Jessica Bozeman v. City of Tallahassee

• Court: District Court, N.D. Florida
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 4:26-cv-00216
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Page 1 of 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION JESSICA BOZEMAN,

Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF CITY OF TALLAHASSEE,

Defendant. _________________________/ REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this case by filing an emergency complaint, ECF No. 1, seeking “prospective non-dispositive relief” concerning three animals1 who are being held in the Tallahassee-Leon County Animal Services Center. Plaintiff also filed an emergency motion

for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and service was directed, requiring an expedited response. ECF No. 6. In response,

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, ECF No. 12, and a response, 1 The animals at issue are dogs. ECF No. 1 at 2. Page 2 of 15 ECF No. 13, in opposition to the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff has filed a notice of supplemental facts,2 ECF

No. 10, and a memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 18. Those motions are ready for a ruling. Underlying Facts

The City of Tallahassee brought an action in state court against Plaintiff Jessica Bozeman, seeking custody of four dogs and prohibiting Ms. Bozeman “from possessing or having custody of domestic animals.” See City of Tallahassee v Jessica Bozeman, 2026 CC 000429. ECF No. 4

at 4; see also ECF No. 12 at 2. Judgment was entered in favor of the City and against Ms. Bozeman on February 27, 2026. ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 4 at 4-8. The “Final Judgment” transferred custody of four dogs to the City of

Tallahassee. ECF No. 4 at 7. The Order stated that “Respondent, Jessica Bozeman, shall have no further custody of the three (3) remaining dogs.”3

2 Plaintiff’s notice concerns the status of the three animals at issue and the remains of the fourth animal. ECF No. 10. The notice has been reviewed. 3 One dog, Shianne, has already been euthanized. ECF No. 1 at 1. The other three dogs have been “temporarily placed . . . in administrative hold status.” Id. at 4. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 3 of 15 Id. Ms. Bozeman filed an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal which is still pending. Id.

Ms. Bozeman’s emergency motion seeks to prevent the City from placing the dogs up for adoption and from “transferring, fostering, rescuing, euthanizing, relocating, sterilizing, surrendering, or subjecting” the dogs to “irreversible disposition or permanent transfer of custody while state

appellate review remains pending . . . .” ECF No. 3 at 2. Her complaint asserts a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ECF No. 1 at 5, and the request for relief within the complaint mirrors the request from the

emergency motion. Id. at 6. Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12 The City points out that it lawfully seized the dogs from Ms. Bozeman “following a finding of probable cause” that her minor son “had engaged in

sexual abuse of” one of the dogs. ECF No. 12 at 2. The Final Judgment was entered after notice was given to Ms. Bozeman and she was provided an opportunity to be heard during an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 3. That

Judgment ordered that permanent custody of the dogs “be turned over to the City of Tallahassee Animal Services.” Id.

Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 4 of 15 The City further explains that Ms. Bozeman filed multiples motions to stay and motions to review in the county court and the court of appeal. Id.

at 4. Both “the county court and the appellate court have denied the motions,”4 id, and Ms. Bozeman acknowledges that fact in her initial complaint. See ECF No. 1 at 3 (“Prior state preservation and stay requests have been denied or failed to result in enforceable preservation of the

animals”). Her “emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction” contends that her instant request “for temporary non-disposition preservation” does not duplicate the request she filed in the

Florida First District Court of Appeal “seeking conditional structured placement or limited remand,” and she advises that motion was “pending,” at least as of May 4, 2026. ECF No. 3 at 4. The City asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action

and strips this Court of jurisdiction. ECF No. 12 at 5. Further, the City’s motion to dismiss argues that this Court must abstain under Younger v Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Id. at 13. Additional arguments are that

4 The District Court of Appeal denied her motion to stay. ECF No. 12 at 4. The City advises that Ms. Bozeman filed five motions in the appellate court and three motions in county court. Id. (citing to ECF No. 11-1). Ms. Bozeman acknowledges that her stay requests were denied. ECF No. 1 at 3; see also ECF No. 4 at 9. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 5 of 15 Plaintiff lacks Article III standing and her complaint fails to state a claim. Id. at 19-29.

In response, Ms. Bozeman argues that her injury is not the final judgment, this case is not barred by Rooker-Feldman, and Younger abstention does not apply. ECF No. 18 at 1-2. She contends those “arguments are internally contradictory” because state proceedings cannot

be both final and ongoing. Id. at 3. Finally, she asserts that the complaint should not be dismissed because she has standing and has stated a due process claim. Id. at 3-4.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction A well established body of law known as the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” bars federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). “The

Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies when ‘state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments’ bring later claims in federal district court that invite the district court to review5 and reject the earlier

state-court judgments.” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th

5 To be clear, the Court has reviewed only the “Final Judgment” as referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint and not other attachments provided. See ECF No. 17. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 6 of 15 Cir. 2012). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), the Supreme Court

clarified that the Rooker–Feldman “doctrine is ‘confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.’” Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine applies where an issue presented to the district court is

“inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1262. A claim is “inextricably intertwined” if it asks a federal court to “effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Target Media Partners,

881 F.3d at 1286. Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine because “[i]t is well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Harper v. Chase

Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 132 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 7 of 15 Here, Ms. Bozeman argues that this action is not barred because her “alleged injury is not the entry of the Final Judgment” but, instead, it is the

threatened loss of the dogs “before appellate review concludes.” ECF No. 18 at 1. She contends that granting relief in her favor “would not require finding the state judgment erroneous.” Id. at 2. Her emergency motion states that she “does not ask this Court to reverse, modify, vacate, review,

or stay the state Final Judgment.” ECF No. 3 at 2. Rather, her complaint seeks to prevent the City from transferring custody of the dogs through adoption, fostering, or rescue and seeks to prevent them from being

euthanized during her appeal. ECF No. 1 at 6. Importantly, a final judgment was entered against Ms. Bozeman and in favor of the City in county court. The judgment was based on the court’s conclusion that Ms. Bozeman did not meet her burden “to prove she is able

and fit to have custody of and adequately provide for” the dogs at issue. ECF No. 4 at 5. Her custody of the dogs was terminated and the dogs were placed in the custody of the City. Id. at 7. Ms. Bozeman’s “injury” is

directly caused by the Final Judgment - her loss of possession of the dogs which renders her unable to control what the City does with the dogs.

Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 8 of 15 It would appear that her claim in this case is inextricably intertwined with the Final Judgment as entered by County Court Judge Nina Ashenafi-

Richardson on February 27, 2026, because she is asking this Court to nullify the Judgment by forbidding the City to assert its authority over property which was placed in its custody - four dogs. Although she argues that she is not seeking to vacate the state court order in this case, see ECF

No. 3 at 2, and she contends she is merely requesting the dogs be preserved in this action, Ms. Bozeman’s ultimate purpose is to “obtain restoration” of the animals. Id. at 8. She contends that if the “animals are

disposed of,” her “appeal risks becoming a paper exercise.” Id. Yet the ongoing appeal presents an additional issue - has the state proceeding ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman? That question was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal in Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d

1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009). There, the Court pointed to its earlier decision in Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464 (11th Cir.1996), which “implie[d] that the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine does not apply where a state court loser has appealed to the state appellate court.” Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1276. However, there is no longer a need to rely on an implication as the Eleventh Circuit has now clearly Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 9 of 15 held “that state proceedings have not ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman when an appeal from the state court judgment remains

pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that judgment.” 558 F.3d at 1279. The City argues that “[t]he pendency of the state appeal is irrelevant”

because this action “does not challenge the issues raised on appeal.” ECF No. 12 at 10-11. First, regardless of what issues are currently on appeal, this Court must recognize the undisputed fact between the parties that an

appeal is currently pending. If the state court proceedings have not ended, then Rooker-Feldman does not bar this action. Second, if plaintiffs filed an action in federal court, requesting the court “to consider whether their constitutional rights were violated during the proceedings and whether they

are entitled to damages for those violations,” such a claim “falls outside Rooker-Feldman’s boundaries.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that due process claim was not barred).

Ms. Bozeman’s claim in this Court is a due process claim. ECF No. 1 at 5. The argument that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be denied. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 10 of 15 Younger Abstention The City next argues that the Younger abstention doctrine compels

this Court to “decline the exercise of jurisdiction . . . out of respect for the independence of state court proceedings.” ECF No. 12 at 13. The City argues that this case fits within two categories of cases which require

abstention. Id. at 14. First, the underlying state court case was brought pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 828.073,6 a “civil enforcement statute through which” the City initiated a proceeding against Ms. Bozeman for violating Florida's animal welfare laws. ECF No. 12 at 14. According to the City,

that is “a civil enforcement proceeding akin to a criminal prosecution within” the second category of Younger abstention cases. Additionally, it is argued that this is also a civil proceeding “that implicate[s] a state court’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. at 15. Of course,

Ms. Bozeman disagrees. ECF No. 18 at 2. She argues this case does not fall within one of the three exceptional categories. Id.

6 The Final Judgment said that the trial court “considered evidence properly presented pursuant to Section 828.073(5)(a), (d), (e), and (h), Florida Statutes.” ECF No. 4 at 5. Section 828.073 provides for the removal and care of animals which have been “neglected or mistreated.” Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 11 of 15 At the outset, this Court highlights for the parties that “federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction.” Sprint

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (2013). The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter.” Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 72, 134 S. Ct. at 588.

While the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear the cases before them, the Younger doctrine presents a narrow exception. [31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003)] (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). Younger “requires a federal court to abstain where a plaintiff's federal claims could be adjudicated in a pending state judicial proceeding.” Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988). Leonard v. Alabama State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 907 (11th Cir. 2023). “The Supreme Court has recognized only three types of state proceedings where abstention is warranted: (1) ‘criminal prosecutions’; (2) ‘civil enforcement proceedings’; and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ... judicial functions.’” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989) (NOPSI) (quoted in Leonard, 61 F.4th at 907-08). Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 12 of 15 The first consideration is whether the underlying state court proceeding was a “civil enforcement proceeding.” Court “decisions

applying Younger to instances of civil enforcement have generally concerned state proceedings ‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in ‘important respects.’” Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 79, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explained the characteristics of such actions

as sanctioning the federal plaintiff “for some wrongful act,” involving “a state actor who “often initiates the action,” and which involves the enforcement of state law, commonly begun by an investigation which

culminates “in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” 571 U.S. at 79- 80 (citations omitted); see also Watson v. Fla. Jud. Qualifications Comm’n, 618 F. App’x 487, 490 (11th Cir. 2015). The Court agrees with the City that the underlying proceeding based on the enforcement of Florida’s animal

welfare law is a civil enforcement proceeding. The next consideration is “whether the case warrants Younger abstention” by analyzing the three factors from Middlesex Cnty. Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) - “(1) do the proceedings constitute ‘an ongoing state judicial proceeding,’ (2) ‘do the proceedings implicate important state interests,’ and (3) ‘is there an Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 13 of 15 adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.’” Morancy v. Salomon, No. 24-12505, 2025 WL 1341957, at *2

(11th Cir. May 8, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 888, 223 L. Ed. 2d 276 (2025) (quoting Middlesex). The first factor is simple - both parties agree that Ms. Bozeman’s appeal is still pending and, thus, “ongoing.” The second factor is also simple. “Proceedings implicate important

state interests when they are necessary for the vindication of vital state policies.” Morancy, 2025 WL 1341957, at *2 (citing to 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274). The State of Florida has an important interest in

preventing animal cruelty and has made animal cruelty a criminal offense. FLA. STAT. § 828.12. The third Middlesex factor puts the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate “that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate

remedy for their federal claims.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279 (quoted in Morancy, 2025 WL 1341957, at *3). This Court must “assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of

unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Id. Ms. Bozeman has not shown that she is unable to obtain an “adequate remedy” in the Florida First

Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 14 of 15 District Court of Appeal. Therefore, because all three Middlesex factors have been met, abstention under Younger is appropriate.7

“Younger abstention applies to claims for injunctive relief, as well as claims for declaratory judgment that would effectively enjoin state proceedings.” Watson, 618 F. App’x at 491 (citing to Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)). Ms.

Bozeman’s only requests for relief in this case were for injunctive and declaratory relief. ECF No. 1 at 6. Because the Younger abstention bars this case, it is recommended that Ms. Bozeman’s motion for temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, be denied. See Watson, 618 F. App’x at 491 (holding the district court “did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Watson’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief” which were barred by Younger abstention). The Defendant City’s

motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, should be granted. RECOMMENDATION It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, ECF No. 12, based on Younger abstention be GRANTED, that 7 Briefly, this Court notes that “[e]xceptions to Younger abstention include bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute.” 618 F. App’x at 490. None of those exceptions apply in this case and Ms. Bozeman did not argue that they do. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF Page 15 of 15 Plaintiff’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to preserve specific animals from irreversible

municipal disposition, ECF No. 3, be DENIED; and this case be DISMISSED. IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on May 28, 2026.

S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636. Case No. 4:26cv216-RH-MAF