COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Chaney and Senior Judge Annunziata
JERROD DEMONTE VINES MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1086-22-1 PER CURIAM JUNE 6, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE John W. Brown, Judge
(Jennifer T. Stanton, Senior Appellate Attorney; Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Jerrod Demonte Vines appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his previously
suspended sentences. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion “in imposing an active
period of incarceration of three years for [his] probation violations.” After examining the briefs
and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the
appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, we “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may properly be drawn from it.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274
(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 318, 329 (2013)).
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413. In February 2007, Vines pled guilty to possession of cocaine. The trial court initially
deferred judgment in the case and placed Vines on probation because it found him eligible for first
offender status. However, Vines failed to comply with the terms of his deferred disposition and he
was convicted of that possession charge in 2008. The trial court then sentenced Vines to four years
of incarceration with three years and ten months of that sentence suspended.
In May 2013, the trial court found Vines guilty of violating the conditions of his probation
because Vines had “incurred a new conviction” for intentional damage to property and he had “not
refrained from illicit drug use” as required under the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked
and resuspended Vines’s suspended sentence in its entirety. In December 2015, the trial court
convicted Vines of violating the conditions of his probation again. This time, the trial court revoked
Vines’s suspended sentence, resuspended three years of that sentence, and only imposed an active
sentence of ten months of incarceration.
Then, in 2019, Vines was convicted of committing grand larceny and obstruction of justice.
The trial court sentenced him to five years and twelve months of incarceration, with four years and
fifteen months suspended, for those convictions. As a result of sustaining those new convictions,
the trial court again found Vines guilty of violating the terms of his probation. It then revoked the
remaining three years of his sentence for his 2008 conviction, but resuspended his sentence without
imposing any active time.
Then, in October 2021, Vines’s probation officer filed a major violation report stating that
Vines had pled guilty to destruction of property. Although the trial court again deferred judgment in
that case, it ordered Vines to do 100 hours of community service, take an anger management course,
and pay $1,280 in restitution. According to the major violation report, however, Vines had “not
-2- made a payment” toward restitution.1 In May 2022, Vines’s probation officer filed a major
violation report addendum stating that Vines had been convicted of driving with a suspended license
and that he was charged with failure to appear in court. At his revocation hearing, Vines
acknowledged the driving with a suspended license conviction and conceded that he had violated
the terms of his suspended sentences.
The trial court found Vines guilty of violating the conditions of his probation for driving on
a suspended license and for failure to pay restitution. The trial court emphasized that this was
Vines’s fourth probation violation on the 2008 conviction for possession of cocaine. Consequently,
the trial court revoked Vines’s suspended sentences, imposed three years of active incarceration,
and resuspended four years and fifteen months. Vines now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Vines argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to three years of
active incarceration because the trial court “did not give weight to the fact that the new
conviction was a traffic misdemeanor” and because the trial court “sentenced Mr. Vines to
double the high-end of his guidelines.” “In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact
and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’”
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12
Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)).
Generally, after suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of
sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation
period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the
1 At Vines’s revocation hearing, the Commonwealth entered Vines’s restitution payment history into evidence indicating that Vines had not made any payments toward the restitution ordered. -3- court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of
suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with
the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). If the basis of the probation violation is
“that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the
suspension, . . . then the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of
that period previously suspended.” Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
In this case, Vines admitted that he had violated the terms of the suspended sentences by
failing to obey all federal, state, and local laws. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Vines
suffered a new criminal conviction during the suspension period. Therefore, it was within the
trial court’s discretion to “impose or resuspend any or all” of the previously suspended
sentences. Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
Indeed, Vines does not contend on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient cause to
revoke his suspended sentences. Rather, he argues that the trial court should have given more
weight to his mitigating evidence. However, “[i]t is within the trial court’s purview to weigh any
mitigating factors presented by the defendant.” Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36
(2000). We, therefore, cannot disturb the trial court’s judgment based on its assessment of
Vines’s mitigating evidence simply because this Court might have weighed the evidence
differently. Moreover, Vines’s repeated probation violations were a relevant factor for the trial
court to consider.
Here, significant aggravating factors weighed heavily against Vines’s mitigating
evidence. The trial court emphasized Vines’s criminal history and his multiple probation
violations. The trial court balanced Vines’s mitigation evidence against the other evidence and
determined that an active sentence of three years was appropriate in this case.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Chaney and Senior Judge Annunziata
JERROD DEMONTE VINES MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1086-22-1 PER CURIAM JUNE 6, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE John W. Brown, Judge
(Jennifer T. Stanton, Senior Appellate Attorney; Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Jerrod Demonte Vines appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his previously
suspended sentences. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion “in imposing an active
period of incarceration of three years for [his] probation violations.” After examining the briefs
and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the
appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, we “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may properly be drawn from it.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274
(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 318, 329 (2013)).
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413. In February 2007, Vines pled guilty to possession of cocaine. The trial court initially
deferred judgment in the case and placed Vines on probation because it found him eligible for first
offender status. However, Vines failed to comply with the terms of his deferred disposition and he
was convicted of that possession charge in 2008. The trial court then sentenced Vines to four years
of incarceration with three years and ten months of that sentence suspended.
In May 2013, the trial court found Vines guilty of violating the conditions of his probation
because Vines had “incurred a new conviction” for intentional damage to property and he had “not
refrained from illicit drug use” as required under the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked
and resuspended Vines’s suspended sentence in its entirety. In December 2015, the trial court
convicted Vines of violating the conditions of his probation again. This time, the trial court revoked
Vines’s suspended sentence, resuspended three years of that sentence, and only imposed an active
sentence of ten months of incarceration.
Then, in 2019, Vines was convicted of committing grand larceny and obstruction of justice.
The trial court sentenced him to five years and twelve months of incarceration, with four years and
fifteen months suspended, for those convictions. As a result of sustaining those new convictions,
the trial court again found Vines guilty of violating the terms of his probation. It then revoked the
remaining three years of his sentence for his 2008 conviction, but resuspended his sentence without
imposing any active time.
Then, in October 2021, Vines’s probation officer filed a major violation report stating that
Vines had pled guilty to destruction of property. Although the trial court again deferred judgment in
that case, it ordered Vines to do 100 hours of community service, take an anger management course,
and pay $1,280 in restitution. According to the major violation report, however, Vines had “not
-2- made a payment” toward restitution.1 In May 2022, Vines’s probation officer filed a major
violation report addendum stating that Vines had been convicted of driving with a suspended license
and that he was charged with failure to appear in court. At his revocation hearing, Vines
acknowledged the driving with a suspended license conviction and conceded that he had violated
the terms of his suspended sentences.
The trial court found Vines guilty of violating the conditions of his probation for driving on
a suspended license and for failure to pay restitution. The trial court emphasized that this was
Vines’s fourth probation violation on the 2008 conviction for possession of cocaine. Consequently,
the trial court revoked Vines’s suspended sentences, imposed three years of active incarceration,
and resuspended four years and fifteen months. Vines now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Vines argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to three years of
active incarceration because the trial court “did not give weight to the fact that the new
conviction was a traffic misdemeanor” and because the trial court “sentenced Mr. Vines to
double the high-end of his guidelines.” “In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact
and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’”
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12
Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)).
Generally, after suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of
sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation
period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the
1 At Vines’s revocation hearing, the Commonwealth entered Vines’s restitution payment history into evidence indicating that Vines had not made any payments toward the restitution ordered. -3- court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of
suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with
the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). If the basis of the probation violation is
“that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the
suspension, . . . then the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of
that period previously suspended.” Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
In this case, Vines admitted that he had violated the terms of the suspended sentences by
failing to obey all federal, state, and local laws. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Vines
suffered a new criminal conviction during the suspension period. Therefore, it was within the
trial court’s discretion to “impose or resuspend any or all” of the previously suspended
sentences. Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
Indeed, Vines does not contend on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient cause to
revoke his suspended sentences. Rather, he argues that the trial court should have given more
weight to his mitigating evidence. However, “[i]t is within the trial court’s purview to weigh any
mitigating factors presented by the defendant.” Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36
(2000). We, therefore, cannot disturb the trial court’s judgment based on its assessment of
Vines’s mitigating evidence simply because this Court might have weighed the evidence
differently. Moreover, Vines’s repeated probation violations were a relevant factor for the trial
court to consider.
Here, significant aggravating factors weighed heavily against Vines’s mitigating
evidence. The trial court emphasized Vines’s criminal history and his multiple probation
violations. The trial court balanced Vines’s mitigation evidence against the other evidence and
determined that an active sentence of three years was appropriate in this case.
-4- “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the
trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of
all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740
(2007). Vines’s repeated disregard of the terms of his suspended sentences supports a finding that
he was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation
represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and
sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010)
(quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Vines failed to make productive
use of the grace that had been extended to him, and he continued to engage in criminal conduct
during the suspension period.
We further note that it is well-settled that “[o]ur sentencing guidelines ‘are discretionary,
rather than mandatory.’” Fazili v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 248 (2019) (quoting West v.
Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007)). “Accordingly, a circuit court’s failure to follow the
guidelines is ‘not . . . reviewable on appeal.’” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Code
§ 19.2-298.01(F)).
Consequently, we certainly cannot say that the sentence that the trial court imposed does
not represent a proper exercise of its sentencing discretion. See Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39
Va. App. 314, 321-22 (2002) (finding the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the
defendant’s previously suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the
defendant’s] offenses and his continuing criminal activity”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we do not disturb the decision of the circuit court.
Affirmed.
-5-