Jesse Chacon v. Ralph Diaz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 21-55182
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE CHACON, Jr., No. 21-55182

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:20-cv-01898-JWH-KS v.

RALPH DIAZ; et al., MEMORANDUM*

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 11, 2025**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, S.R. THOMAS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Former California state prisoner Jesse Chacon, Jr. appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

defendants violated his right to freedom of association and retaliated against him.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Watison v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Chacon’s expressive association claim

because Chacon failed to show that Birdsong’s denial of his group grievances was

not rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. See Overton v. Bazzetta,

539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (explaining that where a challenged decision “bear[s] a

rational relation to legitimate penological interests” that “suffices to sustain” the

decision and “[w]e need not . . . define the asserted right of association . . . or

determine the extent to which it survives incarceration”); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d

802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving

the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he

complains.”).

The district court properly dismissed Chacon’s retaliation claims related to

his group grievances because he failed to plausibly allege that defendants acted

with a retaliatory motive or that their conduct did not advance a legitimate

penological interest. See Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1201 (9th Cir. 2022)

(setting forth requirements of a retaliation claim in the prison context). Chacon did

not allege any facts indicating that the defendants who passed the statewide

regulation knew about the group grievances and lawsuits, let alone that they

2 intended to retaliate for them. See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir.

2014) (“We have repeatedly held that mere speculation that defendants acted out of

retaliation is insufficient.”).

The district court also correctly dismissed Chacon’s claim of conspiracy

because he did not allege any facts supporting the inference that the defendants

agreed to deprive him of his First Amendment rights. See Crowe v. Cnty. of San

Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To establish liability for a conspiracy

in a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate the existence of an agreement or

meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights” (quoting Mendocino Envtl.

Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999))). Accordingly, the

district court was also correct to dismiss all claims against defendant Armenta

because Chacon did not allege that Armenta was involved in a conspiracy, nor that

she was individually involved in any of the alleged harms. See Jones v. Williams,

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (liability under § 1983 requires “a showing of

personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation”). Chacon alleged only that

Armenta denied a group grievance, but not that Armenta denied his grievance.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chacon’s motion to

transfer venue because the Central District of California is where Chacon resides,

the events at issue took place, and relevant evidence and witnesses are located.

Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no

3 abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion to transfer venue based on, among

other things, where the events at issue occurred and the relevant witnesses and

sources of proof were located); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Chacon has not identified error in the district court’s designation of a

magistrate judge to hear and decide nondispositive pretrial matters. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A); Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th

Cir. 1993) (discussing scope of magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(b)(1)).

Chacon has not raised on appeal any argument concerning the district court’s

dismissal of his state-law claims or his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief,

and we therefore do not address them. See Orr v. Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 932 (9th

Cir. 2018) (explaining that arguments “omitted from the opening brief are deemed

forfeited”). We also do not consider Chacon’s claim of content and viewpoint

discrimination in his opening brief because he did not allege that claim in his

complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring pleadings to contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim”); Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 n.6 (9th Cir.

1996) (declining to consider on appeal claims that complaint contained only “a

passing reference to”).

AFFIRMED.1

1 Chacon’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal, Dkt. 18, is DENIED.