Judgment rendered January 14, 2026. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,654-CA No. 56,655-CA (Consolidated Cases)
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
No. 56,654-CA No. 56,655-CA
JESSE JUSTIN COLVIN AND ROBERT BRADFORD JONES RUBY SUE HILL COLVIN AND HIS WIFE, RONI Plaintiffs-Appellants MICHELLE REPPOND JONES Plaintiffs-Appellees versus versus ROBERT BRADFORD JONES AND RONI MICHELLE JESSIE JUSTIN COLVIN AND REPPOND JONES HIS WIFE, RUBY SUE HILL Defendants-Appellees COLVIN Defendants-Appellants
Appealed from the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Union, Louisiana Trial Court Nos. 50,974 and 50,978
Honorable Monique Babin Clement, Judge
DURRETT LAW OFFICES, LLC Counsel for Appellants By: NiKayla Leann Willaert
LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL S. COYLE Counsel for Appellees By: Michael Stephen Coyle
Before HUNTER, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Plaintiffs, Jesse Justin Colvin and Ruby Sue Hill Colvin, appeal a
district court ruling establishing the “old downed fence” as the boundary
between the properties and issuing a permanent injunction in favor of Robert
Bradford Jones and Roni Michelle Reppond Jones, including damages in the
amount of $7,500.00 to each of the Joneses. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
On July 12, 2012, Jesse and Ruby Colvin (collectively, the “Colvins”)
purchased an immovable property in Union Parish, twenty-three acres
located at 2479 Highway 828, Farmerville, LA (“Colvin Property”), where
they established their primary residence. Two years later, on or about March
25, 2014, Robert and Roni Jones (collectively, the “Joneses”) purchased a
one-acre tract of immovable property located at 3227 Linville Fire Tower
Road, Farmerville, LA (“Jones Property”), where they established their
primary residence. The parties became friends and good neighbors for over a
decade until the boundary line became a matter in dispute.
The Colvins asserted the property in dispute is a seventy-foot deep
timber and undergrowth strip of land between two properties, and such strip
is entirely within their northern border. Additionally, the Colvins asserted
the correct north boundary of the property line is shown in both the “1989”
and “2012” surveys. However, the Joneses contended the boundary between
the two properties is the “combination fence” or “old wire fence,” which is
located south of the property. The Joneses expressed verbal ownership of the
disputed property by instructing the Colvins on how to use the boundary. In
response, the Colvins placed “NO TRESPASSING” signs along the surveyed property. When the Joneses continued to assert verbal
ownership over the disputed property, the Colvins erected larger “NO
TRESPASSING” signs and placed them along the surveyed property line.
On September 8, 2023, the Colvins filed suit against the Joneses to
judicially fix the boundary between the parties. Thereafter, the Joneses filed
for both permanent injunction and damages alleging that the Colvins
deprived them of their enjoyment of their property by placing large
harassing signs facing their property; placing a dead cow by the survey line;
installing orange construction fencing near the boundary; using high-
intensity lights to shine onto their property, including their backyard; and
operating loud power generators during dusk to dawn hours.
Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that the north
boundary of the Colvin tract and the south boundary of the Jones tract are
judicially fixed at the old combination fence. The court granted the
permanent injunction against the Colvins, ordering them to remove all signs,
posts, lights, and other flagging materials, and found Jesse Colvin liable to
the Joneses for damages in the amount of $7,500 each.
DISCUSSION
Assignment Error 1: Boundary Dispute
The Colvins contend the district court erred by fixing the boundary at
the old, downed fence, issuing a permanent injunction against them, and
awarding the Joneses $7,500 in damages. More specifically, the Colvins
argue that the Joneses could not bring a possessory action because they were
allegedly dispossessed in April 2022 when wooden stakes were placed on
the property. The Colvins further contend that the Joneses bore the burden of
proving the extent of their possession and, having failed to prove acquisitive 2 prescription, the boundary should instead be determined according to title.
Thus, the trial court erred by fixing the boundary at the “old downed fence.”
Three real actions to determine ownership or possession of
immovable property are the possessory action, the petitory action, and the
boundary action. A boundary action is a real action under the Code of Civil
Procedure that is distinct from a possessory and a petitory action. Hooper v.
Hero Lands Co., 15-0929 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16), 216 So. 3d 965, writ
denied, 16-0971 (La. 9/16/16), 206 So. 3d 205. In this matter, the trial court
was not presented with a possessory action but a boundary action.
Under La. C.C. art. 784, “A boundary is the line of separation
between contiguous lands. A boundary marker is a natural or artificial object
that marks on the ground the line of separation of contiguous lands.” Article
785 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: “The fixing of the boundary may
involve the determination of the line of separation between contiguous lands,
if it is uncertain or disputed; it may also involve the placement of markers on
the ground, if the markers were never placed, were wrongly placed, or no
longer to be seen.” Article 786 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: “The
boundary may be fixed upon the demand of an owner or of one who
possesses as owner.”
The court shall determine the boundary based on the parties’
ownership. Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 786, if neither party proves ownership,
the boundary shall be fixed according to the limits established by possession.
According to La. C.C. art. 531, one claiming ownership of an immovable
against another who has had the immovable for one year after commencing
possession in good faith and with just title, or who has had the immovable
for ten years, shall prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous 3 owner or by acquisitive prescription. When the parties trace their titles to a
common author, preference shall be given to the more ancient title. La. C.C.
art. 793. When a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be
fixed according to the limits established by prescription rather than titles.
Additionally, boundary location is a question of fact, and the determination
of its location by the trial court should not be reversed absent manifest error.
Bowman v. Blankenship, 34,558 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d
134, writ denied, 01-1354 (La. 6/22/01), 794 So. 2d 794. The party claiming
acquisitive prescription bears the burden of proof. La. C.C. art. 794; Fabre
v. Manton, 21-1418 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/28/22), 343 So. 3d 821.
If a party and his ancestors in title possessed for 30 years without
interruption, within visible bounds, more land than their title called for, the
boundary shall be fixed along these bounds. La. C.C. art. 794. After
considering the evidence, including the testimony and exhibits of a surveyor
or the other expert appointed by the court or by a party, the court shall
render judgment fixing the boundary between the contiguous lands in
accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties. La. C.C.P. art.
3693.
In a boundary action or claim for acquisitive prescription, the
boundary’s location is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact,
and such determination should not be reversed on appeal in absence of
manifest error. Horaist v. Pratt, 21-00166 (La. 3/23/21), 312 So. 3d 1093;
Cumpton v. Dragon Ests., LLC, 55,784 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/24), 399 So. 3d
676.
In Marcello v. Jo-Blanche Corp., 2020-1113 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/4/21),
330 So. 3d 632, writ denied, 21-01666 (La. 1/19/22), 331 So. 3d 330, the 4 plaintiffs filed a boundary action concerning a drainage ditch that did not run
in a straight line along the property line. They argued that the boundary
should be fixed by acquisitive prescription on the down-the-bayou side of
the ditch, relying on title records and a 2020 Templeton survey, which is
consistent with a 1973 McGee survey. The defendant contended the
boundary should instead follow the up-the-bayou side of the ditch according
to a survey referenced in the defendant’s title. The trial court fixed the
boundary in accordance with the 2020 Templeton survey. On appeal, the
court held that the plaintiffs, as the parties claiming acquisitive prescription,
bore the burden of proving ownership through a previous owner or by actual
possession. Finding no manifest error in the trial court’s evaluation of the
evidence, the appellate court affirmed the boundary as established in the
2020 Templeton survey.
In Hebert v. Superior Rental Props., LLC, 23-1015 (La. App. 1 Cir.
9/25/24), 405 So. 3d 704, the plaintiffs, co-owners of undivided interests in
the property, sought to fix the boundary and obtain a permanent injunction,
presenting extensive testimony and exhibits, while the defendants offered
expert survey testimony and numerous documents and maps. The trial court
reviewed the property’s history dating back to 1807 and concluded that the
boundary could not be fixed by title because both parties’ titles were equally
ancient and defective. Relying on La. C.C. art. 792, the court instead
resolved the issue through acquisitive prescription and found that the
plaintiffs had continuously, publicly, and peaceably possessed the land for
more than thirty years. It accordingly set the boundary line, relying in part
on the defendants’ own survey, and granted a permanent injunction
preventing defendants from making substantial alterations. On appeal, the 5 court affirmed, finding no manifest error in the trial court’s reliance on
acquisitive prescription or in its placement of the boundary line.
In the instant case, Jerry L. Rugg completed the first survey of the
Colvin property on July 20, 1989 (the “1989 Survey”); James Michael Duty
completed the second survey on May 16, 2012 (the “2012 Survey”), which
labeled the “old wire fence (down)” south of the northern boundary of the
Colvin property. The boundary separating the Colvin Property from the
Joneses’ property has never been formally established; however, three
surveys of the Colvin property have been completed. Delta Land Surveying
(“DLS”) conducted the most recent survey, during which wooden stakes
were placed along the boundary at issue.
At trial, multiple witnesses testified about the disputed boundary
between the Jones and Colvin properties, using old surveys and remnants of
an aged “combination fence,” which suggested a longstanding but unclear
dividing line. During his testimony, Jesse Colvin (“Jesse”) stated the Jones
Property was vacant when he purchased the Colvin Property. He testified
there were remnants of an old fence near the northern boundary of his
property and the southern boundary of the Jones Property. Jesse
acknowledged that the survey conducted in 2012 referenced the “old fence
line.” Further, he stated that he had the property surveyed in 2022 because
he did not know the location of his property line. According to Jesse, the
steel posts placed on the property by his grandchildren were placed in
accordance with the 2022 survey. Jesse admitted that prior to the boundary
dispute, he had never visited the northern boundary of the property (the
disputed area), and he had never kept livestock or cut trees in that area. He
stated he relied on his grandchildren to re-stake survey markers. 6 Jim Gandy, a previous owner of the Colvin property, testified he
purchased the property in 1989, and he had the property surveyed because he
wanted to build a pond. According to Gandy, he left a buffer of trees on the
northern property line for privacy reasons.
James Michael Duty, a professional land surveyor, testified he
prepared a “retracement” of a downed fence on the property in 2012. He
stated the location of the downed combination fence in his survey was the
same as the one noted in the survey later conducted by Jerry Rugg. Duty
opined that the property “line of record” was north of the old fence shown
on the surveys, and property lines set forth in the 2012 survey matched the
public record.
Stacy Albritton testified he co-owned the property to the east of the
Jones Property. He stated the fence between the Colvin and Jones properties
is located along the pasture line south of the tree line. He also stated the
fence had been in the same location since his father purchased the property.
Albritton admitted that he hunted and walked along the property line.
Robert Bradford Jones (“Brad”) testified that he believed the old fence
was the boundary when he purchased the property, and he used the disputed
area for hunting. He admitted that he did not have a survey conducted, and
he did not know the exact property lines to the east or west of the property.
Nonetheless, he testified that Linville Fire Tower Road was the north
property line, and the old fence line was the south property line because the
property was already cleared to the south of it when he purchased it. Brad
also stated he had never seen Jesse in that location prior to 2023. According
to Brad, after tensions escalated in early 2023, Jesse began posting numerous
“no trespassing” signs; moved a dead cow near the line; erected large 7 insulting signs; and installed loud, bright lighting, which the Joneses argued
created a nuisance.
After considering the testimony and evidence, the trial court found
that title evidence could not resolve the disputed line and that the “old
downed fence” represented the limits established by possession. The court
also found Jesse’s actions were intentional; caused the Joneses fear, anxiety,
and loss of enjoyment of their backyard; and were unsupported by any
evidence that Brad had threatened or trespassed on the Colvin property.
Because this finding is factual and supported by the record, we cannot say
the trial court manifestly erred in fixing the boundary at the “old downed
fence.” As such, this assignment lacks merit.
Assignment Error 2: Permanent Injunction
In the second assignment of error, the Colvins argue that the trial
court erred when it issued a mandatory injunction ordering them to remove
all signs, posts, lights, and flagging materials and enjoined them from
placing any similar materials at the exact location. Although the Joneses
asserted the works constructed by the Colvins constituted a nuisance and
served no purpose other than to intimidate them and cause damage their
health, the Colvins claim the Joneses failed to present evidence of any
damages in the form of depreciation of land values, structural damage to the
immovable property, or injuries to persons pursuant to La. C.C. art. 667.
Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3601, “[a]n injunction shall be issued in
cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the
applicant[.]” Succession of Smith v. Portie, 2019-183 (La. App. 3 Cir.
12/30/19), 289 So. 3d 77, 80.
8 La. C.C. art. 667 states:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still, he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his works would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care[.]
La. C.C. art. 668 states:
Although one is not at liberty to make any work by which his neighbor’s buildings may be damaged, yet everyone has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor.
Thus, he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular agreement in that respect may raise his house as high as he pleases, although by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbor’s house, because this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage.
See also, Taylor v. Denka Performance Elastomer LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d
1039, 1054 (E.D. La. 2018).
If there is a substantial interference with the rights of a plaintiff to the
peaceful use of his premises and to such rest and quiet as may be expected in
such a neighborhood, and if the interference is not temporary but obviously
will continue unless prevented by judicial process, a right to injunctive relief
exists. Fos v. Thomassie, 26 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. 1946). See
also, Diefenthal v. Longue Vue Mgmt. Corp., 561 So. 2d 44 (La. 1990).
Since plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, they must prove irreparable injury in
addition to the necessary showing of real damage under C.C. 667–669.
C.C.P. 3601; Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., Inc., 290 So. 2d 821 (La.1974); Hilliard
v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 256 So. 2d 127 (1972). 9 In Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1985), three residents
of a Jefferson Parish subdivision sought injunctive relief to stop the
defendants from operating an elaborate annual Christmas display that drew
overwhelming crowds into their neighborhood. The trial court granted only
limited relief, but on appeal, the court examined factors such as the
neighborhood’s character, the degree of intrusion, and the impact on
residents’ health and safety. The evidence showed that the display generated
heavy traffic, loud music, bright lights, and significant delays for nearby
homeowners despite law-enforcement efforts to reduce disruptions.
Considering these impacts, the Louisiana Supreme Court enjoined the
defendant from operating a display of such size and extravagance, prohibited
oversized illuminated figures, and required that any accompanying sound be
reduced so it could not be heard inside the nearest homes.
In Par. of E. Feliciana ex rel. E. Feliciana Par. Police Jury v. Guidry,
04-1197 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/05), 923 So. 2d 45, writ denied, 05-2288 (La.
3/10/06), 925 So. 2d 515 the parish sought a permanent injunction against a
commercial motocross track, alleging its operation violated nuisance and
noise ordinances. The trial court found, based on resident testimony and
noise readings, that the track substantially interfered with neighboring
property enjoyment. On appeal, the court applied La. C.C. arts. 667-669 and
concluded that although some inconveniences are expected, the persistent
noise reaching up to 85 decibels from morning until night created excessive
and intolerable intrusion in the rural area. The appellate court held that the
operation caused real damage and affirmed the injunction.
In the present matter, the record states that Jesse’s activities consisted
of the following: 10 (1) The installation of orange construction fencing near the boundary at issue. On April 11, 2023, Jesse installed a series of 8×12 “PRIVATE PROPERTY NO TRESPASS” commercial signs along the full length of the Joneses’ property line, claiming he did so because he believed Albritton had threatened his wife.1 The trial court found no evidence supporting Jesse’s claimed justification.
(2) The placement of a dead cow next to the survey line. On May 4, 2023, Jesse placed one of his dead cows into the wooded area near the Joneses. Jesse testified that he only moved the cow to that location until he found a place to bury it. However, Jesse further testified, not denying having told Brad, “I was fucking with you with the dead cow,” a statement he made on the June 19, 2023, recorded call.
(3) The placement of large harassing and “posted” signs facing the Joneses’ property. On May 20, 2023, Jesse erected three large signs each four feet by sixteen feet and mounted on eight-foot poles just ten feet from the northern boundary line facing the Joneses’ property. Two fluorescent orange signs displayed “NO TRESPASSING FROM NEIGHBORS” with poop-emoji symbols meant to depict the Joneses as “shitty neighbors,” while a third sign announced “J-ONE HOG FARM Coming Soon.” Jesse claimed the signs were prompted by a “nasty letter” from Brad dated April 14, 2023. The trial court reviewed the letter and found it simply requested a truce between the parties.
(4) The shining of high-intensity lights onto the Jones property, including into their backyard, and the operation of loud power generators during the dusk hours. On May 23, 2023, Jesse installed lights to illuminate the signs, powering them with a generator that Brad testified caused his whole house to vibrate. Jesse admitted he illuminated the signs specifically to send a message to Brad to leave him alone.
The trial court also found that Jesse’s conduct, including erecting
harassing signs; placing a dead cow near the boundary; installing
construction fencing; and directing high-intensity lights and generator noise
toward the Joneses, was intentional, served no legitimate purpose, and
1 Stacy Albritton testified on behalf of the Joneses and co-owns the property east of the Jones property. Jesse alleges Brad sent Albritton to his house to threaten his wife, Ruby; however, he did not present any evidence to substantiate the claim. 11 substantially interfered with the Joneses’ quiet enjoyment of their property.
These actions constituted real damage and created irreparable injury
sufficient to justify injunctive relief under La. C.C.P. art. 3601 and La. C.C.
arts. 667-668. We find no manifest error regarding the court’s ruling.
Assignment of Error 3: Damages
In the final assignment of error, the Colvins argue that the Joneses’
alleged harms were mere inconveniences. They contend the Joneses suffered
no physical or property damage, were not prevented from using their yard,
and presented no medical proof of mental distress or financial loss. The
Colvins also argue they are entitled to an award of monetary damages “in an
amount to be determined either by this Court or by the trial court.”
In all civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of
factual determinations is the manifest error standard. Hayes Fund for First
United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain,
LLC, 14-2592 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So. 3d 1110; see also Detraz v. Lee, 05-
1263, 950 So. 2d 557 (La. 1/17/07). To determine whether an activity or
work occasions real damage or mere inconvenience, a court is required to
assess the reasonableness of the conduct in light of the circumstances, which
analysis involves consideration of factors such as the character of the
neighborhood; the degree of the intrusion; and the effect of the activity on
the health and safety of the neighbors. Markerson v. Composite
Architectural Design Sys., LLC, 17-1252 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/18) 255 So.
3d 1065.
One claiming damages arising out of a condition constituting a
nuisance has the burden of proving that the condition constitutes a nuisance
and that damages resulted therefrom. Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 12 1988). A landowner is responsible for damages to an aggrieved neighbor
upon a showing that: (1) he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known that his works would cause damage; (2) that the damage
could have been prevented by reasonable care; and (3) that he failed to
exercise such reasonable care. Perniciaro v. Hamed, 20-62 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/16/20), 309 So. 3d 813. The frequent disruption of the plaintiffs’ sleep,
combined with their worry, apprehension, stress, inconvenience, and loss of
enjoyment of their property, is sufficient to constitute serious and material
discomfort to persons of normal sensibilities in a normal state of health.
Badke v. USA Speedway, LLC, 49,060 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So. 3d
1117, writ denied, 14-1533 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d 606.
Here, this Court must defer to the trial court’s factual determinations
unless clearly wrong. Although the Colvins argued that the Joneses suffered
only minor inconveniences without physical, medical, or financial harm,
Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that serious and material discomfort,
such as repeated sleep disruption, stress, worry, and loss of enjoyment of
property, can constitute real damage. Based on the evidence, the trial court
concluded that the Colvins’ construction activities created a nuisance
intended to harass and intimidate them, causing discomfort, loss of
enjoyment, and sleep disturbance, thereby justifying the $7,500 damages
award. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of damages.
Likewise, based on this record, we see no error in the trial court’s failure to
award monetary damages to the Colvins.
13 CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED and all costs are to be paid by the Appellants, the
Colvins.
AFFIRMED.