Jerry Dale Mccaulley V. State Of Washington

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

JERRY D. MCCAULLEY, No. 88984-2-I Appellant,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent.

BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Jerry Dale McCaulley satisfied the requirements for restoration of his firearm rights under former RCW 9.41.040(4) (2022) but did not petition to restore those rights until after the legislature amended the statute. See LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295, §§ 3, 4. Under the amended statute, RCW 9.41.041(2)(b)(ii), the legislature added a requirement that offenders must pay court ordered restitution in full before they are eligible for restoration of their right to possess a firearm. The trial court denied McCaulley’s petition because he had not yet fully paid restitution. McCaulley appeals. Because the court improperly applied RCW 9.41.041 retroactively to McCaulley’s petition, we reverse.

FACTS

On February 26, 2014, McCaulley was convicted of vehicular assault. At sentencing, the court ordered he pay $153,779.80 in restitution. As a result of the felony conviction, the court also revoked McCaulley’s right to possess a firearm.

Over the next five years, McCaulley did not make restitution payments. But he completed all the other conditions of his sentence and remained crime free. As

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a result, McCaulley was eligible to reinstate his right to possess a firearm under former RCW 9.41.040(4). Still, McCaulley did not immediately petition to restore that right.

In 2023, our legislature amended former RCW 9.41.040(4) to remove language pertaining to the restoration of firearm rights and enacted a new statute to address that issue, RCW 9.41.041. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295, §§ 3, 4. Under the new statute, a petitioner must still satisfy all sentencing conditions and remain crime free,1 but they must also have paid their restitution obligation in full to restore their firearm possession rights. RCW 9.41.041(2)(b)(ii) (petitioner must have “completed all sentencing conditions, other than nonrestitution fines and fees”). The new statute took effect on July 23, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295.

On August 18, 2025, McCaulley petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights under former RCW 9.41.040(4).2 He acknowledged that he did not meet the current statutory requirements under RCW 9.41.041(2)(b)(ii) because he had not paid restitution. But McCaulley argued that the court should apply former RCW 9.41.040(4) to his petition because he had met all the requirements of the former statute before the legislature amended it. On October 3, the trial court denied McCaulley’s petition. It concluded that RCW 9.41.041 applied to his petition and

1 RCW 9.41.041(2)(a) requires the petitioner to have been in the community

without being convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any crime that prohibits the possession of a firearm for a number of consecutive years, dependent on the crime. Further, the petitioner cannot have any pending charges or other convictions that would disqualify them from owning a firearm, and law enforcement must have determined that the petitioner is not subject to any other prohibition on firearms at the time of the petition. RCW 9.41.041(2)(b)(i), (iii), (iv).

2 McCaulley first petitioned for restoration of his firearm possession rights in

December 2023. While the record is not clear, it appears that the 2023 petition was dismissed. McCaulley renewed his restoration petition in August 2025.

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that McCaulley did not meet the requirements under that statute because he had not fully paid restitution.

McCaulley appealed directly to our Supreme Court. That court denied direct review and transferred the appeal to us.

ANALYSIS

McCaulley argues that the court erred by unlawfully applying the eligibility requirements of RCW 9.41.041 retroactively. We agree.

A threshold question to whether a court unlawfully applied a statute retroactively is “whether application of the statute to the facts of a particular case would be in fact retroactive.” State v. Luna, 5 Wn.3d 465, 486, 578 P.3d 273 (2025). Determining whether a court applied a statute prospectively or retroactively is a question of statutory interpretation. Id. at 485. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. Our fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Id.

We presume a statute operates prospectively unless the legislature specifies that it is to operate retroactively. State v. T.K., 139 Wn.2d 320, 329, 987 P.2d 63 (1999). “ ‘A statute does not operate “retrospectively” merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment . . . or upsets expectations based in prior law.’ ” Id. at 3303 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods, 511 U.S. 244, 269, 114 S. Ct. 1522, 128 L. Ed. 2d (1994)). Instead, a statute is retroactive as applied if the event that triggered its application—the precipitating event—occurred before the statute went into effect. In re Pers.

3 Alteration in original.

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Restraint of Flint, 174 Wn.2d 539, 547, 277 P.3d 657 (2012). “To determine the precipitating event giving rise to application of a statute, a court may look to the subject matter regulated by the statute.” T.K., 139 Wn.2d at 330 (citing In re Est. of Burns, 131 Wn.2d 104, 112, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997)).

In T.K., our Supreme Court considered whether an amended statute governing the vacating of juvenile records applied retroactively to juvenile offender T.K.’s petition to vacate his disposition orders. 139 Wn.2d at 328-29, 323. In that case, T.K. satisfied the statutory conditions necessary to vacate his juvenile records but did not immediately petition to vacate them. Id. at 323. Then, the legislature amended the relevant statute, adding more requirements for vacating that T.K. could not meet. Id. at 323-24. After the amendment, T.K petitioned to vacate his juvenile conviction records under the old statute. Id. at 324. But the trial court applied the amended statute and rejected his petition. Id. We reversed, concluding that the trial court unlawfully applied the amended statute retroactively. Id.

Our Supreme Court agreed. T.K., 139 Wn.2d at 335. It explained that to ascertain whether a statute is applied retroactively, courts must determine the precipitating event giving rise to its application. T.K., 139 Wn.2d at 330. And to determine the precipitating event, we may look to the subject matter regulated by the statute. Id. Our Supreme Court then concluded that the subject matter regulated by the statute in T.K.’s case was the statutorily defined conditions for vacating juvenile records. Id. at 331. And it noted that once the juvenile offender meets the conditions of the statute, they have a right to relief, and the trial court has a nondiscretionary obligation to vacate the records no matter when the

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offender makes their request. Id. So, “[c]onsidering the subject matter addressed by the provisions in question and the mandatory language of the statute,” our Supreme Court concluded that “completion of the statutory conditions, not the filing of a motion to [vacate], is the event that triggers application of the statute.” Id. at 332.

The statutes governing restoration of McCaulley’s right to possess a firearm are like the juvenile statutes in T.K. The subject matter regulated by the restoration statutes is the setting of conditions the petitioner must meet to restore their firearm rights. See former RCW 9.41.040; RCW 9.41.041. And once the petitioner satisfies those conditions, the court has a nondiscretionary obligation to restore their rights. State v. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 77. 65 P.3d 343 (2003) (holding that the statute restoring firearm possession rights imposes “only a ministerial duty on the court when the enumerated, threshold requirements are met”).4 So, applying the analysis in T.K., the precipitating event that triggers application of the statute to restore firearm rights is completion of the statutory conditions, not filing a petition for restoration. Indeed, our Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 177-78, 421 P.3d 944 (2018).

In that case, defendant Edgar Dennis remained crime free for more than 15 consecutive years after the loss of his firearm rights in 1991, but then he was convicted of a misdemeanor in 2014. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d at 171. Dennis petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights in 2016 under former RCW

4 Footnote omitted.

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9.41.040(4),5 but the superior court denied his petition, holding that the statutory language requiring a petitioner be crime free for a 5-year period means the 5 years immediately preceding a petition for restoration. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 177-78. It concluded, “Given that a court’s role in the restoration process is purely ministerial, the precipitating event for eligibility for restoration is when the statutory requirements are met, not when the petition is filed.” Id. at 177. So, Dennis was statutorily eligible to petition for reinstatement once he was crime free for 5 consecutive years after his 1991 conviction. Id. at 177-78. And because the court had no discretion but to reinstate Dennis’ firearm rights, “[t]he only discretion the restoration provision contemplates is the petitioner’s discretion to decide when to petition.” Id. at 177.

The State argues that Dennis is inapt here because “the question [in that case] was not determining whether a right had vested under a prior version of a statute. Rather the holding was about resolving a potential [conflict] within the current statutory framework.” We disagree. The analysis to ascertain a precipitating event is the same no matter its underlying purpose. And our Supreme Court’s conclusion that Dennis had a right to reinstate his firearm rights once he satisfied the statutory conditions, and that he had the discretion to choose when to petition, is analogous to the issue here. Because the precipitating event for the statute restoring firearm rights is completion of the statutory requirements, and McCaulley satisfied those requirements while former RCW 9.41.040(4) was in

5 The statute cited in Dennis is likely former RCW 9.41.040(4) (2016), the statute in

effect when Dennis filed his petition. See 191 Wn.2d at 170-71. In any event, the language pertinent to our analysis did not change between 2016 and 2023. Compare former RCW 9.41.040(4) (2016), with former RCW 9.41.040(4) (2022).

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effect, the trial court’s application of RCW 9.41.041(2)(b)(ii) to his petition was retroactive.

Finally, the trial court’s retroactive application of the statute was unlawful.

As discussed above, we presume that statutes operate prospectively unless they express an intent otherwise. See T.K., 139 Wn.2d at 332. Still, we have recognized two exceptions to the rule of prospective application. See id. First, an amendment will apply retroactively if it is curative, meaning it clarifies or technically corrects ambiguous language. Id.; In re F.D. Food Processing, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 452, 461-52, 832 P.3d 1303 (1992). And second, a statute will apply retroactively if it is remedial in purpose. T.K., 139 Wn.2d at 323 (citing State v. McClendon, 131 Wn.2d 853, 861, 935 P.2d 1334 (1997)). But the State makes no argument that either of these exceptions apply here. So, we must presume that RCW 9.41.041 applies prospectively, and the court erred by retroactively applying the statute to McCaulley’s petition to restore his firearm rights.

We reverse and remand for the trial court to apply former RCW 9.41.040(4)

to McCaulley’s petition to restore his firearm rights.

WE CONCUR: