In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-14-00452-CR NO. 09-14-00453-CR ____________________
JEROMY JOHN LEAX, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee _______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 221st District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 13-11-11867 CR (Counts I and II) ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Jeromy John Leax with two counts of online solicitation
of a minor. In a pre-trial application asking the trial court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus, Leax challenged the constitutionality of the online solicitation statute. He
also filed a motion to quash the indictment that charged him with the crime of
online solicitation of a minor. Before trial, and based on the terms of his plea
agreement with the State, Leax pled guilty to committing the offenses alleged in
1 the indictment. On Leax’s two convictions for online solicitation, the trial court
assessed concurrent thirteen-year sentences.
Leax appeals his convictions, and he challenges the trial court’s pre-trial
ruling on his motion to quash the indictment. In three issues, Leax contends that
the trial court erred by finding section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code
constitutional. According to Leax, section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code is
unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violates
the Dormant Commerce Clause. We conclude that Leax’s issues are without merit,
and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Texas Penal Code section 33.021(c) provides that a person commits an
offense under this section:
if the person, over the Internet, by electronic mail or text message or other electronic message service or system, or through a commercial online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person, including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another person.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c) (West Supp. 2015). At the time Leax committed
the offenses that are at issue, the statute defined a “minor” as “an individual who
represents himself or herself to be younger than 17 years of age” or “an individual
whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years of age.” Act of May 25, 2005, 2 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1273, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 4049, 4050 (amended 2015)
(current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(a)) (italics omitted). The former
statute also provided that it was not a defense that “(1) the meeting did not occur;
(2) the actor did not intend for the meeting to occur; or (3) the actor was engaged
in a fantasy at the time of commission of the offense.” Id. (current version at Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(d)).
Leax contends that given the other subsections of section 33.021, section
33.021(c) forbids a substantial amount of protected speech “that is neither
solicitant nor directed at someone the speaker believes to be a minor.” He also
contends that section 33.021(c) is void for vagueness because people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning of the intent element. Last, Leax
argues that by attempting to place regulations on Internet users everywhere, section
33.021(c) unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Leax suggests that the courts should adopt a categorical test
and declare section 33.021(c) void unless it falls into one of the categories of
historically unprotected speech. Leax points to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States to support his argument that content-based restrictions
on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to a few
traditional categories of expression. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537,
3 2544, 567 U.S. ___ (2012); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2010).
These categories include speech integral to criminal conduct. Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”). Additionally, as Leax
acknowledges in his brief, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently applied a
conduct-based analysis in addressing a facial challenge to a different subsection of
section 33.021. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We are bound to follow the federal constitutional analysis employed by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Lewis v. State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“We are bound in criminal cases to
follow decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”). In reviewing a claim that a
statute is facially unconstitutional, the question presents a question of law that is
reviewed using a de novo standard. Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 14. Initially, in evaluating a
statute’s constitutionality, we presume the statute is valid and that the legislature
has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily by enacting it. Id. at 14-15. The party
challenging a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional normally carries the
burden to establish the statute’s unconstitutionality, but the presumption is reversed
4 if the challenged statute seeks to restrict and punish speech based on its content. Id.
at 15. “Content-based regulations (those laws that distinguish favored from
disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed) are presumptively invalid, and the
government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
We apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations. Id.
The arguments that Leax raises in his appeal have been presented to us in
several other cases we decided this year. See Ex parte Mahmoud, No. 09-15-
00424-CR, 2016 WL ___, at *__ (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 30, 2016, no pet. h.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Goetz, No. 09-15-00409-CR,
2016 WL ___, at *__ (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 30, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); State v. Paquette, No. 09-15-00361-CR, 2016 WL
747243, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 24, 2016, no pet. h.); Ex parte
Victorick, No. 09-13-00551-CR, 2014 WL 2152129, at **2-7 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont May 21, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication),
cert. denied, Victorick v. Texas, 135 S.Ct. 1557 (2015). In Victorick, we concluded
that section 33.021(c) “punishes conduct rather than the content of speech alone.”
2014 WL 2152129, at *3. Thus, we rejected Victorick’s argument that section
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In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-14-00452-CR NO. 09-14-00453-CR ____________________
JEROMY JOHN LEAX, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee _______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 221st District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 13-11-11867 CR (Counts I and II) ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Jeromy John Leax with two counts of online solicitation
of a minor. In a pre-trial application asking the trial court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus, Leax challenged the constitutionality of the online solicitation statute. He
also filed a motion to quash the indictment that charged him with the crime of
online solicitation of a minor. Before trial, and based on the terms of his plea
agreement with the State, Leax pled guilty to committing the offenses alleged in
1 the indictment. On Leax’s two convictions for online solicitation, the trial court
assessed concurrent thirteen-year sentences.
Leax appeals his convictions, and he challenges the trial court’s pre-trial
ruling on his motion to quash the indictment. In three issues, Leax contends that
the trial court erred by finding section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code
constitutional. According to Leax, section 33.021(c) of the Texas Penal Code is
unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violates
the Dormant Commerce Clause. We conclude that Leax’s issues are without merit,
and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Texas Penal Code section 33.021(c) provides that a person commits an
offense under this section:
if the person, over the Internet, by electronic mail or text message or other electronic message service or system, or through a commercial online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person, including the actor, with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another person.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(c) (West Supp. 2015). At the time Leax committed
the offenses that are at issue, the statute defined a “minor” as “an individual who
represents himself or herself to be younger than 17 years of age” or “an individual
whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years of age.” Act of May 25, 2005, 2 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1273, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 4049, 4050 (amended 2015)
(current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(a)) (italics omitted). The former
statute also provided that it was not a defense that “(1) the meeting did not occur;
(2) the actor did not intend for the meeting to occur; or (3) the actor was engaged
in a fantasy at the time of commission of the offense.” Id. (current version at Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(d)).
Leax contends that given the other subsections of section 33.021, section
33.021(c) forbids a substantial amount of protected speech “that is neither
solicitant nor directed at someone the speaker believes to be a minor.” He also
contends that section 33.021(c) is void for vagueness because people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning of the intent element. Last, Leax
argues that by attempting to place regulations on Internet users everywhere, section
33.021(c) unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Leax suggests that the courts should adopt a categorical test
and declare section 33.021(c) void unless it falls into one of the categories of
historically unprotected speech. Leax points to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States to support his argument that content-based restrictions
on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to a few
traditional categories of expression. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537,
3 2544, 567 U.S. ___ (2012); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2010).
These categories include speech integral to criminal conduct. Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”). Additionally, as Leax
acknowledges in his brief, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently applied a
conduct-based analysis in addressing a facial challenge to a different subsection of
section 33.021. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We are bound to follow the federal constitutional analysis employed by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Lewis v. State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“We are bound in criminal cases to
follow decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”). In reviewing a claim that a
statute is facially unconstitutional, the question presents a question of law that is
reviewed using a de novo standard. Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 14. Initially, in evaluating a
statute’s constitutionality, we presume the statute is valid and that the legislature
has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily by enacting it. Id. at 14-15. The party
challenging a statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional normally carries the
burden to establish the statute’s unconstitutionality, but the presumption is reversed
4 if the challenged statute seeks to restrict and punish speech based on its content. Id.
at 15. “Content-based regulations (those laws that distinguish favored from
disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed) are presumptively invalid, and the
government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
We apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations. Id.
The arguments that Leax raises in his appeal have been presented to us in
several other cases we decided this year. See Ex parte Mahmoud, No. 09-15-
00424-CR, 2016 WL ___, at *__ (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 30, 2016, no pet. h.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Goetz, No. 09-15-00409-CR,
2016 WL ___, at *__ (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 30, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); State v. Paquette, No. 09-15-00361-CR, 2016 WL
747243, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 24, 2016, no pet. h.); Ex parte
Victorick, No. 09-13-00551-CR, 2014 WL 2152129, at **2-7 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont May 21, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication),
cert. denied, Victorick v. Texas, 135 S.Ct. 1557 (2015). In Victorick, we concluded
that section 33.021(c) “punishes conduct rather than the content of speech alone.”
2014 WL 2152129, at *3. Thus, we rejected Victorick’s argument that section
33.021(c) of the Penal Code involved a content-based restriction on speech, and we
began our analysis with the presumption that section 33.021(c) of the Penal Code
5 was constitutionally valid. Id. at *4. Moreover, we decided that section 33.021(c)
has a rational relationship to a legitimate and compelling state interest of protecting
children from sexual predators by prohibiting online solicitation of a minor to
engage in sexual acts. Id. at **3, 5.
Relying on our analysis in Victorick, we concluded in three recent opinions
that section 33.021(c) is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Mahmoud,
2016 WL ___, at *__; Goetz, 2016 WL ___, at *__; Paquette, 2016 WL 747243, at
*3; see Victorick, 2014 WL 2152129, at **2-7. Based on our former precedent, we
decline to revisit our decision in Victorick. Therefore, we reject Leax’s arguments
that section 33.021 is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Paquette,
2016 WL 747243, at *3; Victorick, 2014 WL 2152129, at *6.
Leax also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash
because section 33.021 violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. We rejected this
same contention in Paquette, in Mahmoud, and in Goetz, and we decline to revisit
our analysis regarding the claim that section 33.021 violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause. See Mahmoud, 2016 WL ___, at *__; Goetz, 2016 WL ___, at
*__; Paquette, 2016 WL 747243, at *4. We affirm our prior holdings that section
6 33.021(c) has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce and does not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Paquette, 2016 WL 747243, at *4.
Having considered Leax’s arguments, we conclude that the trial court
properly denied Leax’s motion to quash the indictment. We overrule issues one
through three, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ HOLLIS HORTON Justice
Submitted on July 21, 2015 Opinion Delivered April 13, 2016 Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.