RENDERED: FEBRUARY 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0457-MR
JERRY SKINNER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 18-CI-002948
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT; CATHY M. DUNCAN; JESSICA THORNTON; AND KYLE FEENEY APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, A. JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: Jerry Skinner appeals from a summary judgment entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of Louisville/Jefferson County Metro
Government and three of its employees, Cathy M. Duncan, Jessica Thornton, and
Kyle Feeney (collectively, “Louisville Metro”), on his claims under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act (“KWA”), KRS1 61.101 et seq. Skinner alleged that he was
terminated from his employment in violation of the KWA, for reporting that
Louisville Metro’s Fleet & Facilities Department (“FFD”) failed to obtain
electrical permits and inspections required by law for certain electrical work
performed in-house.
On appeal, Skinner argues that his communications regarding the
permitting issue constituted protected disclosures under the KWA and that the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. Louisville Metro responds that
Skinner did not disclose non-public information, did not report alleged wrongdoing
to a qualifying authority within the meaning of the Act, and failed to present
evidence that any protected disclosure was a contributing factor in his termination.
After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties and Witnesses
Skinner is a licensed master electrician with extensive prior
experience as an electrical inspector. Before the events giving rise to this
litigation, Skinner worked for Louisville Metro’s Department of Codes and
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2- Regulations (“DCR”),2 including service as an Assistant Chief Electrical Inspector.
He later worked as an electrical inspector for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Louisville Metro, through FFD, is responsible for maintaining and
repairing government-owned buildings throughout Jefferson County. The
Facilities Division within FFD performs in-house electrical, mechanical, and
general maintenance work at public facilities. At all relevant times, Cathy Duncan
served as Director of FFD; Jessica Thornton served as Administrator of the
Facilities Division; and Kyle Feeney served as Maintenance Manager and was
Skinner’s direct supervisor while he worked there. Carl Hamm is a former
employee of FFD’s Facilities Division. Before his retirement in September 2017,
Hamm worked as a facilities maintenance electrician for three years.
Troy Crawford was Louisville Metro’s Chief Electrical Inspector
within the DCR during the relevant time period, and supervised Skinner when he
worked at DCR.
B. The Electrical Permitting Framework
At issue in this case is whether Skinner’s communications with
Duncan, Thornton, Feeney, and Crawford regarding FFD’s failure to obtain
2 DCR is the agency authority authorized to enforce the Kentucky Building Code by administering the inspection process for electrical construction taking place within the county.
-3- electrical permits in violation of applicable statutes and local ordinances
constituted protected disclosures under the KWA.
To place this issue in the proper context, some background regarding
the electrical permitting process is necessary. The relevant statute, KRS 227.480,
provides in relevant part that:
(1)(a) A city, county, urban-county government, charter county, or consolidated local government or the state shall, according to the Uniform State Building Code as it pertains to the plan review and inspection responsibilities of local governments or the state, require any person to obtain a permit before commencing construction, alteration, or repairs of any electrical system.
(b) The city, county, urban-county government, charter county, or consolidated local government or the state shall require all inspections that are deemed necessary by the department for the safety of life and property. The department shall promulgate administrative regulations to describe the circumstances where inspections are required.
(2) A city, county, urban-county government, charter county, or consolidated local government or the state shall not issue a permit unless the applicant submits proof of being licensed as an electrical contractor under KRS Chapter 227A or of acting on behalf of a licensed electrical contractor. However, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to:
...
(b) Electrical work performed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, a city, county, urban-county government, charter county, or consolidated local government, or any subdivision thereof[.]
-4- (Emphasis added.)
The interpretation most consistent with the statutory language is that
while Louisville Metro is required under subsection (1) to obtain permits and
inspections before commencing construction, alteration, or repair of an electrical
system, it is exempt under subsection (2) from the requirement that a permit
applicant submit proof of licensure as an electrical contractor. For purposes of
evaluating summary judgment, we assume, without deciding, that this
interpretation is correct.
The exemption in KRS 227.480(2)(b) for electrical work performed
by an urban-county government nevertheless created uncertainty within FFD
during the relevant period regarding whether permits were required at all before in-
house electrical work was performed. Before Skinner was hired, FFD supervisory
personnel, including, among others, Thornton, Feeney, and Duncan, discussed
whether electrical permitting requirements applied to in-house work performed on
government-owned buildings. Discovery revealed that some employees believed
permits were required for at least certain categories of electrical work. Former
FFD employee Carl Hamm submitted an affidavit stating that he believed permits
were required for installations and upgrades and that he had raised those concerns
multiple times with FFD management before Skinner’s employment.
-5- Given the uncertainty before Skinner’s employment, FFD sought
guidance from the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office. After reviewing the issue,
the County Attorney advised that FFD was exempt from the permitting and
inspection requirements because the electrical work at issue was performed by
Louisville Metro employees on government-owned buildings. FFD thereafter
continued its existing practices in reliance on that advice.
C. Skinner’s Hiring and Early Employment
Skinner applied for a Maintenance Supervisor position within the
Facilities Division in late 2017. He was interviewed twice in December 2017.
During the second interview, Skinner learned that FFD did not routinely obtain
electrical permits for in-house work. Based on his experience as an electrical
inspector, Skinner expressed concern that permits were required. Duncan
responded that the issue had already been reviewed and that the Jefferson County
Attorney’s Office had advised that permits were not required. Skinner accepted
the position with that understanding and began employment on January 8, 2018.
After beginning work, Skinner reviewed work orders assigned to his
maintenance crew and concluded that some of the electrical work involved
installations or upgrades that, in his view, required permits and inspections.3
3 These work orders included removing and replacing breaker panels at multiple Metro facilities, installing new electrical outlets and systems at workspaces and maintenance shops, repairing
-6- Skinner raised these concerns with Feeney and Thornton, both of whom deferred to
Duncan’s position that FFD was exempt from permitting requirements.
D. Communications with Crawford and Internal Follow-Up
In February 2018, Skinner contacted Troy Crawford, the DCR’s Chief
Electrical Inspector and Skinner’s former supervisor, to ask whether FFD’s
electrical work required permits and inspections. Crawford reviewed the
applicable statutes and ordinances and responded by email, providing materials
supporting Skinner’s interpretation that permits were required for certain types of
work. Skinner forwarded Crawford’s email to Feeney and Thornton.
Discovery revealed that after receiving Crawford’s email, FFD
supervisors discussed whether the issue should be reconfirmed with the Jefferson
County Attorney’s Office. No immediate overall policy change in permitting
practices occurred, although emails make clear that Skinner’s supervisors were
working toward obtaining permits, at least for some projects, and were actively
reevaluating their prior interpretation of the legal statutes and ordinances.
E. Termination and Post-Employment Events
Skinner continued to express concern regarding the lack of permits
and inspections for certain electrical work; it appears that these concerns were
damaged underground wiring at Public Works facilities, and replacing breaker panels at Louisville Metro City Hall.
-7- addressed to his supervisors. In March 2018, he created an online account with the
DCR to facilitate permit requests for work performed by him.
On April 12, 2018, Skinner was informed that his employment was
being terminated for failure to successfully complete his probationary period. He
received a termination letter, but he had not been issued any prior formal written
disciplinary warnings. Discovery revealed, however, that Skinner had been
reprimanded by Thornton through text messages for failing to properly supervise
his subordinates. The record also includes written work plans and a one-on-one
review, all of which mentioned the supervision issue.
After his termination, Skinner applied for another position within
Louisville Metro but was not selected. He later alleged that the failure to rehire
him was retaliatory and based on his filing of the underlying KWA action against
Louisville Metro.
F. Procedural History
Skinner filed this action in May 2018, asserting claims under the
KWA and for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The circuit court
dismissed the wrongful-discharge claim at the pleading stage, concluding that the
claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4
4 Skinner has not appealed the dismissal of his wrongful-discharge claim.
-8- During discovery, Skinner moved to amend his complaint to add a
second KWA claim after Crawford testified in his deposition that Skinner was not
rehired at the DCR because of his pending whistleblower lawsuit. Skinner alleged
that this testimony established a separate instance of retaliation under the KWA
based on post-termination conduct. The circuit court granted Skinner’s motion to
amend.
Thereafter, Skinner moved for partial summary judgment on the
newly added claim. Louisville Metro responded by filing its own motion for
summary judgment, seeking judgment in its favor on both of Skinner’s KWA
claims. Following briefing and oral argument, the circuit court entered a lengthy
and well-reasoned opinion granting summary judgment in favor of Louisville
Metro on both claims.
As a threshold matter, the circuit court concluded that Skinner failed
to establish the required causal connection between any alleged protected
disclosure and his termination. The court determined that Louisville Metro
demonstrated that Skinner’s termination resulted from his failure to properly
supervise subordinates during his probationary period, rather than from any alleged
protected disclosure, and that Skinner failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut
that showing.
-9- Alternatively, the circuit court concluded that Skinner’s
communications with his supervisors did not constitute protected disclosures
because they were directed to the individuals allegedly responsible for the conduct
at issue and did not involve the disclosure of non-public information, as FFD’s
permitting practices were widely known within the organization and consistent
with guidance received from the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office. The court
further concluded that Skinner’s communications with Crawford did not constitute
a report under the KWA because Skinner was seeking confirmation and guidance
regarding the interpretation of the applicable statutes and ordinances, rather than
reporting concealed wrongdoing. Finally, the circuit court concluded that the
KWA does not extend to post-employment retaliatory conduct, rendering Count II
of Skinner’s amended complaint non-actionable.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment. We
review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Patton v. Bickford,
529 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Ky. 2016); Wolfe v. Kimmel, 681 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Ky. 2023).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
-10- law.” CR5 56.03; Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 709 S.W.3d 232, 236-37
(Ky. 2025). Because summary judgment involves no fact-finding, we afford no
deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 706 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Ky. 2024).
III. ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Skinner made a
protected disclosure within the meaning of the KWA. Absent a protected
disclosure, Skinner cannot establish a prima facie claim under the KWA, and
summary judgment was proper. Accordingly, our analysis focuses solely on
whether Skinner’s communications concerning the electrical permitting issue
qualify as protected disclosures under KRS 61.102.6
The KWA, codified at KRS 61.101 et seq., was enacted in 1986 to
encourage public employees to come forward with information regarding
governmental wrongdoing by protecting them from retaliation for doing so. N. Ky.
Area Dev. Dist. v. Wilson, 612 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2020). The statute prohibits
a public employer from taking adverse action against an employee who, in good
5 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The parties raise additional arguments on appeal, including whether Skinner’s alleged disclosures were a contributing factor in his termination and whether the KWA affords protection to former employees for alleged post-termination retaliation. Because Skinner failed to establish that he made a protected disclosure under the KWA, those arguments are moot, and we do not address them.
-11- faith, reports or discloses information relating to an actual or suspected violation of
law, waste, fraud, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
KRS 61.102(1).
Because the KWA serves the public purpose of identifying and
deterring governmental misconduct, it is remedial in nature and must be liberally
construed to effectuate that purpose. Workforce Dev. Cabinet v. Gaines, 276
S.W.3d 789, 793 (Ky. 2008). At the same time, the statute does not create a
general cause of action for every workplace grievance or policy disagreement
involving a public employer. Harper v. Univ. of Louisville, 559 S.W.3d 796, 801-
03 (Ky. 2018). Rather, its protections are directed toward disclosures that further
the public interest by exposing governmental wrongdoing. Id.
To establish a violation of KRS 61.102, an employee must
demonstrate four elements: (1) the employer is an officer or entity of the state; (2)
the employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee made or attempted to
make a good-faith report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law
to an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer took action or threatened
to take action to discourage the employee from making such a disclosure or to
punish the employee for making it. Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Mil.
Affs., 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. App. 2004).
-12- Kentucky courts have consistently held that the KWA protects
employees who expose governmental wrongdoing that is concealed or not
generally known, and not those who merely reiterate information already known to
the employer. Harper, 559 S.W.3d at 802-03. In Davidson, this Court affirmed
summary judgment where the employee alleged wrongdoing but “did not report
anything . . . which was not already known,” such as secretive or hidden agency
procedures. Davidson, 152 S.W.3d at 255. Davidson thus establishes that the
disclosure of information already known to the employer and others does not
necessarily satisfy the third element of a KWA claim.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Harper, holding that
the KWA is intended to protect “the whistleblower who exposes information not
generally known,” and that the reporting of information “which is public
information or otherwise already widely known within the organization cannot
qualify as a whistleblower disclosure.” Harper, 559 S.W.3d at 802. In Harper,
the employee’s complaints concerned matters that had already been raised,
reviewed, and addressed within the university, and therefore did not constitute
protected disclosures under the statute.
Similarly, in Moss v. Ky. State Univ., this Court held that a university
employee’s allegations regarding accounting violations were not actionable under
the KWA because the university was already aware of the accounting issue and
-13- was attempting to address it. Moss v. Ky. State Univ., 465 S.W.3d 457, 458 (Ky.
App. 2014). As we explained, where the employer is already cognizant of the
alleged wrongdoing, the employee’s complaints “were hardly an initial report”
within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 460.
In Admin. Off. of Cts. v. Miller, the Supreme Court underscored that
whether an employee disclosed non-public or concealed information is a question
of law. There, the Court held “as a matter of law” that the employee did not make
a protected disclosure because she failed to report “previously concealed or non-
public information that would entitle her to protection under KRS 61.102.” Admin.
Off. of Cts. v. Miller, 468 S.W.3d 323, 324 (Ky. 2015). Miller confirms that
summary judgment is appropriate where the undisputed facts demonstrate that the
alleged disclosure did not reveal concealed wrongdoing.
Finally, Helbig v. City of Bowling Green illustrates that a
disagreement over the legality of a publicly known policy does not constitute a
protected disclosure. Helbig v. City of Bowling Green, 371 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. App.
2011). In Helbig, a police officer filed a grievance asserting that a newly adopted
overtime policy violated a state statute. The Court rejected the whistleblower
claim because the policy and the statute allegedly violated were both publicly
available and widely known, explaining that the KWA was not “needed to
encourage employees to disclose the illegality of a city commission’s publicly
-14- enacted policy.” Id. at 743. Rather, such disputes are properly resolved through
other legal mechanisms, such as declaratory actions.
Applying these principles to the undisputed facts, Skinner’s
communications regarding FFD’s electrical permitting practices did not constitute
protected disclosures under the KWA. The record establishes that FFD’s practice
of performing in-house electrical work without obtaining permits was widely
known within the organization well before Skinner’s employment. FFD
supervisory personnel, including Duncan, Thornton, and Feeney, were aware of the
practice and had discussed whether permitting requirements applied to in-house
work on government-owned buildings. Former employee Carl Hamm stated in an
affidavit that he had raised the same concerns with FFD management multiple
times before Skinner was hired. Skinner himself learned of the practice during his
second interview in December 2017, before he began work, when Duncan
informed him that the issue had already been reviewed.
Moreover, FFD did not attempt to limit its practice to those inside the
organization. Before Skinner’s employment, FFD sought and obtained guidance
from the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office, which advised that FFD was exempt
from permitting and inspection requirements for in-house electrical work on
government-owned buildings. FFD continued its existing practices in reliance on
that legal advice. The fact that the issue had already been elevated to an external
-15- legal authority for review, and that FFD acted in accordance with the advice
received, further demonstrates that the practice was neither concealed nor
unknown.
Skinner’s communications thus did not expose hidden or secretive
wrongdoing. Rather, they expressed a professional disagreement with an openly
maintained interpretation of the applicable statutes, one that had already been
vetted by the Jefferson County Attorney’s Office. Except Crawford, every
individual to whom Skinner directed his concerns was already aware of the
permitting question and of FFD’s position.7 After receiving Crawford’s email,
FFD supervisors actively discussed whether to reconfirm the issue with the County
Attorney’s Office and began working toward obtaining permits for at least some
projects. Skinner’s concerns, however valid they may have been as a matter of
electrical code interpretation, were not an initial report of concealed wrongdoing.
See Moss, 465 S.W.3d at 458.
While FFD’s permitting practice was not memorialized in a publicly
enacted ordinance as was the case in Helbig, the operative principle is the same:
where the challenged conduct is openly maintained and known to those in
authority, an employee’s disagreement with its legality does not constitute the type
of disclosure the KWA was designed to protect. Skinner’s dispute with FFD’s
7 Given that Crawford was unaware, we will separately analyze that communication below.
-16- interpretation of KRS 227.480 was, at bottom, a legal disagreement properly
resolved through other channels. Because the undisputed facts establish that
Skinner’s communications did not reveal concealed or non-public information,
they did not constitute protected disclosures under KRS 61.102, and summary
judgment was properly granted on this basis. Harper, 559 S.W.3d at 802.
Skinner’s communication with Crawford presents a different issue.
The record reflects that Crawford, as Chief Electrical Inspector within DCR,
possessed authority to enforce the applicable electrical permitting and inspection
requirements. The record further reflects that, prior to his communication with
Skinner, Crawford was unaware that the Facilities Division was not obtaining
permits and inspections for certain in-house electrical work.
In Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, the Supreme Court
addressed the distinction between a protected whistleblower disclosure and an
inquiry or request for guidance regarding the legality of conduct. 459 S.W.3d 339
(Ky. 2015). There, the employee believed her supervisor had engaged in wrongful
conduct and contacted the sheriff’s office to seek an opinion regarding the legality
of the supervisor’s actions. She later confronted the supervisor at a staff meeting
and expressed her objections. After her termination, she asserted a claim under the
KWA.
-17- The Supreme Court held that neither the inquiry to the sheriff’s office
nor the confrontation with the supervisor constituted a report, disclosure, or
divulgence within the meaning of KRS 61.102. The Court emphasized that the
employee had not reported concealed wrongdoing or sought to expose misconduct
to a body empowered to remedy it. Rather, she had sought an opinion regarding
the legality of the conduct and then expressed her disagreement directly to the
individual involved. Such actions, the Court explained, “comport with neither the
statutory language of KRS 61.102, nor the purpose underlying the statute,” which
is “to discourage wrongdoing in government, and protect those who make [such
wrongdoing] public.” Id. at 346 (quoting Workforce Dev. Cabinet v. Gaines, 276
S.W.3d 789, 792 (Ky. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The same reasoning applies here. During his deposition, Skinner
testified that he contacted Crawford to “cover his bases” and to ensure that he was
not unaware of a statute that might exempt Louisville Metro from the permitting
requirements. Skinner further testified that he was “verifying [his] knowledge”
and that Crawford confirmed his understanding that permits were required. This
testimony reflects that Skinner sought confirmation and guidance regarding a
debatable legal issue, not that he reported concealed wrongdoing or alerted
Crawford to ongoing unlawful conduct. Likewise, Crawford’s response is telling.
Crawford emailed the relevant legal authority to Skinner, including his handwritten
-18- notes. This response further indicates that Skinner’s communication with
Crawford was an inquiry seeking his opinion and not a report.
Consistent with Pennyrile, an employee’s request for an opinion or
verification regarding the legality of conduct, even if motivated by a sincere belief
that the conduct is improper, does not constitute a protected disclosure under the
KWA. Nor does forwarding the resulting information to management, without
more, transform such an inquiry into a report or disclosure within the meaning of
KRS 61.102.
Notably, the record does not indicate that Skinner subsequently
reported to Crawford that FFD continued to perform electrical work without
permits after receiving this information. Accordingly, Skinner’s communications
with Crawford do not constitute protected disclosures under the KWA.
Because Skinner failed to establish that he made a protected
disclosure under the KWA, he cannot prevail on his whistleblower claims as a
matter of law. Accordingly, we do not address the parties’ remaining arguments,
including whether Skinner’s alleged disclosures were a contributing factor in his
termination or whether the KWA affords protection to former employees for
alleged post-termination retaliation.
-19- IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s March 22, 2024 order granting summary judgment to Louisville Metro and
dismissing Skinner’s amended complaint with prejudice.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Soha T. Saiyed Cynthia L. Effinger Louisville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
-20-