Jerold Griffin v. City of Sugarland, Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2019
• Docket: 19-20198
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 19-20198 Document: 00515230940 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/10/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

No. 19-20198 Fifth Circuit

FILED Summary Calendar December 10, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce JEROLD GRIFFIN, Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CITY OF SUGARLAND, TEXAS; J. YOUNG; M. SHOCKEY; L. JONES,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division USDC No. 4:18-CV-3121

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jerold Griffin appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the City of Sugarland and three of its officers for alleged excessive force during an arrest. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 5th Cir. 2018). Our review is de novo. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999).

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 19-20198 Document: 00515230940 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/10/2019

No. 19-20198 After reviewing the materials in this case including the video evidence attached to his complaint, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. The district court’s careful and well-reasoned opinion thoroughly addresses all of Griffin’s claims, and we affirm on that basis. Even accepting Griffin’s factual allegations as true, which the video evidence largely corroborates, they are not sufficient to state a claim that the defendant officers used force that was clearly excessive to the need and that was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Although Griffin’s initial offense was minor, his decision to flee and then resist arrest weighs in favor of the officers’ use of force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989). Griffin also fails to identify any settled authority that would have put the defendant officers on notice that the use of force alleged in this case violated Griffin’s constitutional rights. Because his excessive force claim fails because there was no violation of his constitutional rights, Griffin’s bystander liability theory also fails. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013). Finally, Griffin’s claims against the City fail as a matter of law because a city cannot be held liable under § 1983 if an officer has not inflicted a constitutional injury nor does Griffin show any pattern or practice ratified by the City. Saenz v. Heldenfels Brothers, Inc., 183 F.3d 389, 392–93 (5th Cir. 1999). The other questions raised in Griffin’s notice of appeal but that he failed to brief “are considered abandoned.” Dardar v. Lafourche Reality Co., Inc., 985 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 1993). For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.