Jermaine J. Williams, Etc. v. Autobay LLC

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: A-1412-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1412-24

JERMAINE J. WILLIAMS, a/k/a JERMAINE WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AUTOBAY LLC and SABIN KARAM,1

Defendants-Respondents. __________________________

Submitted July 29, 2025 – Decided September 4, 2025

Before Judges Rose and Marczyk.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1593-23.

Perlman DePetris Consumer Law LLC and Lewis G. Adler, attorneys for appellant (Paul DePetris, of counsel and on the briefs; Lewis G. Adler and Lee M. Perlman, of counsel).

1 Improperly pled as Karime Sabine. Marshall Dennehey, PC, attorneys for respondents (Douglas D. Suplee and Walter F. Kawalec, III, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On leave granted, we consider plaintiff Jermaine J. Williams's appeal from

the trial court's November 15, 2024 order denying class certification. After

granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against defendants

Autobay LLC (Autobay) and Sabin Karam, the trial court denied plaintiff's

motions for class certification, finding plaintiff failed to demonstrate his claims

were typical of the proposed class, R. 4:32-1(a)(3), and that individual claims

predominated, R. 4:32-1(b)(3). Following our review of the record and the

applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

This matter stems from the sale of a used vehicle. In June 2022, plaintiff

purchased a 2014 Mercedes from Autobay for $37,950. The parties executed a

contract, titled "Buyer's Order," memorializing the sale.

The contract contained a section itemizing various fees and charges that

comprised the purchase price of the vehicle. Notably, the purchase price

included a "Total Documentary Fee" (documentary fee) of $599 and a

"Temp[orary] Tag Fee" (tag fee) of $75. Plaintiff received a dealer-issued

A-1412-24 2 powertrain warranty for thirty days or 1,000 miles, whichever occurred first,

and a limited warranty for six months or 6,000 miles.

In the months following the sale, plaintiff's vehicle underwent extensive

repairs and maintenance, primarily at automobile service centers other than

Autobay, such as a tire rotation in October, replacing one of the tires in

November at a Mercedes dealership, and an oil change and tire rotation in

December. In late December 2022, Pep Boys installed new brake pads, rotors,

and three new tires, after which plaintiff started noticing the car would "wobble"

when he drove it. In February 2023, plaintiff brought the vehicle to Pep Boys

to correct "the wobbling."

In March 2023, plaintiff took the car to a Mercedes dealership after

noticing a "grinding," and a "tapping and clicking noise while driving" and

braking. The front axles of the vehicle required replacement, but plaintiff

declined to do so at that time due to the high costs of the repairs. In early April,

plaintiff again brought the vehicle to the Mercedes dealership to have the four

wheels balanced.

Plaintiff returned to Autobay on April 12, seeking to address various

problems with the vehicle. On April 24, Autobay performed a "[b]oot repair

kit," which entailed removing and replacing the front boots of the vehicle.

A-1412-24 3 Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he did not believe Autobay completed

the April repairs. Throughout the month of May, Autobay performed additional

repairs and inspections of the vehicle, including fixing a "rattling sound," and

advising plaintiff that the car needed new brake pads and rotors.

On June 15, plaintiff took the vehicle to an auto repair shop after hearing

"clanking" and "clunking" when starting the vehicle. The repair shop

recommended fixing the "left cam[]shaft" and replacing the timing chain, but

plaintiff did not have the work performed at that time. Nearly one week later,

plaintiff went to another auto repair shop, which conducted a diagnostic for a

camshaft repair and provided plaintiff with an estimate for the repairs.

Additional repairs and maintenance were performed on the vehicle

between July and December 2023. Plaintiff testified, at some point thereafter,

he accelerated the vehicle, and the check engine light illuminated, at which point

the vehicle began shaking. Pep Boys could not diagnose the problem. The

vehicle could not be driven and was eventually towed to plaintiff's home, where

it remained inoperable since late January 2024. Plaintiff stated he planned to

surrender the vehicle to the lender. 2

2 According to defendant, the vehicle has since been repossessed. A-1412-24 4 Plaintiff certified that he then initially decided to sue Autobay because

"Autobay apparently did not" repair the axle boot back in April 2023. He

explained he began questioning why the repair shops diagnosed problems with

the car that Autobay had purportedly repaired. In August 2023, plaintiff filed a

twelve-count complaint comprised of class claims and individual claims

pertaining to the contract, the sale of the vehicle, and the subsequent issues with

the vehicle.

Plaintiff alleged that Autobay committed violations of the Consumer

Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210, by: (1) charging plaintiffs a

documentary fee without itemizing that fee, which violated the Automative

Sales Practice Regulations (ASP), N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26B.2 to -26B.3, (Count

Five); (2) making affirmative misrepresentations and engaged in

unconscionable, abusive, fraudulent, and deceptive commercial practices by

"overcharging plaintiffs" a $75 tag fee, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, (Count Six); and (3)

violating the New Jersey Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice

Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, by offering to a consumer and entering into

a consumer contract that "violates any clearly established legal right of a

consumer or responsibility of a seller . . . [under] State or Federal law," (Count

Seven).

A-1412-24 5 During discovery, defendants produced nine separate "Buyer's Order"

contracts entered into with other consumers, which included similar

documentary tag fees. In April 2024, plaintiff moved for partial summary

judgment with respect to the alleged CFA violation pertaining to the

documentary fee under Counts Five and Seven. In May 2024, plaintiff moved

for class certification on Counts Five, Six, and Seven. The proposed class period

spanned six years from August 15, 2023, when plaintiff filed the complaint, and

covered all persons who purchased vehicles from Autobay.

The trial court heard argument on both motions in September 2024. On

October 23, 2024, the court granted plaintiff's partial summary judgment

motion, finding the documentary fee, without appropriate documentation

itemizing that charge, constituted a per se violation of the CFA under Count

Five. The court also granted summary judgment as to plaintiff's TCCWNA

claim under Count Seven.

Next, the court addressed plaintiff's motion for class certification. During

colloquy with counsel during oral argument, the court observed plaintiff's

complaint primarily was focused on individual, rather than class-wide, issues.

It reasoned plaintiff's individual interests and issues related to Autobay

predominated because the class only would be impacted by three of the twelve

A-1412-24 6 counts in the complaint. The court noted it "ha[d] to take a pragmatic view of

how this [case] would proceed as a class action" and that plaintiff initially sued

Autobay based on his dissatisfaction with the repairs to the vehicle but

subsequently "learned counsel figured out . . . there w[ere] . . . per se violations."

However, the court questioned whether its granting of partial summary judgment

would impact the concerns raised about the predominance and typicality

requirements. Accordingly, the court reserved decision and permitted additional

briefing on how and to what extent, if at all, the granting of summary judgment

might affect the issue of class certification.

On November 15, 2024, following briefing, the court entered an order

denying class certification, finding plaintiff failed to demonstrate the claims

were typical of the proposed class, R. 4:32-1(a), and that plaintiff's individual

claims predominated, R. 4:32-1(b)(3). Subsequently, we granted plaintiff leave

to appeal from the denial of class certification.

II.

Plaintiff argues the trial court erroneously denied the motion to certify the

class of individuals aggrieved by the documentary tag fees because class

certification is routinely granted in overcharge cases where a dealer

systematically fails to itemize fees in violation of the CFA. He maintains this

A-1412-24 7 matter meets the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 4:32-1(a)(1) to

(4), namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the

representation. Plaintiff also contends Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) is satisfied because

issues common to the class predominate over any individual issues of a

particular class member, and a class action is the superior method of litigation.

Alternatively, plaintiff asserts that even if certification was not appropriate on

all three counts, partial certification would be appropriate under Rule 4:32-2(d).

Defendant, in turn, argues the court properly denied plaintiff's motion for

class certification because plaintiff failed to meet the typicality or predominance

requirements in order to certify a class. Defendant also asserts plaintiff fails to

demonstrate any entitlement to alternative class certification.

We review an order denying class certification for abuse of discretion.

Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017). Specifically, we "must

ascertain whether the trial court has followed the[] standards [set forth in Rule

4:32-1] and properly exercised its discretion in granting or denying class

certification." Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 506 (2010). A trial

court abuses its discretion when a decision is "made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis." Est. of Kotsovska by Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J.

A-1412-24 8 568, 588 (2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571

(2002)). "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, we

reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the

circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.,

423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement

Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding typicality had not been

met under Rule 4:32-1(a)(3). He asserts his violations are typical of the claims

alleged in the class because both claims advance the same legal theories under

the CFA and TCCWNA and involve the same factual circumstances regarding

defendant's failure to itemize documentary fees. He also asserts his interests are

aligned with the interests and incentives of the class.

Plaintiff further argues that issues common to the class predominate over

individual issues of a particular class member because plaintiff sought class

certification on ASP violations and N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 violations related to the tag

fee overcharge. He maintains the ASP and tag fee overcharge claims present a

"common nucleus of operative fact[]" and seek to redress a "common legal

grievance," making this matter appropriate for class treatment.

A-1412-24 9 "A 'class action is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is

conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."'" Dugan, 231

N.J. at 46 (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 103 (2007)). A

class action "furthers numerous practical purposes, including judicial economy,

cost-effectiveness, convenience, consistent treatment of class members,

protection of defendants from inconsistent obligations, and allocation of

litigation costs among numerous, similarly-situated litigants." Ibid. (quoting

Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 104).

The standard for whether a class should be certified is set forth in Rule

4:32-1. Four initial requirements, "frequently termed 'numerosity,

commonality, typicality[,] and adequacy of representation,'" are set forth in

subsection (a) of that Rule. Id. at 47 (quoting Lee, 203 N.J. at 519). Rule 4:32-

1(a) provides:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

A-1412-24 10 If the plaintiff satisfies each requirement under Rule 4:32-1(a), the trial

court must next consider Rule 4:32-1(b). Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) requires the court

to find "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a

class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy." In the event the court denies class

certification, the named plaintiff may continue to pursue the individual claims.

See Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 440 N.J. Super. 458, 465 (App. Div. 2015)

(noting named plaintiffs' individual breach of contract claims proceeded despite

affirming denial of class certification).

Under Rule 4:32-1(a)(3), a proposed class satisfies the typicality

requirement if its claims "have the essential characteristics common to the

claims of the class." In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412, 425 (1983)

(quoting Moore's Federal Practice § 23.06-2 (1982)). "If the class

representative's claims arise from the same events, practice, or conduct, and are

based on the same legal theory, as those of other class members, the typicality

requirement is satisfied." Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 385

N.J. Super. 172, 180 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice §

23.24[2]).

A-1412-24 11 In Iliadis, the Court noted, "To establish predominance, a class

representative must demonstrate 'that the questions of law or fact common to the

members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members.'" 191 N.J. at 108 (quoting R. 4:32-1(b)(3)). That inquiry tests whether

the proposed class is "sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

representation." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).

We are satisfied the court did not misapply its discretion in concluding

plaintiff failed to satisfy the typicality and predominance requirements. The

court determined plaintiff's claims were not typical of the proposed class

because the thrust of plaintiff's complaint focused on his allegations arising from

his dissatisfaction regarding the repairs Autobay made to his vehicle. The court

noted only three of the complaint's twelve counts were asserted in the class-

certification application. The court essentially determined plaintiff's post-

warranty repair claims were atypical of the other potential class members, and

it observed a problem with certifying a class because plaintiff was focused on

individual issues rather than class-wide issues. We discern no basis to disturb

the court's decision.

Because we affirm the trial court's decision regarding the typicality

requirement, we need not address the predominance issue. Nevertheless, we are

A-1412-24 12 satisfied the court did not mistakenly exercise its discretion in addressing this

factor. The court noted that it "ha[d] to take a pragmatic view of how this [case]

would proceed as a class action, and . . . having a lead plaintiff who [wa]s not

at all interested" in the CFA issues, "it [wa]s completely legitimate to say he

sued on something [else] and learned counsel figured out that there [were] . . .

per se violations." The court continued, "But I don't know . . . if the [c]ourt can

say . . . that's an appropriate circumstance where . . . this [p]laintiff's interest

predominate[s] in a class full of individuals who were just impacted" by three

of the twelve counts. Based on the court's findings, we are unconvinced it erred

in concluding the predominance requirement was not satisfied.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments

raised by plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-1412-24 13