Jesse Sutton, Etc. v. Wilmington Trust, National Association

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-2145
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 15, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D24-2145 Lower Tribunal No. 19-23438-CA-01

Jesse Sutton, etc., Appellant,

vs.

Wilmington Trust, National Association, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami- Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Robert Flavell, P.A., and Robert Flavell (Celebration), for appellant.

Troutman Pepper Locke LLP, and Dorrella L. Gallaway (Atlanta, GA), for appellee Wilmington Trust, National Association; Kula & Associates, P.A., and Elliot B. Kula and William D. Mueller; Robert G. Post, P.A., and Robert G. Post, for appellees Lauren Gorski and Matthew Samsonovitch.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“A court may take judicial

notice of the following matters . . . [r]ecords of any court of this state or of

any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or

jurisdiction of the United States.” (Emphasis added)); § 90.203, Fla. Stat.

(2024) (“A court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a

party requests it and: (1) Gives each adverse party timely written notice of

the request, proof of which is filed with the court, to enable the adverse party

to prepare to meet the request. (2) Furnishes the court with sufficient

information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.”); HSBC Bank

USA, Nat. Ass'n v. Nixon, 117 So. 3d 430, 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The

standard of review for the denial of a motion to vacate a foreclosure sale is

gross abuse of discretion.”); Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251,

1256 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]here is no reasonable possibility that the error

contributed to the verdict.”); Martin v. Martin, 43 So. 3d 195, 196 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2010) (“The trial court has wide discretion in evaluating the credibility

of evidence and witnesses.”); Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122, 1126 (Fla.

1984) (“As long as there is competent, substantial evidence to buttress this

finding, an appeals court should not substitute its judgment for that of the

trier of fact.”); Malkus v. Gaines, 476 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)

(“[T]he equity court should not lend its extraordinary powers to benefit one

2 who is guilty of a fraud or who has ‘unclean hands’.”); GGG Found. & Tr. LLC

v. HMC Assets, LLC, 339 So. 3d 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (quoting Mitchell

v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163, 164 (1918)) (“A trial court, in deciding

whether there are equitable grounds to vacate a foreclosure sale, has ‘large

discretion which will only be interfered with by the appellate court in a clear

case of injustice.’”).