Jesse Amador Maldonado v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 19, 2023
• Docket: 03-21-00544-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-21-00544-CR

Jesse Amador Maldonado, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. CR2017-765, THE HONORABLE DANIEL H. MILLS, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jesse Amador Maldonado challenges his conviction for aggravated

kidnapping. Tex. Penal Code § 20.04. The jury found him guilty, he pleaded true to the

enhancement paragraph, and the jury assessed punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment. See id.

§ 12.42(c)(1). Maldonado contends in two issues that the trial court erred when it excluded

testimony as to the victim’s reputation for truthfulness and when the trial court denied

Maldonado’s requested mistake of fact instruction. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

BACKGROUND

Amanda Lester testified that she and her boyfriend Kevin Kelly were arguing the

morning of July 30, 2017. Kelly was driving Lester from his parents’ house in San Antonio to

her home near Austin. The couple’s fight continued until Kelly pulled the car over while still in San Antonio and removed Lester’s belongings from the car. After Lester exited the vehicle,

Kelly drove away. Lester was not familiar with the area and could not reach Kelly on the phone.

A driver stopped his car and asked Lester if she wanted a ride. Lester accepted

and got in the car. Maldonado’s identity as the driver that picked up Lester that day was later

determined by detectives and then corroborated by Lester through a photo lineup. Lester

testified that soon after Maldonado began driving towards Lester’s home, Lester became “really

scared,” “had a really bad feeling,” and “could just tell there was something really wrong.”

Lester asked Maldonado to stop the car and let her out but he would not. After Lester asked

“[a]bout twenty times” to be let out of the car, Maldonado pulled over into a neighborhood drive.

However, when he realized it was a gated community, he turned around and pulled back onto the

road towards Lester’s home without stopping the car.

Maldonado kept telling Lester he would stop at a gas station, but Lester did not

believe him because they “passed so many gas stations.” Lester threatened to hit Maldonado if

he did not let her out of the car. Maldonado replied, “What, no BJ?” Lester testified that she

understood “BJ” to mean oral sex. Maldonado then grabbed Lester’s ponytail and “shook [her]

head in his lap.” When Lester pushed herself out of his lap, Maldonado punched her in the face

and Lester testified that it hurt and “felt like [her] jaw was broken.”

Lester attempted to unlock the doors but Maldonado kept locking them. When

Lester was able to open the car door, she held it open with her foot. Maldonado grabbed her by

her arm to keep her in the car. Lester was wearing her purse on her shoulder and when the strap

broke from Maldonado grasping it tightly, he threw it out the open car door.

Lester testified that she then called 911 on her cell phone, holding the phone away

from Maldonado. When she saw that the call had connected, she began to scream for help.

2 Maldonado pulled Lester closer to him by her arm, grabbed her phone, and threw it out the open

door. The sheriff’s department dispatch supervisor testified that the 911 recording of the call

included sounds of a woman in distress, background noise like the caller was in a vehicle, and

sounds of “scuffling or shuffling” and then the call disconnected. Lester testified that after

Maldonado threw her phone out of the car, she grabbed his phone and threw it out of the car so

that “they could find him” and “identify who he was.”

Lester testified that Maldonado turned right onto a long road with nothing on it.

She was terrified because she “felt like either he was going to kill [her], or [she] was going to die

jumping out of his car.” Lester fought with Maldonado to get control of the car. She tried to put

it in park but her attempts failed and she could not find an emergency brake.

Lester was able to get out of Maldonado’s grip when her bra strap broke. Lester

testified that she thought that if she did not jump out of the moving vehicle she would be raped

and murdered. So Lester got as low to the ground as she could and rolled out of the moving car.

She testified that she blacked out for a little bit and then ran down the street trying to get help

although she was barely able to run. Lester testified that she had a lot of injuries including a

fractured spine, road rash over every bony part of her body, and a softball-sized lump on the

back of her head. She also had a busted lip, including a cut and bruising, which was caused by

Maldonado punching her.

Thomas Loftis testified that he was driving the car that was behind Maldonado’s

car when Lester jumped out. Maldonado’s car was moving fast, veered off the road, and

fishtailed wildly. Loftis saw the car’s door open and “a body come flying out of it.” Maldonado

did not stop the car but, rather, drove away. Loftis stopped his car and got out. He saw Lester

trying to run towards him but she fell back down. He testified that he believed she was either

3 frightened or in shock. Lester was bleeding through her clothing and was crying. Loftis stayed

with her until police and EMS arrived. Loftis was familiar with the area of road where Lester

jumped out of the car. He testified that it was rural and pretty empty and he agreed with the

State that Lester had jumped out “quite a ways down” the road.

Detective Eric Guerrettaz, the responding officer on the scene, testified that he

learned from Lester that both her and Maldonado’s phones had been thrown out of the vehicle.

Lester was taken to the hospital by EMS. Detective Guerrettaz organized a search for the

cellphones with other officers and was able to locate both cellphones. Detective Haynes testified

that he identified Maldonado as a suspect based on information he extracted from Maldonado’s

phone. Lester testified that sometime after she was released from the hospital, she went to the

sheriff’s office and identified Maldonado in a photo lineup as the person who took her.

Kelly, Lester’s ex-boyfriend, was called as a defense witness. Kelly testified on

voir dire that he and Lester started dating for about two years before the offense, and that he had

met her a couple years prior to them dating. He testified that they dated for some time after the

incident but were not in a relationship at the time of trial. In his testimony in front of the jury, he

testified regarding his perspective of the events the day of Lester’s abduction prior to when

Lester got out of Kelly’s vehicle. Defense counsel asked Kelly his opinion as to Lester’s

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but the trial court sustained the State’s objection to

this question based on an improper predicate.

Maldonado testified at trial in his own defense. He testified that when Lester first

got in his car, he noticed a cut on her chin, and she told him that her boyfriend had just beat her

up. Maldonado testified that after he asked her what had happened with her boyfriend, Lester

accused him of working with her boyfriend and told him she wanted to get out of the car.

4 Maldonado testified that he stopped at a subdivision to let Lester out of the car but that she did

not get out and instead told him to drive away because her boyfriend was behind them.

Maldonado explained that when he pushed her head down, he was trying to get her to put her

head down because he thought her boyfriend was following them. He testified that when he

pulled back onto the highway after stopping in the subdivision, Lester began hitting him and

telling him to stop the car and that she wanted to be dropped off “right there.” He explained that

he pulled Lester back into the car after she opened the door and began yelling for help because

he was going 60 or 70 miles per hour and he thought she was going to jump out of the car. He

explained that he threw her phone out of the car because she was hitting him with it. He testified

that she took his phone, opened the car door, threw his phone out, and then hit him with a

multitool that was on the bottom of his phone. He testified that they fought for control of the

steering wheel. Maldonado testified that he hit her to regain control of the car. He testified that

Lester jumped into the backseat and then jumped out of the car. He explained that he took off

because he thought her boyfriend was behind them. Maldonado testified that he went home and

threw away Lester’s remaining belongings that were in his possession because he had them for a

couple days, had planned to call the police but did not, and did not know what else to do with

her belongings.

On cross, Maldonado testified that he did not know at the time that Lester had

tried to call 911. The State asked if he had later told his brother that “when I went back on the

highway, that’s when she was, like, going all crazy and shit and whatever. And then she called

the cops or whatever . . . and that’s when I took the phone . . . and threw it.” Maldonado agreed

that he said that but explained that he already had the incident report at that point. Maldonado

explained that he had planned to stop at a gas station but that a median was in the way so he

5 turned onto the rural road instead and that he could not turn around because he was fighting for

control of the steering wheel. He agreed that they were two miles down the rural road before

Lester jumped out. Maldonado admitted that he was familiar with the area and knew that there

was nothing on the rural road he turned onto.

After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Maldonado guilty of aggravated

kidnapping and assessed punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In two issues on appeal, Maldonado contends that the trial court erred in two

regards: when it excluded the testimony of Lester’s ex-boyfriend concerning his opinion of her

bad character for truthfulness and when it denied Maldonado’s request for a jury instruction on

the mistake of fact defense.

Witness testimony on truthfulness

At trial, defense counsel asked Kelly, the victim’s ex-boyfriend, for his opinion of

whether Lester was a truthful or an untruthful person. The State objected to the testimony based

on an “improper predicate.” The trial court sustained the objection, and defense counsel

continued questioning Kelly without making any argument in support of the admissibility of the

anticipated testimony.

To preserve error for appellate review, a party must present a timely complaint to

the trial court stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the

context of the complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Further, the objection made at trial

must comport with the issue raised on appeal to be preserved for review. Sorto v. State,

173 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

6 On appeal, Maldonado contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the

opinion testimony because it was admissible as testimony regarding a witness’s reputation for

truthfulness. See Tex. R. Evid. 608 (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by

testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,

or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.”). However, trial counsel did not

make any argument regarding Rule 608 in response to the State’s objection or the trial court’s

ruling. Maldonado has not preserved his Rule 608 issue for review. See Sorto, 173 S.W.3d at 476.

Maldonado further contends that the trial court erred because the proper predicate

was established during voir dire questioning of Kelly outside the presence of the jury when he

testified that he had been dating Lester for about two years prior to the offense, had met her two

years prior to starting a dating relationship, and dated her for some time after the offense.

However, trial counsel did not make any argument that a proper predicate had been established,

nor did he attempt to establish a predicate after the objection. Maldonado has not preserved his

challenge to the trial court’s ruling. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1

Thus, we do not address the merits of Maldonado’s first issue. See Ford v. State,

305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“If an issue has not been preserved for appeal,

neither the court of appeals nor this Court should address the merits of that issue.”).

Mistake of fact defense

Maldonado contends that the trial court erred when it denied his requested jury

instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. Specifically, Maldonado’s defense theory at trial

was that he did not intend to abduct Lester but, rather, was under the mistaken belief that her

boyfriend was behind them. The State contends that the trial court properly denied the requested

7 instruction because it was an improper comment on the evidence and Maldonado was not entitled

to such instruction.

Jury charge error claims are reviewed under a two-pronged test in which the

appellate court must determine: (1) whether the charge was erroneous, and (2) if there was an

error, whether the error was harmful to the defendant. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 143–44

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on

reh’g). “A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence,

whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or uncontradicted, and regardless of how

the trial court views the credibility of the defense.” Celis v. State, 416 S.W.3d 419, 430 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013). “In deciding whether a defensive theory is raised, the evidence is viewed in

the light most favorable to the defense.” VanBrackle v. State, 179 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

The mistake of fact defense is a statutory defense to prosecution when “the actor

through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated

the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.” Tex. Penal Code § 8.02(a). As

relevant here, a person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping “if he intentionally or

knowingly abducts another person with the intent to:” “inflict bodily injury on him or violate or

abuse him sexually;” or “terrorize him or a third person.” Id. § 20.04(a). “‘Abduct’ means to

restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place

where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force.” Id.

§ 20.01(2). “‘Restrain’ means to restrict a person’s movements without consent.” Id. § 20.01(1).

Thus, the aggravated kidnapping statute includes two relevant mental states in addition to

intentionally or knowingly abducting a person. Id. §§ 20.01, 20.04. As applicable here, the first

8 is to intend to prevent the person’s liberation by secreting or holding her in a place where she is

not likely to be found. Id. § 20.01(2). The second is to have the intent to inflict bodily injury, to

violate or abuse sexually, or terrorize her. Id. § 20.04(a).

At trial, Maldonado requested a mistake of fact defense instruction and argued, as

relevant here, that his mistaken belief that Lester’s boyfriend was following them negated the

requisite mental state. Specifically, he argued that when he pushed her head into his lap, he did

it because he thought the boyfriend was behind them and not because he was trying to secrete her

away or sexually abuse her. The trial court determined that a mistake of fact defense instruction

was not proper, and it was not included in the charge.

On appeal, Maldonado contends that he should have been given a mistake of fact

instruction because his testimony established that he did not intend to abduct Lester with either

the intent to secrete her away or with the intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize her but, rather,

he intended to evade her boyfriend who he mistakenly thought was behind them. Maldonado

relies on Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), to support his contention that

he was entitled to the mistake of fact defense instruction. In Miller, the Court of Criminal

Appeals held that the defendant charged with kidnapping a child was entitled to an instruction on

mistake of fact because the defendant had testified that she believed that the baby’s mother was

offering the child for an informal adoption and so the defendant took custody of the child with

what she believed was the mother’s consent. Id. at 585. Thus, the defendant’s “mistaken belief

would negate a conscious objective or desire to abduct the child by restraining the child without

parental consent.” Id.

However, here Maldonado’s mistaken belief that he was evading Lester’s

boyfriend does not negate the mental states relevant to whether he abducted Lester with the

9 intents to either: (1) secrete her away, or (2) harm or terrorize her. First, Maldonado’s mistaken

belief that the boyfriend was following does not negate his intent to secrete her away without her

consent. Specifically, Maldonado admitted during his testimony at trial that Lester asked

multiple times to be let out of the vehicle and that he did not stop the car and let her out. His

mistaken belief that he was evading the boyfriend can be consistent with the intent to secret her

away and thus is a disagreement regarding the evidence but does not negate the requisite intent.

As to the intent to harm or terrorize, Maldonado’s testimony that he did not stop

because he thought the boyfriend was behind them is an explanation for his behavior but does

not negate the intent. If the jury believed he did not intend to harm or terrorize Lester, but

instead only intended to evade her boyfriend, then the element of intent would not have been

proven. However, his mistaken belief that the boyfriend was pursuing, does not negate his intent

to also harm or terrorize Lester, because believing that he intended to evade the boyfriend would

not require the jury to find him not guilty. He could hold both intents.

Comparing Maldonado’s contentions to the facts present in Miller, is illustrative.

Miller testified that she believed she had permission of the mother, which directly negated the

intent to abduct the child without the mother’s consent, as a person would not intentionally take

custody of a child both with and without consent. See Miller, 815 S.W.2d at 585. Thus, Miller’s

mistaken belief that she had consent to take custody of the child negated the requisite mental

state for the kidnapping offense. Here, Maldonado could have both intended to evade the

boyfriend and intended to harm or terrorize Lester. Maldonado’s description of events provides

a different story and explanation for his behavior but does not negate the “the kind of culpability

required for commission of the offense.” See Tex. Penal Code § 8.02(a).

10 We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction

regarding the mistake of fact defense. Because we have concluded there is no trial court error,

we do not address the harm analysis in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals

must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue

raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”). We overrule Maldonado’s

second issue.

CONCLUSION

Because we cannot reach Maldonado’s first issue and overruled his second issue,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: October 19, 2023

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