IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2023-CT-01011-SCT
JERMILLE JOHNSON v.
ELIZABETH CLEVELAND, JOHNNY BRIDGES, RAY F. BUTLER, RAYMOND W. HILL, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AND JOHN McADAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHANCERY CLERK OF HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/22/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARGARET ALFONSO TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LEWIE G. “SKIP” NEGROTTO, IV JOEL CHARLES REYNOLDS, JR.
MATTHEW LIENHARD SCHLOEGEL JOHN ANDREW HAMMOND
MARGARET E. MURDOCK
PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
NANCY MORSE PARKES
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JOHN ANDREW HAMMOND MATTHEW LIENHARD SCHLOEGEL ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: LEWIE G. “SKIP” NEGROTTO, IV PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED, AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED - 08/06/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The issue, and the only issue, before us in the instant appeal is whether Elizabeth Cleveland has standing to assert adverse possession of the home in which she has lived for decades. The defendant and cross-plaintiff, Jermille Johnson, asks the Court to review a judgment entered by the chancery court that did two things. First, the judgment in question found that Cleveland, the plaintiff and cross-defendant, had standing to challenge the tax sale of the real property on which her house sits and where she has lived since the 1980s. Second, the judgment granted Cleveland’s prayer for the tax sale to be voided for lack of notice. ¶2. On appeal, Johnson challenges only the chancellor’s finding that Cleveland, via her claim for adverse possession of the property, has standing to challenge the tax sale. Johnson does not appeal the chancellor’s decision to void the tax sale. Accordingly, the sole issue ripe for consideration in the instant appeal is standing. The issue of whether Cleveland can prove the elements of adverse possession is not before us. Accordingly, the instant opinion is not intended, nor should it be read, to address any issue other than standing raised in the instant litigation, e.g., the merits of Cleveland’s adverse possession claim or the invalidation of the tax sale. ¶3. Because Cleveland has standing, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court.
FACTS
¶4. The case sub judice concerns land in Harrison County, Mississippi, that was sold to
3
the state of Mississippi for unpaid taxes in August 2017. In April 2021 and October 2021, the State conveyed the land to Jermille Johnson by means of forfeited tax land patents. In early September 2021, Elizabeth Cleveland filed a complaint against Johnson and others in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, seeking to quiet title via adverse possession and to void the tax sale for failure to give proper notice. Cleveland claimed that she was the owner of the property because she had adversely possessed the property for more than twenty years. ¶5. The chancery court found that Cleveland had standing to challenge the tax sale and the land patents. The chancery court further determined that because the proper parties had not been given notice of the period of redemption, the tax sale was void. As a result, the chancellor cancelled the land patents and returned the property to the county. Johnson appealed. ¶6. The Court of Appeals held that Cleveland did not have standing to challenge the tax sale and land patents and that the chancellor erred by declaring the tax sale void. Johnson v. Cleveland, 412 So. 3d 575, 577, 581 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). The Court of Appeals also held that Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21 (Rev. 2020) prevented an owner from challenging the notice requirement after the land had been struck off to the state. Johnson, 412 So. 3d at 580. As a result, the court reversed the chancellor’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions that the chancellor address Johnson’s counterclaim to quiet title under Mississippi Code Section 11-17-3 (Rev. 2019). Johnson, 412 So. 3d at 581. ¶7. On July 8, 2025, Cleveland petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari, which we
4
granted. She argues that (1) the Court of Appeals erred by determining that she did not have standing, and (2) the plain language of Section 29-1-21 does not prohibit her from challenging the tax sale. ¶8. Based on our review of the case, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court.
DISCUSSION
¶9. The Supreme Court reviews standing de novo, and in doing so looks to “the well pleaded allegations of the complaint which are taken as true.” SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto Cnty., 170 So. 3d 441, 445 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2015) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Athens Stove Works, Inc., 481 So. 2d 292, 296 (Miss. 1985)). Because standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we may also review it sua sponte. Hotboxxx, LLC v. City of Gulfport, 154 So. 3d 21, 27 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2015) (citing City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000); Frisby v. City of Gulfport (In re City of Biloxi), 113 So. 3d 565, 570 (Miss. 2013)). ¶10. In Reeves v. Gunn, 307 So. 3d 436 (Miss. 2020), the Court overruled its earlier standing precedent to the extent that the phrase “colorable interest,” which the Reeves Court described as an “admittedly amorphous term,” had become a basis for finding that a party had standing to bring a claim. Id. at 438-39 (¶¶ 10-12) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrison Cnty. v. City of Gulfport (In re City of Gulfport), 557 So. 2d 780, 782 (Miss. 1990), abrogation recognized by Butler v. Watson (In re Initiative Measure No. 65), 338 So. 3d 599, 605 (Miss. 2021)). We removed the phrase because it led to “categorical
5
standing without considering the nature of the claims before a court,” thereby “offend[ing] basic jurisprudential principles.” Id. at 439 (¶ 12). ¶11. Although, after Reeves, we no longer look to the existence of a colorable interest to establish standing, Reeves was hardly a wholesale reworking of Mississippi’s law of standing. In an opinion handed down four years after Reeves, the Court wrote:
[i]t is well settled that Mississippi’s standing requirements are quite liberal.
This Court has explained that while federal courts adhere to a stringent definition of standing, limited by Art. 3, § 2 of the United States Constitution to a review of actual cases and controversies, the Mississippi Constitution contains no such restrictive language.
Midsouth Ass’n of Indep. Schs. v. Parents for Pub. Schs., 384 So. 3d 1226, 1230 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73, 77 (Miss. 2019)). Moreover, “[w]e have been more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Van Slyke v. Bd. of Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning, 613 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993)). Accordingly, it remains true that Cleveland can demonstrate standing if she can show “an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant[s.]” SASS Muni-V, LLC, 170 So. 3d at 446 (¶ 13) (quoting Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Miss. 1995), overruled by Reeves, 307 So. 3d at 439).
“[A]n individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a defendant must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute or by common law.” City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 525 (Miss. 2005) (quoting [State v.]Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d [401,]
405 [(Miss. 2001)]). “[F]or a plaintiff to establish standing on grounds of experiencing an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant/appellee, the adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the general public.” Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So. 3d 25,
6
33–34 (Miss. 2010) (citing Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So. 2d 149, 153 (Miss. 2002)).
SASS Muni-V, LLC, 170 So. 3d at 446 (¶ 13) (alteration in original). ¶12. Cleveland had standing to challenge the tax sale of her home for two reasons. First, as the trial court found, Cleveland’s simultaneous adverse possession claim gave her a sufficient interest in the land to establish standing. If her allegations in support of her adverse possession claim are true, and we must take them as such, then she obtained full and complete title to the land ten years before she filed her complaint. Second, although not relied on by the trial court, the unique facts of the case support standing based on adverse impact. In her complaint, Cleveland alleged that she faced losing the home in which she had lived for decades and on which she believed she had been paying property taxes for years. That alleged loss is plainly an adverse impact sufficient to support standing. ¶13. “To acquire property by adverse possession, a claimant must show that its possession of the property was: (1) open, notorious, and visible; (2) hostile; (3) under claim of ownership; (4) exclusive; (5) peaceful; and (6) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years.” Double J Farmlands, Inc. v. Paradise Baptist Church, 999 So. 2d 826, 829 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2008) (citing Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So. 2d 468, 475 (Miss. 2005)). Mississippi also has an adverse possession statute that provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to persons under the disability of minority or unsoundness of mind the right to sue within ten (10) years after the removal of such disability, as provided in Section
7
15-1-7. However, the saving in favor of persons under disability of unsoundness of mind shall never extend longer than thirty-one (31) years.
Miss. Code Ann. 15-1-13(1) (Rev. 2019) (emphasis added). ¶14. Critical to Cleveland’s standing is that, under adverse possession law, title vests by operation of law once the ten-year period expires. Crotwell v. T&W Homes, 318 So. 3d 1117, 1123 (¶¶ 20-22) (Miss. 2021). Ultimately, of course, a court must adjudicate the issue before a title is marketable, but the legally functional moment when ownership vests is at the end of ten years. Id. In Crotwell, the question was whether Richard Prestage had, through adverse possession, acquired title in a parcel of real estate prior to Prestage’s abandonment of the property. Id. at 1123 (¶¶ 19-20). The Crotwells, who claimed possession of the property, argued that Prestage abandoned the property in question seven years before conveying it to T&W Homes; therefore, his attempted conveyance was invalid. Id. However, the Crotwell Court held that Prestage’s title had vested exactly when the ten-year prescriptive period closed: “Here, Prestage’s adverse possession time started when his grandfather died in June 1998 and vested ten years later in June 2008. Thus, Prestage obtained full and complete title to the property in June 2008.” Id. at 1123 (¶ 22). In other words, Prestage obtained ownership of the land before he abandoned it, despite never having a court adjudicate his title, and his conveyance of the land to T&W Homes seven years after he abandoned the property was valid. ¶15. The language of Section 15-1-13(1), quoted above, i.e., that the running of ten years of qualifying occupancy “shall vest . . . a full and complete title” dictated the Crotwell holding.
8
[T]he ordinary and normal sweep of the statute operates to invest the adverse occupant upon the completion of the statutory period with a new and independent title to every estate in the land—a title not derived at all from or in any privity whatever with any former owner, 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, § 200, p. 804; 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed., Secs. 1171, et seq., and which may be used defensively by the occupant not only but also as an adequate basis to confirm or quiet his title.
Crotwell, 318 So. 3d at 1123 (¶ 21) (quoting Levy v. Campbell, 200 Miss. 721, 28 So. 2d 224, 226 (1946)). ¶16. Pursuant to Crotwell and Section 15-1-13(1), if the allegations in the her complaint are true, Cleveland’s adverse possession of the property, which, as the trial court pointed out in its order, went largely uncontested by any of the defendants, would have fully vested title in her approximately ten years prior to her filing her complaint. Because standing is determined from the allegations of the complaint, Cleveland has standing to pursue her claim. If she did indeed obtain full title to the property more than a decade ago, without court action, she will now lose it. ¶17. Even if Cleveland’s potential, even probable, adverse possession of the property was insufficient to give her standing, given the unusual facts of the instant case, she would have standing pursuant to the adverse impact that would result to her should the tax sale not be voided. In short, she would be removed from her home of two decades, on which she has believed herself to be paying taxes faithfully. ¶18. The adverse impact is underscored by the answer of one defendant, the Chancery Clerk of Harrison County. The chancery clerk admitted in his answer to the complaint that the land on which Cleveland’s house sat was wrongly sold and that the tax sale should be
9
voided. He wrote:
Due to an error in mapping, the home/improved property located on the subject property that was sold at the subject tax sale was placed on a different parcel.
Due to this error, the home owner was not given any requisite notice of the tax sale on the subject property, thereby, voiding the subject tax sale.
The chancery clerk’s response provides strong support for Cleveland’s argument that she will suffer an adverse impact sufficient to establish standing. ¶19. Johnson also claims that Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21 bars Cleveland’s action. The section reads:
The Secretary of State, on receiving from the chancery clerk the list of unredeemed lands sold to the state for taxes, shall enter the same in the register of tax lands by counties and in the regular order of townships, ranges and sections; and if the description of any of the lands be indefinite or defective and need to be made good by reference to the assessment roll under which it was sold, the Secretary of State may add to the description such alternative description as will clearly designate the land, prefacing the same with words “being as appears by the assessment roll of said county, for the year _____”
The Secretary of State, with the approval of the Governor, may sell the tax lands in the manner provided in this chapter, at such prices and under such terms and conditions as the Secretary of State with the approval of the Governor may fix, subject to the limitations imposed in this chapter, or the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Governor, may transfer any of the tax lands to any other state agency, county, municipality or political subdivision of the state. Such agency or subdivision then may retain or dispose of those lands as provided by law. If a state agency, county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, has applied for transfer or purchase of the tax lands, it shall have priority over all other applicants except the original owner, his heirs or assigns. The courts shall not recognize claims by the original owner, his heirs or assigns after unredeemed lands are sold to the state for taxes and received by the Secretary of State’s office or conveyed to a state agency, county, municipality or other political subdivision.
Miss. Code Ann. § 29-1-21 (Rev. 2020). Johnson argues that the final sentence of the section deprives Cleveland of standing. His interpretation would deprive of standing anyone
10
challenging the sale of any title sold to the state for delinquent taxes. We disagree. ¶20. Other statutes clearly contemplate court proceedings that challenge properties sold at tax sales. Mississippi Code Section 15-1-17 clearly permits prior owners to bring claims in certain scenarios, i.e., a suit seeking to cancel the tax sale “on account of any defect, irregularity or illegality in the assessment, levy or sale of such land for delinquent taxes[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-17 (Supp. 2025). Here, Cleveland sought to challenge the legality of the tax sale and to have it voided for improper notice. As a result, Section 15-1-17 permits such a filing. Ultimately, the application of the statute goes to the merits of Cleveland’s claim and not her standing to bring it, which is before us today.
CONCLUSION
¶21. The question before the Court is whether Cleveland has standing to bring suit. Because she alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to show an adverse impact—namely, the loss of her home through no fault of her own—she has standing. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Harrison County Chancery Court.
¶22. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED, AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
KING, P.J., ISHEE AND SULLIVAN, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, C.J., CONCURS DUBITANTE WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BRANNING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRIFFIS, J. WILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, CONCURRING DUBITANTE:
¶23. While the result reached by the majority is correct by the standards of today’s law, the
11
dissent’s concerns regarding the need for notice is valid and very important. A look at earlier stages of the concept, adverse possession, reveals it once required recorded, paper title before a person acquired perfect title to property. With that understanding, Cleveland does not have perfect title to the land she is claiming by adverse possession. But certainly, she can and did claim title through an ownership right acquired by adverse possession. ¶24. Adverse possession has ancient origins, going back as far as the Code of Hammurabi. Brian Gardiner, Squatters’ Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for Equitable Application of Property Laws, 8 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 119, 123-24 (1997).1 The first recorded mention of adverse possession in the English legal system came in 1275 with chapter 39 of the Statute of Westminster I, in which the possession period was based on a specific date rather than an amount of time. Id. at 126. In those days, seisin, which “meant simply possession” at that time, was the basis of title. Seisin, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 137 (1918). As a result, “[e]xcept for government grant, possession is thus the ultimate root of all titles. Title deeds are nothing but the history or evidence of the transfer of rights arising from possession . . . .” Id. at 137. ¶25. The model of adverse possession that the American colonies used was derived from the Statute of Limitations of 1623. Gardiner, supra, at 127-130. However, while that statute barred true title owners from ejecting adverse possessors after the requisite period, the statute did not actually vest the adverse possessor with right and title. Statute of Limitations 1623,
1 The ancient Romans also a had a system of adverse possession that influenced the civil law traditions regarding adverse possession. Gardiner, supra, at 123-25, 128.
12
21 Jac. 1 c. 16 (1623), https://vlex.co.uk/vid/limitation-act-1623-808135713; Sandra Petersson, Something for Nothing: The Law of Adverse Possession in Alberta, 30 Alberta L. Rev. 1291, 1297-98 (1992); Ballantine, supra, at 138-39. In England, meeting the elements of adverse possession did not extinguish right and title in the true title holder and vest right and title in the adverse possessor until Parliament passed the Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, well after American independence. Petersson, supra, at 1297-98; Ballantine, supra, at 138-39. ¶26. The colonies, and eventually the states, began to codify adverse possession using the 1623 law. Gardiner, supra at 127-30. Mississippi followed the trend, and the Act of Limitations of 1822 reveals that the earliest statutes in this state read:
Fifty years’ actual possession of any lands, tenements, or other real estate, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent, conveyance or otherwise, in whatever way or manner such possession might have commenced or have been continued, shall vest a full and complete right and title, in every actual possessor or occupier of such lands, tenements, or other real estate, and shall be a good and sufficient bar, to all claims that may be made, or actions commenced by any person or persons whatever, for the recovery of any such land, tenements, or other real estate.
A. Hutchinson, Code of Mississippi: Being an Analytical Compilation of the Public and General Statutes of the Territory and State, with Tabular References to the Local and Private Acts from 1798 to 1848 (1848) (emphasis added). An amendment to the Act of Limitations in 1844 kept the “right and title” language, id., and subsequent case law reflected that language. Ellis v. Murray, 6 Cushm. 129 (Miss. 1854). ¶27. In those days, the law of this state reflected the distinction between the right, which was the claimed ownership interest in the land, and title, which meant proof of ownership,
13
i.e., a written instrument. Title, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) (“Title may be defined generally to be the evidence of right which a person has to the possession of property. The word title certainly does not merely signify the right which a person has to the possession of property; because there are many instances in which a person may have the right to the possession of property, and at the same time have no title to the same.”). ¶28. However, by 1906, the legislature took a slight sidestep, one which has since caused great confusion: it altered the phrase “right and title” to only read “title.” A.H. Whitfield & Annotators, et al., Mississippi Code of 1906 of the Public Statute Laws of the State of Mississippi (1906). The language used in our case law followed suit, and the concepts of “right” and “title” have since become conflated. See Title, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining title as both “the union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property” and “legal evidence of a person’s ownership rights in property; an instrument (such as a deed) that constitutes such evidence”); see, e.g., Fant v. Williams, 118 Miss. 428, 79 So. 343, 345 (1918) (“If the defendant was in adverse possession of the lands in controversy for the period of time necessary to create title, it is immaterial whether that possession immediately preceded the institution of plaintiff’s action.” (emphasis added) (quoting Geoghegan v. Marshall, 66 Miss. 676, 6 So. 502, 502 (1889))). ¶29. Every now and then, the older formulation breaks through into modern jurisprudence. For example, as the dissent points out, this Court stated in Roy v. Kayser, 501 So. 2d 1110 (Miss. 1987), that “the Roys met their burden of proof, vesting title in them as a
14
consequence.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added). Rather than using this state’s long-time formulation, the Court momentarily held that meeting the elements of adverse possession only bestows a claim to title through the acquisition of a right, whereas title itself only comes from court adjudication and, ultimately, obtaining record title. ¶30. The practical realities of property law are better served by reestablishing the distinction between “right” and “title.” With record title to property, a person can, inter alia, lawfully enter, possess, use, list as collateral, lease, claim tax benefits from, and dispose of the property however he wills. However, as the majority and dissent recognize, a person can do nothing with what is now called “title” by adverse possession until a court has adjudicated the issue. Maj. Op. ¶ 14. Such “title” has only two uses: it may “be used defensively by the occupant . . . [or] as an adequate basis to confirm or quiet his title.” Levy v. Campbell, 200 Miss. 721, 28 So. 2d 224, 226 (1946) (citing Fant, 118 Miss. at 433; Itawamba Cnty. v. Sheffield, 195 Miss. 359, 13 So. 2d 649; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533, 12 S. Ct. 720, 36 L. Ed. 532). The uncertainty ultimately leads to true title holders who have no notice that the property is no longer theirs. On the other hand, by requiring that an adverse possessor seek and obtain record title, the world is given notice of the adverse possessor’s ownership interest. ¶31. This realignment does not deprive Cleveland of standing. This Court has held:
Quite simply, the issue adjudicated in a standing case is whether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant or whether a party plaintiff in an action for legal relief can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action. “Such is the general rule.”
15
Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Jackson Fed’n of Tchrs., 372 So. 3d 997, 1001 (Miss. 2023) (quoting Butler v. Watson (In re Initiative Measure No. 65), 338 So. 3d 599, 605 (Miss. 2021)). “We follow ‘the traditional articulation of “adverse impact” to describe when a party can assert standing to bring a suit[.]’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Initiative Measure No. 65, 338 So. 3d at 605). “[T]he adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the general public.” SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto Cnty., 170 So. 3d 441, 446 (Miss. 2015) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So. 3d 25, 33-34 (Miss. 2010)). ¶32. Here, Cleveland alleges that she can prove the elements of adverse possession. A claim to title by adverse possession is a “present, existent actionable . . . interest” in the property, and based on the allegations of the complaint, Cleveland’s claim was “complete at the time of the institution of the action.” Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 372 So. 3d at 1001 (quoting In re Initiative Measure No. 65, 338 So. 3d at 605). Further, Cleveland has suffered a unique adverse impact since she could lose the property she has lived on for decades and over which she has a claim to title by adverse possession. As a result, Cleveland has standing. ¶33. Based on the older understanding of adverse possession, Cleveland has a claim to title through an ownership right acquired by adverse possession, which gives her standing to bring her claim. Because of the uncertainty under the current understanding of title and the safety that comes with requiring record title, the legislature would do well to consider returning to the language “right and title.”
16
BRANNING, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶34. Our standing requirements, liberal as they may be, are not without limitation. This Court has been clear that, “an individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a defendant must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law. . . .” City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 526 (Miss. 2005). Cleveland had no legally cognizable interest in the property at the time she contested the tax sale, thus she lacked standing. Because this Court lacks the authority to manufacture such an interest, even to circumvent a less-than-desirable outcome, I respectfully dissent.
Interest Required for Standing ¶35. The majority reiterated the trial court’s statement that Cleveland’s “adverse- possession claim gave her a sufficient interest in the land to establish standing.” Maj. Op. ¶ 12. We first need a clear understanding of what particular interest is required to establish standing to contest a tax sale for lack of proper notice. ¶36. This Court has been clear that “different standing requirements are accorded to different areas of the law. . . .” Butler v. Watson (In re Initiative Measure No. 65), 338 So. 3d 599, 605 (Miss. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting City of Picayune, 916 So. 2d at 526). As such, this case demands a narrow focus. ¶37. Mississippi’s standard for determining who is entitled to notice of a tax sale is record ownership. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-1 to -11 (Rev. 2024). Section 27-43-1 provides that “[t]he clerk of the chancery court shall . . . be required to issue notice to the record owner of the land sold . . . .” The trial court correctly pointed out that Mississippi’s long-standing
17
policy is to protect landowners from loss by sale of their land for taxes. See Campbell Props., Inc. v. Cook, 258 So. 3d 273, 274 (Miss. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing Reed v. Florimonte, 987 So. 2d 967, 975 (Miss. 2008)). ¶38. In the same vein, the trial court emphasized the clerk’s responsibility to strictly follow the notice requirements of Mississippi Code Section 27-43-1, which provides that “[t]he clerk of the chancery court shall . . . be required to issue notice to the record owner of the land as sold[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-1 (Rev. 2024) (emphasis added). Mississippi Code Section 27-43-3 goes on to require the clerk to serve the record owner by personal service, certified mail and publication for Mississippi residents. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-3 (Rev. 2024) (emphasis added). ¶39. Additionally, Mississippi Code Section 29-1-23 provides that “[w]henever the words ‘original owner’ appear in this chapter, they shall be construed to mean the owner of the title on date of sale of land for taxes.” Miss. Code Ann. § 29-1-23 (Rev. 2020) (emphasis added). Therefore, entitlement to notice not only depends on record ownership, but that ownership as existing at the time of the tax sale. ¶40. Further, Mississippi Code Section 27-43-5 (Rev. 2024) states that “[i]t shall be the duty of the clerk of the chancery court to examine the record of deeds, mortgages and deeds of trust in his office to ascertain the names and addresses of all mortgagees, beneficiaries and holders of vendors liens of all land sold for taxes[.]” ¶41. While Mississippi tax-sale law favors strict compliance with these notice requirements “in favor of landowners,” the standard for determining who qualifies as a landowner has
18
always been “record ownership.” Foreman v. DHP1, LLC, 406 So. 3d at 767-70 (quoting Campbell Props., 258 So. 3d at 277)). ¶42. While it is without dispute that the chancery clerks are required to make “diligent search and inquiry” of their records when satisfying notice requirements of Section 27-43-3, no provision in our law requires the clerks to personally inspect properties for individuals claiming ownership without record title. Yet that is likely to be the result of the majority’s opinion. ¶43. The Court has addressed the issue of entitlement to tax-sale notice in SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto County, 170 So. 3d 441, 443 (Miss. 2015), in which the purchaser of a property at a tax sale brought suit to challenge a subsequent tax sale on the same property. The trial court held that because SASS was not entitled to notice of the pending tax sale, it did not have standing to contest the tax sale. Id. at 444-45. But on appeal, this Court reasoned that because SASS was a tax sale purchaser, it “had obtained an actionable interest in the property” and therefore had standing to contest the subsequent tax sale. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (citing Moore v. Marathon Asset Mgmt., LLC, 973 So. 2d 1017). ¶44. Becoming a tax-sale purchaser is commensurate to being a record owner due to the evidence of ownership produced through recorded documents. See Miss. Code Ann. § 27-45- 23 (Rev. 2024); Miss. Code Ann. § 89-5-1 (Rev. 2021). These documents, in turn, serve to put the world on notice of some form of ownership interest in the property . In fact, the Court stated that a “tax-sale purchaser undeniably holds an interest in the property, both prior to and after the expiration of the redemption period, regardless of the validity of the sale.” Id.
19
(emphasis added). The Court determined that, because SASS was a tax-sale purchaser and thus a statutory lienholder under Mississippi Code Section 27-45-27(1) (Rev. 2010), it had an actionable interest in the property that afforded it standing to contest the tax sale. SASS, 170 So. 3d at 449. Such is not the case here because Cleveland lacked record ownership or any type of established interest in the property. ¶45. It is important to note that the special concurrence groups the concept of record title with perfect title. Con. Op. ¶ 23. There is no requirement in Mississippi law that title be “perfect” for purposes of notice of a tax sale or standing to contest a tax sale, and this dissent is not suggesting the same. As explained above, our law is clear that “record ownership” is the standard for determining who is entitled to notice of a tax sale.
An Adverse Possession Claim is Not Sufficient ¶46. The trial court and the majority both assert that an adverse possession claim is enough to establish standing to contest a tax sale. In fact, the trial court “[c]onsider[ed] that Ms. Cleveland’s claim of ownership to the subject property through adverse possession has not been challenged by any party” in reaching its conclusion. This position is wholly unsupported by Mississippi law. ¶47. “Under Mississippi law, the party asserting adverse possession as the basis for their claim of title has the burden of proof on the issue.” Roy v. Kayser, 501 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Miss. 1987) (citing Gadd v. Stone, 459 So. 2d 773, 774 (Miss. 1984); Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Blalock, 389 So. 2d 498, 502 (Miss. 1980); Eady v. Eady, 362 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1978)). “We have previously declared that one asserting a claim of adverse possession must
20
prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of six elements: possession must be (1) under claim of right; (2) actual; (3) open, notorious and visible; (4) exclusive; (5) continuous and uninterrupted for ten years, and (6) peaceful.” Stallings v. Bailey, 558 So. 2d 858, 860 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis added) (citing Pieper v. Pontiff, 513 So. 2d 591, 594 (Miss.1987); Johnson v. Black, 469 So. 2d 88, 90 (Miss.1985); Davis v. Clement, 468 So. 2d 58, 62 (Miss.1985); Gadd v. Stone, 459 So. 2d 773, 774 (Miss. 1984); Trotter v. Gaddis & McLaurin, Inc., 452 So. 2d 453, 456 (Miss. 1984); Cole v. Burleson, 375 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1979)). ¶48. In addition, several qualifying factors must be considered by the trial courts in an adverse possession analysis. For example, this Court has held “that possession with permission of the record owner can never ripen into adverse possession.” Rice v. Pritchard, 611 So. 2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1992). Whether the adverse possession claim affects the entire tract or simply a portion is dependent on whether actual possession is coupled with ownership under color of title. Wentworth v. Forne, 242 Miss. 883, 137 So. 2d 166, 168 (1962). Payment of taxes is not conclusive evidence of ownership, as it is but one factor to be considered. Geoghegan v. Krauss, 228 Miss 231, 87 So. 2d 461, 465 (1956); Leavenworth v. Reeves, 106 Miss. 722, 64 So. 660, 661-62 (1914). Possession alone is insufficient to establish adverse possession, and claim of title is incompatible with recognition of title in the true owner. Coleman v. French, 233 So. 2d 796, 796-97 (Miss. 1970) (emphasis added). ¶49. Our law is replete with cases in which claimants met the high standard of proof to
21
have their interests established under our adverse possession laws. See generally Roy, 501 So. 2d at 1112 (finding that adjacent landowners established title by adverse possession); Trotter, 452 So. 2d at 458-59 (Miss. 1984) (finding that adverse possession claimant met all elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence); McSwain v. B. M. Stevens Co., 247 So. 2d 707, 709 (Miss. 1971) (finding adverse possession elements met for a portion of the land in question). Specifically, in Roy, after an extensive evidentiary hearing on the claim for adverse possession, the Court held that “the [claimants] met their burden of proof [of all elements of adverse possession], [thereby] vesting title in them as a consequence.” 501 So. 2d at 1112 (emphasis added). ¶50. One the other hand, there are countless cases in which the claimants filed their claim, had the matter heard but were not successful in establishing their interests. See generally Savage v. Parrish, 488 So. 2d 1342 (Miss. 1986) (holding that the evidence supported the chancellor’s decision that adverse possession was not established); Johnson, 469 So. 2d 88 (holding that permissive use does not ripen into adverse possession); Hans v. Hans, 482 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1986) (holding that permissive use by the claimant tolled the statute). ¶51. Simply stating a claim of adverse possession does not create any interest in property. The analysis is extremely fact-intensive with a high burden of proof. Once a claimant meets the burden of proof, however, title will “vest[ ] . . . in them as a consequence.” Roy, 501 So. 2d at 1112. ¶52. The majority suggests that adjudication of an adverse possession claim is only to make “title . . . marketable” and points to Crotwell v. T&W Homes, 318 So. 3d 1117 (Miss.
22
2021) stating “[the claimant] obtained ownership of the land before he abandoned it, despite never having a court adjudicate his title . . . .” Maj. Op. ¶ 14. But the Crotwell Court actually agreed with the chancery court that “[c]lear and convincing evidence [established] that [the claimant] adversely possessed the one acre tract of land.” Crotwell, 318 So. 3d at 1121. While the trial court did make the title vesting retroactively effective, it did so after an extensive evidentiary hearing on the adverse possession claim, including detailed factual findings on each of the adverse possession elements. Id. ¶53. In the present case, it is important to note that Cleveland’s posture is a that of un- adjudicated claim of adverse possession. In the trial court, no witnesses were called nor any facts developed, as the parties only provided legal arguments. So the majority’s reference to “Cleveland’s potential, even probable, adverse possession” claim, without factual development in the trial court, is without proper support. Maj. Op. ¶ 17. A claim of adverse possession is not enough to establish any interest in property.
Present Actionable Interest ¶54. The majority states that “[i]f her allegations in support of her adverse possession claim are true . . . then she obtained full and complete title to the land. . .”. Maj. Op. ¶ 12. But what Cleveland could have proved is not the appropriate standard. ¶55. This Court has recognized that the issue turns on “whether a party plaintiff . . . can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action.” In re Initiative Measure No. 65, 338 So. 3d at 605 (Miss. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting City of Picayune, 916 So. 2d at
23
526). ¶56. In the present case, Cleveland only had an un-adjudicated adverse possession claim at the time of the tax sale. Because her interest was not complete at the time of the institution of her action contesting the tax sale, she lacked standing.
Adverse Impact ¶57. The majority asserts that Cleveland had adverse impact standing, without providing legal authority. Maj. Op. ¶ 18. Recognizing that Cleveland has asserted that her home is in jeopardy, no facts have been developed in this case either way. In addition, the record reveals that the chancery clerk’s answer in the trial court proceedings admits numerous mapping errors calling into question the property boundaries. ¶58. In City of Madison v. Bryan, this Court failed to recognize the existence of adverse impact standing in the absence an established interest in the subject property. City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000). In conjunction with the adverse impact standard is the requirement that “a claim against a defendant . . . be grounded in some legal right recognized by law . . . . “ City of Picayune, 916 So. 2d at 525. As discussed, facts not having been developed in this case, Cleveland has not proved any such right.
The tax sale cut off Cleveland’s adverse possession claim.
¶59. Finally, even if Cleveland had standing, her adverse possession claim on remand would be unsuccessful because the tax sale would have cut off her claim. Mississippi Code Section 29-1-21(Rev. 2020) provides that “[t]he courts shall not recognize claims by the original owner . . . after lands are sold to the state for taxes[.]” Additionally, Section 29-1-23
24
(emphasis added) states that “[w]henever the words “original owner appear in this chapter, they shall be construed to mean the owner of title on date of sale of land for taxes.” And this Court has held that “[r]egardless of the extent and quality of a defendant’s adverse possession, its period was tolled by sale to the State for taxes.” Winstead v. Winstead, 204 Miss. 787, 38 So. 2d 118, 119 (1948) (citing Harris v. Lollar, 17 So. 2d 325 (Miss. 1944)). ¶60. The majority suggests that Mississippi Code Section 15-1-17 (Supp. 2025) provides Cleveland another avenue to contest the tax sale. Maj. Op. ¶ 20. Not being raised in the trial court or on appeal, however, this issue is not squarely before the Court. ¶61. In conclusion, Cleveland took no legal action to establish her ownership rights in the land until her attempt to contest the tax sale. Simply put, asserting a claim of adverse possession is not enough to establish record ownership; neither is it enough for standing to contest a tax sale. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse the trial court’s judgment invalidating the tax sale and to remand the case to the chancery court for a hearing on Johnson’s complaint to quiet and confirm title.
GRIFFIS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.