Jessica Dauzat v. Marcus Cooper

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 4, 2015
• Docket: CA-0014-1014
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-1014

JESSICA DAUZAT, ET AL.

VERSUS

MARCUS COOPER, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2013-8934-A HONORABLE MARK A. JEANSONNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

JIMMIE C. PETERS JUDGE

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Sean P. Rabalais Casler, Bordelon, & Lawler 11550 Newcastle Avenue, Suite 200 Baton Rouge, LA 70816 (337) 347-0096 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Progressive Security Insurance Company Norris J. Greenhouse 214 North Main Street P.O. Box 444 Marksville, LA 71351 (318) 253-6394 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Jessica Dauzat

Cory P. Roy Roy & Scott, Attorneys at Law P. O. Box 544 Marksville, LA 71351 (318) 240-7800 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES: Daniel Lachney Lacey Lachney

Heather L. Landry Milling Benson Woodward, L.L.P. 445 North Boulevard, Suite 200 Baton Rouge, LA 70802 (225) 291-7300 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association PETERS, J.

The defendant in this litigation, Progressive Security Insurance Company

(Progressive), appeals the fault aspects of a trial court judgment rendered against it

in favor of the plaintiffs, Jessica Dauzat and Daniel Lachney, awarding them

monetary damages for the injuries they sustained in an August 7, 2012 automobile

accident. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The accident at issue occurred on the afternoon of August 7, 2012, in Baton

Rouge, Louisiana, and involved a vehicle driven by Jessica Dauzat and one driven

by Marcus Cooper. At the time of the accident, both Ms. Dauzat‟s 1999 Ford F-

150 King Cab pickup truck and Mr. Cooper‟s 2002 Chevrolet Tahoe were traveling

eastbound on Interstate 10 (I-10) between the Siegen Lane and Essen Lane exits

when Ms. Dauzat‟s vehicle struck the rear of Mr. Cooper‟s vehicle. Daniel

Lachney occupied the front passenger seat of Ms. Dauzat‟s vehicle; and his

daughter, Lacey Lachney, occupied the back seat. Katie Touchet occupied the

front passenger seat of Mr. Cooper‟s vehicle. Progressive insured Mr. Cooper‟s

vehicle for liability purposes, and Southern Casualty Insurance Company

(Southern Casualty) insured Ms. Dauzat‟s vehicle for underinsured/uninsured

coverage.

On February 4, 2013, Ms. Dauzat and Mr. Lachney filed a suit for damages

against Mr. Cooper, Progressive, and Southern Casualty. 1 In their suit, the

plaintiffs asserted that Mr. Cooper suddenly and without warning switched lanes,

1 Mr. Lachney asserted a claim for damages individually and on behalf of his minor child, and the trial court rejected that claim after trial. Additionally, by the time the matter went to trial, any issue involving Southern Casualty had been resolved. Also, at the beginning of the trial on the merits, the plaintiffs dismissed Mr. Cooper as a party defendant, leaving Progressive as the only defendant. thereby causing the accident. The matter went to trial against Progressive on June

11, 2014.

After completion of the two-day evidentiary phase of trial, the trial court

rendered oral reasons for judgment finding Mr. Cooper to be solely at fault in

causing the accident and awarded general and special damages to Ms. Dauzat in

the amount of $35,156.38; and awarded general and special damages to Mr.

Lachney in the amount of $34,850.12. On July 8, 2014, the trial court executed a

written judgment conforming to the oral reasons for judgment and, thereafter,

Progressive perfected this appeal. In its appeal, Progressive asserts that the trial

court erred in concluding that the accident was caused solely and exclusively by

the fault of Mr. Cooper.

OPINION

The plaintiffs assert that the accident occurred when Mr. Cooper attempted

to change lanes on I-10, and that this action on his part created a sudden

emergency. The trial court agreed.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:81(A) provides that “[t]he driver of a motor

vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and

prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and

the condition of the highway[,]” and Louisiana courts have uniformly held that a

following motorist in a rear-end collision is presumed to have breached that

required standard of conduct and is presumed negligent. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d

1120 (La.1987). Still that driver may overcome this presumption by establishing

the existence of a sudden emergency caused by the forward vehicle that the

following motorist could not have reasonably anticipated. Cheairs v. State ex rel.

Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 03-0680 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536; Boudreaux v.

2 Wimberley, 02-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), 843 So.2d 519, writ denied, 13-1251

(La. 9/5/03), 852 So.2d 1037.

With regard to changing lanes, La.R.S. 32:79(1) provides that “[a] vehicle

shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be

moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can

be made with safety.” In addition, La.R.S. 32:104(A) provides that “[n]o person

shall...turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway

unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.”

Furthermore, in the event of a lane change maneuver, a motorist must use signals

to indicate an intention to change lanes. La.R.S. 32:104(D).

The jurisprudence has recognized that “a motorist attempting to make a lane

change on a multiple-lane highway is required to determine that the maneuver can

be „made safely without endangering normal overtaking or oncoming traffic‟

before attempting the lane change.” Daigle v. Mumphrey, 96-1891, p. 5 (La.App.

4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 260, 263, quoting Averna v. Industrial Fabrication &

Marine Service, Inc., 562 So.2d 1157, 1161 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). The motorist

changing lanes “is held to a greater burden of care than is a motorist proceeding on

a straight line in a marked lane at a lawful rate,” and “when a motorist has changed

lanes just prior to an accident, that motorist bears the burden of proving that he

determined that the movement could be made safely prior to attempting the move.”

Id. As recognized in Anthony v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 227 So.2d 180,

183 (La.App. 2 Cir.1969):

A motorist whose vehicle is struck from the rear by reason of his inopportune change of lanes may not thereby convert the occurrence into a rear-end collision so as to impose the burden upon the other motorist to exculpate himself from negligence. In such cases, plaintiffs have the burden to establish, by a reasonable preponderance of evidence, the facts upon which they rely, that is, in this instance, 3 that a rear-end collision occurred. Otherwise a defendant would bear the burden of establishing his freedom from fault in all cases involving accidents occasioned by a forward motorist‟s changing of traffic lanes. Such a shift of the burden of proof is neither authorized nor countenanced by statutory enactments or by pronouncements found in the jurisprudence.

The four adult occupants of the vehicles provided the trial court with

testimony concerning how the accident occurred, and this testimony was factually

conflicting. The trial court choose to accept the version of the accident established

by the plaintiffs‟ testimony, and it is well settled in Louisiana‟s jurisprudence that

a reviewing court may not set aside a factfinder‟s determinations absent manifest

error. Stobart v. State through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

It is undisputed that both vehicles were eastbound on I-10 between the Essen

Lane and Siegen Lane exits immediately before the accident, and that construction

in that area had reduced the highway to two eastbound lanes. According to Ms.

Dauzat and Mr. Lachney, immediately before the accident both vehicles had been

traveling in the left, or inside lane of I-10, with the Cooper vehicle in the lead. Mr.

Cooper attempted to change lanes into the right lane, but before he had completed

the maneuver, changed his mind and attempted to move back into the left lane in

front of Ms. Dauzat. When he started to move back into the left lane, Ms. Dauzat‟s

right front bumper struck Mr. Cooper‟s left rear bumper, causing Ms. Dauzat‟s

vehicle to veer to the left and strike the concrete wall separating the median

between the eastbound and westbound lanes.

Both Ms. Dauzat and Mr. Lachney testified to a number of lane changes in

heavy traffic by the two vehicles in the moments before the accident and asserted

that at no time did Mr. Cooper signal his intent to change lanes. Mr. Lachney

testified that it appeared Mr. Cooper was attempting to move to the right lane

thinking the traffic would be less congested, but half-way through that maneuver 4 he realized that the right lane was more congested than the left and attempted to

move back into the left lane.

On the other hand, Mr. Cooper and Ms. Touchet testified that from the time

they entered I-10 at its intersection with Acadian Throughway Mr. Cooper

remained in the right lane and was not attempting to change lanes when Ms.

Dauzart‟s vehicle struck theirs. They remained in the right lane because they were

unfamiliar with the highway and did not want to miss the exit to the Mall of

Louisiana. Mr. Cooper testified that as he and the vehicle in front of him slowed at

a normal pace, he heard a screeching of tires, looked in the rear view mirror, and

saw Ms. Dauzart unsuccessfully swerve to avoid the collision.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court specifically found Ms. Dauzat and

Mr. Lachney to be credible, and found that Mr. Cooper was not a credible witness.

Specifically, the trial court stated that Ms. Dauzat and Mr. Lachney were “very,

very, simple people, not capable of malingering.” The trial court further found that

“Ms. Dauzat was so not coached which is to be applauded that she couldn‟t get left

and right correct. She was trying to explain the story about whether they were in

the left lane or the right lane and she confused a lot of her own testimony. I cannot

punish her for that, she was not trying to mislead the court in anyway. She‟s a

simple person. She‟s not a college graduate obviously[.]” The trial court also

noted that although Mr. Lachney was a convicted felon, its conclusion was that his

testimony was credible. Specifically, the trial court noted that “[t]he man is not

capable of misleading the court. He‟s a simple person, he doesn‟t have the capacity

or the ability to spin a web of deceit and tell us a good story. He can only tell us

what he believes to be the truth.”

5 On the other hand, the trial court found Mr. Cooper to be “a well oiled

machine, almost robotic. A good story and obviously a better story teller.” Of

specific significance to the trial court was Mr. Cooper‟s denial under oath of the

preparations he made the night before trial. The trial court found that this

testimony caused Mr. Cooper‟s credibility to be “strained.” The trial court also

found that the photographs depicting the damage to the two vehicles supported the

plaintiffs‟ version of the accident. In addressing the specifics of the accident itself,

the trial court factually found that Mr. Cooper had left the left lane of travel

immediately before the accident, that Ms. Dauzat accelerated to fill the gap left by

Mr. Cooper vacating the left lane, and that Mr. Cooper then attempted to reenter

the left lane before completing his maneuver into the right lane, thereby creating a

sudden emergency, and that the point of impact was “a foot and a half over into the

plaintiff‟s lane.”

In reviewing the evidentiary record, we recognize that inconsistencies exist

in the testimony of all of the witnesses, and that Ms. Dauzat‟s testimony is

particularly confusing. As pointed out by the trial court, she transposed directions

when attempting to identify the position of her vehicle at specific times leading up

to the accident. Additionally, her use of time and distance at various times before

the accident was not realistic; she gave a vague and seemingly conflicting written

statement to the investigating officer immediately after the accident; and although

an attempt was made to effect a sketch of the final positions of the vehicles at the

time of the accident, the sketch generated is less than helpful. Still, the ultimate

result of Ms. Dauzat‟s testimony was to establish the factual scenario accepted by

the trial court.

6 This court recently reasserted that basic rule of appellate review of factual

determinations in Poole v. Poole, 08-1325, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09), 7 So.3d

806, 810 (second alteration in original), wherein it stated the following:

In order to reverse a fact finder‟s determination of fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and meet the following two-part test: (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. [Stobart, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).] Where there is conflict in the testimony presented at trial, the trial court‟s reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). A trial court‟s credibility determinations are subject to the strictest deference, and the manifest error or clearly wrong standard demands great deference for the trial court‟s findings. Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93- 2661 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 1305. “[T]he issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder‟s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Thus, if the trial court‟s decision is reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though the appellate court would have weighed the evidence differently. Rosell, 549 So.2d 840.

Following the guidelines set forth in Poole, we first note that a reasonable

basis does exist for the trial court‟s factual findings, and although other factual

findings could be just as reasonable, we do not find that the trial court was clearly

wrong or manifestly erroneous. We find no merit in Progressive‟s assignment of

error.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment finding Marcus

Cooper to be solely at fault for the accident and awarding Jessica Dauzat and

Daniel Lachney damages. We assess all costs of this appeal to Progressive

Security Insurance Company.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.