1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 25cv1146-LL-BJW
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS
14 S&R TOWING, INC., et al., [ECF No. 6] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, acting pro se, sued Defendants S&R Towing, Inc. 18 Fallbrook, CA – Facility and S&R Towing, Inc. Carlsbad, CA – Facility. ECF No. 4. 19 Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 20 can be granted. ECF No. 6. The matter is fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for 21 determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. 22 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Parties may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 25 may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 26 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule 27 8,” which requires a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). 28 To survive this motion, a complaint must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 1 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although 2 “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 3 the nonmoving party,” courts are not required to accept as true “allegations that contradict 4 matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, 5 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 6 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 This standard is ultimately a “liberal” one, especially when the action has been filed 8 “pro se.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1976). Still, even under a “liberal 9 interpretation,” courts “may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 10 See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 The operative complaint has claims for Defendants’ alleged violations under: 13 (1) retaliation [due to disability], 48 U.S.C. § 12203; (2) [mail] fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 14 and (3) invasion of privacy using illegal technology terror intent, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 15 See ECF No. 4. 16 As best the Court can tell from this 60-page complaint, Plaintiff alleges that 17 Defendants, acting by and through numerous “co-shills,” devised a ruse to tow his 2018 18 Nissan Kicks SUV on September 20, 2021, in furtherance of its alleged criminal conspiracy 19 and enterprise. See generally id. These alleged criminal acts include attempts to: (1) swap 20 the Nissan transmission with a remote-controlled transmission, which Defendants could 21 then activate to “covertly” create a malfunction while Plaintiff was driving on the freeway, 22 with the intent to cause him bodily harm; (2) intimidate and retaliate against Plaintiff for 23 his “Whistle Blowing,” which evidently exposed Defendants’ 2019 plot to murder his aunt, 24 then “destroy” her corpse by “illegal cremation;” (3) place a “chloroform/ricin/cyanide 25 boiler maker dirty bomb injection” into the Nissan interior; (4) conspire with Western 26 Dental employees to place “Illegal Telephone-Tooth [sic] Technology” in his mouth that 27 would “leak cianide [sic];” and (5) prevent Plaintiff from exercising his “civic duty and 28 constitutional rights” by restricting his ability to travel to the Pacific Palisades 1 neighborhood in Los Angeles, where he planned to “legally intimidate home invaders” 2 with whom Defendants were apparently conspiring to organize a series of arson attacks, 3 and who were planning to travel to Former Speaker of the United States House of 4 Representatives, Ms. Nancy Pelosi, and her husband, Mr. Paul Pelosi’s home in San 5 Francisco, utilizing 800-mile long “terror tunnels” that run under their property. See id. 6 For additional context, Defendants state that this matter arises from Plaintiff’s arrest 7 on September 20, 2021. See generally ECF No. 6. On that day, Defendants state that the 8 Carlsbad Police Department received reports of a suspicious vehicle at Tamarack Avenue 9 and Sunnyhill Drive in Carlsbad, CA. Id. at 3. When police responded, they encountered 10 Plaintiff, who they determined had a warrant for his arrest. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently 11 taken into custody. Id. Following his arrest, the Carlsbad Police Department impounded 12 Plaintiff’s vehicle, and requested that Defendants tow the vehicle to its yard. Id. 13 Defendants argue that based on these facts Plaintiff filed a complaint that launches 14 into a frenetic regurgitation of dozens of conspiracy theories, which are encompassed by 15 an overarching claim that Defendants are the leaders of a vast criminal enterprise whose 16 sole purpose is to seek revenge against Plaintiff for his purported “Whistle Blowing” 17 against Defendants and its co-conspirators. Id. Ultimately, Defendants argue that the 18 complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to maintain any claims of retaliation, fraud, or 19 invasion of privacy using illegal technology terror intent under 48 U.S.C. § 12203, 20 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), respectively. Id. 21 Without relying on the additional context that Defendants allege, the Court agrees 22 with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to plead enough facts to maintain any of his three 23 enumerated causes of action. Complaints must include “a short and plain statement of the 24 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” with allegations that are “simple, 25 concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (d)(1); see Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1199–1200 26 (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule 8”). Plaintiff’s complaint is 27 neither simple, concise, nor direct. Instead, it is replete with repetitive conclusory 28 allegations of wrongdoing, verbose excerpts from sources, and protracted digressions that 1 appear to have little bearing on any legal claims Plaintiff may be asserting. The Court 2 therefore finds that Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 8’s requirement to provide a short 3 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief with 4 allegations that are simple, concise, and direct. See United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. 5 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases upholding 6 dismissals of complaints that were “verbose,” “confusing,” “ambiguous,” “unintelligible,” 7 “rambling,” “conclusory,” and “highly repetitious”); Bourke v. City of San Diego, No. 14- 8 cv-1047-BAS-RBB, 2015 WL 687092, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 25cv1146-LL-BJW
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS
14 S&R TOWING, INC., et al., [ECF No. 6] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, acting pro se, sued Defendants S&R Towing, Inc. 18 Fallbrook, CA – Facility and S&R Towing, Inc. Carlsbad, CA – Facility. ECF No. 4. 19 Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 20 can be granted. ECF No. 6. The matter is fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for 21 determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. 22 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Parties may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 25 may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 26 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule 27 8,” which requires a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). 28 To survive this motion, a complaint must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 1 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although 2 “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 3 the nonmoving party,” courts are not required to accept as true “allegations that contradict 4 matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, 5 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 6 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 This standard is ultimately a “liberal” one, especially when the action has been filed 8 “pro se.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1976). Still, even under a “liberal 9 interpretation,” courts “may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 10 See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 The operative complaint has claims for Defendants’ alleged violations under: 13 (1) retaliation [due to disability], 48 U.S.C. § 12203; (2) [mail] fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 14 and (3) invasion of privacy using illegal technology terror intent, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 15 See ECF No. 4. 16 As best the Court can tell from this 60-page complaint, Plaintiff alleges that 17 Defendants, acting by and through numerous “co-shills,” devised a ruse to tow his 2018 18 Nissan Kicks SUV on September 20, 2021, in furtherance of its alleged criminal conspiracy 19 and enterprise. See generally id. These alleged criminal acts include attempts to: (1) swap 20 the Nissan transmission with a remote-controlled transmission, which Defendants could 21 then activate to “covertly” create a malfunction while Plaintiff was driving on the freeway, 22 with the intent to cause him bodily harm; (2) intimidate and retaliate against Plaintiff for 23 his “Whistle Blowing,” which evidently exposed Defendants’ 2019 plot to murder his aunt, 24 then “destroy” her corpse by “illegal cremation;” (3) place a “chloroform/ricin/cyanide 25 boiler maker dirty bomb injection” into the Nissan interior; (4) conspire with Western 26 Dental employees to place “Illegal Telephone-Tooth [sic] Technology” in his mouth that 27 would “leak cianide [sic];” and (5) prevent Plaintiff from exercising his “civic duty and 28 constitutional rights” by restricting his ability to travel to the Pacific Palisades 1 neighborhood in Los Angeles, where he planned to “legally intimidate home invaders” 2 with whom Defendants were apparently conspiring to organize a series of arson attacks, 3 and who were planning to travel to Former Speaker of the United States House of 4 Representatives, Ms. Nancy Pelosi, and her husband, Mr. Paul Pelosi’s home in San 5 Francisco, utilizing 800-mile long “terror tunnels” that run under their property. See id. 6 For additional context, Defendants state that this matter arises from Plaintiff’s arrest 7 on September 20, 2021. See generally ECF No. 6. On that day, Defendants state that the 8 Carlsbad Police Department received reports of a suspicious vehicle at Tamarack Avenue 9 and Sunnyhill Drive in Carlsbad, CA. Id. at 3. When police responded, they encountered 10 Plaintiff, who they determined had a warrant for his arrest. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently 11 taken into custody. Id. Following his arrest, the Carlsbad Police Department impounded 12 Plaintiff’s vehicle, and requested that Defendants tow the vehicle to its yard. Id. 13 Defendants argue that based on these facts Plaintiff filed a complaint that launches 14 into a frenetic regurgitation of dozens of conspiracy theories, which are encompassed by 15 an overarching claim that Defendants are the leaders of a vast criminal enterprise whose 16 sole purpose is to seek revenge against Plaintiff for his purported “Whistle Blowing” 17 against Defendants and its co-conspirators. Id. Ultimately, Defendants argue that the 18 complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to maintain any claims of retaliation, fraud, or 19 invasion of privacy using illegal technology terror intent under 48 U.S.C. § 12203, 20 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), respectively. Id. 21 Without relying on the additional context that Defendants allege, the Court agrees 22 with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to plead enough facts to maintain any of his three 23 enumerated causes of action. Complaints must include “a short and plain statement of the 24 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” with allegations that are “simple, 25 concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & (d)(1); see Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1199–1200 26 (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule 8”). Plaintiff’s complaint is 27 neither simple, concise, nor direct. Instead, it is replete with repetitive conclusory 28 allegations of wrongdoing, verbose excerpts from sources, and protracted digressions that 1 appear to have little bearing on any legal claims Plaintiff may be asserting. The Court 2 therefore finds that Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 8’s requirement to provide a short 3 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief with 4 allegations that are simple, concise, and direct. See United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. 5 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases upholding 6 dismissals of complaints that were “verbose,” “confusing,” “ambiguous,” “unintelligible,” 7 “rambling,” “conclusory,” and “highly repetitious”); Bourke v. City of San Diego, No. 14- 8 cv-1047-BAS-RBB, 2015 WL 687092, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb, 18, 2015) (dismissing the 33- 9 page complaint under Rule 8 because it was “riddled with ambiguous allegations that are 10 confusing, redundant, and oftentimes seemingly irrelevant”). 11 Even if Plaintiff’s complaint was partly intelligible, there are not enough well-pled, 12 non-conclusory allegations to suggest a plausible claim for any of his three enumerated 13 causes of action. For one, Plaintiff does not claim that he ever identified himself as 14 disabled, that he was requesting an accommodation for himself due to a disability, that 15 Defendants referenced or even knew about his disability, that Defendants knew he was 16 disabled or would need an accommodation for a disability, or that Defendant is a private 17 entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation. Therefore, the Court 18 cannot plausibly infer that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff on account of his 19 disability. Next, Plaintiff’s second claim for mail fraud is under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, a federal 20 criminal statute, which does not provide a private right of action. See Ross v. Orange Cnty. 21 Bar Ass’n, 369 F. App’x 868, 869 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that there is “no separate 22 private right of action for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341”). Finally, for his third claim 23 under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), the Freedom of Information Act, this applies to federal agencies 24 and entities over which the federal government exercises substantial control or supervision. 25 Plaintiff never alleges that he is seeking disclosure of records held by federal agencies, that 26 Defendant is a “federal agency” for purposes of the Act, nor does Plaintiff make any 27 attempt to tie this into “invasion of privacy using illegal technology terror intent,” which 28 does not exist in the U.S. Code. 1 CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure 3 state a claim. Since Plaintiff is pro se and this is the Court’s first substantive order on 4 complaint, it will grant him one chance to amend. By December 18, 2025, Plaintiff 5 file any amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to do so by that date, the Court may 6 || enter a final order dismissing this case, based both on failure to state a claim and failure to 7 || prosecute. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 8 ||not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 9 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.’’). 10 Finally, Plaintiff's handwritten motions purportedly seeking a 30-day extension to 11 |/respond to any judicial notice or defensive pleading (even though Plaintiff already opposed 12 || Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss), 3 blank subpoenas stamped with the U.S. Clerk of Court’s 13 ||Seal, and copies of ECF Nos. 6 and 9 (which were already mailed to Plaintiff), are all 14 || DENIED AS MOOT. ECF Nos. 10, 11, 14, 16. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: November 18, 2025 NO 17 QF 18 Honorable Linda Lopez 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28