JEREMY KENNEDY V. ARKANSAS PAROL BOARD AND ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 25, 2025
DocketCV-24-247
StatusPublished

This text of JEREMY KENNEDY V. ARKANSAS PAROL BOARD AND ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION (JEREMY KENNEDY V. ARKANSAS PAROL BOARD AND ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JEREMY KENNEDY V. ARKANSAS PAROL BOARD AND ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION, (Ark. 2025).

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 131 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-24-247

Opinion Delivered: September 25, 2025 JEREMY KENNEDY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 35CV-23-920]

ARKANSAS PAROLE BOARD AND HONORABLE JODI RAINES ARKANSAS DIVISION OF DENNIS, JUDGE CORRECTION APPELLEES AFFIRMED.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Jeremy Kennedy, who is incarcerated at a unit of the Arkansas Division of

Correction, appeals the circuit court’s order granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss. We

hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis with respect to a pro se petition

for preliminary injunction1 and a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus

against the Arkansas Parole Board (APB)2 and the Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC).

After the circuit court granted his petition to proceed in forma pauperis, the appellees moved

1 Kennedy does not contend on appeal that he was entitled to an injunction, and the claim is considered abandoned. Sylvester v. State, 2017 Ark. 309, 530 S.W.3d 346. 2 The Arkansas Parole Board became the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board on January 1, 2024. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-201(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). to revoke Kennedy’s in forma pauperis status and to dismiss his pleadings. The motion was

granted, and Kennedy filed a timely notice of appeal.

Kennedy’s petition alleged that the APB had acted outside its statutory authority

when it denied his transfer eligibility for two years and that the ADC would then be acting

outside its statutory authority by declining to transfer him to the Division of Community

Correction. He asserted that the denial was improper because his multiple felony convictions

fell within a target group that were eligible for transfer and that the APB had no discretion.

The circuit court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss and Kennedy appeals.

On a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the petition are treated as true and viewed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Our standard of review for an order granting a

motion to dismiss is abuse of discretion. Worden v. Kirchner, 2013 Ark. 509, at 6, 431 S.W.3d

243, 247. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly.

Griffin v. State, 2018 Ark. 10, at 2, 535 S.W.3d 261, 262. When a petition is dismissed on a

question of law, we conduct a de novo review.

First, we consider whether dismissal of the declaratory-judgment action was proper

under sovereign immunity. Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution provides:

“The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.” We have

explained that lawsuits seeking declaratory relief against the state must be for acts that are

ultra vires, unconstitutional, or illegal. See Martin v. Haas, 2018 Ark. 283, at 7–8, 556 S.W.3d

509, 514–15. This does not mean all lawsuits alleging unconstitutional acts can go forward.

Each must still plead facts, if proven, that would establish entitlement to relief. See Williams

v. McCoy, 2018 Ark. 17, at 4, 535 S.W.3d 266, 269.

2 We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to

dismiss Kennedy’s declaratory-judgment action. Kennedy failed to plead sufficient facts to

overcome sovereign immunity. Generally, “[t]he determination of parole eligibility is solely

within the province of the ADC.” Carroll v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 395, at 3–4, 442 S.W.3d 834,

837. Declaratory-judgment relief “may be appropriate if the ADC has acted ultra vires, has

acted beyond its legal authority, or has failed to adhere to a parole statute.” Schuldheisz v.

Felts, 2024 Ark. 137, at 3, 696 S.W.3d 817, 820.

Kennedy’s argument that the APB acted outside its authority is based on this court’s

decision in Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186, 519 S.W.3d 682. In Lenard, we held that the

APB acted outside its statutory authority when it denied his transfer eligibility. Id. As

necessary in these cases, Lenard required this court to review continually fluctuating parole-

eligibility statutes. Id. It was necessary to know the date of his convictions in order to apply

the correct statute.

Kennedy pleaded that he was convicted of residential burglary in 2009 and 2013,

breaking or entering in 2018 and 2022, and criminal mischief and theft in 2022. Yet his

petition does not provide the conviction dates. One relevant parole-eligibility statute,

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-615, has effective dates of July 27, 2011, February

20, 2013, August 16, 2013, April 1, 2015, and July 22, 2015, among others. Kennedy’s

petition therefore lacks the factual details of his conviction dates and which version of the

statute would support his argument that the APB had misapplied the criteria for parole

eligibility. And without the APB misapplication, he has no action against the ADC. Even

taking the facts in the light most favorable to Kennedy, the petition does not contain

3 sufficient facts to establish that the APB erred in its treatment of Kennedy’s eligibility for

parole or transfer to a community correction facility. As a result, we hold that the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the declaratory-judgment petition.

The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce

the performance of a duty. Linell v. State, 2019 Ark. 25, at 2, 565 S.W.3d 482, 484. One

who seeks mandamus relief must show a clear and certain right to relief and that there is no

other remedy. Id. Again, for the above reasons, Kennedy failed to sufficiently plead facts

showing that he was entitled to a clear and certain right to relief. We hold that the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Kennedy’s mandamus petition.

Last, Kennedy appeals the circuit court’s decision designating the dismissal as a

“strike” under Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-68-607 (Supp. 2023). For a dismissal to

constitute a strike, the circuit court had to determine that Kennedy’s cause of action was

frivolous or malicious or that he failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-68-607(b); Davis v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 64, 568 S.W.3d 268.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-68-607(b) provides that an incarcerated person

may not bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under the

Arkansas indigency statutes if on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated or

detained in any facility, the incarcerated person brought an action that was determined by a

court to be frivolous or malicious or failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

The appellees point to three prior suits brought by Kennedy that constituted a strike:

Kennedy v. Arkansas Parole Board, 33CV-23-156 (denying Kennedy’s in forma pauperis

status); Kennedy v. Felts, 33CV-23-97 (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

4 state a claim); and Kennedy v. Criminal Justice Coordinator, 60CV-23-3883 (denying

Kennedy’s petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for failure to state a colorable

cause of action). Kennedy does not present this court with a sufficient record on appeal to

show that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding a strike. McCullon v. State, 2023

Ark. 190, 679 S.W.3d 358. We affirm the circuit court’s decision to designate the dismissal

as a strike.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Worden v. Kirchner
2013 Ark. 509 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2013)
Carroll v. Hobbs
2014 Ark. 395 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2014)
Lenard v. Kelley
2017 Ark. 186 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2017)
Sylvester v. State
2017 Ark. 309 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2017)
LONNIE WILLIAMS v. KIA MCCOY
2018 Ark. 17 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2018)
JAMES R. GRIFFIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS
2018 Ark. 10 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2018)
Martin v. Haas
556 S.W.3d 509 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2018)
Linell v. State
2019 Ark. 25 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2019)
Davis v. Kelley
2019 Ark. 64 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2019)
Corey McCullon v. State of Arkansas
2023 Ark. 190 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2023)
Vern Schuldheisz v. John Felts, Chairman, Arkansas Parole Board
2024 Ark. 137 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
JEREMY KENNEDY V. ARKANSAS PAROL BOARD AND ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeremy-kennedy-v-arkansas-parol-board-and-arkansas-division-of-correction-ark-2025.