Jessie L. Nelson, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent. and Cameron D. Woods, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: July 22, 2025
• Docket: SC100957_and_SC101008
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc

JESSIE L. NELSON, ) Opinion issued July 22, 2025 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SC100957 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent. )

and

CAMERON D. WOODS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SC101008 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY The Honorable Patrick K. Robb, Judge

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CASS COUNTY The Honorable Stacey J. Lett, Judge

Jessie Nelson and Cameron Woods appeal the overruling of their respective

amended motions for postconviction relief. The Court holds each record reflects Nelson

and Woods were abandoned by their appointed counsel when appointed counsel filed untimely amended motions. Given this Court’s finding of abandonment, remand for an

abandonment inquiry is not required. Because the motion courts did not clearly err in

overruling the amended motions on the merits after conducting evidentiary hearings, the

Court affirms the judgments.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Nelson v. State

In August 2018, witnesses saw Nelson in a vehicle at the scene of a shooting that

left one person dead and another permanently injured. The state charged Nelson with

first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action. The

circuit court entered its judgment finding him guilty, after a jury trial, of all counts. In

January 2020, the circuit court sentenced Nelson. The court of appeals affirmed. State v.

Nelson, 635 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. App. 2021) (mem.). In December 2021, the court of

appeals issued its mandate.

On March 8, 2022, Nelson filed his pro se Rule 29.15 motion. 1 The same day, the

motion court entered its order appointing the public defender to represent Nelson. On

March 9, 2022, a public defender entered an appearance on Nelson’s behalf. The public

defender did not request an extension of time to file an amended motion. On July 6,

2022, the public defender filed an amended motion. On August 2, 2023, after an

evidentiary hearing, the motion court entered its judgment overruling the amended

1 Unless otherwise specified, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2020).

2 motion. Nelson appealed. This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of

appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Woods v. State

The state charged Woods with unlawful use of a weapon. In March 2021, Woods

entered an open plea of guilt. 2 The state recommended the statutory maximum of 15

years’ imprisonment, and Woods requested a 15-year sentence with the sentence

suspended and probation. The relevant statute authorized a suspended execution of

sentence with probation because Woods was not charged as a prior or persistent offender.

On May 3, 2021, the circuit court entered its judgment and sentenced Woods to 15 years’

imprisonment. Woods did not appeal.

On October 29, 2021, Woods filed his pro se motion under Rule 24.035 (2021). 3

On November 4, 2021, the motion court entered an order appointing the public defender

to represent Woods and specified in the order the public defender had “120 days in which

to file an amended motion as set forth in Rule 24.035/Rule 29.15 cases.” 4 On December

19, 2021, a public defender entered an appearance and advised the motion court the guilty

plea and the sentencing hearing transcript had been filed December 16, 2021. On April

2 An “open plea” includes no agreement as to sentencing. Branson v. Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Mo. banc 2025). 3 References to Rule 24.035 (2021) are to the version effective through November 3, 2021. 4 For the reasons set out in this opinion, the motion court stated an incorrect deadline in its appointment order. The order did not extend the filing deadline because, under Rule 24.035(g) (2021), the motion court lacked authority to alter the deadlines or grant an extension beyond that permitted by the rule.

3 15, 2022, the public defender filed an amended motion. On November 3, 2023, after an

evidentiary hearing, the motion court entered its judgment overruling the amended

motion. Woods appealed. This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the trial court’s action on the motion filed under this Rule

29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the

trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 29.15(k). The same applies for review of Rule

24.035 proceedings. See Rule 24.035(k) (2021). “Appellate courts presume the motion

court’s findings are correct and a judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the

entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has

been made.” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal quotation

omitted).

“This Court interprets the rules by applying principles similar to those used for

state statutes.” Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2012). “In determining

statutory intent, and this Court’s intent in the rules, this Court will look to the plain and

ordinary meaning of those words as defined in the dictionary.” Id. (internal quotation and

alteration omitted).

4 Analysis

Because appointed counsel did not timely file the amended motions, appointed counsel abandoned Nelson and Woods

Because Nelson was sentenced in January 2020, the 2020 version of Rule 29.15

(last amended January 1, 2018) in effect at Nelson’s sentencing date applies to his

postconviction proceedings regardless of any later amendments. Scott v. State, No.

SC100916, _ S.W.3d _, slip op. at 5 (Mo. banc July 22, 2025). Likewise, because Woods

was sentenced in May 2021, the version of Rule 24.035 effective through November 3,

2021 (last amended January 1, 2018) applies to Woods’ postconviction proceeding

regardless of any later amendments. Scott, No. SC100916, slip op. at 5.

The 2020 version of Rule 29.15(g) provided (when there is a direct appeal) an

amended motion must be filed within 60 days of the earlier of both: (1) the date the

mandate issues from the court of appeals, and (2) appointment of counsel or entry of

appearance on behalf of the movant by any counsel who is not appointed. Rule 29.15(g)

also permitted an extension of this deadline, with no extension to exceed 30 days

individually and the total of all extensions not to exceed 60 days. Nelson’s amended

motion filed by the public defender was not timely because it was filed more than 60 days

after the earlier of both issuance of the court of appeals’ mandate and the order

appointing the public defender to represent Nelson, and the public defender neither

sought nor obtained an extension of the 60-day deadline.

Similarly, Rule 24.035(g) (2021) provided (when there is no direct appeal) an

amended motion must be filed within 60 days of the earlier of both: (1) the date a

5 complete transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing are filed in the trial court,

and (2) appointment of counsel or entry of appearance on behalf of the movant by any

counsel who is not appointed. Rule 24.035(g) (2021) also permitted an extension of this

deadline, with no extension to exceed 30 days individually and the total of all extensions

not to exceed 60 days. Woods’ amended motion filed by the public defender was not

timely because it was filed more than 60 days after the earlier of both the filing of the

complete transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing and the order appointing the

public defender to represent Woods, and the public defender neither sought nor obtained

an extension of the 60-day deadline.

Because neither Nelson’s nor Woods’ amended motion was timely, the ordinary

course would be to remand these cases to the motion court to conduct an abandonment

hearing to determine if the tardiness of each motion was the fault of counsel and was not

the result of the movant’s actions or inactions. 5 See Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495, 498

(Mo. banc 1991) (“If counsel’s apparent inattention results from movant’s negligence or

intentional failure to act, movant is entitled to no relief other than that which may be

afforded upon the pro se motion.”). Such a hearing, however, serves no purpose here.

Remand to the motion court for an abandonment inquiry is the appropriate

disposition when an “independent inquiry is required but not done.” Moore v. State, 458

S.W.3d 822, 826 & n.3 (Mo. banc 2015). For Nelson and Woods, however, remand is

5 In Scott, the Court recognized the abandonment doctrine applies only to appointed counsel. Scott, No. SC100916, slip op. at 7. Counsel for both Nelson and Woods were appointed.

6 not required because the record unmistakably demonstrates appointed counsel abandoned

each movant by failing to timely file an amended motion, and these failures were not due

to any negligence or intentional failure to act by Nelson or Woods. Instead, the record

plainly shows appointed counsel’s failures resulted from incorrectly determining which

version of the rules to follow. Nelson’s appointed counsel included in the amended

motion a “statement of timeliness” stating:

Once a movant files a Form 40 after a direct appeal, the amended motion is due within 120 days of both the appointment of counsel and the issuance of the mandate. Rule 29.15(g). This Court appointed the Office of the Public Defender on March 8, 2022. Mr. Nelson’s amended motion is due and timely filed on Wednesday, July 6, 2022, which is 120 days from March 8, 2022.

Likewise, Woods’ appointed counsel included in the amended motion a “statement of

timeliness” stating:

Rule 24.035(g) requires that an amended motion be filed within 120 days of “the date both a complete transcript consisting of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing has been filed in the trial court and counsel is appointed.” The Court appointed the Office of the Public Defender on November 4, 2021. The guilty plea and sentencing transcripts were filed on December 16, 2021. Accordingly, the amended motion is due to be filed on April 15, 2022.

Each counsel applied the wrong version of the rule and, as a result, miscalculated

the deadline for each movant’s amended motion. Neither Nelson nor Woods played any

role in these miscalculations.

Not only is there no need to remand for abandonment hearings, there also is no

need to remand for the motion courts to address the claims in Nelson’s and Woods’

untimely amended motions. Because both motion courts erroneously concluded Nelson’s

and Woods’ amended motions were timely, both held evidentiary hearings on the claims

7 raised in each of the amended motions. Both motion courts made findings of facts and

conclusions of law denying all claims in those amended motions.

Rather than waste time and effort remanding for abandonment hearings when

abandonment is clear on the face of the record, or remanding for evidentiary hearings on

claims that already have been heard at an evidentiary hearing and adjudicated, the only

reasonable conclusion is for this Court to reach the merits of Nelson’s and Woods’

appeals without further delay.

The Court affirms the motion court’s judgment as to Nelson

In two points on appeal, Nelson asserts the motion court clearly erred in denying

some of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In his first point, Nelson asserts

the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to investigate and use employment records to impeach a victim-witness because the

motion court ignored Nelson’s arguments. In his second point, Nelson asserts the motion

court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a

motion to suppress and request a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1978).

“To be entitled to postconviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a

movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed

to meet the Strickland test.’” Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 420 (quoting Watson v. State, 520

S.W.3d 423, 435 (Mo. banc 2017)). “Strickland requires the movant to show that his or

her ‘counsel’s performance was deficient,’ and that counsel’s deficient performance

‘prejudiced the defense[.]’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,

8 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Both deficient performance (i.e., the performance prong)

and prejudice (i.e., the prejudice prong) must be shown by a preponderance of the

evidence ... to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. (alteration in original)

(internal quotation omitted).

In point one, Nelson asserts the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim

because it ignored his arguments this evidence would have boosted the credibility of his

testimony in his own defense and impeached the victim’s testimony naming Nelson as

the shooter. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified she did not pursue the

employment records because Nelson’s defense was that he was not at the shooting and

had been misidentified. Trial counsel feared introducing evidence Nelson worked with

the victim in 2016 would only strengthen the victim’s identification of Nelson.

The motion court concluded trial counsel was not ineffective because the

employment records would not have provided a viable defense to the charges. “Failure to

impeach a witness will not warrant post-conviction relief unless the testimony offers a

defense to the charged crimes.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 904 (Mo. banc 2013).

Even if the employment records would have impeached the victim’s testimony, the

records did not provide Nelson a defense. The motion court did not clearly err in denying

this claim.

In point two, Nelson asserts the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress and request a Franks

hearing regarding evidence recovered from a search of his wife’s vehicle. At the

evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified she did not file a motion to suppress because

9 Nelson did not own the vehicle and did not occupy the vehicle at the time of the search,

so counsel believed Nelson lacked standing to challenge the vehicle search.

The motion court concluded trial counsel was not ineffective because Nelson

lacked standing to challenge the search, and, even if Nelson had standing, a motion to

suppress would not have been meritorious because the search warrant was supported by

probable cause. Nelson’s arguments about standing do not establish a motion to suppress

the vehicle search would have been meritorious. Counsel is not ineffective in failing to

file a meritless motion to suppress. State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 870 (Mo. banc

1992). Because Nelson has not established the deficient performance prong of his claim,

the Court need not consider the prejudice prong. Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 420. The

motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.

The Court affirms the motion court’s judgment as to Woods

In a single point on appeal, Woods asserts the motion court clearly erred in

denying his claim trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call an expert witness at his

sentencing hearing in mitigation to testify about Woods’ mental conditions and the abuse

he suffered as a child.

“A movant may challenge counsel’s assistance at sentencing as ineffective.”

Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. banc 2013). “If a defendant aggrieved by

ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing is willing to abide by the guilty plea or

conviction, the defendant nonetheless may have recourse under a post-conviction motion

if the defendant demonstrates that sentencing was influenced by ineffective assistance of

counsel during sentencing.” Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Mo. App. 2020)

10 (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he two-pronged test from Strickland applies equally to

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of a sentencing hearing.” Id.

(alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). “Applied to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing, a movant must show that but for sentencing counsel’s

errors ... the result of the sentencing would have been different, specifically, that his

sentence would have been lower.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations

Sentencing counsel testified he made a strategic decision not to call a mental

health expert because he “did not want to put the emphasis on mental health” and,

instead, wanted to offer an improved home plan and community support for Woods’

probation request. Sentencing counsel further testified he had been trained that, when

there is an open plea, “[y]ou always want to kind of just openly admit that you committed

the act and then try to present good character.”

The motion court concluded sentencing counsel’s strategic decision not to call an

expert witness was informed, reasonable, and not deficient. The motion court also

concluded Woods did not establish prejudice because there was no reasonable probability

Woods would have received a suspended execution of sentence with probation, the only

other sentence allowed by the relevant statute, had counsel presented the expert testimony

at Woods’ sentencing hearing. The motion court found the sentencing court had before it

and said it considered the mental evaluation and the sentencing assessment report in

reaching its judgment. By way of these documents, the sentencing court knew Woods

had been physically abused as a child; was a heavy substance abuser; and had diagnoses

11 of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and schizophrenia. The expert’s testimony

expounding on these areas would not have created a reasonable likelihood Woods’

sentence would have been different. While Woods argued to the motion court the expert

testimony was necessary to show the sentencing court the impact his mental illness may

have had on the offense date, he ignores this evidence also shows his mental health issues

would make it difficult for him to control his behavior, and he would be a danger to the

community if he received probation. The motion court found: “This evidence, had it

been presented at sentencing, is not mitigating. If anything, [the expert’s testimony]

reinforces the [c]ourt’s reasoning for sentencing [Woods] to the Department of

Corrections. [The] testimony supports the [s]tate’s argument that [Woods] is a danger to

the community given his impulsivity, recklessness, and anger[.]”

Because Woods did not satisfy the prejudice prong of his claim, the Court need

not consider the performance prong. Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 420.

Conclusion

The judgments of the motion courts denying postconviction relief are affirmed.

___________________________________ Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.