Jerry Bonds, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 6, 2019
Docket18A-CR-3075
StatusPublished

This text of Jerry Bonds, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Jerry Bonds, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jerry Bonds, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Jun 06 2019, 5:47 am

the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK Indiana Supreme Court estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals and Tax Court

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jerry Bonds, Jr. Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jerry Bonds Jr., June 6, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-3075 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G01-9708-CF-116824

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3075 | June 6, 2019 Page 1 of 5 [1] Jerry Bonds, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for alternative

placement pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-3. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 31, 1998, Bonds pled guilty to murder and Class A felony robbery for

an incident in which he killed the owner of Young’s General Market and took

money from the cash register. On October 14, 1998, the trial court sentenced

Bonds to sixty-five years for murder and twenty years for robbery, to be served

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of eighty-five years incarcerated. Our

Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Bonds’ sentence on appeal. Bonds v. State, 729

N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind. 2000).

[3] After various unsuccessful attempts at post-conviction relief and reduction of

his sentence, Bonds filed a motion for alternative placement on November 20,

2018. In his motion, Bonds requested placement in a community corrections

program, specifically home detention, work release, or daily reporting. Bonds

stated in the motion that his request was

in accordance with Indiana Code § 35-38-2.6 []. The Defendant Bonds does not wish the Court to construe this Motion as a ‘Motion for Modification of Sentence’. The Sentence Length at present is not at issue and only alternative placement is to be considered.

(App. Vol. II at 126) (errors and emphasis in original). The trial court

summarily denied Bonds’ request on November 21, 2018.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3075 | June 6, 2019 Page 2 of 5 Discussion and Decision [4] We first note that Bonds proceeds pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are

held to the same standards as licensed attorneys, and thus they are required to

follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004), trans. denied. Although we will attempt to decide cases on the merits

when possible, we will deem issues waived on appeal if noncompliance with the

Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure substantially impedes our ability to

consider the merits of the case. Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce

Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “We will not become an

advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either

inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.”

Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchan. Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985),

reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[5] Bonds argues the trial court erred when it denied 1 his motion for alternative

placement pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-3, which states, in

relevant part, “[t]he court may, at the time of sentencing, suspend the sentence and

order a person to be placed in a community corrections program as an

alternative to commitment to the department of correction” (emphasis added).

1 Bonds also argues the trial court erred when it considered his motion for alternative placement as a motion for modification of sentence. However, he does not direct us to the portion of the record wherein the trial court did what he alleges and, accordingly, has waived this argument for appeal. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 29 N.E..3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (waiving issue for appeal where argument not supported by citations to the record or citation to relevant legal authority).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3075 | June 6, 2019 Page 3 of 5 The trial court sentenced Bonds in 1998. He filed his motion for consideration

for alternative placement “in accordance with Indiana Code § 35-38-2.6” (App.

Vol. II at 126), on November 20, 2018, over twenty years after his sentencing.

As Bonds did not request placement in community corrections at the time he

was sentenced in 1998, he in ineligible for placement in community corrections

under Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-3. See Keys v. State, 746 N.E.2d 405, 407

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-3 “merely authorizes the trial court

to suspend a sentence and place defendant in a community corrections program

at the time of sentencing, but [] it does not allow the trial court to modify

placement after sentencing.”). 2

Conclusion [6] As Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-3 allows for community corrections

placement “at the time of sentencing” and Bonds filed his motion for alternative

placement under that statute twenty years after he was sentenced, the trial court

did not err when it denied his motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

[7] Affirmed.

2 Bonds also argues his motion was “Shortstopped” at the trial court level and doing so was “demonstrative of bias and prejudice against the Appellant due to his ‘pro se’ status[.]” (Br. of Appellant at 11.) However, Bonds’ argument regarding this alleged issue is, at best, confusing, and is waived for failure to make a cogent argument under Indiana Appellate Rule 46. See Jackson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 926, 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (failure to make cogent argument waives issue from appellate consideration), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3075 | June 6, 2019 Page 4 of 5 Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3075 | June 6, 2019 Page 5 of 5

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Related

Bonds v. State
729 N.E.2d 1002 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2000)
Terpstra v. Farmers and Merchants Bank
483 N.E.2d 749 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1985)
Evans v. State
809 N.E.2d 338 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2004)
Keys v. State
746 N.E.2d 405 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2001)
Adrian Jackson v. State of Indiana
992 N.E.2d 926 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2013)

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