Jess Willard Mattox, Sr. v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas

Jess Willard Mattox, Sr. v. State

DecidedJuly 18, 2003

Docket06-01-00212-CR

StatusPublished

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Jess Willard Mattox, Sr. v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-01-00212-CR

JESS WILLARD MATTOX, SR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court

Fannin County, Texas

Trial Court No. 19720

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Carter

O P I N I O N

Jess Willard Mattox, Sr., appeals from his conviction by a jury for the offense of aggravated sexual assault on a child. The jury assessed his punishment at sixty years' imprisonment. Mattox contends that the admission of the testimony of C.H. and Donetta Britt at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial about Mattox's prior bad sexual acts was reversible error and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to permit him to reopen his case after closing.

Mattox was indicted for having sex with a minor girl. The complainant, S.B., testified that, on two consecutive days while she was home sick, Mattox (her stepfather) came home around noon, ordered her to remove her clothes, and had sexual intercourse with her. There was no objective evidence of the crime. After making the allegation, S.B. moved in with Edith Coker. Coker testified S.B. recanted her story, and a letter written by Michelle Hodge was introduced into evidence, which also stated S.B. had recanted her allegation.

During the presentation of the State's case, the State introduced testimony from C.H., a minor girl and friend of S.B., that Mattox had attempted to talk her into, or pay her to engage in sex. After the defense presented its case, Britt testified as a rebuttal witness⁽¹⁾ that, several years earlier, while she was a minor, Mattox and several other men had sex with her.

Mattox argues that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of extraneous offenses. We first address the admission of the testimony of C.H. The admission of extraneous-offense evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh'g). If the trial court admits the evidence in light of the factors enunciated in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), and the court's decision to admit the evidence is "within the zone of reasonable disagreement," the trial court's decision will be upheld. Rankin, 974 S.W.2d at 718.

C.H. initially testified about an incident where Mattox had come into a bedroom with her and S.B. and asked them both to show him their breasts, and that S.B. did, but she did not. Mattox's counsel then asked to present a motion outside the presence of the jury. The trial court excused the jury, and counsel (1) asked for a mistrial because of her allegations about Mattox's actions toward her, and then (2) argued that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The objection/motion was overruled.

Shortly thereafter, the State asked C.H. whether there were any other instances in which Mattox took inappropriate actions in the presence of her and the complainant. Counsel objected at that point based on improper character evidence, and the objection was overruled. At that point, no questions had been asked that would necessarily implicate improper character evidence, and thus the trial court correctly overruled the objection.

The State then continued to question C.H., and in response to one of his questions about what had happened while C.H. and the complainant were together with Mattox, she described a scene in the complainant's bedroom where Mattox asked her for sexual favors in return for cigarettes and money. Mattox did not object to that testimony.

After that exposition ended, the State then ask C.H. about another incident where Mattox had driven her and the complainant to a lake. After the question was asked, and in the midst of the answer, counsel objected because the testimony would constitute improper character evidence. The objection was overruled, and C.H. completed her testimony by explaining how Mattox had again asked her for sexual favors. The State referred to this testimony in its closing argument.

Relevant evidence of a person's bad character is generally not admissible for the purpose of showing that he or she acted in conformity with his or her character. Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 259-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 386-88 (op. on reh'g). In applying the Texas Rules of Evidence, however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also held that the evidence may be admissible when it is shown to be relevant to a noncharacter conformity issue of consequence in the case, such as establishing intent or rebutting a defensive theory. Robbins, 88 S.W.3d at 259; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387-88.⁽²⁾

A trial court is in the best position to decide these admissibility questions, and appellate courts therefore review its decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. This standard requires an appellate court to uphold a trial court's admissibility decision when that decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id.

In a number of cases, evidence about extraneous bad acts or offenses allegedly committed by an accused has been held admissible to refute defensive theories raised by the accused. Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 886-87 & n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (noting that "[e]vidence of extraneous offenses committed by the accused has been held admissible . . . to refute a defensive theory raised by the accused") (quoting Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); and referencing Crank v. State, 761 S.W.2d 328, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ("[p]robably the most common situation which gives rise to the admission of extraneous offenses is in rebuttal of a defensive theory")); see also Rodriguez v. State, No. 290-01, 2003 WL 1534250, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2003) (Myers, J., dissenting).

From the opening statements and throughout the testimony, Mattox's sole defensive theory was that the complainant was not telling the truth about any sexual activities between them. The reason suggested for her alleged lies was that she was angry about his version of parental discipline and wanted to move in order to live with her biological father in South Carolina.

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