Jermaine Earl v. State of Florida
This text of Jermaine Earl v. State of Florida (Jermaine Earl v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC19-1506 ____________
JERMAINE EARL, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
April 8, 2021
LABARGA, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the
First District Court of Appeal in Earl v. State, 276 So. 3d 359,
360-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The district court certified that its
decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the Third and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal in Solomon v. State, 254 So. 3d 1121 (Fla.
5th DCA 2018); Vargas v. State, 188 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 5th DCA
2016); and Burks v. State, 237 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). We
have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The current conflict arises from differing interpretations of the
term “illegal sentence” under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(a). Because Earl does not argue that he was prejudiced by
the court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion, however, we need not
consider the meaning of an illegal sentence in this context. The
rule must be read in harmony with our statutes, which tell us that
“the party challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has
the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in the
trial court. A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an
express finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court.”
§ 924.051(7), Fla. Stat. (2020).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2010, after a jury trial, Earl was convicted of one
count of armed robbery with a firearm and one count of kidnapping
to facilitate a felony. The jury also indicated in the special verdict
form that Earl was in possession of a firearm during the robbery.
The trial court sentenced Earl to concurrent life sentences for both
counts, designated him a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), and
ordered him to serve 100 percent of his sentences.
-2- On June 19, 2018, Earl filed the subject rule 3.800(a) motion.
He argued that his life sentences are illegal because the trial court
failed to impose ten-year mandatory minimum sentences pursuant
to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2010) (the 10-20-life
statute), despite the fact that the jury verdict form reflects a special
finding that he actually possessed a firearm during the commission
of the crime. He asserted that the trial court’s failure to impose the
mandatory minimum sentences rendered his sentences illegal and
required correction. Attached to Earl’s motion were portions of his
judgment and sentences reflecting his convictions and his PRR
designation, as well as a one-page excerpt of the transcript from the
sentencing hearing where the lower court indicated that it did not
have discretion in sentencing Earl to life on both counts.
The postconviction court denied Earl’s rule 3.800(a) motion,
explaining that while the sentencing judge could have imposed the
ten-year mandatory minimum sentences, the failure to do so did
not render Earl’s sentences illegal because it “would not have
changed [Earl’s] incarceration by one day.” Earl, 276 So. 3d at 360.
Earl filed a motion for rehearing, which the postconviction court
denied, and he appealed to the First District.
-3- The First District dismissed the appeal because even though
the sentencing judge was required to impose ten-year mandatory
minimum sentences under the 10-20-life statute, Earl was not
entitled to challenge his sentences on that ground because he
benefited from the error. Earl, 276 So. 3d at 360-62. The First
District certified conflict with the Third and Fifth Districts’ holdings
in Solomon, Vargas, and Burks, which hold that a defendant can
use rule 3.800(a) to challenge a trial court’s failure to impose a
mandatory minimum term on a sentence pursuant to the 10-20-life
statute even though the enhancement would not affect the duration
of the sentence. Earl, 276 So. 3d at 361-62.
The postconviction court and the First District acknowledge
that Earl’s life sentences are illegal because they do not contain ten-
year mandatory minimum provisions; however, both lower courts
concluded that Earl is not entitled to relief because he benefited
from the error. Earl argues on appeal that he must be resentenced
because the trial court had a duty to impose ten-year mandatory
minimum sentences and its failure to do so renders his life
sentences illegal.
-4- ANALYSIS
Rule 3.800(a) states, in pertinent part: “A court may at any
time correct an illegal sentence . . . when it is affirmatively alleged
that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to
that relief . . . .” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1). The rule does not
define the term “illegal sentence.”
The current conflict presents the question of whether relief as
contemplated by rule 3.800(a) may include the imposition of
harsher sentences at a defendant’s request.
Though the plain language of rule 3.800(a) does not expressly
prohibit defendants from seeking to correct unlawfully lenient
sentences, we note that defendants are not entitled to such relief
under the rule absent a showing of prejudice. Section 924.051,
Florida Statutes, addresses collateral review in criminal cases. The
statute defines prejudicial error as “an error in the trial court that
harmfully affected the judgment or sentence.” § 924.051(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. The statute also states:
An appeal may not be taken from a judgment or order of a trial court unless prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved . . . . A judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when an appellate court determines . . . that prejudicial error occurred . . . .
-5- Id. § 924.051(3).
The trial court did not have discretion to omit the mandatory
minimum terms of his sentence pursuant to the 10-20-life statute.
However, Earl did not argue that he was prejudiced by receiving a
more lenient sentence than the trial court was required to impose.
Nor did Earl argue that he was prejudiced by the postconviction
court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion because the relief he
sought was a sentence with more onerous terms than the one that
he initially received.
Earl is serving two mandatory life sentences as a prison
releasee reoffender. If the postconviction court granted Earl’s rule
3.800(a) motion, he would be serving two mandatory life sentences
as a prison releasee reoffender and those sentences would also
contain ten-year mandatory minimum terms. As the postconviction
court noted, had Earl been granted the relief he requested, his
sentence would not have been changed by a single day. Therefore,
Earl cannot show that the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion
resulted in harm that may be remedied on appeal.
-6- CONCLUSION
We approve the First District’s decision below. To the extent
that they are inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove the
Third and Fifth Districts’ decisions in Solomon, Vargas, and Burks.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
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