NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________
No. 22-2182 ________
JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, Commissioner; ROBERT D. GILMORE, Superintendent/Warden, SCI Greene; CANDICE LACKEY, Unit Manager; PSYCHIATRIST BERGER; PSYCHOLOGIST BAWDY; DEPUTY DIALESANDRO, Deputy Superintendent; ZAKEN, Deputy of Security; SGT. CHESMER, Correctional Officer; C.O. MILLER; SGT. BEERS, Correctional Officer; LT. JELLOT, Correctional Guard; C.O. STEFFIN; TODD H. FUNK, Correctional Staff Member; MAJOR BUZAS; COUNSELOR SPIKER; PSYCHOLOGIST BRITTANY NOVAJ; SERGEANT ROGERS; SHIRLEY MOORE ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01390) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 13, 2024
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 18, 2024) ___________
OPINION* ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Jerome Junior Washington, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the District Court’s judgment in favor of the defendants in his civil rights action.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Washington filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and supplements
thereto, against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections officials and employees and
medical providers at State Correctional Institution - Greene. He claimed violations of his
constitutional rights based upon inadequate mental health treatment and many other
conditions of his confinement while he was housed in the Secure Residential Treatment
Unit (“SRTU”). The SRTU is an alternative to the DOC’s Restricted Housing Unit for
inmates with serious mental illnesses and/or other disabilities. Washington sought money
damages and other relief. He has since been transferred to another institution.
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by one of the defendants and
later granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a
comprehensive opinion. This appeal followed.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 Our standard of review is
plenary. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We will
1 The District Court also denied Washington’s motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment. Washington did not appeal that ruling. 2 We have appellate jurisdiction where, as here, a Magistrate Judge adjudicated a case upon the express or implied consent of the parties. See Prater v. Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2023).
2 affirm a grant of summary judgment if “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Revock v. Cowpet Bay
W. Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
Washington does not contest the majority of the District Court’s rulings. In his
brief, he asserts that defendants Lackey (a Unit Manager), Brawdy (a psychologist), and
Steffin, Jellots, and Beers (corrections officers) acknowledged that he was suicidal but
denied him placement in a psychiatric observation cell and/or medical care. He states
that he cut himself, that blood was all over his cell, and that Lackey and the officers went
outside to smoke cigarettes. He claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs.
Washington’s complaint raised a claim against Brawdy based on an incident on
April 24, 2018.3 Washington alleged that he told Brawdy that he did not want to be in the
SRTU, that he felt suicidal, and that he wanted to go to a psychiatric observation cell.
Brawdy responded that to get out of the SRTU he had to complete the program.
Washington later cut himself and officers Hennessey and Anderson allegedly delayed
getting him medical care. In response to Washington’s grievances, prison officials found
that Hennessey notified staff when he saw blood in Washington’s cell and that treatment
providers had determined that his placement in an observation cell was not necessary.
3 The evidence supporting Washington’s claims includes his affidavits and his verified complaint, which is treated as an affidavit to the extent his allegations are based on personal knowledge and would be admissible. Revock, 853 F.3d at 100 n.1. 3 In its opinion granting summary judgment, the District Court stated that
Hennessey and Anderson were not named defendants and that, based on the grievance
responses, Washington could not show that any defendant knew of and disregarded a
serious risk of harm to his health or safety. To the extent Washington appeals this ruling,
his disagreement with Brawdy’s denial of his request to be placed in a psychiatric
observation cell, without evidence that Brawdy was aware of a serious risk of harm, did
not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment
claims”). Washington also did not contend that Lackey, Steffin, Jellots, or Beers was
involved in this incident. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)
(requiring personal involvement for liability under § 1983). He has thus shown no error
in the District Court’s ruling.
Washington also stated in affidavits that on May 31, 2018, he told staff that he was
suicidal, and he was denied placement in a psychiatric observation cell or any treatment.
Lackey and Steffin were allegedly present, and Lackey said that the situation was not
serious and left to smoke a cigarette. In his brief opposing summary judgment,
Washington stated that he cut himself and that Lackey, Steffin, and Brawdy left him
bleeding in his cell.
Washington did not include this claim in his complaint or in the supplements
thereto. The District Court stated that it would not consider any new claims raised by
Washington in his brief. Even if the District Court had discretion to treat a new claim
raised at the summary judgment stage as a motion to amend the complaint, see Schmees v
4 HC1.COM, Inc., 77 F.4th 483, 488 (7th Cir. 2023), it did not err by not doing so here.
Washington’s complaint had been pending for several years, he had supplemented it
twice, and the defendants had already filed a summary judgment motion addressing his
numerous claims. Any claim against these defendants arising out of an incident on May
31, 2018, was not properly before the District Court.4
Washington also argues on appeal that defendant Miller, a corrections officer,
harassed him by calling him offensive names and threatening to harm him.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________
No. 22-2182 ________
JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, Commissioner; ROBERT D. GILMORE, Superintendent/Warden, SCI Greene; CANDICE LACKEY, Unit Manager; PSYCHIATRIST BERGER; PSYCHOLOGIST BAWDY; DEPUTY DIALESANDRO, Deputy Superintendent; ZAKEN, Deputy of Security; SGT. CHESMER, Correctional Officer; C.O. MILLER; SGT. BEERS, Correctional Officer; LT. JELLOT, Correctional Guard; C.O. STEFFIN; TODD H. FUNK, Correctional Staff Member; MAJOR BUZAS; COUNSELOR SPIKER; PSYCHOLOGIST BRITTANY NOVAJ; SERGEANT ROGERS; SHIRLEY MOORE ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01390) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) December 13, 2024
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 18, 2024) ___________
OPINION* ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Jerome Junior Washington, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the District Court’s judgment in favor of the defendants in his civil rights action.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Washington filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and supplements
thereto, against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections officials and employees and
medical providers at State Correctional Institution - Greene. He claimed violations of his
constitutional rights based upon inadequate mental health treatment and many other
conditions of his confinement while he was housed in the Secure Residential Treatment
Unit (“SRTU”). The SRTU is an alternative to the DOC’s Restricted Housing Unit for
inmates with serious mental illnesses and/or other disabilities. Washington sought money
damages and other relief. He has since been transferred to another institution.
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by one of the defendants and
later granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a
comprehensive opinion. This appeal followed.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 Our standard of review is
plenary. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We will
1 The District Court also denied Washington’s motion to reconsider the grant of summary judgment. Washington did not appeal that ruling. 2 We have appellate jurisdiction where, as here, a Magistrate Judge adjudicated a case upon the express or implied consent of the parties. See Prater v. Dep’t of Corr., 76 F.4th 184, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2023).
2 affirm a grant of summary judgment if “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Revock v. Cowpet Bay
W. Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
Washington does not contest the majority of the District Court’s rulings. In his
brief, he asserts that defendants Lackey (a Unit Manager), Brawdy (a psychologist), and
Steffin, Jellots, and Beers (corrections officers) acknowledged that he was suicidal but
denied him placement in a psychiatric observation cell and/or medical care. He states
that he cut himself, that blood was all over his cell, and that Lackey and the officers went
outside to smoke cigarettes. He claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs.
Washington’s complaint raised a claim against Brawdy based on an incident on
April 24, 2018.3 Washington alleged that he told Brawdy that he did not want to be in the
SRTU, that he felt suicidal, and that he wanted to go to a psychiatric observation cell.
Brawdy responded that to get out of the SRTU he had to complete the program.
Washington later cut himself and officers Hennessey and Anderson allegedly delayed
getting him medical care. In response to Washington’s grievances, prison officials found
that Hennessey notified staff when he saw blood in Washington’s cell and that treatment
providers had determined that his placement in an observation cell was not necessary.
3 The evidence supporting Washington’s claims includes his affidavits and his verified complaint, which is treated as an affidavit to the extent his allegations are based on personal knowledge and would be admissible. Revock, 853 F.3d at 100 n.1. 3 In its opinion granting summary judgment, the District Court stated that
Hennessey and Anderson were not named defendants and that, based on the grievance
responses, Washington could not show that any defendant knew of and disregarded a
serious risk of harm to his health or safety. To the extent Washington appeals this ruling,
his disagreement with Brawdy’s denial of his request to be placed in a psychiatric
observation cell, without evidence that Brawdy was aware of a serious risk of harm, did
not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment
claims”). Washington also did not contend that Lackey, Steffin, Jellots, or Beers was
involved in this incident. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)
(requiring personal involvement for liability under § 1983). He has thus shown no error
in the District Court’s ruling.
Washington also stated in affidavits that on May 31, 2018, he told staff that he was
suicidal, and he was denied placement in a psychiatric observation cell or any treatment.
Lackey and Steffin were allegedly present, and Lackey said that the situation was not
serious and left to smoke a cigarette. In his brief opposing summary judgment,
Washington stated that he cut himself and that Lackey, Steffin, and Brawdy left him
bleeding in his cell.
Washington did not include this claim in his complaint or in the supplements
thereto. The District Court stated that it would not consider any new claims raised by
Washington in his brief. Even if the District Court had discretion to treat a new claim
raised at the summary judgment stage as a motion to amend the complaint, see Schmees v
4 HC1.COM, Inc., 77 F.4th 483, 488 (7th Cir. 2023), it did not err by not doing so here.
Washington’s complaint had been pending for several years, he had supplemented it
twice, and the defendants had already filed a summary judgment motion addressing his
numerous claims. Any claim against these defendants arising out of an incident on May
31, 2018, was not properly before the District Court.4
Washington also argues on appeal that defendant Miller, a corrections officer,
harassed him by calling him offensive names and threatening to harm him. Washington
stated in his verified complaint and in an affidavit that Miller continuously called him “no
teeth,” “rapist,” and several offensive names, and that Miller threatened him with harm
and taunted him. See DCT ECF 3 at 23; DCT ECF 136 at 6. The District Court held,
and we agree, that Washington’s claims of verbal harassment did not state a viable Eighth
Amendment claim. See Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing cases).
Washington also stated in these filings that Miller deprived him of access to a
psychologist, a shower, and a group session on October 10, 2018. To the extent
Washington pursues this claim on appeal, Miller’s actions on this single day do not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d
210, 228 (3d Cir. 2015).
4 The District Court dismissed Washington’s claims against defendant Berger, a mental health provider, arising out of an encounter on May 31, 2018. Washington does not dispute this ruling, and we do not consider it. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that an appellant’s brief must set forth each argument that he wishes to pursue).
5 Washington further asserts that Miller and defendant Rogers, another officer,
fabricated misconduct reports in order to prolong his confinement in the SRTU. He
contends that Lackey and others knew that he did not engage in misconduct. Washington
asserted in a supplement to his complaint that Rogers issued a false misconduct report on
October 22, 2018. The record reflects that Washington was charged with using abusive
language and refusing to obey an order. Washington had a disciplinary hearing, was
found guilty, and received 30 days of disciplinary custody. Washington remained in the
SRTU, but his status was changed shortly thereafter from phase 3 to phase 4. A prisoner
in the SRTU must reach phase 1 to return to the general population.
The District Court ruled that Washington’s placement in the SRTU, no matter
what phase, did not implicate a protected liberty interest because it did not impose an
“atypical deprivation.” 6/1/22 Mem. Opinion at 29; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995) (requiring that conditions impose an “atypical and significant hardship
… in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” to implicate a liberty interest). The
District Court explained that an inmate in the SRTU had access to programming and
other activities. The District Court further ruled that, even if Washington’s confinement
implicated a protected liberty interest, he received due process. We need not address the
District Court’s first ruling because Washington does not challenge on appeal its
conclusion that he received due process. This was an independent basis for granting
summary judgment, and “[t]he failure to challenge an independent basis for a district
6 court’s decision is fatal to an appeal.” LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164, 191 (3d Cir.
2022).5
Washington also argues that defendant Chesmer, a corrections officer, threatened
him with harm, tried to put his life in danger by calling him a rapist, and sprayed
oleoresin capsicum (a pepper spray) in his face when he was handcuffed. He asserts that
Lackey and others were aware that Chesmer bullied him. Washington’s complaint and
supplements, however, again include no such allegations. Washington asserted in his
brief opposing summary judgment that officials failed to protect him from an attack by
Chesmer, but like Washington’s claim discussed above, such a claim was not properly
before the District Court. In addition, Washington generally claimed below that inmates
were sprayed when they had a mental health crisis. The District Court stated, and we
agree, that he did not claim a violation of his own rights on this basis.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5 The DOC Appellees contend that Washington has failed to challenge the District Court’s ruling that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this claim. We find it unclear whether the District Court made a definitive ruling in this regard. We thus do not deny relief on appeal on this basis. 7