AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 27, 2020
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-01118-CR
JEROME JORDAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans Opinion by Justice Reichek Jerome Jordan appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. Bringing two issues,
appellant contends the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge that did not require a unanimous
verdict and the judgment should be reformed to reflect the correct offense for which he was
convicted. We agree the judgment should be reformed as appellant requests. We disagree,
however, that the court’s charge was erroneous. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to reflect
the correct offense and, as modified, we affirm.
Factual Background
In early 2016, appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus being driven by Brandon
Patterson. Both Patterson and appellant lived in Dallas and they discussed getting together to
smoke marijuana. The two men sent text messages to each other for several weeks until Patterson sent appellant a message on April 20, 2016 asking if they could meet. Appellant sent Patterson
his address.
Patterson drove to appellant’s apartment complex and appellant invited him inside.
Appellant suggested they go get some “weed” and Patterson responded that he only had $20 with
him. Appellant asked “Why would you come over here with only $20 and we were talking about
getting high?”
At that point, appellant went into his bathroom and came out with an assault rifle.
Appellant pointed the gun at Patterson and told him to hand over his phone and keys, take off his
shoes, and get on the ground. Appellant said, “I know you’re not gonna make me kill you over
some money.” When Patterson refused to get on the ground, appellant shot him in the leg.
Once Patterson was laying on the floor, appellant began circling around, ranting about
money. He then picked up some cables and Patterson thought appellant was going to use the cables
to tie him up. When appellant placed the gun against the wall, Patterson crawled towards it and
he and appellant grabbed the gun at the same time. As they struggled over control of the gun, it
discharged. Appellant shouted that his brother was in the other room and Patterson had forced
him to shoot through the wall. Appellant then stabbed Patterson in the chest with a knife Patterson
had earlier seen lying on a nearby table. Patterson testified he remembered being stabbed twice.
Patterson heard someone come to the apartment door, bang on the outside, and ask if
everything was okay. Patterson yelled back that appellant was trying to kill him and asked the
person to call the police. Appellant became more upset and tried to stab Patterson in the neck, but
the knife either “folded” or broke. Appellant then fled the apartment. Police found appellant the
next day in a truck parked in the apartment complex parking lot. Patterson’s wallet was recovered
from the truck. Appellant was arrested and indicted for aggravated robbery. The indictment
alleged that appellant used and exhibited both a gun and a knife during the course of the offense.
–2– Appellant was tried before a jury. After the evidence was presented, the trial court
submitted a jury charge to which appellant did not object. The abstract portion of the charge
instructed the jury that “[a] person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing
theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or
knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” It further
instructed that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person committing
robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” “Deadly weapon” was defined as “a firearm or
anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily
injury, or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.” The application portion of the charge read as follows:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment.
Alternatively, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to- wit: a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment.
The jury was instructed that its verdict was required to be by a unanimous vote of all members and
the verdict form returned by the jury stated it unanimously found appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery. Appellant brought this appeal.
–3– Analysis
I. Unanimity of Verdict
In his first issue, appellant contends the jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to convict
him without requiring it to agree unanimously on all essential elements of the offense. Appellant
argues the jury was required to make a unanimous decision regarding the type of deadly weapon
used and submission of different theories of the offense in the disjunctive allowed for an
impermissible non-unanimous verdict. We note that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a finding on either weapon.
It has long been held that, when the State alleges differing methods of committing an
offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive. See Kitchens
v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Further, where alternative
methods of committing the same offense are submitted to the jury in the disjunctive, it is
appropriate for the jury to return a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding
under any of the theories submitted. Id. There is no requirement that the jury reach an agreement
on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. Id. Although the jury must
unanimously agree that the defendant committed one specific crime, the jury need not find
unanimously that the defendant committed the crime in one specific manner or using the same
specific means. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Russell v. State,
No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury
need only agree unanimously as to fact that appellant committed murder, not as to specific manner
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AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed January 27, 2020
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-01118-CR
JEROME JORDAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans Opinion by Justice Reichek Jerome Jordan appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. Bringing two issues,
appellant contends the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge that did not require a unanimous
verdict and the judgment should be reformed to reflect the correct offense for which he was
convicted. We agree the judgment should be reformed as appellant requests. We disagree,
however, that the court’s charge was erroneous. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to reflect
the correct offense and, as modified, we affirm.
Factual Background
In early 2016, appellant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus being driven by Brandon
Patterson. Both Patterson and appellant lived in Dallas and they discussed getting together to
smoke marijuana. The two men sent text messages to each other for several weeks until Patterson sent appellant a message on April 20, 2016 asking if they could meet. Appellant sent Patterson
his address.
Patterson drove to appellant’s apartment complex and appellant invited him inside.
Appellant suggested they go get some “weed” and Patterson responded that he only had $20 with
him. Appellant asked “Why would you come over here with only $20 and we were talking about
getting high?”
At that point, appellant went into his bathroom and came out with an assault rifle.
Appellant pointed the gun at Patterson and told him to hand over his phone and keys, take off his
shoes, and get on the ground. Appellant said, “I know you’re not gonna make me kill you over
some money.” When Patterson refused to get on the ground, appellant shot him in the leg.
Once Patterson was laying on the floor, appellant began circling around, ranting about
money. He then picked up some cables and Patterson thought appellant was going to use the cables
to tie him up. When appellant placed the gun against the wall, Patterson crawled towards it and
he and appellant grabbed the gun at the same time. As they struggled over control of the gun, it
discharged. Appellant shouted that his brother was in the other room and Patterson had forced
him to shoot through the wall. Appellant then stabbed Patterson in the chest with a knife Patterson
had earlier seen lying on a nearby table. Patterson testified he remembered being stabbed twice.
Patterson heard someone come to the apartment door, bang on the outside, and ask if
everything was okay. Patterson yelled back that appellant was trying to kill him and asked the
person to call the police. Appellant became more upset and tried to stab Patterson in the neck, but
the knife either “folded” or broke. Appellant then fled the apartment. Police found appellant the
next day in a truck parked in the apartment complex parking lot. Patterson’s wallet was recovered
from the truck. Appellant was arrested and indicted for aggravated robbery. The indictment
alleged that appellant used and exhibited both a gun and a knife during the course of the offense.
–2– Appellant was tried before a jury. After the evidence was presented, the trial court
submitted a jury charge to which appellant did not object. The abstract portion of the charge
instructed the jury that “[a] person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing
theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or
knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” It further
instructed that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person committing
robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.” “Deadly weapon” was defined as “a firearm or
anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of causing death or serious bodily
injury, or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury.” The application portion of the charge read as follows:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment.
Alternatively, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 20th day of April, 2016, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, JEROME JORDAN, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, threaten or place BRANDON PATTERSON in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to- wit: a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the indictment.
The jury was instructed that its verdict was required to be by a unanimous vote of all members and
the verdict form returned by the jury stated it unanimously found appellant guilty of aggravated
robbery. Appellant brought this appeal.
–3– Analysis
I. Unanimity of Verdict
In his first issue, appellant contends the jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to convict
him without requiring it to agree unanimously on all essential elements of the offense. Appellant
argues the jury was required to make a unanimous decision regarding the type of deadly weapon
used and submission of different theories of the offense in the disjunctive allowed for an
impermissible non-unanimous verdict. We note that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting a finding on either weapon.
It has long been held that, when the State alleges differing methods of committing an
offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive. See Kitchens
v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). Further, where alternative
methods of committing the same offense are submitted to the jury in the disjunctive, it is
appropriate for the jury to return a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding
under any of the theories submitted. Id. There is no requirement that the jury reach an agreement
on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict. Id. Although the jury must
unanimously agree that the defendant committed one specific crime, the jury need not find
unanimously that the defendant committed the crime in one specific manner or using the same
specific means. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Russell v. State,
No. 05-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury
need only agree unanimously as to fact that appellant committed murder, not as to specific manner
and means of how appellant committed murder).
The element of the offense at issue here is the jury’s finding that appellant used or exhibited
a deadly weapon. As stated above, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding that a knife and/or gun was used in the offense. Nor does he dispute that both
–4– were deadly weapons under the facts of this case. Because the element of the offense on which
the jury had to agree was only that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, and both weapons
alleged by the State qualified as such, there was no need for the jury to unanimously agree on
which weapon was used. See Landrian, 268 S.W.3d at 535; see also Ruiz v. State, No 03-97-
00051-CR, 1998 WL 644299, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 17, 1998, pet. ref’d) (proper to
submit in disjunctive the nature of the deadly weapon used or exhibited during commission of
offense). We conclude the court’s charge on the issue was proper. We overrule appellant’s first
issue.
II. Judgment Modification
In his second issue, appellant requests this Court modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect
the correct offense for which he was convicted. The State agrees. Appellant was tried and
convicted for the offense of aggravated robbery. The judgment, however, states appellant was
convicted for the offense of “AGGRAVATED ASSALT [sic] WITH A DEADLY WEAPON –
TO WIT: A FIREARM/KNIFE.” We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth
when we have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,
865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Because the record affirmatively shows appellant was
convicted for aggravated robbery, we modify the trial court’s judgment by striking the word
“ASSALT” from the space provided for “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and replace it
with the word “ROBBERY.”
–5– As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 181118F.U05
–6– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JEROME JORDAN, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-18-01118-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1675605-J. Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Molberg and Evans participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The word "ASSALT" in the space provided for "Offense for which Defendant Convicted” is STRUCK and REPLACED with the word "ROBBERY." As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered January 27, 2020
–7–