Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-1264 ____________
JESSE BELL, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
____________
No. SC2024-1556 ____________
JESSE BELL, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
August 28, 2025
COURIEL, J.
Jesse Bell, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the
circuit court’s order summarily denying his motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, §§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Bell’s
rule 3.851 motion and deny Bell’s habeas petition.
I
While serving a forty-year sentence at Mayo Correctional
Institution (Mayo), Bell and his cellmate, Barry A. Noetzel,1 devised
a plan to murder Correctional Officer James Newman and one of
their fellow inmates, Donald H. Eastwood Jr. Bell v. State, 336 So.
3d 211, 212-13 (Fla. 2022). As we have recounted elsewhere, Bell
and Noetzel sharpened pieces of metal into weapons, adopted a
vegan diet to gain closer proximity to the area of the kitchen where
Officer Newman worked, and chose to kill Eastwood as a rehearsal
for their planned murder of Officer Newman. Id. at 213; Noetzel v.
State, 328 So. 3d 933, 936 (Fla. 2021).
On the day they had chosen, June 26, 2019, Bell and Noetzel
succeeded in killing Eastwood. They lured him into their cell,
1. See Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2021) (affirming codefendant Noetzel’s first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death).
-2- stabbed his eyes, strangled him until his face turned purple, and
hid his body between the bunks in their cell. Bell, 336 So. 3d at
213. Correctional officers foiled their attack on Officer Newman
later that day, but only after Bell and Noetzel grievously injured
him. Id.; Noetzel, 328 So. 3d at 937.
Bell confessed to the crimes and was transferred from Mayo to
Florida State Prison (FSP). On October 29, 2019, a grand jury
returned an indictment charging him and Noetzel with first-degree
murder, attempted murder of a correctional officer with a deadly
weapon, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and two counts
of possession of contraband in a prison. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 213.
The trial court appointed counsel at Bell’s first appearance,
which occurred on December 5, 2019. Six days later, the State
provided discovery exhibits, including an audio-recorded interview
between Bell and an investigator for the Lafayette County State
Attorney’s Office.
During the recorded interview, the investigator and Bell
reviewed video footage, among other evidence, and discussed
Eastwood’s murder and the attack on Officer Newman. Bell said
that, while he was being apprehended, Mayo correctional officers
-3- told Bell that they were “going to beat the s**t out of [Bell and
Noetzel]” and “probably kill [them].” Chuckling, Bell told the
investigator that he expected as much. When the investigator
asked whether in fact that ever happened, Bell said it hadn’t, but
said, “[w]hen we got [to FSP], I mean, that’s between me and you
cause I, I earned that a** whoopin’ you know and so I’m not mad
about that . . . .” This exchange comprised less than one minute of
the forty-five-minute interview; Bell spoke about the abuse for six
seconds.
On December 13, 2019—eight days after the court appointed
Bell’s counsel and two days after the State provided discovery
exhibits—Bell waived his right to counsel, entered a no-contest plea
to all charges in the indictment, and waived his right to a penalty-
phase jury trial. Id. at 214. During all required colloquies, Bell
consistently and unequivocally affirmed that he understood the
rights at issue and was acting of his own volition.
At Bell and Noetzel’s joint penalty-phase proceeding, after the
court renewed the required colloquies, Bell again unequivocally
chose to represent himself. The court appointed standby counsel,
and the State called several witnesses to prove five aggravating
-4- factors. Id. After the State rested, Bell took the stand and offered
brief mitigation testimony highlighting his history of depression,
good courtroom and prison behavior, family support, honesty, and
decision to take responsibility by voluntarily entering a no-contest
plea. Id. at 215. He admitted his competency report into evidence
but did not call any other witnesses or present additional mitigation
evidence. Id. In closing, Bell argued against three of the
aggravating factors the State had advanced. Id.
Upon the State’s suggestion, the court ordered a presentence
investigation (PSI) out of an abundance of caution. Id. Bell
objected, expressing concerns about prolonging his sentencing and
arguing that a PSI was unnecessary under Muhammad2 since he
did not waive mitigation. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215. The court
overruled Bell’s objection and reassured him that the PSI would not
cause a delay. Nevertheless, Bell refused to sign a release of
information for a more thorough PSI.3 The circuit court ultimately
2. Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363 (Fla. 2001) (requiring certain mitigation-investigation procedures to be followed when a defendant waives mitigation).
3. As we previously stated, “[t]hough the PSI was not particularly thorough, it included the type of information a
-5- sentenced Bell to death for the murder of Eastwood. Id.4
On direct appeal, Bell raised two issues. He argued that the
circuit court abused its discretion, specifically by failing to order a
comprehensive PSI, not requiring the State to present all mitigating
evidence in its possession, and neglecting to appoint counsel to
further investigate his potentially mitigating circumstances. He
also argued that the circuit court committed fundamental error by
not determining beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
comprehensive PSI requires.” Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215 n.7 (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b)).
4. The circuit court found four aggravating factors: (1) Bell was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (very great weight); and (4) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (very great weight). The court found no statutory mitigators and five nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Bell took responsibility for his conduct and cooperated during the investigation and prosecution (little weight); (2) Bell exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); (3) Bell had been previously diagnosed with and treated for depression (little weight); (4) Bell had never assaulted any correctional officers until the attack on Officer Newman (no weight); and (5) Bell’s family loves him (slight weight). Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215.
-6- aggravating factors justified a death sentence and outweighed the
mitigating circumstances.
This Court affirmed Bell’s first-degree murder conviction and
sentence of death and found that Bell’s no-contest plea was
voluntarily and knowingly entered. Id. at 218. Finding that
Muhammad was not applicable (since Bell did not waive mitigation),
we rejected Bell’s claim that he was deprived of an individualized
sentencing when the trial court declined to employ additional
mitigation-investigation procedures. See, e.g., Muhammad, 782 So.
2d at 363; Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 490 (Fla. 2015)
(modifying Muhammad’s procedures to give trial courts discretion to
appoint independent, special counsel to present mitigation when
the PSI and the State’s mitigation evidence point to the probability
of significant mitigation).
Bell timely filed his initial rule 3.851 motion for postconviction
relief. Following a Huff5 hearing, the circuit court summarily denied
5. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the opportunity to appear before the court on initial postconviction motions “for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion”).
-7- Bell’s motion, finding that each of his claims was procedurally
barred and otherwise conclusively refuted by the record. Appealing
that order, Bell now argues that the circuit court erred in
summarily denying three claims which allege: his waivers of counsel
and a penalty-phase jury were involuntary due to prison abuse;
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present evidence
of the prison abuse to challenge the voluntariness of his waivers;
and he was deprived of an individualized sentencing determination
due to the involuntary waivers.
II
The circuit court did not err in denying Bell’s postconviction
motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Each of Bell’s
postconviction claims is predicated on his waivers of counsel and a
penalty-phase jury, which he entered voluntarily and knowingly
and did not challenge on direct appeal. The claims are therefore
barred.
“[This Court] review[s] a circuit court’s summary rejection of a
postconviction claim de novo, ‘accepting the movant’s factual
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,
and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the
-8- movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238,
1239 n.2 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215
(Fla. 2019)). We have said that “[a] circuit court should hold an
evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant
makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual
determination.’ ” Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021)
(quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla. 2012)). Further,
claims that could have been raised on direct appeal “are not
cognizable through collateral attack.” Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d
323, 325 (Fla. 1983); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)
(prohibiting claims that could or should have been raised on direct
appeal).
A
Bell says his waivers of counsel and a penalty-phase jury were
involuntary because he had been abused while incarcerated. A
claim like this is barred if it is not first raised on direct appeal. See
Knight v. State, 211 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2016) (claims that waivers of
guilt- and penalty-phase juries were not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary were procedurally barred in postconviction because they
should have been raised on direct appeal (citing Muhammad v.
-9- State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992))). The circuit court was
therefore correct to deny these claims.
Bell’s claims are, in any event, conclusively refuted by the
record. Waivers of counsel and a penalty-phase jury “must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Boatman v. State, 402 So. 3d
900, 922 (Fla. 2024) (quoting Knight, 211 So. 3d at 17). “[T]he law
ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently
aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and
how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances.”
Figueroa-Sanabria v. State, 366 So. 3d 1035, 1054 (Fla. 2023)
(alteration in original) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
629 (2002)).
Here, the record shows that Bell’s waivers were knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. Bell testified during his waiver colloquies
that he had not been threatened or forced to enter his waivers, and
that he was doing so of his own accord. See Hutchinson v. State,
243 So. 3d 880, 883 (Fla. 2018) (“[Defendant]’s colloquy supported
the conclusion that his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.”). Bell never hesitated. He repeatedly expressed his
desire for a speedy resolution and explained his decision to waive a
- 10 - penalty-phase jury: he felt that the circuit judge was in a better
position to consider his mitigation than twelve strangers. Bell also
testified during his mitigation presentation as to the reasons he
entered his waivers, referencing his acceptance of responsibility and
desire not to cost “the taxpayers extra money.” Even after the
circuit court accepted his waivers, Bell repeatedly declined the
court’s renewed offers of counsel.
The circuit court did not err in summarily denying his claims.
B
Bell next raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for
counsel’s failure to investigate and discover the fact that he had
been abused while incarcerated, and to present such evidence to
refute the voluntariness of Bell’s counsel and penalty-phase jury
waivers. He does not challenge his guilty plea. The circuit court
also correctly denied this claim.
“This Court has consistently held that to be entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on a motion claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must allege specific facts establishing both
deficient performance of counsel and prejudice to the defendant.”
Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 587 (Fla. 2008) (collecting cases).
- 11 - For the first prong, “the defendant must establish ‘that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ ”
Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 466 (Fla. 2022) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). This means
that counsel’s representation must have fallen “ ‘below an objective
standard of reasonableness’ under ‘prevailing professional norms.’ ”
Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688). And when assessing reasonableness, we take
careful care “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
King v. State, 260 So. 3d 985, 994 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689).
The second prong requires the showing of “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Morris, 931 So. 2d at
828 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the penalty-phase
context, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded
- 12 - that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
The most Bell can muster as to counsel’s deficient
performance is to assert that counsel failed to adequately discover,
investigate, and act upon a six-second statement in a forty-five-
minute recorded interview. According to Bell, his counsel should
have: (1) reviewed the interview footage and determined that the
described mistreatment could have rendered Bell’s waivers
involuntary; (2) investigated the abuse by interviewing corroborating
inmate-witnesses and obtaining their statements; and (3) presented
that evidence to the trial court to prevent it from accepting Bell’s
waivers.
This theory rests on a speculative and attenuated chain of
reasoning that fails to establish deficient performance or prejudice.
Bell’s statements during the interview contain no indication that
prison abuse was influencing his decision-making, nor does he
signal distress. To the contrary, Bell laughed with the interviewer
while discussing his mistreatment and described it as something he
“expected” and “earned” from having attacked a correctional officer.
Nothing in the recording suggests that he was intimidated or
- 13 - coerced, or that he planned to enter waivers due to the isolated
incident discussed during the interview or any other alleged
mistreatment while incarcerated.
The corroborating affidavits also fail to support his theory.
During postconviction proceedings, Bell submitted affidavits from
two corroborating inmate-witnesses, Mitchell Womack and Leo L.
Boatman, neither of whom were contacted prior to postconviction
counsel’s representation. Each affidavit discusses generally the
type of mistreatment that inmates receive at FSP when they have a
violent charge against a correctional officer. As applicable to Bell,
Womack states that he spoke directly with Bell, who told him about
threats from FSP staff about “mess[ing] [Bell] up” and that Bell was
denied meals when staff served him “ghost trays.” Womack’s
affidavit, however, makes no reference to any of these threats or
actions as having influenced Bell’s waivers.
As to Boatman’s affidavit, he recalls that Bell and Noetzel
complained about abuse and mistreatment during the first several
months at FSP, though he concedes that Bell did not tell him
directly. Boatman goes on to offer his personal beliefs formed from
this secondhand knowledge. He speculates that Bell could not take
- 14 - the abuse, oppression, and delays in his CM6 review and that he
“burned out.” The only portion of the affidavit that comes close to
suggesting firsthand knowledge, or a causal link between the abuse
and Bell’s decision to enter his waivers, is a sentence stating: “Bell
was just so disheartened and said the only way to make it stop was
to ‘tap out.’ ” Although purportedly a direct quote from Bell
embedded in a paragraph full of Boatman’s own inferences, there is
no indication that this statement was tied to the timing or
substance of Bell’s legal decisions, or what exactly he meant by “tap
out.” Without such context, the statement does not provide reliable
or direct evidence that Bell’s waivers were influenced by his
mistreatment or entered involuntary.
Considered in the context of the record we have, counsel’s
performance does not fall below an objective standard of
6. CM refers to “Close Management,” which involves “the separation of an inmate apart from the general population, for reasons of security or the order and effective management of the institution, when the inmate, through his or her behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of others.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-601.800(1)(a). The Code provides the procedures for CM classifications and reviews. See id. R. 33-601.800(2), (16).
- 15 - reasonableness. As we have recognized, Strickland requires us to
evaluate “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering
all the circumstances.” 466 U.S. at 688; see, e.g., Hayward v.
State, 183 So. 3d 286, 297 (Fla. 2015) (“A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances
of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689)). Here, counsel had two days with the State’s discovery
materials before Bell entered his waivers. In that time, even if
counsel did review the discovery in full, the nature of the available
evidence, namely the recorded interview, does not provide a basis to
challenge the voluntariness of Bell’s waivers. And while the
affidavits both generally paint a troubling picture of the conditions
for inmates with pending capital charges who are housed at FSP,
they fail to provide a sufficient connection between the alleged
abuse and the voluntariness of Bell’s waivers. Ultimately, neither
piece of evidence that Bell points to on postconviction is sufficient
to establish deficient performance.
Similarly, Bell fails to show prejudice. Even if counsel had
- 16 - uncovered and presented evidence of abuse, there is no reasonable
probability that the trial court would have prevented Bell from
waiving counsel or a penalty-phase jury, given his unequivocal
responses during the waiver colloquies. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629
(“[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and
sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of
the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances.” (emphasis omitted)). Bell’s subsequent claim that
his waivers were influenced by abuse does not undermine the
evidence of Bell’s ability to understand or appreciate the legal
consequences of waiving counsel and a penalty-phase jury at the
time of his waiver colloquies. His retrospective rationalization is
insufficient. See Caylor v. State, 407 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2025)
(holding that a defendant’s internal motivations or subsequent
realizations do not retroactively negate the understanding of the
right to a penalty-phase jury at the time of the waiver), petition for
cert. filed, No. 25-5184 (U.S. July 16, 2025).
Bell also cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that he
would have received a life sentence if the court had rejected his
waivers. Even when represented by counsel, a “defendant has the
- 17 - right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present
during the penalty phase.” Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1054
(quoting Bell, 336 So. 3d at 217). And Bell could not have been
compelled to introduce any additional mitigation beyond what he
already offered. Id. (“Put plainly, ‘a defendant cannot be forced to
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.’ ”
(quoting Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 461 (Fla. 2003))). Any
speculation to the contrary fails to establish prejudice. See
Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 477 (Fla. 2011) (“Mere speculation
that counsel’s error affected the outcome of the proceeding is
insufficient.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)).
Since Bell did not allege specific facts establishing both
deficient performance and prejudice, he failed to make a facially
sufficient claim. The postconviction court’s summary denial was
appropriate.
C
Bell’s claim that he was deprived of an individualized
sentencing due to his waiver of counsel is procedurally barred. A
variation of this claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal
when Bell unsuccessfully raised several arguments related to the
- 18 - trial court’s handling of mitigating evidence. Bell, 336 So. 3d at
216-17. One of which was that he was deprived of an
individualized sentencing determination due to the minimal
mitigation presented and the trial court’s failure to employ the
procedures established in Muhammad. Id. This Court has already
determined that Bell received all that was required for an
individualized sentencing determination, and a defendant cannot
revive a rejected direct appeal claim by repackaging it under a
different label in postconviction. Id. at 217; see Barwick v. State,
361 So. 3d 785, 792-95 (Fla. 2023) (finding that variations of claims
that were raised and rejected in prior proceedings are procedurally
barred).
Even if not procedurally barred, Bell’s claim is without merit.
Bell did not waive mitigation, and the sentencing court considered
the mitigation evidence offered by Bell. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 217. His
argument that additional mitigation could have been presented by
counsel, had he not entered his waiver, is speculative given this
Court’s deference to a competent capital defendant’s “great control
over the objectives and content of [their] mitigation.” Boyd v. State,
910 So. 2d 167, 189-90 (Fla. 2005) (“Whether a defendant is
- 19 - represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se, the defendant has
the right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present
during the penalty phase.” (citation omitted)). The postconviction
court’s summary denial was warranted.
III
In his habeas petition, Bell argues that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise Bell’s untimely first appearance under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130 as an unpreserved claim
of fundamental error. We disagree.
“While the failure to raise unpreserved claims on appeal is not
normally a basis for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the
failure to raise unpreserved claims of fundamental error may be.”
Davis v. State, 383 So. 3d 717, 742 (Fla.) (citing Wickham v. State,
124 So. 3d 841, 863 (Fla. 2013)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 248
(2024). Fundamental error is error that “reaches down into the
validity of the trial itself to the extent that [a death sentence] could
not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”
Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 212 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Card v.
State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001)). Considering all the facts,
we cannot conclude that appellate counsel was ineffective in not
- 20 - raising Bell’s untimely first appearance as a matter of fundamental
error.
Bell—who was of course incarcerated for other crimes
throughout the proceedings relevant here—made his first
appearance approximately five weeks after the grand jury had
returned an indictment. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.130, every arrested person must be taken before a judge for a first
appearance within twenty-four hours of arrest. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.130(a). And we have “remind[ed] the State of its obligation under
rule 3.130 to take every arrested person, including those already in
custody on other grounds, before a magistrate within twenty-four
hours of arrest.” Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 672 (Fla. 2004).
The purpose of a first appearance is to inform the defendant of
the charges and their rights, and to determine conditions for
release. Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 752 (Fla. 2002). Rule
3.130 does not prescribe what ought to happen if a defendant is not
brought before a judge within twenty-four hours. A delay in the
first appearance does not automatically lead to release, dismissal of
charges, or the suppression of evidence. See, e.g., id. at 754
(concluding that a delayed first appearance did not compel
- 21 - defendant’s confession and, thus, the trial court properly denied his
motion to suppress); Globe, 877 So. 2d at 672 (holding that a delay
in following the first-appearance procedures of rule 3.130 must be
shown to have induced a confession in order for the confession to
be inadmissible, and finding that the delay did not induce the
already incarcerated defendant’s confession when he was not
subject to release, was repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights, and
made incriminating statements less than twenty-four hours after
his arrest); Keen v. State, 504 So. 2d 396, 399-400 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress was
proper in the absence of a showing that the first-appearance delay
induced an otherwise voluntary statement), disapproved in part on
other grounds, Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985, 990 (Fla. 1992).
While it is undisputed that the State failed to comply with rule
3.130, it is also undisputed that Bell’s trial counsel did not preserve
an objection. We therefore assess whether the delay, standing
alone, amounts to fundamental error. As Bell does not allege that
the delay in his first appearance resulted in any prejudice, we are
hard-pressed to do so. Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 951-52 (Fla.
2003) (instructing that prejudice due to a delay of an initial
- 22 - appearance must be “proven on a case-by-case basis”). The State’s
delay is regrettable, but it does not call into question the
fundamental legitimacy of Bell’s trial, and neither trial counsel’s
failure to object, nor appellate counsel’s having declined to raise the
delay as an unpreserved error, undermines confidence in the result
of his case. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1070 (Fla.
2000) (“Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an
issue which is without merit.”).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order summarily
denying Bell’s postconviction motion and deny habeas relief.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lafayette County, David W. Fina, Judge – Case No. 342019CF000055CFBXMX And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Adrienne Joy Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
- 23 - for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
- 24 -