus on the former. We have
authority to review trial court determinations that jurisdiction is lacking, but “[w]e go no
further than necessary to determine jurisdiction.” Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus,
Tex. House of Representatives, 647 S.W.3d 681, 699 (Tex. 2022). Therefore, I would
end it with the Church’s failure to mention the plea to the jurisdiction.
Jeff Rambin Justice
Date Submitted: May 22, 2025 Date Decided: June 25, 2025