1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 Jermaine Graves, Case No. 2:25-cv-01294-APG-BNW
5 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 6 v.
7 North Las Vegas PD, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before this Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff 11 submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees and 12 costs or give security for them. Id. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (at ECF No. 5) 13 will, therefore, be granted. In addition, this Court denies the original motion to proceed in forma 14 pauperis (at ECF No. 1) as moot. 15 Plaintiff also filed an original complaint (at ECF No. 1-1) and then moved to amend the 16 complaint (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted. This Court now screens 17 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 10) as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). 18 I. ANALYSIS 19 A. Screening Standard for Pro Se Prisoner Claims 20 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 22 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 23 granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 25 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 26 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 27 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 1 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 2 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 4 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 5 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 6 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 7 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 8 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 10 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 11 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 12 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 B. Screening the Amended Complaint 14 Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, Officers Robledo and LeStrange arrested him 15 without reasonable suspicion. He also alleges they used excessive force when effectuating the 16 arrest. Lastly, he alleges that the City of North Las Vegas either maintained policies or customs 17 permitting such unconstitutional conduct, or alternatively, it failed to adequately train, supervise, 18 or discipline its officers. 19 Plaintiff asserts the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Fourth Amendment 20 Excessive Force, Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, 21 and a claim under Monell liability based on either the policies in place or the failure to properly 22 train. Plaintiff names the following three defendants: the City of North Las Vegas, NLV Officer 23 Robledo, and NLV Officer LeStrange. 24 i. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force 25 A claim of excessive force during an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 26 “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989). Whether 27 the use of force by a law enforcement officer was objectively reasonable must be assessed “in 1 intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular 2 seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and 3 quality of the intrusion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 4 governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quotations omitted). In this analysis, the court must 5 consider the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the plaintiff 6 posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the plaintiff 7 actively resisted arrest. Id.; see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 8 921 (9th Cir. 2001). While the Graham factors are guidelines, “there are no per se rules in the 9 Fourth Amendment excessive force context” and the court may examine the totality of the 10 circumstances. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). 11 ii. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure 12 “A claim for unlawful arrest is ‘cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 13 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.’” Perez- 14 Morciglio v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing 15 Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2001)). Probable cause exists if, at 16 the time of the arrest, “under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers (or 17 within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person would believe the 18 suspect had committed a crime.” Perez-Morciglio, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Blankenhorn v. 19 City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471–72 (9th Cir. 2007)). 20 iii. Fourteenth Amendment 21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 22 prohibits the government from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due 23 process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the 24 opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. 25 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). To 26 plead a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the plaintiff has a 27 “liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State”; and (2) the procedures 1 employed to deprive the plaintiff of liberty or property were constitutionally deficient. Ky. Dep’t. 2 of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 Jermaine Graves, Case No. 2:25-cv-01294-APG-BNW
5 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 6 v.
7 North Las Vegas PD, et al.,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before this Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff 11 submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees and 12 costs or give security for them. Id. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (at ECF No. 5) 13 will, therefore, be granted. In addition, this Court denies the original motion to proceed in forma 14 pauperis (at ECF No. 1) as moot. 15 Plaintiff also filed an original complaint (at ECF No. 1-1) and then moved to amend the 16 complaint (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted. This Court now screens 17 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 10) as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). 18 I. ANALYSIS 19 A. Screening Standard for Pro Se Prisoner Claims 20 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 22 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 23 granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 25 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 26 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 27 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 1 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 2 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 4 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 5 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 6 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 7 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 8 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 9 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 10 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 11 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 12 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 B. Screening the Amended Complaint 14 Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, Officers Robledo and LeStrange arrested him 15 without reasonable suspicion. He also alleges they used excessive force when effectuating the 16 arrest. Lastly, he alleges that the City of North Las Vegas either maintained policies or customs 17 permitting such unconstitutional conduct, or alternatively, it failed to adequately train, supervise, 18 or discipline its officers. 19 Plaintiff asserts the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Fourth Amendment 20 Excessive Force, Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, 21 and a claim under Monell liability based on either the policies in place or the failure to properly 22 train. Plaintiff names the following three defendants: the City of North Las Vegas, NLV Officer 23 Robledo, and NLV Officer LeStrange. 24 i. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force 25 A claim of excessive force during an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 26 “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989). Whether 27 the use of force by a law enforcement officer was objectively reasonable must be assessed “in 1 intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular 2 seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and 3 quality of the intrusion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 4 governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quotations omitted). In this analysis, the court must 5 consider the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the plaintiff 6 posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the plaintiff 7 actively resisted arrest. Id.; see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 8 921 (9th Cir. 2001). While the Graham factors are guidelines, “there are no per se rules in the 9 Fourth Amendment excessive force context” and the court may examine the totality of the 10 circumstances. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). 11 ii. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure 12 “A claim for unlawful arrest is ‘cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 13 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.’” Perez- 14 Morciglio v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing 15 Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2001)). Probable cause exists if, at 16 the time of the arrest, “under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers (or 17 within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person would believe the 18 suspect had committed a crime.” Perez-Morciglio, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Blankenhorn v. 19 City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471–72 (9th Cir. 2007)). 20 iii. Fourteenth Amendment 21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 22 prohibits the government from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due 23 process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the 24 opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. 25 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). To 26 plead a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the plaintiff has a 27 “liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State”; and (2) the procedures 1 employed to deprive the plaintiff of liberty or property were constitutionally deficient. Ky. Dep’t. 2 of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 3 “Under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process prong,” courts analyze the 4 conduct using “the ‘shocks the conscience’ test.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 5 2001). “The threshold question is ‘whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so 6 egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Id. 7 iv. Monell claim 8 A municipality may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the municipality 9 itself causes the violation at issue. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) 10 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). To state a claim 11 for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional 12 deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. City of 13 Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's 14 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 15 practically have the force of law.” See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 16 Municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions. Id. at 60. 17 Municipalities can only be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights under certain 18 circumstances. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95. “[M]unicipalities may be liable under § 1983 for 19 constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a 20 failure to train, supervise or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton by 21 Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). 22 * ** 23 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint provides only conclusory statements that mimic some 24 of the elements of the claims above. Indeed, the first amended complaint simply contains the type 25 of formulaic recitation which has been deemed insufficient to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). As a result, this Court will dismiss the first amended 27 complaint with leave to amend. 1 C. Instructions for amendment 2 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must read this order carefully and 3 || provide facts that support each element of each of the claims he wishes to assert. In addition, he 4 || must provide date and place where the incident took place. 5 Plaintiff is further advised that if he files a second amended complaint, the prior 6 || complaints no longer serve any function in this case. As such, if he files a second amended 7 || complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The 8 || Court cannot refer to a prior pleading or to other documents to make his amended complaint 9 || complete. The second amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference to 10 || prior pleadings or to other documents. 11 |} OL CONCLUSION 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in 13 || forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to 14 || conclusion without prepaying fees or costs or giving security for them. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma 16 || pauperis (ECF No. 1) is DENIED as moot. 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 10) is 18 || GRANTED. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's first amended complaint (ECF No. 10) is 20 || DISMISSED with leave to amend. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff wishes to amend, he must do so by 22) J anuary 19, 2026. Failure to file a second amended complaint by this deadline may result in the 23 || dismissal of the case. See Local Rule IA 11-8. 24 25 DATED: December 15, 2025 26 07 Frye BRENDA WEKSLER 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE