Rel: March 27, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CR-2024-0290 _________________________
Jeremy T. Williams
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Russell Circuit Court (CC-22-210, CC-22-211, CC-22-212, CC-22-213, and CC-22-791)
WINDOM, Presiding Judge.
Jeremy T. Williams appeals his guilty-plea convictions for murder
made capital because he intentionally caused the death K.H., who was
less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975; for
murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. CR-2024-0290
during the course of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1); for
murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.
during a first-degree rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and for murder made
capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-
degree sodomy, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3), and his resulting sentence of death.1
On March 13, 2024, Williams filed a notice of his intent to plead
guilty to the capital-murder charges as well as to various other offenses.
At a hearing held on that date, the Russell Circuit Court, in accordance
with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Rule 14.4, Ala. R.
Crim. P., informed Williams of the rights he would be waiving by
pleading guilty and questioned him to ensure that his decision was
knowing and voluntary. (R. 16-46.) After determining that Williams's
1 Williams included on his notice of appeal case numbers related to
his guilty plea convictions for first-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; for sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old, see § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975; production of obscene material, see § 13A- 12-197, Ala. Code 1975; for abuse of a corpse, see § 13A-11-13, Ala. Code 1975; for first-degree human trafficking, see § 13A-6-152, Ala. Code 1975, and for conspiracy to commit first-degree human trafficking, see §§ 13A- 4-3 and 13A-6-152, Ala. Code 1975. However, because Williams neither preserved nor reserved an issue for appeal before pleading guilty nor filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, he failed to invoke his limited right to appeal those convictions. See Ingram v. State, 882 So. 2d 374, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Therefore, we dismiss this appeal insofar as it relates to those convictions. 2 CR-2024-0290
decision was knowing and voluntary and not the result of any coercion,
threats, or promises, the circuit court accepted Williams's guilty pleas. A
jury trial was conducted on the capital-murder charges, see § 13A-5-42,
Ala. Code 1975, after which the jury found Williams guilty of the charges
of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 860-61.)
Following the jury's verdict, the penalty phase of Williams's trial
began. Williams waived the jury's participation in his capital sentencing
and waived his right to present evidence in mitigation. (R. 60-71.) See §
13A-5-44(c), Ala. Code 1975. At the sentencing phase, the circuit court
sentenced Williams to death for his capital-murder convictions.
Facts
On December 13, 2021, K.H., a five-year-old girl, was reported
missing in Columbus, Georgia. Sergeant Ryan Vardman of the Columbus
Police Department interviewed K.H.'s mother, Kristy Siple. Siple did not
have legal custody of K.H., but K.H.'s father, who had been vested with
sole custody, had left K.H. in Siple's care.2 After his interview with Siple,
Sgt. Vardman sought an interview with Williams, who was one of the last
2 Siple lost custody of K.H. due to her substance-abuse issues. At the time of K.H.'s death, a juvenile court had in a place a noncontact order between Siple and K.H. 3 CR-2024-0290
individuals to be seen with K.H. Sgt. Vardman, though, was unable to
speak with Williams about her disappearance.
While researching Williams's background, Sgt. Vardman learned
that, a few days earlier, an adult female had reported to law-enforcement
officers that Williams had forcibly sodomized her. A detail from the
report of that incident that Sgt. Vardman found of particular interest was
that Williams was alleged to have stated to the victim that he had taught
a five-year-old girl named "[K.]" how to perform oral sex and that he
wanted the victim to perform oral sex on him like K. (R. 637, 647.) Sgt.
Vardman surmised, albeit incorrectly,3 that perhaps the victim had
misheard Williams and that K. was K.H., who had a similar first name
and was also five years old. Sgt. Vardman interviewed the victim and
confirmed her statement. Sgt. Vardman then obtained an arrest warrant
for Williams in the sodomy case as well as a search warrant for Williams's
property in Columbus.
While executing the search warrant, Sgt. Vardman located a shed
in the backyard. Inside was a child-sized foam chair and a peanut-butter
sandwich that had a child-sized bite taken out of it. Williams's wife
3 In fact, K. is Williams's oldest daughter.
4 CR-2024-0290
arrived home during the search and asked about the purpose of the
search. Sergeant Braden Dobbins spoke with her, and, with a "look of
terror on her face," Williams's wife gave the Sgt. Dobbins the address of
a duplex in Phenix City "where that child would be if [Williams] had done
anything to her." (R. 642, 657.)
Around that time, officers with the Russell County Sheriff's Office
located Williams at a motel in Phenix City and took him into custody.
Inside his motel room, officers recovered electronic devices and drug
paraphernalia. An interview with Williams, however, did not lead to the
whereabouts of K.H.
Sgt. Dobbins and other officers traveled to the Phenix City address
given to him by Williams's wife. The officers entered the empty duplex;
in the basement, K.H.'s naked body was found under a tarp. Investigator
Brad Evans of the Russell County Sheriff's Office described the horrific
sight: "What did I see? A five-year-old little girl. Rigor mortis had
obviously set in. Legs up, spread. Ligature marks around her wrists,
around her throat, bruising on the face, bleeding from the vagina and
anus. That's what I saw." (R. 728.)
5 CR-2024-0290
A couple of weeks later, on Christmas night, Williams notified the
detention staff at the Russell County Jail that he wanted to speak with
Lieutenant Steve Johnson. Williams told Lt. Johnson that he "had been
praying the night before" and wanted "to speak about similar crimes [to]
get it off of his chest." (R. 678.)
During the interview, Williams told Lt. Johnson, among other
things, about his daughter K. Williams "stated that he had sexually
molested [K.] probably on a daily basis while they were [living in Alaska]"
and that his abuse continued when the family relocated to Texas. (R.
683-84.) Williams admitted that the sexual abuse typically took the form
of oral sex and that he had shown K. pornography to teach her how to do
it. Williams also spoke of his addictions to cocaine and then, for the last
several years, methamphetamine. The interview turned to victims
following the family's move from Texas to Phenix City, and Williams
admitted that he had molested other young girls, though he could not
remember all of their names. They spoke specifically about K.H., and Lt.
Johnson told Williams that a body had been found in a basement.
Williams responded: "[W]ell, then, I did it." (R. 686.) Williams also asked
if the body had been found under a tarp. Lt. Johnson confirmed that fact,
6 CR-2024-0290
and Williams again acknowledged his guilt: "[W]ell, then, I did it, I
remember that."
Williams told Lt. Johnson that he knew K.H.'s mother, Kristy Siple,
through "a prostitute web page called Skip the Game." (R. 688.) Williams
had a sexual relationship with Siple, and the two abused
methamphetamine together. Williams stated that, on at least one
occasion, he had been entrusted with Siple's children while Siple
answered a prostitution call. This had surprised Williams, because he
had already told Siple that he "liked to have sex with smaller kids." (R.
690.) Lt. Johnson asked about Williams's taking K.H., and Williams
disclosed that he had done so with Siple's knowledge. In fact, he had
haggled with Siple over a price for taking "[K.H.] with him for a little
while [for] a little head, meaning oral sex." (R. 692-93.) The two settled
on $2,500 for Williams's taking K.H. for one hour for "oral sex only." (R.
693.)4
Around 2:00 a.m. on December 13, Williams took K.H. to his house
in Columbus. Eventually, though, he and K.H. were seen by Williams's
4 Williams admitted to Lt. Johnson, though, that he had no money
and never intended to pay Siple. 7 CR-2024-0290
wife, who told him: "[Y]ou can't be here with her, you have to leave." (R.
694.) Williams left around 6:20 a.m., taking K.H. to the duplex in Phenix
City. On the way, Williams showed K.H. pornography; according to
Williams, K.H. stated, " 'I'm not going to do this,' and [Williams] punched
her in the head." (R. 696.) Williams parked on the side of the duplex so
that his aunt, who lived across the street, would not know he was there.
Williams again showed pornography to K.H. Williams also smoked
methamphetamine and made K.H. smoke it, too. Williams described for
Lt. Johnson the sexual acts that he forced K.H. to perform, including oral,
vaginal, and anal sex. The abuse lasted an hour to an hour and a half,
and Williams characterized it as "very rageful and sexually driven." (R.
699.) Williams killed K.H. by choking her, and her death did not come
quickly:
"According to [Williams], it took 10 to 15 minutes for her to die. … [A]t one point … he thought she was dead, and he let go of her because his hands were tired. And he said, the baby, [K.H.] sat up and gasped for air and then fell back down. And he said, 'I went back to choking her again.' "
(R. 701.) Williams used his cell phone to take photographs and to record
videos of his sexual abuse of K.H., which, Williams admitted, occurred
8 CR-2024-0290
both before and after K.H.'s death. Investigators recovered the
photographs and videos from Williams's cell phone.
Standard of Review
Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., as amended effective January 12, 2023,
provides:
"In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals may, but shall not be obligated to, notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant."
This Court will continue to review the entire record for plain error
in all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.
" 'The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court or on appeal.' Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 2001). Plain error is 'error that is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.' Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 167 (Ala. 1997), modified on other grounds, Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1998). 'To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed error must not only seriously affect a defendant's "substantial rights," but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.' Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aff'd, 778 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000). 'The plain error standard applies only where a particularly egregious error occurred at trial and that error has or
9 CR-2024-0290
probably has substantially prejudiced the defendant.' Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d at 167. '[P]lain error must be obvious on the face of the record. A silent record, that is a record that on its face contains no evidence to support the alleged error, does not establish an obvious error.' Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 753 (Ala. 2007). Thus, '[u]nder the plain-error standard, the appellant must establish that an obvious, indisputable error occurred, and he must establish that the error adversely affected the outcome of the trial.' Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 751 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). '[T]he plain error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." ' United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982))."
DeBlase v. State, 294 So. 3d 154, 182-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018). That
said,
"[b]ecause plain-error review is now discretionary, it is no longer necessary for this Court to address in its opinions every issue that is subject only to plain-error review and, even if we choose to address those issues, we are not required to engage in the type of in-depth analyses as we have in the past."
Iervolino v. State, 402 So. 3d 844, 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023). With these
principles in mind, this Court will address Williams's appeal.
Discussion
In early 2025, Williams mailed the Office of the Attorney General a
series of letters that stated his desire to drop his appeals and to have an
execution date set. Although Williams could not drop his appeals because
10 CR-2024-0290
his capital-murder convictions and sentence of death were subject to
automatic review, see §§ 13A-5-53 and 13A-5-55, Ala. Code 1975, it
appeared to the parties and to this Court that Williams sought to invoke
his state-law right to represent himself on appeal. See Ex parte Scudder,
789 So. 2d 837, 841 (Ala. 2001) (holding that, "taken together, §§ 12-22-
130 and 15-12-22(b)[, Ala. Code 1975,] confer upon a defendant in a
criminal case the right to represent himself on appeal if he desires to do
so"). To ensure that his decision was voluntarily and knowingly made,
see Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 753, 757 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), this Court
on May 7, 2025, remanded the cause to the circuit court with instructions
for it to conduct a hearing at which it should apprise Williams of the
dangers and possible disadvantages of waiving his right to appellate
counsel and invoking his right to represent himself.
On May 23, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing in
accordance with this Court's instructions. During the hearing, the circuit
court thoroughly informed Williams of the disadvantages and
consequences of self-representation and a refusal to file an appellate
brief. (Rem. R. 3-12.) The circuit court determined, based on his
interactions with Williams during the hearing and before, during, and
11 CR-2024-0290
after trial, that Williams's decisions were knowing and voluntary. (Rem.
R. 13.)
Williams has indeed chosen not to file an appellate brief on his
behalf, but his decision does not end this Court's review. Because
Williams was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, his
appeal is automatic, and this Court must review the propriety of the
circuit court's finding that Williams's decision to represent himself on
appeal and to forgo filing a brief on appeal was knowing and voluntary,
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, and the
propriety of his sentence of death. See §§ 12-22-150, 13A-5-53, and 13A-
5-55, Ala. Code 1975; Rule 45A Ala. R. App. P. See also Sibley v. State,
775 So. 2d 235, 240 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Block v. State, 744 So. 2d 404,
406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
I.
First, this Court must review the circuit court's finding that
Williams's decision to represent himself on appeal and his waiver of
appellate counsel was knowing and voluntary. Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 240;
Block, 744 So. 2d at 406. This Court must also review whether Williams's
decision to forgo filing a brief on appeal was knowing and voluntary. Id.
12 CR-2024-0290
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-22 (1975), the United
States Supreme Court explained that, although a defendant has a right
to represent himself and waive the assistance of counsel, the intelligence
of the waiver of counsel must be scrutinized. "When an [appellant]
manages his own [appeal], he relinquishes ... many of the traditional
benefits associated with the right to counsel." Id. at 835. Because an
appellant who invokes his state-law right to represent himself and
refuses to file a brief on his own behalf waives many traditional benefits,
" 'in order to represent himself the [appellant] must "knowingly and
intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits' " and " 'should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that
the record will establish that "he knows what he's doing and his choice is
made with eyes open." ' " Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 242-43 (opinion on return
to remand) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). "While it is desirable that
the trial court engage, as it did in this case, in a colloquy in which it
expressly advises the defendant of 'the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation,' such a colloquy is not mandated." Moody v. State, 888
So. 2d 532, 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Tomlin v. State, 601 So.
2d 124, 128 (Ala. 1991)). "The ultimate test is whether it 'appear[s] from
13 CR-2024-0290
the record as a whole that a defendant's waiver of counsel and decision
to represent himself were knowing and intelligent.' " Moody, 888 So. 2d
at 554 (quoting Teske v. State, 507 So. 2d 569, 571 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987)). "Under this approach, the focus of the inquiry is on 'the particular
facts and circumstances involved, "including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused." ' " Moody, 888 So. 2d at 554 (quoting Tomlin,
601 So.2d at 128-29, quoting in turn Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)).
A trial court may consider the following factors in determining
whether a defendant's decision to represent himself was knowing and
voluntary:
" '(1) the background, experience and conduct of the defendant including his age, educational background, and his physical and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant had contact with lawyers prior to the trial; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charges, the possible defenses, and the possible penalty; (4) the defendant's understanding of the rules of procedure, evidence and courtroom decorum; (5) the defendant's experience in criminal trials; (6) whether standby counsel was appointed, and the extent to which he aided the defendant; (7) whether the waiver of counsel was the result of mistreatment or coercion; or (8) whether the defendant was trying to manipulate the events of the trial.' "
Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 239 (opinion on original submission) (quoting
Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 1989)). See also United
14 CR-2024-0290
States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 1995) (listing the same
factors). " 'All factors need not point in the same direction.' " Sibley, 775
So. 2d at 243 (opinion on return to remand) (quoting Cash, 47 F.3d at
1089).
Williams was 40 years old at the time of the Faretta hearing; he
was a high-school graduate and a veteran of the United States Air Force.
There was no evidence indicating that Williams suffered from any
physical or mental issues that would have affected his decision making
or that he was under the influence of any drugs, legal or otherwise, or
alcohol at the time of the hearing. Williams, having already been through
a trial at which he was acquitted of child abuse, was quite familiar with
the criminal judicial process.5 It appears from the record that Williams
had ample contact with his counsel both before and during trial. Before
trial, counsel told the circuit court that he had been "over and over" "in
detail" the implications of Williams's decision to waive the presentation
of mitigation evidence (R. 64); the only expressed frustration, if it could
be called that, was from Williams's counsel, who told the circuit court
5 Williams admitted to Lt. Johnson that he had, in fact, committed
the act of child abuse for which he had been acquitted. (R. 704-05.) 15 CR-2024-0290
that Williams had been uncooperative in their attempts to gather
mitigation evidence. (R. 75.) There was no question that Williams
understood the significance of his convictions and his sentence -- in
entering his guilty pleas, Williams explained to the circuit court that he
wanted to "expedite the process" (R. 26), and Williams agreed with the
circuit court at the Faretta hearing that his "execution was what we're
discussing here today." (Rem. R. 5.) Williams testified that he had not
been forced, coerced, or threatened in any way in making his decision to
represent himself.
At the Faretta hearing, the circuit court informed Williams that he
had the right to counsel and that, if he could not afford counsel, counsel
would be appointed for him. (Rem. R. 6.) The circuit court thoroughly
informed Williams of the dangers and difficulty of self-representation,
particularly as an inmate without formal legal training. (Rem. R. 6-9.)
The circuit court discussed with Williams this Court's automatic review
of his convictions and sentence and the standard of review this Court
would apply if he failed to file an appellate brief. (Rem. R. 10-11.) More
to the point, the circuit court asked Williams if he understood that, "if
16 CR-2024-0290
you don't make any additional appeals, you will face execution sooner."
(Rem. R. 11.) Williams answered that he understood.
Given the record before this Court, we have no trouble concluding
that Williams "not only knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, waived
his right to counsel, but also his right to present issues to this court as it
reviews his conviction and his sentence of death." Sibley, 775 So. 2d at
243 (opinion on return to remand). Additionally, we have no doubt "that
when [Williams] 'decided to forgo presentation of any issues in the review
of his conviction and death sentence he could appreciate his position and
he knew that his life was at stake.' " Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 753, 758
(Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 244 (opinion on
return to remand)). Therefore, the circuit court did not err in allowing
Williams to exercise his right to self-representation on appeal.
II.
This Court is obligated to review the sufficiency of the State's
evidence to sustain Williams's guilty-plea convictions for capital murder.
See § 13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975. Williams pleaded guilty to four capital
offenses -- murder made capital because he intentionally caused the
death of K.H., who was less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15);
17 CR-2024-0290
murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.
during the course of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1);
murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.
during a first-degree rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and murder made capital
because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree
sodomy, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3).
"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced
by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and
consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Powe
v. State, 597 So. 2d 721, 724 (Ala. 1991) (citing Faircloth v. State, 471 So.
2d 485 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)). " 'The test used in determining the
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.' " Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)
(quoting O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).
" ' "When there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair
inference, find the defendant guilty the trial court should submit [the
18 CR-2024-0290
case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this court will not disturb the trial
court's decision." ' " Sale v. State, 8 So. 3d 330, 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)
(citations omitted). " ' "The role of appellate courts is not to say what the
facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to allow submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury." ' " Ex parte
Stewart, 900 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, in
a capital case in which the defendant pleads guilty, "[t]he guilty plea may
be considered in determining whether the state has met [its] burden of
proof." § 13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975.
The common element through all four of Williams's capital-murder
convictions is that he intentionally caused the death of K.H. A person
commits an intentional murder if, with "intent to cause the death of
another person, he or she causes the death of that person." § 13A-6-
2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. K.H.'s body was found underneath a tarp in the
basement of Williams's duplex. Williams admitted to strangling K.H. to
death, which aligned with the forensic pathologist's finding that K.H.
died of asphyxia. (R. 788-90.) Williams explained to Lt. Johnson that he
killed K.H. because, although Siple had agreed that he could engage in
oral sex with K.H., "he got carried away and started raping her and
19 CR-2024-0290
penetrating her vagina and anus, and he knew that he would get caught
for that." (R. 702-03.) This was ample evidence that K.H. is dead and
that Williams intentionally caused her death.
Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he
intentionally caused the death of K.H., who was less than 14 years of age,
see § 13A-5-40(a)(15). The State presented evidence that K.H. was five
years old at the time of her death. Thus, the State's evidence was
sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally caused the death of a child
less than 14 years of age.
intentionally caused the death of K.H. during the course of a first-degree
kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1). "A person commits the crime of
kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts another person with intent
to … [i]nflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or abuse him
sexually." § 13A-6-43(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. "Abduct" means to " restrain
a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either … [s]ecreting or
holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or … [u]sing or
threatening to use deadly physical force." § 13A-6-40(2), Ala. Code 1975.
"Restrain" means to:
20 CR-2024-0290
"intentionally or knowingly restrict a person's movements unlawfully and without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved. Restraint is 'without consent' if it is accomplished by:
"a. Physical force, intimidation or deception, or
"b. Any means, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than 16 years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement."
§ 13A-6-40(1), Ala. Code 1975.
The State presented evidence indicating that Williams took K.H.
from Siple's Columbus home with Siple's permission. Yet, Williams did
not have consent under § 13A-6-40(1)b. because Siple did not have legal
custody of K.H.; sole custody had been vested with K.H.'s father.
Williams first took K.H. to his property in Columbus, but, when Williams
was seen by his wife with K.H., Williams took K.H. to his duplex in
Phenix City. Williams showed pornography to K.H. while they traveled
to Phenix City and struck her when she refused to perform the acts in
the pornography. Williams took steps to hide his vehicle at the duplex,
and he secreted K.H. in the basement of the duplex for the purpose of
21 CR-2024-0290
sexually abusing her. In the basement, Williams bound and sexually
abused K.H. and, ultimately, strangled her to death. Thus, the State's
evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally caused the
death of K.H. during a first-degree kidnapping.
intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree rape, see §
13A-5-40(a)(3). "A person commits the crime of rape in the first degree if
he … [b]eing 16 years old or older, engages in sexual intercourse with
another person who is less than 12 years old." § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code
1975. "Sexual intercourse" "has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon
any penetration, however slight; emission is not required." § 13A-6-60(4),
Ala. Code 1975.
In addition to Williams's admission that he, an adult male, had
raped K.H., a five-year-old child, the officers who discovered K.H.'s body
saw that K.H. had experienced vaginal bleeding. Further, the forensic
pathologist noted tears and bruising to K.H.'s genitalia. Thus, the
State's evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally
caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree rape.
22 CR-2024-0290
Finally, Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he
intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy, see
§ 13A-5-40(a)(3). "A person commits the crime of sodomy in the first
degree if he … [b]eing 16 years old or older, engages in sodomy with a
person who is less than 12 years old." § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975.
"Sodomy" is defined as "[a]ny sexual act involving the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another person." § 13A-6-60(5), Ala.
Code 1975.
In addition to Williams's admission that he, an adult male, had
sodomized K.H., a five-year-old child, the officers who discovered K.H.'s
body saw that K.H. had experienced anal bleeding. The forensic
pathologist noted the same bloody discharge, and he testified that the
damage to K.H.'s rectum was consistent with being anally penetrated.
Thus, the State's evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams
intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy.
The evidence of Williams's guilt on all four capital-murder charges,
which included Williams's admission of guilt, was overwhelming.
Consequently, this Court has no trouble concluding that the State met
its burden of proof for each conviction.
23 CR-2024-0290
III.
Although no longer required by Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., we have
nonetheless reviewed the record in this case, and we find no plain error
or defect in the guilt or penalty phase of the trial. See § 13A-5-53(a), Ala.
IV.
Pursuant to § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, this court is required to
address the propriety of Williams's capital-murder convictions and his
sentence of death. Williams was indicted for, and convicted of, murder
made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H., who was
less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15); murder made capital
because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during the course of a
first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1); murder made capital
because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree
rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and murder made capital because he
intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy, see
§ 13A-5-40(a)(3). The circuit court found the following three statutory
aggravating circumstances to exist based on the guilt-phase verdicts: 1)
the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in
24 CR-2024-0290
the commission of a rape, see § 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975; 2) the capital
offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in a kidnapping,
see § 13A-5-49(4); and 3) the capital offense was committed when the
victim was less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-49(11), Ala. Code 1975.
In addition, the circuit court, as the sentencer, found that the State had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams's capital offenses were
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses,
see § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court found only one
statutory mitigating circumstance to exist -- that Williams had no
significant history of prior criminal activity, see § 13A-5-51(1), Ala. Code
1975. Noting that Williams had waived the presentation of mitigating
evidence, the circuit court found the existence of only one nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance -- that Williams had accepted responsibility for
his conduct.
The circuit court found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Williams to
death. Our review of the sentencing order demonstrates that the circuit
court properly weighed the aggravating circumstances and the
25 CR-2024-0290
mitigating circumstances and correctly sentenced Williams to death. The
record supports the circuit court's decision.
The record does not reflect that Williams's sentence of death was
imposed as the result of the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor. See § 13A-5-53(b)(1).
Section 13A-5-53(b)(2) requires this Court to reweigh the
aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances to
determine whether Williams's sentence of death was proper. After
independently weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
this Court finds that Williams's death sentence is appropriate.
As required by § 13A-5-53(b)(3) this Court must determine whether
Williams's sentence is excessive or disproportionate when compared to
the penalties imposed in similar cases. Williams was convicted of four
counts of capital murder during his kidnapping, rape, and sodomy of five-
year-old K.H. A sentence of death has been imposed for similar crimes
throughout this State. See Lewis v. State, 889 So. 2d 623 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003); Scott v. State, 937 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Jones
v. State, 43 So. 3d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, this Court
finds that the sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate.
26 CR-2024-0290
Accordingly, Williams's capital-murder convictions and his
sentence of death are affirmed. For the reasons stated in note 1, the
portion of Williams's appeal that relates to his noncapital convictions is
dismissed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
Kellum, Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.