Jermer v. Siemens Energy

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit·Decided January 25, 2005·No. 03-4191·Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 File Name: 05a0041p.06

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

X Plaintiff-Appellant, - JON JERMER, - - - No. 03-4191 v. , > SIEMENS ENERGY & AUTOMATION, INC., - Defendant-Appellee. - N Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 02-00448—Sandra S. Beckwith, District Judge. Argued: December 10, 2004 Decided and Filed: January 25, 2005 Before: MERRITT, GIBBONS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: David G. Torchia, TOBIAS, KRAUS & TORCHIA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Keith P. Spiller, THOMPSON HINE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David G. Torchia, TOBIAS, KRAUS & TORCHIA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Keith P. Spiller, THOMPSON HINE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This Ohio diversity case arises from the plaintiff-employee’s so-called “Greeley” claim against his former employer for wrongful discharge. The specific claim is that he was dismissed in retaliation for raising complaints about the air quality at the employer’s facility in Ohio. The district court rejected the claim. In Ohio, common law claims of wrongful discharge in violation of “public policy” were created by the case of Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990). Relevant “public policy” may arise from a number of sources including the federal and Ohio Constitutions, statutory law, administrative rules or the common law, according to Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 320-21 (Ohio 1997). Five years after Greeley, the Ohio Supreme Court in Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995), set out the following four necessary elements of this new “public policy” claim, the second of which (the “jeopardy element”) is at issue in this appeal:

1 No. 03-4191 Jermer v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. Page 2

1. That [a] clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law (the clarity element). 2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element). 3. The plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy (the causation element). 4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element). Id. (emphasis in original). The Court held that the first two elements are questions of law while the latter two are questions of fact. Id. at 658. This language from Collins is very general and leaves a lot of room for interpretation. The meaning of these four elements for this new Ohio tort has not yet gained the level of clarity or certainty that allows predictive outcomes. The question before us is the meaning of the second element, the so-called “jeopardy element.” Our interpretation of this gateway element is as follows: although complaining employees do not have to be certain that the employer’s conduct is illegal or cite a particular law that the employer has broken, the employee must at least give the employer clear notice that the employee’s complaint is connected to a governmental policy. It must be sufficiently clear from the employee’s statements that he is invoking governmental policy that a reasonable employer would understand that the employee relies on the policy as the basis for his complaint. Because the employee here never connected his statements about air quality to governmental policy or mentioned or in any way invoked governmental policy as the basis of his complaint, we agree with the district court that his case must be dismissed for the failure to show that his dismissal would “jeopardize” Ohio’s public policy. I. Plaintiff Jon Jermer was hired in December 1998 by defendant, Siemens Energy, to work as a manufacturing engineer in Siemens’ Norwood, Ohio, facility. Steve Kroeger served as Jermer’s supervisor. In early 1999, responding to complaints from other employees about the air quality at the facility, Siemens had its insurance company conduct air quality testing. Several key pieces of equipment could not be physically examined, and the testing was inconclusive. Some employee complaints continued. In November 1999, following up on these continued complaints, Kroeger, the supervisor, assigned Jermer the task of investigating the situation. Jermer alleges that it was about this time that he heard the supervisor state that Franka Cope, one of the employees who had complained about the air, should be fired for her complaints. She was not, in fact, discharged or otherwise disadvantaged, according to the record. Jermer hired Ungers & Associates to conduct a second analysis. This testing was delayed until May 2000, after the heating was turned off for the summer. The test indicated the presence of several varieties of mold, some of which were potentially harmful to human health. Ungers’ report noted that the HVAC system was unable to effectively regulate humidity. It recommended that Siemens “consider changes to the HVAC system that would improve the air conditioning” by removing humidity since “[h]igh humidity levels are often associated with mold growth.” No. 03-4191 Jermer v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc. Page 3

Uncontradicted evidence establishes that Siemens followed up on Ungers’ recommendations by having its HVAC contractor thoroughly inspect the air conditioning system to ensure proper functioning.1 Jermer was not involved in these activities. In early 2001, the supervisor grew concerned with Jermer’s conduct in the workplace. He noted increased absenteeism and several confrontations between Jermer and co-workers. The supervisor consulted with the human resources department in February 2001 regarding his concerns and decided at that time to begin documenting the problems without notifying Jermer. Between March 2001 and September 2001 the supervisor identified nineteen days when Jermer either arrived late or left early. The supervisor also documented three encounters during the same time frame in which Jermer responded to requests from co- workers with statements like “that’s [someone else’s] problem,” “[y]ou’re beginning to piss me off, that’s not part of my objectives,” and “I took myself off that project.” In June 2001, in response to a co-worker’s persistent cough and his own irritated sinuses, Jermer researched air filters and identified one that he claimed would remove some mold spores from the air in relatively small spaces. He requested from his supervisor that the company provide the filter and subsequently filed an official requisition form requesting the filter. After initially indicating he would approve the request, the supervisor denied it. In July 2001, as they were walking to an unrelated meeting at the human resources department, Jermer asked his supervisor how the air quality project was going and asked if he needed any assistance with re-testing. Jermer reports that, as part of this discussion, he stated “I still think there’s issues.” In response to Jermer’s offer of assistance, the supervisor said, “we’ll see.” On September 12, 2001, the supervisor initiated a meeting with Jermer. 2In the meeting, he told Jermer, for the first time, that he was concerned about Jermer’s job performance.

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Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.
677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)