In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
JERRY ALLAN RIDGE, JR., WD75986 Respondent, OPINION FILED: v. APRIL 29, 2014 DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Miller County, Missouri The Honorable Kenneth L. Oswald, Judge
Before Division Three: Anthony Rex Gabbert, P.J., Victor C. Howard, Thomas H. Newton, JJ.
The Director of Revenue appeals the circuit court‟s judgment reinstating the driver‟s
license of Jerry Ridge, Jr. The Director raises one point on appeal. The Director argues that the
court erred in reinstating Ridge‟s driving privileges because Ridge‟s statement to the Missouri
State Highway Patrol Trooper that he did not want to take a chemical blood test constituted a
refusal. We affirm.
Factual Background
On August 5, 2012, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper Derek Mason stopped the
vehicle driven by Ridge because Mason noticed Ridge‟s vehicle commit a lane violation. When
Mason interacted with Ridge he noticed that Ridge had several signs of intoxication, including an odor of marijuana, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and mumbling of speech. Ridge also admitted
to Mason that he had been smoking marijuana shortly before being pulled over.
After noticing these signs of intoxication, Mason administered several field sobriety tests
which Ridge failed. As a result, Mason arrested Ridge for driving while intoxicated. Mason
advised Ridge of his Miranda rights and Missouri‟s Implied Consent Law and requested a sample
of Ridge‟s blood. Ridge agreed to provide a blood sample. A short time later while Ridge and
Mason were sitting in the patrol car, Mason recorded in his report that Ridge refused after
initially agreeing to provide a blood sample. Because of his noted refusal, Mason did not get a
blood sample from Ridge and the Director sought to have Ridge‟s license revoked for a year.
Ridge filed a petition for review.
At the hearing, the circuit court heard testimonies from Mason and Ridge. Mason
testified that, while he did not remember the exact words Ridge used, Ridge refused after
initially agreeing to submit a blood test. Ridge testified that, before Mason drove him to get his
blood test, Mason inquired if Ridge “really want[ed] to do this? Because I don‟t want to get all
the way down there and then you not do it.” Ridge testified that he then told Mason that he
didn‟t want to do it. The court found that Ridge did not “unequivocally refuse” to submit to a
chemical test of his blood and reinstated Ridge‟s driver‟s license. The Director appeals.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court‟s judgment in a driver‟s license revocation case like any
other court-tried civil case. White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307 (Mo. banc 2010). On
appeal of a court-tried civil case, we will affirm the trial court‟s judgment unless there is no
substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously
declares or applies the law. Murhpy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). “The
2 evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court‟s judgment and all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded.” McKay v. Dir.
of Revenue, 382 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Mo. App. 2012) (quoting Kimbrell v. Dir. of Revenue, 192
S.W.3d 712, 714 (Mo. App. 2006)). Furthermore, it is the fact finder‟s duty to weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 586-87
(Mo. App. 2007).
Missouri Implied Consent Law
In the Director‟s sole point on appeal, the Director argues that the court erred in
reinstating Ridge‟s driving privileges because Ridge‟s statement to Mason that he did not want to
take a chemical blood test constituted a refusal. We find no error.
Under Missouri‟s Implied Consent Law, a person who operates a motor vehicle on the
public highways in Missouri is deemed to have given implicit consent to “a chemical test or tests
of the person‟s breath, blood, salvia, or urine” if a police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the driver is in an intoxicated or drugged condition. § 577.020.1, RSMo 2000;1 McKay,
382 S.W.3d at 121. A driver may, however, revoke his implied consent when asked to submit to
chemical testing. § 577.041.1. If the driver refuses the testing, their driver‟s license is revoked
for one year. § 577.041.3.
A person who has their driving privileges revoked by the Director for failure to submit to
chemical testing may seek review of the revocation in the circuit court of the county where the
arrest or stop occurred. § 577.041.4. “At this hearing, the trial court is authorized to determine
only the following: (1) whether the driver was arrested; (2) whether the arresting officer had
1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri as updated through the 2012 Cumulative Supplement.
3 reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving while intoxicated; and (3) whether the
driver refused to submit to an authorized chemical test as requested.” Kimbrell, 192 S.W.3d at
715 (citing Driskell v. Dir. of Revenue, 169, S.W.3d 187, 189 (Mo. App. 2005); § 577.041.4).
The Director bears the burden of proving these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
If the court determines that any of these three elements is lacking, the court shall order the
Director to reinstate the license. § 577.041.5.
In this case, neither the Director nor Ridge contest whether Ridge was arrested nor
whether Mason had reasonable grounds to believe Ridge was driving while intoxicated. The
only contested issue on appeal is whether Ridge refused to submit to a blood sample as requested
by Mason. “In reviewing a particular issue that is contested, the nature of the appellate court‟s
review is directed by whether the matter contested is a question of fact or law.” White, 321
S.W.3d at 308. When this Court reviews questions of fact, deference is given to the fact-finder.
Id. “When the facts relevant to an issue are contested, the reviewing court defers to the trial
court‟s assessment of the evidence.” Id.
Here, the facts revelant to Ridge‟s alleged refusal are contested. At the hearing, the
Director‟s only witness was Mason who testified that Ridge agreed to take the chemical blood
test after he read Ridge the Missouri Implied Consent Law. He also testified that a few minutes
after Ridge agreed to take the chemical blood test Ridge stated that he did not want to take the
test. Mason, however, could not recall exactly what Ridge said. Instead, he could only
remember that Ridge said he did not want to do it. Mason testified that he did not advise Ridge
of the Missouri Implied Consent Law after his initial notice.
Trooper‟s Narrative, apparently recorded by Mason the night of the arrest, was also
admitted into evidence. It read in part:
4 At 0026 hours, I read Ridge the Missouri Implied Consent Law and requested a chemical sample of his blood at which time Ridge stated, “Yes.” At 0027 hours, I advised Ridge of his Miranda rights, at which time Ridge stated he understood.
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
JERRY ALLAN RIDGE, JR., WD75986 Respondent, OPINION FILED: v. APRIL 29, 2014 DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Miller County, Missouri The Honorable Kenneth L. Oswald, Judge
Before Division Three: Anthony Rex Gabbert, P.J., Victor C. Howard, Thomas H. Newton, JJ.
The Director of Revenue appeals the circuit court‟s judgment reinstating the driver‟s
license of Jerry Ridge, Jr. The Director raises one point on appeal. The Director argues that the
court erred in reinstating Ridge‟s driving privileges because Ridge‟s statement to the Missouri
State Highway Patrol Trooper that he did not want to take a chemical blood test constituted a
refusal. We affirm.
Factual Background
On August 5, 2012, Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper Derek Mason stopped the
vehicle driven by Ridge because Mason noticed Ridge‟s vehicle commit a lane violation. When
Mason interacted with Ridge he noticed that Ridge had several signs of intoxication, including an odor of marijuana, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and mumbling of speech. Ridge also admitted
to Mason that he had been smoking marijuana shortly before being pulled over.
After noticing these signs of intoxication, Mason administered several field sobriety tests
which Ridge failed. As a result, Mason arrested Ridge for driving while intoxicated. Mason
advised Ridge of his Miranda rights and Missouri‟s Implied Consent Law and requested a sample
of Ridge‟s blood. Ridge agreed to provide a blood sample. A short time later while Ridge and
Mason were sitting in the patrol car, Mason recorded in his report that Ridge refused after
initially agreeing to provide a blood sample. Because of his noted refusal, Mason did not get a
blood sample from Ridge and the Director sought to have Ridge‟s license revoked for a year.
Ridge filed a petition for review.
At the hearing, the circuit court heard testimonies from Mason and Ridge. Mason
testified that, while he did not remember the exact words Ridge used, Ridge refused after
initially agreeing to submit a blood test. Ridge testified that, before Mason drove him to get his
blood test, Mason inquired if Ridge “really want[ed] to do this? Because I don‟t want to get all
the way down there and then you not do it.” Ridge testified that he then told Mason that he
didn‟t want to do it. The court found that Ridge did not “unequivocally refuse” to submit to a
chemical test of his blood and reinstated Ridge‟s driver‟s license. The Director appeals.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court‟s judgment in a driver‟s license revocation case like any
other court-tried civil case. White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307 (Mo. banc 2010). On
appeal of a court-tried civil case, we will affirm the trial court‟s judgment unless there is no
substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously
declares or applies the law. Murhpy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). “The
2 evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court‟s judgment and all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded.” McKay v. Dir.
of Revenue, 382 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Mo. App. 2012) (quoting Kimbrell v. Dir. of Revenue, 192
S.W.3d 712, 714 (Mo. App. 2006)). Furthermore, it is the fact finder‟s duty to weigh the
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 586-87
(Mo. App. 2007).
Missouri Implied Consent Law
In the Director‟s sole point on appeal, the Director argues that the court erred in
reinstating Ridge‟s driving privileges because Ridge‟s statement to Mason that he did not want to
take a chemical blood test constituted a refusal. We find no error.
Under Missouri‟s Implied Consent Law, a person who operates a motor vehicle on the
public highways in Missouri is deemed to have given implicit consent to “a chemical test or tests
of the person‟s breath, blood, salvia, or urine” if a police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the driver is in an intoxicated or drugged condition. § 577.020.1, RSMo 2000;1 McKay,
382 S.W.3d at 121. A driver may, however, revoke his implied consent when asked to submit to
chemical testing. § 577.041.1. If the driver refuses the testing, their driver‟s license is revoked
for one year. § 577.041.3.
A person who has their driving privileges revoked by the Director for failure to submit to
chemical testing may seek review of the revocation in the circuit court of the county where the
arrest or stop occurred. § 577.041.4. “At this hearing, the trial court is authorized to determine
only the following: (1) whether the driver was arrested; (2) whether the arresting officer had
1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri as updated through the 2012 Cumulative Supplement.
3 reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving while intoxicated; and (3) whether the
driver refused to submit to an authorized chemical test as requested.” Kimbrell, 192 S.W.3d at
715 (citing Driskell v. Dir. of Revenue, 169, S.W.3d 187, 189 (Mo. App. 2005); § 577.041.4).
The Director bears the burden of proving these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
If the court determines that any of these three elements is lacking, the court shall order the
Director to reinstate the license. § 577.041.5.
In this case, neither the Director nor Ridge contest whether Ridge was arrested nor
whether Mason had reasonable grounds to believe Ridge was driving while intoxicated. The
only contested issue on appeal is whether Ridge refused to submit to a blood sample as requested
by Mason. “In reviewing a particular issue that is contested, the nature of the appellate court‟s
review is directed by whether the matter contested is a question of fact or law.” White, 321
S.W.3d at 308. When this Court reviews questions of fact, deference is given to the fact-finder.
Id. “When the facts relevant to an issue are contested, the reviewing court defers to the trial
court‟s assessment of the evidence.” Id.
Here, the facts revelant to Ridge‟s alleged refusal are contested. At the hearing, the
Director‟s only witness was Mason who testified that Ridge agreed to take the chemical blood
test after he read Ridge the Missouri Implied Consent Law. He also testified that a few minutes
after Ridge agreed to take the chemical blood test Ridge stated that he did not want to take the
test. Mason, however, could not recall exactly what Ridge said. Instead, he could only
remember that Ridge said he did not want to do it. Mason testified that he did not advise Ridge
of the Missouri Implied Consent Law after his initial notice.
Trooper‟s Narrative, apparently recorded by Mason the night of the arrest, was also
admitted into evidence. It read in part:
4 At 0026 hours, I read Ridge the Missouri Implied Consent Law and requested a chemical sample of his blood at which time Ridge stated, “Yes.” At 0027 hours, I advised Ridge of his Miranda rights, at which time Ridge stated he understood. At 0032 hours, Ridge stated he would not submit to a chemical test of his blood. Ridge was then transported to the Miller County jail for processing.
Ridge was the only other witness to testify at the hearing. He testified that, shortly after
agreeing to the chemical blood test, Mason said, “Well, do you really want to go do this?
Because I don‟t want to get all the way down there and then you not do it.” Ridge then
responded that he “didn‟t want to do it.” Ridge also testified that he did not believe by making
this response he was refusing to take the chemical blood test because he did not want to lose his
license.
In the circuit court‟s judgment, the court found that Ridge agreed to submit to a chemical
blood test after being read the implied consent law by Mason. The court further concluded that
after agreeing to the test Ridge did not thereafter “unequivocally refuse” to submit to the
chemical blood test. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and
deferring to the circuit court‟s assessment of the evidence, we find that the court‟s judgment was
not against the weight of the evidence.
Here, the record reveals that Mason could not remember what Ridge actually said when
he purportedly refused to take the test. Mason‟s report also did not contain the exact language
Ridge used even though the report quoted Ridge‟s response when he first agreed to take the
chemical blood test verbatim. Although the Director argues that Ridge was uncooperative,
Mason‟s report and corresponding testimony shows that Ridge had been fully cooperative with
Mason. The fact that Ridge was unable to properly follow the instructions for each of the field
sobriety tests does not mean that he was uncooperative—only that he failed the tests.
5 Furthermore, based on Ridge‟s testimony as to Mason‟s statements following Ridge‟s
initial consent, an inference can be made that Ridge‟s refusal was prompted or influenced by
Mason‟s seemingly unnecessary inquiry into whether Ridge really wanted to go through with the
blood test. Such an inference could reasonably cast doubt on whether Ridge‟s statement was
actually a refusal.2 See Bruce v. Dept. of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Mo. App. 2010) (“A
„refusal‟ occurs when a person fails, of his or her own volition, to do what is necessary in order
for the test at issue to be performed.”). Hence, the court‟s conclusion that Ridge did not
“unequivocally refuse” to submit to a chemical test was not against the weight of the evidence.
We conclude, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in reinstating Ridge‟s driving
privileges after finding that Ridge did not refuse to submit to a chemical blood test as the court‟s
judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. Consequently, as the Director failed to
meet its burden that Ridge refused to take the chemical blood test, Ridge was entitled to
reinstatement. We affirm the circuit court‟s judgment.
Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge
All concur.
2 We note that, in light of the facts presented herein, not “wanting to” submit to the test and “refusing to” submit to the test are distinguishable. While many drivers may not “want” to take the test, they are nonetheless willing when faced with potential license revocation. That was exactly the case here. Ridge made an affirmative response when asked to take the test. When later asked by Mason if he wanted to take the test, Ridge responded that he didn‟t want to. However, at the revocation hearing, Ridge testified that he didn‟t want to take the test but would in order not to lose his license.