Rel: March 6, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0377 _________________________
Jessica Bugge
v.
Jeb S. Fannin
Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court (DR-21-900167)
FRIDY, Judge.
Attorney Jessica Bugge appeals from an order that Talladega
Circuit Judge Jeb S. Fannin entered finding her in contempt for her
failure to attend the third day of trial as scheduled in the underlying
divorce action. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order in CL-2025-0377
part, reverse it in part, and remand the matter for the entry of an order
consistent with this opinion.
Background
On June 6, 2021, Jennifer Riddle commenced a divorce action in the
Talladega Circuit Court ("the trial court"). On September 23, 2021, Bugge
filed a notice of appearance in the divorce action on behalf of Riddle. The
trial court first set the divorce action for trial on April 19, 2022, but
continued it numerous times before eventually beginning the trial in
March 2023. From the record before us, it appears that the trial was held
on two days and that the third day of the trial was scheduled for May 15,
2023. However, the trial court continued the resumption of the trial
several times for reasons not pertinent to this appeal.
On October 16, 2024, the trial court set the resumption of the trial
for December 9 and 10, 2024. On Friday, December 6, 2024, Bugge filed
a motion to continue the trial, which was scheduled to resume the
following Monday. The trial court granted the continuance and, on
December 11, 2024, rescheduled the trial for December 16 and 18, 2024.
On December 12, 2024, Bugge filed a notice of trial conflict and a motion
to continue, which the trial court granted.
2 CL-2025-0377
The trial court held a status conference on December 18, 2024, to
determine available dates for the resumption of the trial. Based on the
dates the attorneys provided, the trial court entered an order on January
14, 2025, setting the case for trial on January 30 and 31, 2025. On
January 27, 2025, Bugge filed a notice of trial conflict. On January 29,
2025, she filed a motion to continue the trial in this case, asserting that
she had a hearing in a criminal case in the Franklin Circuit Court that
day, that a motion for sanctions relating to discovery requests was still
pending, that the defendant had requested additional documents from
her client, Riddle, and that the defendant still had not provided certain
financial information that Bugge had requested during discovery. Bugge
again sought a continuance "until such time as all pending motions in
this case have been heard, and all Orders complied with, in order that
both parties can prepare for trial based on some advance knowledge of
what issues and facts stand to be addressed." Bugge did not attend the
trial on January 30, 2025.
On February 26, 2025, the trial court entered an order ("the show-
cause order") directing Bugge to appear before the court on March 6,
2025, to show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt for
3 CL-2025-0377
failing to attend the trial as ordered and to show cause why sanctions
should not be imposed on her. In the show-cause order, the trial court
explained that the trial had been specially set for January 30 and 31,
2025, based on dates of availability that Bugge had provided, but that,
when the case was called for trial on January 30, Bugge was absent. The
trial court noted that Bugge had failed to provide a justifiable reason for
her absence and had not gained the court's permission to be absent.
On March 5, 2025, Larry Riddle, the defendant in the action, filed
a motion for sanctions to recover the expenses he had incurred related to
the January 30, 2025, trial date for which Bugge had failed to appear. He
explained that he lived in The Villages in Florida and that he had
traveled 1,050 miles roundtrip to attend the trial in Talladega. Using
fifty-one cents per mile to calculate his travel expenses, he requested
$546 for his travel; $287.68 for hotel expenses; $341.77 for meals, gas,
etc.; and an attorney fee of $4,650 incurred from December 18, 2024,
through January 30, 2025.1 He attached an affidavit and documentary
evidence attesting to the validity of those expenses to his motion.
1Based on Riddle's figures, the amount he requested for his travel
should have been $535.50. 4 CL-2025-0377
At the March 6, 2025, hearing, Bugge gave a rambling explanation
for her absence that boiled down to her belief, which she said was based
on court documents, that she had a jury trial in a criminal case in the
Franklin Circuit Court ("the Franklin criminal case") scheduled for the
morning of January 30. Judge Fannin asked Bugge why she did not e-
mail him that morning to notify him that she would not be in attendance
at the trial in this case. She noted that he had retired and said that she
did not have his e-mail address. Judge Fannin told Bugge that, even
though he was retired, he still received e-mail at his AlaCourt e-mail
address.2
The attorney for the defendant introduced into evidence the
AlaCourt case-action-summary sheet for the Franklin criminal case
indicating that on December 20, 2024, that case was set for a pretrial
docket on January 30, 2025, and that it was not set for a jury trial until
April 2025. The attorneys and the trial court took a closer look at the
2During the litigation of the divorce action, Judge Fannin retired.
On September 9, 2024, the presiding judge of the Talladega Circuit Court entered an order observing that he had received an order from the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court assigning Judge Fannin to serve as a circuit and district judge in Talladega County, and he assigned Judge Fannin to continue to preside over the Riddle divorce action. 5 CL-2025-0377
case-action-summary sheet, which indicated that the Franklin criminal
case had never been set for trial on January 30, 2025. During a
conversation among Bugge, Judge Fannin, and defense counsel, Bugge
said that she did not remember "if this was the jury trial or if this was
the pretrial, but in either way, shape or form, I was -- I did have to be
there. I was not excused. I did try to get excused."
Judge Fannin asked Bugge whether she had tried to contact
defense counsel in the underlying divorce action about the trial setting.
Bugge's response was evasive, and the defense attorney told Judge
Fannin that his office had not received a telephone call or an e-mail from
Bugge regarding the January 30, 2025, trial setting.
Bugge told Judge Fannin that he had not responded to her request
to continue. He said: "If I didn't respond, that would mean I didn't want
to continue it. Can you not understand that?" Bugge said that she did not
and that the trial court's failure to rule on her motion to continue did not
provide her with any direction. She also told Judge Fannin that her
failure to attend the trial could not be considered contempt because, she
said, it was not willful. She also said that she believed that a criminal
case took precedence over this "financial case."
6 CL-2025-0377
On April 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order ("the contempt
order") finding that the divorce action had been set for trial twice in
December and that Bugge had requested a continuance both times. After
granting both continuances, the trial court wrote, it had held a status
conference to ascertain when the attorneys for the parties could be
available for trial. The attorneys were all available on January 30 and
31, 2025, so the trial court set those dates for the trial to resume.
In the contempt order, the trial court found that, on December 20,
2024, a pretrial hearing was scheduled for January 30, 2025, in the
Franklin criminal case. It also found that Bugge did not follow the
Attorney Calendar Conflict Resolution Order ("the conflict-resolution
order")3 by failing to contact counsel for the defendant in the divorce
action immediately to resolve the conflict when she received notice of the
3Pursuant to Rule 201(b)(2), Ala. R. Evid., we take judicial notice
that the conflict-resolution order, adopted effective October 22, 1990, outlines the procedure an attorney is to follow when he or she is scheduled to appear in more than one court at the same time or within such a short period that the attorney cannot reasonably be expected to appear in both courts. The conflict-resolution order provides that, upon receiving notice of a trial or hearing that conflicts with a trial or hearing that has already been set, the attorney is to immediately attempt to resolve the conflict and, if he or she is unable to do so, to "promptly" attempt to resolve the conflict by filing an appropriate motion in the courts involved. 7 CL-2025-0377
date of the pretrial conference in the Franklin criminal case. The trial
court also noted that Bugge did not file a notice of conflict with the trial
court until January 27, 2025, and that Bugge had failed to follow the
conflict-resolution order by failing to consult with Judge Fannin or notify
him that she had made efforts to resolve the scheduling conflict and that
those efforts had been unsuccessful.
The trial court found that Bugge had filed a motion to continue in
the divorce action on January 29, 2025, the day before the trial was set
to resume, in which she referred to her scheduling conflict and other
things. The trial court did not continue the divorce action, and it noted in
the contempt order that, pursuant to the conflict-resolution order, "no
resolution of a conflict shall result in a continuation unless a continuance
is expressly ordered by the trial judge." Additionally, the trial court found
that, on the morning of January 30, 2025, Bugge called the Talladega
circuit clerk's office and said that she would not be attending the trial
that day. When the trial court called the case for trial, Bugge did not
appear. Finally, the trial court found, Bugge's "argument to support her
absence from the trial is without merit, and she should be adjudged in
8 CL-2025-0377
contempt of court for her failure to attend a specially set trial, with a
specially sitting trial judge."
The trial court sentenced Bugge to the Talladega County jail for
contempt but suspended that sentence to provide Bugge with an
opportunity to purge herself of contempt. The trial court directed Bugge
to pay the defendant's attorney fee of $4,500 and $1,175.45 for the
expenses he had incurred for traveling to Talladega for the trial; she was
to remit the payments within thirty days from the date of the contempt
order. If she failed to remit those payments, the trial court ordered, the
jail sentence would be imposed.
Bugge appealed the contempt order to the Alabama Supreme Court
on May 14, 2025. That court transferred the appeal to this court on May
22, 2025, pursuant to § 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975.
Analysis
Bugge contends that, because the contempt order does not specify
whether she was in direct or indirect contempt, or civil or criminal
contempt, it is inadequate and due to be reversed. To support her
contention, Bugge cites Charles Manufacturing Co. v. United Furniture
Workers, 361 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Ala. 1978). However, that case involves
9 CL-2025-0377
the notice that must be provided to a person against whom contempt
charges have been levied, not what information is to be included in the
contempt judgment itself. To the extent that Bugge argues that she was
deprived of notice as to the nature of the contempt charges against her,
i.e., that she was not told whether the trial court's show-cause order
alleged direct or indirect contempt, or civil or criminal contempt, we have
found no authority that requires such specificity in a show-cause order.
In Charles Manufacturing, our supreme court discussed the various
types of contempt, explaining that
"[c]ontempts are divided along two lines: first, civil or criminal contempt. Civil contempt sanctions seek to compel or coerce compliance with orders of the court in the future, while a criminal contempt is one in which the purpose of the proceeding is to impose punishment for disobedience of orders of the court. The second line divides contempts into those which are either direct or indirect. Direct contempts are those committed in the 'presence' of the judge, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, and are actually observed by the court. If some of the essential elements are not personally observed by the judge it is an indirect contempt."
361 So. 2d at 1035-36 (citations omitted). In Ex parte Sheffield, 120 So.
3d 1091, 1094-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), this court determined that the
failure of an attorney to appear for a scheduled hearing or trial
constitutes constructive, or indirect, contempt and that the accused
10 CL-2025-0377
attorney is entitled to due process that requires him or her to be advised
of the charges against him or her, as well as an opportunity to be heard.
See also Ex parte Tarpley, 293 Ala. 137, 300 So. 2d 409 (1974). The
preliminary statement, here the show-cause order, "must set forth all
facts essential to the court's jurisdiction, including facts constituting a
contempt, and the statement must clearly apprise the person charged of
the nature and cause of the accusation." Charles Mfg., 361 So. 2d at 1037.
In its show-cause order, the trial court notified Bugge that the
wrongful conduct that was the basis of the alleged contempt was her
failure to attend the specially set trial on January 30, 2025, and the trial
court provided Bugge with a hearing in which she was afforded the
opportunity to address her actions and to "give testimony relevant either
to the issue of complete exculpation or extenuation of the offense and in
mitigation of the penalty imposed." Charles Mfg., 361 So. 2d at 1037.
Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of due process were
satisfied.
Bugge also argues that the contempt order did not indicate whether
she was in civil contempt or in criminal contempt and points out that
each type is governed by a different standard of review and each provides
11 CL-2025-0377
for different types of remedies. In State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1072
(Ala. 1989), our supreme court discussed the differences between civil
and criminal contempt, writing:
"Contempts are characterized as either civil or criminal. Civil contempt seeks to compel or coerce compliance with orders of the court, while a criminal contempt is one in which the purpose of the proceeding is to impose punishment for disobedience of orders of the court.
"The sanction for civil contempt continues indefinitely until the contemnor performs as ordered. A critical distinction is that the sanction for criminal contempt is limited in Alabama district and circuit courts to a maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five days."
(Citations omitted.) The Thomas court also observed that "[t]he line
between civil and criminal contempt can sometimes become blurred." Id.
at 1073. That court wrote: "Confusion arises in attempts to classify civil
and criminal contempts, because the elements often overlap. In
appropriate circumstances, however, a party's actions can support a
finding of both civil and criminal contempt." Id. See also Willis v. Willis,
329 So. 3d 650, 661-62 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (holding that trial court
found mother in both criminal contempt and civil contempt).
In Kizale v. Kizale, 254 So. 3d 233, 237-38 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017),
this court wrote:
12 CL-2025-0377
"The two types of contempt -- criminal and civil -- are governed by different standards of review. In the case of civil contempt, we have often explained that
" 'whether a party is in contempt of court is a determination committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, absent an [excess] of that discretion or unless the judgment of the trial court is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably wrong, this court will affirm.'
"Unlike civil contempt, criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the alleged contemnor's guilt.
" 'The standard of review in an appeal from an adjudication of criminal contempt occurring in a civil case is whether the offense, i.e., the contempt, was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ...
" ' "The essential elements of the criminal contempt for which punishment has been imposed on [the defendant] are that the court entered a lawful order of reasonable specificity, [the defendant] violated it, and the violation was wilful. Guilt may be determined and punishment imposed only if each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ' "
(Citations and footnote omitted.)
In Hill v. Hill, 637 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), this court
explained that whether a certain charge involves civil contempt or
criminal contempt becomes important because one facing a contempt
13 CL-2025-0377
charge must be able to purge himself or herself from the contempt. To
purge oneself in a criminal-contempt case, the contemnor must pay the
fine imposed, serve the authorized time, or do both. Id. To purge oneself
in a civil-contempt case, the contemnor must comply with the court's
order. Id.
Here, the trial court found Bugge in contempt for her failure to
attend the trial as scheduled and her failure to follow the provisions set
forth in the conflict-resolution order and sentenced her to five days in the
Talladega County jail. Because Bugge could not comply with the trial
court's order to attend trial on January 30, 2025, she could not purge
herself of contempt; therefore, the trial court's finding of contempt
necessarily was intended to punish Bugge for her failure to attend the
trial as scheduled. Thus, the trial court's finding of contempt was
criminal in nature, not civil. See Ingram v. Allred, 119 So. 3d 1176, 1186
(Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (holding that attorney was held in criminal
contempt for failing to attend hearing because purpose of contempt was
to punish attorney rather to compel attendance at hearing because
attorney could not "travel back in time" to appear at that hearing to purge
herself of contempt).
14 CL-2025-0377
To hold a party in either criminal contempt under Rule
70A(a)(2)(C), Ala. R. Civ. P., or civil contempt under 70A(a)(2)(D), Ala. R.
Civ. P., the trial court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the party
willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order. T.L.D. v. C.G., 849
So. 2d 200, 205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Shook v. Shook, 385 So. 3d 65, 85
(Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Bugge contends that, here, the evidence did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had acted willfully and
deliberately when she did not attend the trial on January 30, 2025. Bugge
argues that a finding of contempt would be appropriate in this case only
if the evidence showed that she had "intended to thwart the [trial] court's
order, or to avoid completing the case." Bugge's brief, p. 6. She cites no
authority for that contention, however.
The evidence supports the trial court's findings that Bugge knew
that the divorce action was to resume in the trial court on January 30,
2025, that she made the decision to attend a pretrial docket call in the
Franklin criminal case instead, and that she did not immediately contact
defense counsel to resolve the scheduling conflict when she received
notice of the date of the pretrial conference in the Franklin criminal case,
as the conflict-resolution order requires. The evidence also supports the
15 CL-2025-0377
trial court's finding that Bugge did not file a notice of conflict with the
trial court until January 27, 2025, and that she had failed to consult
promptly with Judge Fannin about her efforts to resolve the conflict, as
required by the conflict-resolution order. This evidence supports a
determination that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Bugge's failure to attend
the trial on the date scheduled was willful and deliberate and that her
conduct constituted criminal contempt. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in finding Bugge in contempt.
Bugge also contends that, if the trial court properly found her in
criminal contempt and a jail sentence was the consequence, the trial
court could not subject her to purging herself from that contempt by
requiring her to pay the defendant's expenses. In the contempt order, the
trial court directed that Bugge could purge herself from contempt if she
paid the travel expenses the defendant incurred traveling to Talladega to
attend the trial and the attorney fee the defendant incurred for his
attorney's immediate preparation and attendance at the trial on January
30, 2025. Bugge contends that the trial court's order permitting her to
purge herself of contempt in this manner is inconsistent with a finding of
criminal contempt, arguing that, if the jail sentence was punishment,
16 CL-2025-0377
then the finding of contempt "should not be subject to being purged by
payment of a large sum of money to the defendant." Bugge's brief, p. 19.
As discussed, we conclude that the trial court held Bugge in criminal
contempt, not civil contempt, and, as a result, we agree with Bugge that,
as part of the contempt action, the trial court lacked authority to impose
on her the requirement that she pay the defendant the expenses he
requested in his motion for sanctions to purge herself of contempt.
“Sanctions for criminal contempt are limited by statute to a
maximum fine of $100 and imprisonment not to exceed five days. See Ala.
Code 1975, § 12-11-30(5)." Pate v. Guy, 934 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005). "'To purge [oneself] in a criminal contempt case, the
contemnor must pay the fine imposed, serve the authorized time, or do
both." Davenport v. Hood, 814 So. 2d 268, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (citing
Kalupa v. Kalupa, 527 So. 2d 1313 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Because the
trial court could not properly order Bugge to pay the sanctions the
defendant requested as punishment for her criminal contempt, the
contempt order is reversed insofar as it directs Bugge to pay the attorney
fee and travel expenses the defendant requested as part of the contempt
matter. In reaching this conclusion, we are not to be understood as
17 CL-2025-0377
holding that a trial court can never suspend a sentence or fine under the
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Kent v. Herchenhan, 215 So. 3d
1079, 1084 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).
Conclusion
The contempt order is reversed insofar as it directed Bugge to pay
the attorney fee and travel expenses of the defendant to purge herself of
contempt. The balance of the contempt order is affirmed. The cause is
remanded for the trial court to enter an order consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.