Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 448 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.08.03 14:05:57 DIVISION II -05'00' No. CV-19-466 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: October 16, 2019 JESSICA ATWOOD AND VINCENT PEAL APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. ELEVENTH DIVISION [NO. 60JV-18-8] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, APPELLEES JUDGE AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Jessica Atwood and Vincent Peal appeal the Pulaski County Circuit Court order
terminating their parental rights to their child, S.A. (10/30/17). On appeal, they both argue
that the circuit court erred by finding it was in the best interest of the child to terminate
their parental rights because the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to
provide sufficient evidence of adoptability. Peal additionally argues that the circuit court
erred by terminating his parental rights because DHS did not offer him any meaningful
services. We affirm.
On January 4, 2018, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-
neglect of S.A. The petition listed Atwood as the mother and Peal as the putative father,
and it stated that Peal was incarcerated at the Jefferson County Detention Center. In the affidavit attached to the petition, DHS alleged that Atwood had been arrested for first-degree
terroristic threatening and endangering the welfare of a minor. On the same day the petition
was filed, the court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody. On January 10, the
court found probable cause for the emergency custody.
On February 15, the court held an adjudication hearing. Both Atwood and Peal were
present. The court adjudicated S.A. dependent-neglected based on Atwood’s unfitness in
that she was “behaving erratically resulting in her arrest, and subsequently [she] has housing
instability.” The court advised Peal to contact DHS upon his release from jail in order to
obtain a DNA test and establish paternity.
The court held a review hearing on June 20. Atwood and Peal did not appear for
the hearing. The court found that Atwood “has done nothing” and that based on a DNA
test, Peal is the father of the child. The court noted that S.A.’s foster mother testified that
she is bonded to the child and that she is interested in being a permanent placement for her.
On December 12, the court held a permanency-planning hearing. Atwood appeared
at the hearing, but Peal did not. The court noted that Peal had gone to the DHS office in
Jefferson County and had been informed of the date and time of the hearing but that DHS
had no other contact with him. The court noted that Atwood was in jail in Pulaski County.
The court found that both Atwood and Peal “have done nothing” and that no progress had
been made by either parent.
2 On January 28, 2019, DHS filed a petition for termination of Atwood’s and Peal’s
parental rights. DHS alleged the abandonment, 1 aggravated-circumstances, 2 and subsequent-
factors 3 grounds against both Atwood and Peal. DHS also alleged the failure-to-remedy
ground 4 as it applies to custodial parents against Atwood and the failure-to-remedy ground 5
as it applies to noncustodial parents against Peal.
The case proceeded to a termination hearing on March 6, 2019. Peal did not appear
for the hearing. Angela Brown testified that she is an adoption specialist and that she ran a
data matching list in this case. She stated that there “a possible 428 resources that meet the
characteristics of the minor child” and that the particular characteristics used in this case
were “race, age, medical, parental condition.”
Atwood testified that she was incarcerated in Pulaski County serving a four-year
sentence for a probation revocation. She stated that she had not completed parenting classes,
a drug-and-alcohol assessment, or a psychological evaluation. She admitted that she had
tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.
Latasha Gause, the family-service-worker supervisor, testified that throughout the
case, DHS had referred Atwood for parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and a
psychological evaluation. As to Peal, she stated that DHS had referred him for only parenting
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(5). 2 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A). 3 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). 4 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). 5 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(b).
3 classes; she did not know whether DHS made referrals for other services. She testified that
Peal informed DHS on June 18, 2018, that he did not want services. She noted, however,
that he submitted a DNA sample on May 11, 2018, and that he completed parenting classes
on January 29, 2019. She stated that he refused drug screenings on June 18 and December
11, 2018. She explained that DHS last had contact with Peal in December 2018 and that he
provided DHS with an address and telephone number. DHS was unable to contact him
using that information.
Thereafter, on March 13, 2019, the circuit court entered an order terminating both
Atwood’s and Peal’s parental rights. The court found that all the grounds pled in the petition
supported termination and that it was in S.A.’s best interest to terminate Atwood’s and Peal’s
parental rights. The court specifically found that S.A. is adoptable. Thereafter, both Atwood
and Peal timely appealed the termination order to this court.
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the
circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Dade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 443, 503 S.W.3d 96. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young
children, we will give great weight to the circuit court’s personal observations. Jackson v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122.
The termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the
natural rights of the parents. Fox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, 448
4 S.W.3d 735. As a result, there is a heavy burden placed on the party seeking to terminate
the relationship. Id. The termination of parental rights is a two-step process that requires the
circuit court to find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. T.J. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997); Smith v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 753, 431 S.W.3d 364. The first step requires
proof of one or more of the statutory grounds for termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B). The second step requires consideration of whether the termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A).
On appeal, both Atwood and Peal challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding
and argue that DHS presented insufficient evidence of adoptability. They acknowledge that
Brown testified that she conducted a data-matching list and that “428 resources” met the
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Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 448 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.08.03 14:05:57 DIVISION II -05'00' No. CV-19-466 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: October 16, 2019 JESSICA ATWOOD AND VINCENT PEAL APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. ELEVENTH DIVISION [NO. 60JV-18-8] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, APPELLEES JUDGE AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Jessica Atwood and Vincent Peal appeal the Pulaski County Circuit Court order
terminating their parental rights to their child, S.A. (10/30/17). On appeal, they both argue
that the circuit court erred by finding it was in the best interest of the child to terminate
their parental rights because the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to
provide sufficient evidence of adoptability. Peal additionally argues that the circuit court
erred by terminating his parental rights because DHS did not offer him any meaningful
services. We affirm.
On January 4, 2018, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-
neglect of S.A. The petition listed Atwood as the mother and Peal as the putative father,
and it stated that Peal was incarcerated at the Jefferson County Detention Center. In the affidavit attached to the petition, DHS alleged that Atwood had been arrested for first-degree
terroristic threatening and endangering the welfare of a minor. On the same day the petition
was filed, the court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody. On January 10, the
court found probable cause for the emergency custody.
On February 15, the court held an adjudication hearing. Both Atwood and Peal were
present. The court adjudicated S.A. dependent-neglected based on Atwood’s unfitness in
that she was “behaving erratically resulting in her arrest, and subsequently [she] has housing
instability.” The court advised Peal to contact DHS upon his release from jail in order to
obtain a DNA test and establish paternity.
The court held a review hearing on June 20. Atwood and Peal did not appear for
the hearing. The court found that Atwood “has done nothing” and that based on a DNA
test, Peal is the father of the child. The court noted that S.A.’s foster mother testified that
she is bonded to the child and that she is interested in being a permanent placement for her.
On December 12, the court held a permanency-planning hearing. Atwood appeared
at the hearing, but Peal did not. The court noted that Peal had gone to the DHS office in
Jefferson County and had been informed of the date and time of the hearing but that DHS
had no other contact with him. The court noted that Atwood was in jail in Pulaski County.
The court found that both Atwood and Peal “have done nothing” and that no progress had
been made by either parent.
2 On January 28, 2019, DHS filed a petition for termination of Atwood’s and Peal’s
parental rights. DHS alleged the abandonment, 1 aggravated-circumstances, 2 and subsequent-
factors 3 grounds against both Atwood and Peal. DHS also alleged the failure-to-remedy
ground 4 as it applies to custodial parents against Atwood and the failure-to-remedy ground 5
as it applies to noncustodial parents against Peal.
The case proceeded to a termination hearing on March 6, 2019. Peal did not appear
for the hearing. Angela Brown testified that she is an adoption specialist and that she ran a
data matching list in this case. She stated that there “a possible 428 resources that meet the
characteristics of the minor child” and that the particular characteristics used in this case
were “race, age, medical, parental condition.”
Atwood testified that she was incarcerated in Pulaski County serving a four-year
sentence for a probation revocation. She stated that she had not completed parenting classes,
a drug-and-alcohol assessment, or a psychological evaluation. She admitted that she had
tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.
Latasha Gause, the family-service-worker supervisor, testified that throughout the
case, DHS had referred Atwood for parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and a
psychological evaluation. As to Peal, she stated that DHS had referred him for only parenting
1 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(5). 2 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A). 3 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). 4 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). 5 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(b).
3 classes; she did not know whether DHS made referrals for other services. She testified that
Peal informed DHS on June 18, 2018, that he did not want services. She noted, however,
that he submitted a DNA sample on May 11, 2018, and that he completed parenting classes
on January 29, 2019. She stated that he refused drug screenings on June 18 and December
11, 2018. She explained that DHS last had contact with Peal in December 2018 and that he
provided DHS with an address and telephone number. DHS was unable to contact him
using that information.
Thereafter, on March 13, 2019, the circuit court entered an order terminating both
Atwood’s and Peal’s parental rights. The court found that all the grounds pled in the petition
supported termination and that it was in S.A.’s best interest to terminate Atwood’s and Peal’s
parental rights. The court specifically found that S.A. is adoptable. Thereafter, both Atwood
and Peal timely appealed the termination order to this court.
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the
circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Dade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 443, 503 S.W.3d 96. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young
children, we will give great weight to the circuit court’s personal observations. Jackson v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 440, 503 S.W.3d 122.
The termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the
natural rights of the parents. Fox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, 448
4 S.W.3d 735. As a result, there is a heavy burden placed on the party seeking to terminate
the relationship. Id. The termination of parental rights is a two-step process that requires the
circuit court to find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. T.J. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997); Smith v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 753, 431 S.W.3d 364. The first step requires
proof of one or more of the statutory grounds for termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B). The second step requires consideration of whether the termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A).
On appeal, both Atwood and Peal challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding
and argue that DHS presented insufficient evidence of adoptability. They acknowledge that
Brown testified that she conducted a data-matching list and that “428 resources” met the
characteristic of the minor child. However, they assert that she did not state that the child
is adoptable. Atwood further points out that Brown did not define “resource” and did not
explain what the results mean.
Adoptability is not an essential element in a termination case; rather, it is merely a
factor that must be considered by the circuit court in determining the best interest of the
child. Tucker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 430, 389 S.W.3d 1; see also Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). There is no requirement that an adoption specialist testify at
the termination hearing or that the process of permanent placement be completed at the
time of the termination hearing. Fortenberry v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App.
352. Additionally, there is no requirement to prove this factor by clear and convincing
5 evidence or to identify an exact family that, upon termination, would be willing to adopt
the child. See Reed v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 369, 417 S.W.3d 736.
The Juvenile Code does not require “magic words” or a “specific quantum” of
evidence to support a circuit court’s finding regarding adoptability. Sharks v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569. It merely requires that if an adoptability
finding is made, then evidence must exist to support it. Haynes v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2010 Ark. App. 28. Evidence that adoptive parents have been found is not
required, see McFarland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143
(2005), and neither is evidence that proves the child will be adopted. Renfro v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419, 385 S.W.3d 285.
In this case, even though Brown did not specifically explain the data analysis, in the
June 20, 2018 review order, which was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing,
the court noted that the child’s foster mother testified that she is bonded to the child and
that she is interested in being a permanent placement for her. Thus, evidence supports the
court’s adoptability finding.
Peal additionally argues that the circuit court erred by finding that a statutory ground
supported termination because DHS did not provide him additional services beyond
parenting classes and a paternity test. He argues that “because the Department failed to offer
other meaningful services, the trial court clearly erred in terminat[ing his] parental rights on
any of the grounds.” However, the circuit court found that the aggravated-circumstances
ground supported termination, and we have held that a finding of aggravated circumstances
does not require DHS to prove meaningful services toward reunification were provided.
6 Willis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 559, 538 S.W.3d 842. Because Peal
does not otherwise challenge the evidence supporting the aggravated-circumstances ground,
we hold that he has not established reversible error.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant Jessica Atwood.
Lightle, Raney, Streit & Streit, LLP, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for appellant Vincent Peal.
Ellen K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.