Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2023-1749 ____________
JEROMEE SAFFOLD, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
March 19, 2026
GROSSHANS, J.
Can a defendant whose sentence is vacated on direct appeal
withdraw his underlying plea for good cause prior to the imposition
of a new sentence on remand? The Fourth District Court of Appeal
answered this question in the negative, certifying conflict with the
Second District Court of Appeal’s contrary position. Saffold v. State
(Saffold II), 374 So. 3d 836, 840-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As
detailed below, we agree with the Fourth District and hold that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f)’s good-cause standard
does not apply during post-appeal resentencing proceedings. 1
I
Early one morning, Jeromee Saffold picked up a young woman
and offered to drive her home. He instead drove her to a Wal-Mart
parking lot. There, while armed and threatening violence, Saffold
forced the victim to have vaginal, anal, and oral sex with him.
He then drove the victim, against her will, to a nearby
apartment complex, demanding that she perform oral sex on him
while in transit. Upon their arrival, Saffold demanded further
sexual acts from the victim and used her cell phone to record them.
He again coerced those acts by threatening violence—against both
the victim and her family—and bludgeoning her in the head with a
firearm. Eventually, the victim escaped. She then alerted law
enforcement, who arrested Saffold at the apartment complex.
Based on these events, the State charged Saffold with seven
crimes: five counts of armed sexual battery, one count of
kidnapping with intent to facilitate a felony, and one count of
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
-2- aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at
837.
Saffold pled no contest to all seven crimes as charged. At
sentencing, Saffold requested a 25-year sentence—which, if
imposed, would have been a departure from his lowest permissible
sentence of roughly 51 years in prison. The prosecutor argued
against a downward departure and contended that a life sentence
was appropriate.
Ultimately, the trial court declined to sentence Saffold below
the presumptive statutory baseline, citing the horrific details of the
crimes he committed. Saffold was sentenced to six separate life
sentences (each with a minimum mandatory of 25 years) and one
15-year term of imprisonment.
Saffold appealed. Id. Crediting some of Saffold’s arguments,
the Fourth District found several sentencing errors. Saffold v. State
(Saffold I), 310 So. 3d 55, 57-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Consequently, it directed the trial court to modify Saffold’s
scoresheet, remove certain designations and mandatory minimums
from a portion of his sentences, reconsider his request for
-3- downward departure, and resentence him on two of the five armed
sexual-battery counts. Id. at 57 & n.1, 58.
On remand, Saffold moved to withdraw his pleas to all seven
counts, arguing that he had good cause under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.170(f). Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 838. This
rule provides that “[t]he court . . . shall on good cause, at any time
before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or no contest to be
withdrawn.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f). The trial court denied the
motion and reimposed the same overall prison terms—albeit
structured differently and without certain designations and
mandatory minimums. Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 838.
Saffold again appealed, but the Fourth District affirmed with a
lengthy discussion of the Second District’s contrary position. Id. at
838-39 (assessing rationale of Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d 297, 300-
01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)). In Scott, the Second District held that
subdivision (f)’s good-cause standard could apply after sentencing
relief was granted because that subdivision uses the phrase “a
sentence.” Scott, 331 So. 3d at 300-01. In the Second District’s
view, the indefinite article “a” meant that subdivision (f) covers any
sentencing proceeding, “whether that be the initial sentencing or a
-4- subsequent resentencing.” Id. at 301. The Scott court also
emphasized the background legal principle that “when a defendant
is granted resentencing, the original sentence is rendered a nullity
and the sentencing process begins anew.” Id. Finally, the Second
District relied on cases holding that rule 3.170(l)’s post-sentencing
standard applies after a defendant has been resentenced. Id. (citing
Chipman v. State, 285 So. 3d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), and
Passino v. State, 174 So. 3d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), as
examples of courts holding that “the completion of resentencing
starts a new thirty-day clock for a post[-]sentencing motion under
rule 3.170(l)”).
Disagreeing with Scott, the Fourth District held that
subdivision (f) only applies to a defendant’s original sentence.
Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 839-40. It found the rule’s use of “a” to be
ambiguous, observing that the rule’s authors could have, but did
not, choose the word “any.” Id. at 839. And though the court
acknowledged that “resentencing is treated as a new sentencing
proceeding,” it found that this principle “does not negate the fact
that the defendant has already had a sentence imposed.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The court also found that the Second District’s
-5- reliance on post-resentencing precedent was misplaced. Id.
Rounding out its criticism of Scott, the court noted that the Second
District’s position was inconsistent with principles of finality and
would likely frustrate the State’s ability to secure convictions at a
trial many years after the crimes were committed. Id. at 839-40.
Consistent with that analysis, the Fourth District concluded
that Saffold was not entitled to withdraw his plea under subdivision
(f). Id. at 840. The court went on to certify conflict with Scott on
the appropriate plea-withdrawal standard where the original
sentence is vacated on appeal or in postconviction proceedings, but
the conviction remains intact. Id. at 841.
Relying on the certified conflict, Saffold asked us to review the
Fourth District’s decision. We have accepted review and now
resolve the certified-conflict issue.
II
Saffold argues that when a sentence is vacated on appeal, the
underlying plea may be withdrawn for good cause prior to
resentencing, pursuant to rule 3.170(f). 2 However, to grant Saffold
2. Determining the meaning and scope of rule 3.170(f) is a legal matter, which we review de novo. See Born-Suniaga v. State,
-6- the remedy he seeks, we would be required to infer an independent
rules-based exception to longstanding principles of finality, scope of
remand, and conviction validity. We decline to do so.
A
We begin by briefly outlining the varying standards governing
plea withdrawal at different stages of a criminal case. A defendant
may withdraw his plea for any reason before the court formally
accepts it. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g). Once the court accepts the
plea, a defendant may withdraw it “before a sentence” is imposed if
he can show “good cause.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f).
However, following rendition of the sentence, the standard
becomes more stringent. At that point, a plea can only be
withdrawn for five specified reasons listed in rule 9.140 of the
256 So. 3d 783, 786 n.2 (Fla. 2018). Both parties point to various grammatical components of rule 3.170(f) as support for their positions. Consistent with what we have expressed about our interpretative methods, we also consider the overall structure of the rules, as well as the background legal principles against which the rules operate as bearing on the proper meaning of the rule. E.g., Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733, 742 (Fla. 2013) (considering longstanding principle of finality in determining meaning of rule 3.172).
-7- Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. 3 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l).
We have used the terms “manifest injustice” or “prejudice” to
describe what a defendant must show to obtain relief in this post-
sentencing context. See Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733, 735
(Fla. 2013). Finally, on collateral review, a defendant can only
challenge his plea on the basis that it was involuntary. Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5).
These rules reflect that early in a criminal case, a defendant
has the most freedom in seeking to withdraw a plea—consistent
with a preference for trial on the merits. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g);
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f); Stewart v. State, 315 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla.
4th DCA 2021). But as the case proceeds, the grounds for
3. Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii) specifically provides:
A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may otherwise directly appeal only:
a. the lower tribunal’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction; b. a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; c. an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea; d. a sentencing error, if preserved; or e. as otherwise provided by law.
-8- withdrawal narrow, and the required showing becomes more
demanding. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5).
Notably, in postconviction proceedings—meaning those proceedings
instituted after the judgment achieves finality and an appellate
court has issued its mandate—only one limited ground for
withdrawal is authorized. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5). This
progression illustrates that finality interests are built into the rules,
including rule 3.170(f) at issue here.
This makes sense because finality interests are essential to the
criminal justice system. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309
(1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)
(“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the
criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v.
Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both
the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost
v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of
finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an
end, a conclusion, a termination, ‘is essential to the operation of
our criminal justice system.’ ” (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 309)).
-9- Underscoring the importance of this principle, the Florida
Constitution guarantees victims the right to a “prompt and final
conclusion of the case and any related postjudgment proceedings.”
Art. I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const. And as noted by Justice John
Marshall Harlan II, “No one, not criminal defendants, not the
judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment
providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and
every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to
fresh litigation on issues already resolved.” Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgments in part and dissenting in part).
With this background in mind, we consider Saffold’s argument
that focuses on the use of “a” in rule 3.170(f)’s description of the
sentence. According to Saffold, nothing in the text limits
application of the rule to the original sentence. Thus, as he sees it,
rule 3.170(f) broadly applies to any sentence, including one imposed
at resentencing following appellate or collateral proceedings. But as
our discussion above demonstrates, the hyper-technical position
Saffold advances is at odds with the principles of law against which
rule 3.170 was adopted. In fact, the very structure and context of
- 10 - the plea-withdrawal rules, and the interests of finality served by
them, strongly cut against the interpretation urged by Saffold.
Notwithstanding this, Saffold points to our precedent that speaks to
the effect of vacatur of a sentence. But as we explain below, those
cases do not support his position.
B
As Saffold correctly observes, we have recognized that
resentencing is a de novo proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Manago,
375 So. 3d 190, 202 (Fla. 2023); State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399,
405-08 (Fla. 2011); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla.
1992). Indeed, we recently stated that a sentence vacatur
“nulli[fies]” the “prior sentence,” State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930,
933 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745
(Fla. 1986)), or “wipe[s] the slate clean” as to the vacated sentence.
Id. (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011)).
In light of that legal effect, de novo resentencing thus means
that the parties may present new evidence and new arguments
about the proper sentence to be imposed. Fleming, 61 So. 3d at
406 (“[B]oth parties may present new evidence bearing on the
sentence.”); Shine v. State, 273 So. 3d 935, 937 (Fla. 2019)
- 11 - (defendant permitted to assert new grounds for downward
departure sentence at resentencing). Not surprisingly, then, the
resentencing judge is not bound by the prior sentencing judge’s
findings or rationale. Preston, 607 So. 2d at 409; State v. Collins,
985 So. 2d 985, 990 (Fla. 2008). And where the law has changed,
the resentencing judge applies the new law. Fleming, 61 So. 3d at
407.
Critically, these de novo resentencing principles say nothing
about the validity of the convictions upon which the sentences are
based. We made this very point in Okafor. There, we noted that the
concept of de novo resentencing does not extend to the conviction—
that is, the conviction remains completely intact. See Okafor, 306
So. 3d at 933 (“[A]s to Okafor’s death sentence (though not his
murder conviction), our judgment ‘wiped the slate clean.’ ”
(emphasis added) (quoting Pepper, 562 U.S. at 507)). And this
makes sense because any post-appeal alteration to the conviction
itself would be beyond the scope of the remand instruction. Mosley
v. State, 397 So. 3d 1001, 1005 (Fla. 2024) (noting that defendant’s
attack on his conviction was beyond the scope of remand that
pertained solely to the penalty for the relevant offense).
- 12 - Accordingly, these prior cases do not support Saffold’s position
that the resentencing process operates as an indirect way of
attacking final convictions and circumventing the stringent
requirements of the rules governing postconviction proceedings.
C
Having rejected Saffold’s effect-of-vacatur argument, we
underscore a rule of construction that further weakens Saffold’s
argument. Specifically, rule 3.020 requires that all rules of criminal
procedure be construed “to secure simplicity in procedure and
fairness in administration.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.020. Saffold’s
interpretation would accomplish neither of these directives and
would instead hinder the administration of justice.
Consider, for example, defendants who obtain vacatur of their
sentences years after their pleas. If such defendants can get the
benefit of a liberal plea-withdrawal rule, then those defendants
would essentially have two bites at the apple. They could seek plea
withdrawal before the initial sentence is imposed and, if
unsuccessful, rely on the same ground (or a new one) in seeking
withdrawal prior to a resentencing and without any procedural
- 13 - bars. 4 Alternatively, under Saffold’s reasoning, a defendant could
(upon sentence vacatur) seek plea withdrawal for the first time
years after his plea was entered and still rely on the more lenient
good-cause standard.
However, regardless of the reason offered for the post-appeal
plea withdrawal (and whether it was or could have been raised
earlier), embracing Saffold’s interpretation of rule 3.170(f) would
result in the vacatur of convictions previously affirmed on appeal.
This, in turn, would require the State to prove its case many years
after the fact—when memories have faded, potential witnesses have
died or otherwise become unavailable, and physical evidence has
been lost. Campbell, 125 So. 3d at 742 (noting such factors in
rejecting an expansive interpretation of a plea rule).
Besides these concerns, Saffold’s position creates an anomaly.
Under his view, plea-based convictions that become final after an
appeal are less durable than comparable convictions obtained
through a trial. See Love v. State, 559 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1990)
4. At oral argument, Saffold’s counsel conceded that under his view, a convicted defendant could assert good cause based on something that happened before the original sentence. Oral Arg. at 5:20-25.
- 14 - (convictions obtained at trial remained intact despite sentence-
related reversal). But we can think of no principled reason for that
difference. An interpretation that treats similarly situated convicted
defendants differently would not promote “fairness” in the
administration of justice. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.020. Moreover,
Saffold’s reading of the rule also creates tension with other rules,
such as rule 3.170(b) which contemplates multi-case, multi-
jurisdictional plea agreements. Saffold’s theory of rule 3.170(f)
raises questions about whether the withdrawal of any one plea
would unravel an entire bargain.
These potentially anomalous and illogical outcomes weigh
against the interpretation advanced by Saffold. See Campbell, 125
So. 3d at 741 (favoring a construction in plea-withdrawal context
that did not produce absurd result).
We acknowledge the cases marshalled by Saffold on this topic.
Certainly, some state and federal courts have accepted positions
comparable to the one Saffold advocates for here. Though we are
not convinced that these courts are correct, we think that our plea-
withdrawal rules and our emphasis on certain background
principles (such as finality) distinguish us from these other courts.
- 15 - Thus, we do not rely on Saffold’s cited cases in determining the
scope and meaning of our rules.5
III
Given the background principles of law against which the
rules were adopted, as well as the overall structure of the criminal
rules of procedure and the method of construction dictated by
them, we reject Saffold’s interpretation of rule 3.170(f). In doing so,
we approve the Fourth District’s decision below and disapprove the
Second District’s decision in Scott to the extent it is inconsistent
with our opinion today.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. TANENBAUM, J., concurs with an opinion. LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
TANENBAUM, J., concurring.
This case stems from a district-court conflict over a procedural
5. Following the Scott decision’s lead, Saffold also cites Florida cases stating that subdivision (l) applies after a new sentence is imposed on resentencing. The meaning of that rule is not something we must resolve in this case. Accordingly, we offer no comment on the correctness of those cases.
- 16 - rule’s meaning. A close textual treatment is not necessary to
resolve it. It is our rule, after all; and as such it is our statement of
extant judicial policy. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. (giving this
court the authority to “adopt rules for the practice and procedure in
all courts,” including “administrative supervision”). Though it
cannot itself be the source of a substantive right, the rule has the
force of “law” procedurally in court proceedings. See DeLisle v.
Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219, 1224–25 (Fla. 2018) (explaining the
difference between “procedural law”—this court’s domain—and
“substantive law”—the Legislature’s domain).
The rule being procedural law adopted by this court, we can
modify, create, or repeal it at any time, even sua sponte as part of a
court decision or otherwise. See generally In re Amends. to Fla.
Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2019) (adopting sua sponte the
Daubert standard for admissible expert opinion testimony via
amendments to evidentiary rules in an opinion); see also id. at 554–
55 & n.8 (Lawson, J., concurring) (cataloging instances when the
court has “adopt[ed] or amend[ed] rules on our own motion . . .
without following the general procedure outlined in rule 2.140”);
DeLisle, 258 So. 3d at 1229 (noting that this court may pronounce
- 17 - a procedural rule as part of an opinion). If that is the case, our
approach to a dispute over the meaning of a rule necessarily will
differ from our approach regarding the meaning of a statute. Unlike
statutes, with court rules, we are the policymaker, so there are no
separation-of-powers concerns that would warrant a textualist (or
originalist) approach. 6 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9–14 (1997) (railing
against “judge-made law” as a “usurpation” of legislative power); id.
at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing . . . [o]ne need only hold
the belief that judges have no authority to pursue [] broader [social]
purposes or write [] new laws [that the times require].”); ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS xxvii–xxx, 3–28 (2012) (explaining why a textualist approach
is necessary to guard against “judicial lawmaking”). We have the
6. Our being the policymaker also means we happen to know what our intent was when the rule was promulgated (or at least have access to that thinking if we care to look). Cf. In re Amends., 278 So. 3d at 555 n.8 (Lawson, J., concurring) (looking to “our internal court records” to understand “the internal court process that” produced the rule provision in question).
- 18 - authority unabashedly to announce or clarify our policy embodied
in a rule and to apply it to the case at hand.
That, in essence, is what we are called upon to do here. The
Second District and the Fourth District disagree on how to apply
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f). The question we
answer to resolve that conflict is whether, through that rule, we
intended to authorize the trial court to consider a plea-withdrawal
motion—one necessarily directed at the judgment of conviction, not
the sentence—once the judgment has become absolutely final and
the only appellate remand is for resentencing. The question nearly
answers itself. At all events, it truly is a matter of judicial policy,
and we can speak to it directly without resort to construction
canons.
At bottom, there are two implicit policy points essential to this
court’s approval of the Fourth District’s analysis, both of which I
agree with. First, the Fourth District’s judgment in Saffold I7—
addressing only the sentencing order and remanding to address
several sentencing errors—had no effect on the judgment of
7. Saffold v. State, 310 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
- 19 - conviction, which had not been appealed and became final.
Second, rule 3.170(f) fully reflects this court’s policy choice to
imbue an un-appealed or affirmed judgment of conviction with
absolute finality—such that a defendant is “not entitled to bring a
motion to withdraw a plea pursuant to rule 3.170(f) upon court-
ordered resentencing.” Saffold v. State (“Saffold II”), 374 So. 3d 836,
840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
I write to expand on both these points. But first, I address an
oddity behind the Fourth District’s disposition of this case.
In 2019 Jeromee Saffold pleaded no contest to the charges
against him in the underlying case. The trial court then rendered a
judgment that conclusively determined his guilt for armed sexual
battery, aggravated battery, and kidnapping. Though Saffold
appealed the sentence the trial court later imposed, he never
appealed the judgment of conviction. The Fourth District considered
that original appeal as one seeking review only of “his sentences,”
- 20 - which it purportedly affirmed in part and vacated in part. Saffold I,
310 So. 3d at 56–57.8
Following Saffold’s resentencing on remand, he once again
appealed only the new sentences imposed.9 Saffold nevertheless
challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea
using the rule interpretation set out in Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d
297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), in which the Second District held that rule
3.170(f) entitled a criminal defendant to consideration of a motion
to withdraw his plea on resentencing. 10
8. I characterize the Fourth District’s disposition this way because it is remarkably unclear. In the body of the opinion, the Fourth District “affirm[s] the sentence” on appeal (but remanding for correction of the scoresheet) as to one count; “reverse[s] the inclusion of the sexual penetration points on counts IV and V” and remanding for resentencing (without vacating the sentence itself); and “reverse[s] the court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration of the downward departure motion” (without any indication whether the sentence on appeal that might have been affected by that departure had been vacated). Saffold I, 310 So. 3d at 57–58. What is clear is that the Fourth District’s remand had nothing to do with the judgment of conviction, which was left intact as final.
9. Saffold’s notice stated he was appealing the “final order imposing sentence.”
10. In that decision, with which the Fourth District has certified conflict, the Second District also considered only a newly imposed sentence on appeal—not the judgment of conviction.
- 21 - As I just mentioned, the final order on appeal was the
sentence. Yet one of Saffold’s primary claims was that the trial
court’s ruling on his motion should be reversed. The Fourth
District, unfortunately, took him up on this invitation, analyzing
and rejecting Saffold’s argument for doing so and affirming the order
(rather than the sentencing order on appeal). 11 The Fourth District
disagreed in an opinion that is in direct conflict with Scott.
A district court of appeal has jurisdiction to consider only two
types of appeal: 1) “from final judgments or orders of trial courts”;
and 2) “interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by
rules adopted by” this court. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. The order
denying Saffold’s plea motion was neither of these, so it could not
independently have been subject to appellate review the way the
Fourth District suggested.
Take the second type first. As the court recently stated, “there
are very few circumstances where interlocutory appeals are
11. In doing this, the Fourth District made a dispositional mistake similar to the one that I described regarding Saffold I.
- 22 - authorized in criminal proceedings.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. of App.
Proc., 405 So. 3d 332, 333 (Fla. 2025). This order is not one of
them. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(2) (“Appeals of nonfinal orders in
criminal cases are prescribed by rule 9.140.”); Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(b)(1)(C), (D) (listing as appealable certain arguably non-final
“orders” pertaining to imposition, modification, and revocation of
probation); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1) (listing, among others, non-
final “orders” that the State may appeal).
For plea cases like this one, we list by rule the only issues that
can be raised as part of an appeal from the judgment and sentence;
we do not list non-final orders that are separately appealable. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) (identifying a reserved “prior
dispositive order” that may be considered on appeal from a final
order but otherwise identifying the only issues that may be raised in
an appeal from a final judgment rendered following a plea); cf.
ABRAHAM CLARK FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 46–47
(EDWARD W. TUTTLE REV., 5TH ED. 1925). This limitation on issues
reflects our recognition that, though a defendant has a
constitutional right to appeal his judgment of conviction, he has
waived by plea most of the appellate claims he could otherwise
- 23 - make in favor of reversing that judgment. See Robinson v. State,
373 So. 2d 898, 902–03 (Fla. 1979) (construing section 924.06,
Florida Statutes, to be constitutional and holding that a defendant
who has pleaded guilty is limited in his appeal “to a class of issues
which occur contemporaneously with the entry of the plea”);
Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 2000) (“As with
defendants who went to trial, defendants who plead guilty have a
constitutional right to appeal, although the issues that they can
raise on appeal are limited.”).
If an order denying a plea-withdrawal motion is not an
appealable non-final order, the only way it separately would be
reviewable is in the first type of appeal—from “final judgments or
orders of trial courts.” The order on the plea-withdrawal motion is
not that type of order.
In the criminal context, the two original final orders a criminal
defendant can appeal are the judgment of conviction and a
sentence, and he can seek appellate review of either or both. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (providing that multiple final orders may be
reviewed upon the filing of one timely notice of appeal); Fla. R. App.
P. 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F) (distinguishing a criminal defendant’s ability to
- 24 - appeal “a final judgment” and “a sentence”); Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(b)(3) (directing a criminal defendant to file the notice of
appeal “any time between rendition of a final judgment and 30 days
following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”); Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.670 (distinguishing “a final judgment of conviction” from
the imposition of a sentence); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a), (c)
(distinguishing a collateral attack on a “judgment” and on a
“sentence”). The order denying Saffold’s motion directed to his plea
is neither type of original final order. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.650
(defining “judgment” as “the adjudication by the court that the
defendant is guilty or not guilty”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining
“sentence” to be “the pronouncement by the court of the penalty
imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant has
been adjudged guilty”).
The district court’s judicial power—affirm, reverse, set aside—
ultimately operates against the final order on review, that final
order being the trial court’s exercise of judicial power. As part of
that review, the district court considers whether that final order is
the product of some harmful error that the trial court committed in
the proceeding leading to that final order. Cf. Fla. R. App. P.
- 25 - 9.110(h), (k). A procedural error underlying an interim order might
be violative of a substantive right that calls into question the
validity of the final order (i.e., undermining the fairness of the trial).
Cf. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1971) (explaining
that “the violation of a rule of procedure prescribed by this Court
does not call for a reversal of a conviction unless the record
discloses that non-compliance with the rule resulted in prejudice or
harm to the defendant”). If there is such a prejudicial error, then
the district court would reverse or vacate that final order (not the
offending interim order or ruling) and reopen the proceeding. If
there is no prejudicial error, the district court would affirm the final
order (not the order or ruling that had been challenged).
The only order under review by the Fourth District in Saffold II
was the new sentencing order—not the order on Saffold’s plea-
withdrawal request. And the only relief available to Saffold would
have been directed to the sentencing order, provided he could
demonstrate some error in the sentencing process leading to the
order (or in the order itself) that infringed a substantive right. Cf.
Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 572–74 (Fla. 2008) (distinguishing
between “errors in sentence-related orders” that result from the
- 26 - “sentencing process,” on the one hand; and an “error in the
sentencing process” itself, on the other).
Saffold’s initial brief in the Fourth District nevertheless failed
to explain how denial of his change-of-plea motion in any way
related to the new sentencing or how the denial infringed a right
related to the sentencing process. Nor could he. The motion
obviously was directed to the judgment of conviction in the trial
court proceeding, yet that judgment was not (and could not be) on
appeal. The motion simply had nothing to do with the only final
order on review—the new sentence. The Fourth District could have
just summarily affirmed the sentence. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a)
(allowing the appellate court to “summarily affirm the order to be
reviewed if the court finds that no preliminary basis for reversal has
been demonstrated”). 12
Notwithstanding any jurisdictional questions, we are obliged to
state with clarity that rule 3.170(l) does not authorize a trial court
12. I put off for another day whether our certified-conflict jurisdiction can be rooted in a district court’s analysis explaining its purported affirmance of a non-appealable (and non-appealed) order.
- 27 - to consider a change-of-plea motion on a remand for a new
sentencing. I join the majority’s decision to do this and the policy
rationale behind it—to ensure finality in the judgment.
Saffold’s no-contest plea indeed had relevant legal significance.
“Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the
court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). The plea “is
itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and
determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969). By his no-contest plea, Saffold “consent[ed] to the judgment
of conviction.” Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 270–71 (Fla.
1975).
When Saffold did not appeal that judgment originally, it
became final and absolute, and the trial court lost procedural
jurisdiction to modify or vacate it. See Einstein v. Davidson, 17 So.
563, 564–65 (Fla. 1895) (noting how a trial court “loses control of its
judgment[]” after an authorized time period passes so that it cannot
modify or vacate that judgment outside that period, except by
appellate mandate or authorized motion); Davidson v. Stringer, 147
So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1933) (noting that once a trial court renders a
- 28 - final judgment and the time has passed for the court to reconsider
it, the trial court’s jurisdiction is “exhausted” except either to
enforce it, or when authorized, to correct or vacate it); Shelby Mut.
Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970)
(explaining that one of our goals “is that litigation be finally
terminated as quickly as due process and necessary reflection
allows . . . [so u]nless a proper motion or petition [directed at
correcting error in a final judgment] is filed within the allotted time
[as set out by rule], the judgment or order of the trial court becomes
absolute” and “the trial court has no authority to alter, modify or
vacate [it]”); see also FREEMAN, supra, at 392, 399–400; cf. Baskin v.
Klemm, 160 So. 509, 509 (Fla. 1935) (explaining that once an
appellate court’s review of a trial court’s judgment becomes final,
the trial court is “without jurisdiction to change that judgment
without first having permission . . . to so change or modify its
judgment”); State ex rel. Budd v. Williams, 11 So. 2d 341, 341 (Fla.
1943) (“After affirmance of the decree by this court the circuit court
was without jurisdiction to alter or change the decree as so affirmed
without first having authority from this court to so act.”); cf.
Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149 (1907) (“The general principle
- 29 - is that judgments cannot be disturbed after the term at which they
are rendered, and can only be corrected, if at all, by writ of error, or
appeal, or relieved against in equity in certain cases.”); In re Metro.
Tr. Co. of City of New York, 218 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1910) (holding
that a trial court loses the authority to vacate a final decree “[a]fter
the term had expired, and after the complainant had exercised his
right of appeal to procure a review of the errors of which he desired
to complain”).
By rule, we authorize trial courts to open their already
rendered (and otherwise final) judgments in at least two different
ways. One is to establish a time period, after rendition but before
appeal, during which the trial court retains jurisdiction over the
judgment; the other is to authorize consideration of a collateral
attack on the judgment, even after the judgment has been affirmed
on appeal and the trial court has lost jurisdiction over its judgment.
Cf. FREEMAN, supra, at 377 (distinguishing between trial court’s
control over its own judgment “during the term” and its power to
modify or vacate the judgment after the term); id. at 272, 278, 381–
384.
- 30 - Rules authorizing rehearing motions in civil and family-law
proceedings fall into the first category. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a)
(requiring that a motion for rehearing be used to preserve certain
errors in the judgment and authorizing the trial court to “open the
judgment” to “take additional testimony” and “enter a new
judgment”); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(a) (same).
And subdivisions (f) and (l) of rule 3.170 operate the same
way. 13 Subdivision (f) authorizes the trial court to retain control
over the “judgment of conviction” and “set [it] aside,” either “in its
discretion” or “on good cause,” up until pronouncement of sentence.
Subdivision (l) then authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction
over the judgment for thirty days following rendition of the
sentencing order, but to consider only a narrow set of challenges to
that plea judgment. 14
These provisions stand in stark contrast to those rules that
fall into the second category of authorization for a trial court to
13. Rule 3.800’s subdivisions (b) and (c) give similar retention authorization to trial courts regarding their sentencing orders.
14. Subdivision (l) essentially allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction over its judgment to address, pre-appeal, what later would be collateral attacks on the judgment.
- 31 - open its judgment—to consider the collateral attack post-appeal
(i.e., once the time has passed for taking an appeal or a mandate of
affirmance has issued; in either event, the trial court then losing
control over the judgment). Cf. FREEMAN, supra, at 381–84. Under
the civil and family-law rules, we do this by authorizing trial courts
to consider motions for relief from judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.540; Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540. And in the criminal context, we
give this authorization in rule 3.850, in which we allow the trial
court to consider enumerated “grounds [] for relief from judgment or
release from custody.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a); see also id. (b)
(setting a limitation period running from when “the judgment and
sentence become final”); id. (c) (noting that the “rule does not
authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have
been raised . . . if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the
judgment and sentence”); cf. Morgan v. State, 350 So. 3d 712, 716
(Fla. 2022) (highlighting the structural and operational difference
between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.850; the former authorizing
sentence correction as “an extended part of the sentencing process,”
the latter authorizing vacatur of the sentence and starting anew as
- 32 - truly collateral relief). 15 Indeed, to say that rule 3.170(f) authorized
the trial court to consider a collateral attack on Saffold’s then-
absolutely final judgment would be for us to render certain
provisions of rule 3.850 superfluous.
Another telltale of our intent that rule 3.170 operate only pre-
appeal and not as collateral authorization: Both provisions appear
in the “Arraignments and Pleas” section of the rules, rather than in
the “Postconviction Relief” section. Cf. Morgan, 350 So. 3d at 716
(observing that “rule 3.800 proceedings” are an “extended part of
the sentencing process in the underlying criminal case,” and are not
“postconviction proceedings,” based in part on the rule’s
appearance in the “Sentence” portion of the rules rather than the
“Postconviction Relief” portion).
15. Rule 3.800(a) in a way is a hybrid because it continues to authorize the trial court to correct its order “at any time,” even after completion of an appeal, to address an illegal sentence; yet typically, a rule 3.800(a) proceeding would not commence until after the appellate process became final. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b) (allowing a motion to correct sentence, “including an illegal sentence,” to be filed before or during an appeal of the sentencing order); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (“A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time.”).
- 33 - Finally, as I already have mentioned, an order on a motion
filed under rule 3.170 is not a separately appealable, final order.
Instead, denial of the motion is a preserved issue that then may be
raised on direct appellate review of the judgment of conviction. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c.; cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(I)
(tolling rendition for a motion filed under rule 3.170(l)).
An order on a motion under rule 3.850, by contrast, is a final
order—just as an order on a relief-from-judgment motion under rule
1.540 is. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b); cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (describing a
“final post decretal order” as one that is “dispositive of any
question,” constituting a “final and distinct adjudication of rights
which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment”);
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5) (treating an order “entered on an
authorized and timely motion for relief from judgment” as a
“specified final order”).
Orders on motions under rules like these are treated as final
and separately appealable because of their unique, historical
function. Rules like 1.540, 3.850, and 12.540 serve as procedural
substitutes for various ancient writs and equity claims that served
- 34 - the same purpose. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 (abolishing “writs of
coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review” and
directing that “relief from a judgment or decree shall be by
motion . . . or by independent action”); Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d
1236, 1239 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that rule 3.850 was intended as
a procedural substitute for raising “collateral postconviction
challenges to the legality of criminal judgments that were
traditionally cognizable in petitions for writs of habeas corpus”).
The same cannot be said for a rule like 3.170, the function of which
has been described above.
* * *
Saffold basically asks that we pronounce rule 3.170(f) to be
the procedural equivalent of rule 3.850. That approach, as a policy
matter, makes no sense. Rule 3.170(f) is structurally and
operationally different—it has a different purpose—when compared
to rule 3.850. Once Saffold’s judgment of conviction became
absolutely final (when he failed to appeal it), there was no
authorization under rule 3.170 for the trial court to consider setting
it aside on remand, making Saffold’s plea-withdrawal motion—
effectively directed at the judgment—a nullity.
- 35 - Saffold’s only pathway for seeking relief from the judgment of
conviction at that point was rule 3.850. The Fourth District, then,
technically was correct in its conclusion that Saffold was not
entitled to submit his plea-withdrawal motion on a remand strictly
for resentencing (albeit because the trial court did not have the
authority to consider it under rule 3.170(f) in the first place). I
concur in the majority’s approval of that conclusion and in its
disapproval of the Second District’s conclusion to the contrary.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2022-2399
(Broward County)
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
- 36 -