Jesse Andrew Arredondo v. W. L. Montgomery

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 20, 2020
• Docket: 8:17-cv-00998
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JESSE ANDREW ARREDONDO, ) Case No. CV 17-0998-FMO (JPR) 11 ) Petitioner, ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND 12 ) RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. v. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 ) W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden, ) 14 ) Respondent. ) 15 ) ) 16 17 The Court has reviewed the Petition, records on file, and 18 Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, which 19 recommends that judgment be entered denying the Petition and 20 dismissing this action with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 636(b)(1). On February 18, 2020, Petitioner filed Objections 22 to the R. & R., in which he mostly simply repeats arguments from 23 his Petition and Reply. 24 For instance, Petitioner continues to argue that the trial 25 court deprived him of due process when it permitted Erin Glenn to 26 testify that she pleaded guilty to two felonies in connection 27 with his case. (See Objs. at 2-7.) He takes issue (see id. at 28 3) with the Magistrate Judge’s observation that habeas relief is 1 1 not warranted because the “Supreme Court has never specifically 2 addressed whether admission of ‘irrelevant or overtly prejudicial 3 evidence’ can violate due process ‘sufficient to warrant issuance 4 of the writ’” (R. & R. at 18-19 (quoting Holley v. Yarborough, 5 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009))). But the Supreme Court 6 cases he cites (see Objs. at 2 & Pet., Mem. P. & A. at 14 (citing 7 Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), & Hewitt v. Helms, 459 8 U.S. 460 (1983))) do not involve the introduction of irrelevant 9 or prejudicial evidence, and the Ninth Circuit cases he relies on 10 (see Objs. at 2; Pet., Mem. P. & A. at 14-15 (collecting cases)) 11 all predate Holley. 12 In any event, as both the state court and Magistrate Judge 13 found (see R. & R. at 19-20; Lodged Doc. 1 at 8), Glenn’s 14 testimony that she had pleaded guilty in connection with 15 Petitioner’s case did not violate due process because it was 16 relevant to her credibility. Petitioner contends that the 17 prosecution called her as a witness just to elicit that 18 prejudicial information (see Objs. at 6), but he acknowledges 19 that her eyewitness testimony that Petitioner — whom she was 20 dating — and Gerardo Chavira Jr. approached the victim together 21 and later used the stolen car to pick her up (see Lodged Doc. 16, 22 2 Rep.’s Tr. at 294-96, 300-01) undermined Petitioner’s defense 23 that he was “[m]ere[ly] [p]resen[t]” for Chavira’s crime (Objs. 24 at 6) and therefore was relevant. Further, the Magistrate Judge 25 correctly observed that the jury would not necessarily have 26 inferred that she had pleaded guilty to the same crimes 27 Petitioner was on trial for (R. & R. at 20-21) and that even if 28 it did any prejudice was mitigated by the trial court’s limiting 2 1 instruction and the compelling evidence of Petitioner’s guilt 2 (see id. at 21-23). Although Petitioner is correct that the 3 Magistrate Judge did not apply the “harmless error analysis” from 4 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (see Objs. at 3), 5 she was not supposed to do so on habeas review. See Davis v. 6 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (Chapman standard applies on 7 direct appeal, not on habeas review). 8 Additionally, Petitioner continues to rely on People v. 9 Sanchez, 63 Cal. App. 4th 665, 686 (2016) (see Objs. at 10-11), 10 even though it is not clearly established law for purposes of 11 federal habeas review, as explained to him in the R. & R. (R. &. 12 R. at 36-37). Further, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (see 13 Objs. at 11, 15-16), the Magistrate Judge correctly noted that 14 the prosecution’s gang expert did not rely exclusively on case- 15 specific hearsay and that any error was harmless because his 16 assessment that Petitioner was a WSA member was based on 17 sufficient admissible, nontestimonial evidence (see R. & R. at 18 37-41). 19 Petitioner claims that the admissible evidence of his 20 involvement in WSA, as well as in the carjacking, was 21 insufficient. For instance, he points out that in her trial 22 testimony his mother denied telling a police officer that he was 23 a WSA member (Objs. at 11), claims that other evidence of his 24 involvement in WSA was the result of his having been a 25 “brag[g]adocious adolescent” (id. at 12; see id. at 8), and 26 contends that the circumstances surrounding the carjacking 27 supported an inference that he was merely present for — and not 28 involved in — it (id. at 9, 11, 15-16). But the Court must 3 1 review the trial evidence “in the light most favorable to the 2 prosecution,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and 3 the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the jury — which was 4 presented with the same arguments Petitioner presses here — made 5 findings that were sufficiently supported by the evidence (see R. 6 & R. at 22-23, 30-32). Contrary to Petitioner’s claims (see 7 Objs. at 9), the prosecution did not need to prove why Petitioner 8 and Chavira committed the crime or that WSA specialized in car 9 theft to sufficiently establish that Petitioner acted for the 10 benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the gang, 11 see People v. Albillar, 51 Cal. 4th 47, 68 (2010) (“[I]f 12 substantial evidence establishes that the defendant intended to 13 and did commit the charged felony with known members of a gang, 14 the jury may fairly infer that the defendant had the specific 15 intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by those 16 gang members.”). 17 Having reviewed de novo those portions of the R. & R. to 18 which Petitioner objects, the Court agrees with and accepts the 19 findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. IT 20 THEREFORE IS ORDERED that judgment be entered denying the 21 Petition and dismissing this action with prejudice. 22 DATED: March 20, 2020 /s/ 23 FERNANDO M. OLGUIN U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28 4