Jessie Delacruz Milo v. R. Rodriguez, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 1:21-cv-01188
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JESSIE DELACRUZ MILO, No. 1:21-cv-01188-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 13 v. (ECF No. 35) 14 R. RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, filed January 26, 20 2026. Defendants filed an opposition on February 3, 2026. (ECF No. 37.) Although the time for 21 Plaintiff to file a reply has not yet passed, the Court finds a reply is not necessary to resolve the 22 motion. 23 I. 24 DISCUSSION 25 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a party from whom discovery is sought 26 may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending. The court may, for good 27 cause, issue an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 28 1 burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Options available to the court include, among other 2 things, forbidding the disclosure or discovery, forbidding inquiry into certain matters or limiting 3 the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters. Id. 4 District courts have broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is 5 appropriate and, if so, what degree of protection is warranted. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 6 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 7 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the law gives district courts broad latitude to grant 8 protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information). The party 9 seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving “good cause,” which requires a showing 10 “that specific prejudice or harm will result” if the protective order is not granted. In re Roman 11 Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Foltz v. State Farm 12 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)); Westmoreland v. Regents of the Univ. 13 of Cal., No. 2:17-cv-01922-TLN-AC, 2019 WL 932220, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). 14 Here, Plaintiff seeks a protective order to prevent Defendants from taking the depositions 15 of Isaac Razo and Tamrin Razo. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff argues the depositions are irrelevant to 16 liability. Plaintiff’s motion must be denied. 17 First, Plaintiff’s motion is premature. Defendants have not yet scheduled the depositions 18 of Isaac or Tamrin Razo. (Declaration of Ryan Zalesny (Zelesny Decl.) ¶ 3.) Thus, Plaintiff’s 19 motion shall be denied as premature. See Ben-Oni v. Wood, No. 2:24-cv-2769-DJC-JDP (PS), 20 2026 WL 104526, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (“Because there is currently no outstanding 21 discovery, plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is premature.”) Second, Plaintiff does not 22 have standing to seek an order preventing the taking of Isaac or Tamrin Razo’s depositions. See, 23 e.g., Biden v. Byrne, No. 2:23-CV-09430-SVW, 2025 WL 1122392, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 24 2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); Id. (party “does not have standing to bring” either a motion 25 for a protective order or a motion to quash to prevent a non-party’s deposition); but see Hardy v. 26 Davis, No. 2:13-CV-0726 JAM DB, 2017 WL 445723 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2017) (“Absent a claim 27 of privilege or personal right, only the non-party served with the subpoena has standing to quash 28 it.”) (denying party’s motion for a protective order where party objected to nonparty’s ee I OS OS IE I IRIE II IRI IIE DISSE III NE EE

1 | deposition). Because Plaintiff has not identified a privilege or personal right, he cannot seek an 2 | order prohibiting the taking of Isaac or Tamrin Razo’s depositions. Third, the depositions of 3 | Issac and Tamrin Razo are relevant and proportional to the needs of the case based on the proffer 4 | presented by Defendants. This case is proceeding on Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Rodriguez 5 | and Gamboa violated Plaintiffs First Amendment right to send mail to his adult son. Plaintiff 6 | argues that the testimony of Isaac and Tamrin Razo is not relevant to liability. However, 7 | Defendants submit that “Isaac Razo’s testimony regarding, for example, whether he attempted or 8 | intended to contact Plaintiff or wanted to receive contact from Plaintiff is relevant to damages. 9 | Tamrin Razo’s testimony regarding, for example, any historical relationship between Plaintiff and 10 | Isaac Razo, Tamrin Razo’s communications with CDCR, or previous attempts by Plaintiff to 11 | communicate with Isaac or Tamrin Razo is relevant to liability and damages.”! (ECF No. 37 at 12 | 4.) Thus, the deposition of Isaac and Tamrin Razo are relevant under Federal Rule of Civil 13 | Procedure 26. Lastly, Plaintiff's contention that Defendants seek to take Isaac and Tamrin Razo’s 14 | depositions to coerce him into settlement is unfounded. There are simply no allegations to 15 | support Plaintiff's contention of coercion.” Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for a protective order 16 | must be denied. 17 Il. 18 ORDER 19 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for a protective 20 | order is DENIED. 21 99 | IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. fe 23 | Dated: _ February 4, 2026 STANLEY A. BOONE 24 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 ' Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Defendants cannot propound written discovery against Isaac and Tamrin Razo. 07 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, 36. ? Defendants are advised that the Court’s scheduling order explicitly exempted them from the meet and confer 28 requirement (ECF No. 30 4 4), and Plaintiff is not required to do so prior to filing discovery motions.