Jeremy Holloway v. County of Orange

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: May 5, 2021
• Docket: 8:19-cv-01514
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 12 13 JEREMY HOLLOWAY, Case No.: SA CV 19-01514-DOC (DFMx) 14 Plaintiff, 15 vs. 16 COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 17 COUNTY’S MOTION FOR Defendants. 18 SUMMARY JUDMENT [102]; AND GRANTING INDIVIDUAL 19 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION [105]. 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is Defendant County of Orange’s (“Defendant County” or “County”) 2 Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt 102) and Individual Defendants’ Motion for Summary 3 Adjudication (Dkt. 105). Oral arguments were held in this matter on December 14, 2020. After 4 considering the papers and hearing the arguments raised by the parties, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendant County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Individual Defendants’ 6 Motion for Summary Adjudication. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 A. Facts1 9 First Incident 10 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff Jeremy Holloway’s (“Holloway” or 11 “Plaintiff”) Disputed Statement of Facts (“DSF”) (Dkt. 125-1) and Plaintiff’s Separate 12 Statement of Disputed Material Facts (“SS”) (Dkt. 125-2). 13 On January 21, 2018, Brian Fuerbach called 9-1-1. DSF ¶ 1. Fuerbach reported to the 9- 14 1-1 operator that he “had heard a male and female yelling, fists being landed on somebody, and 15 a woman yelling to stop hitting her, that she’s just a girl.” Id. ¶ 2. At approximately 3:40 a.m., 16 Defendant Deputy Renegar became aware of a call for service to O’Neill Park, an 17 unincorporated area of the County of Orange. Id. ¶ 3. The call consisted of a reporting party 18 advising that there was a male and female in a physical altercation that was disturbing the peace 19 occurring to the right of campsite 63. Id. Around 4:07 a.m. Deputy Renegar heard dispatch state 20 that per the reporting party, domestic violence was occurring in a tent by a white truck to the 21 right of campsite 63. Id. ¶ 4. When Deputy Renegar reached the scene, witness Joshua Gomez 22 advised Deputy Renegar that he heard the sounds of fighting and arguing. Id. Gomez pointed 23 Renegar to the south or southeast, where he believed the sounds were coming from. Id. 24 Deputy Renegar and other deputies made contact with Holloway at campsite 65. Id. ¶ 5, 25 SS ¶ 2. Holloway told Deputy Renegar his name and that Holloway was on informal probation. 26

27 1 Unless indicated otherwise, to the extent any of these facts are disputed, the Court concludes they are not material to the 1 DSF ¶ 9. During the encounter, Deputy Renegar requested to pat down Holloway and asked if 2 he had weapons anywhere on his campsite. SS ¶ 9. Holloway informed Renegar that he had 3 camping knives in the campsite and a pocketknife on his person, which later turned out to just 4 be a lighter. Id. ¶ 10. The deputies did not find anyone else in Holloway’s campsite. Id. ¶ 17. At 5 this time, Deputy Renegar did not detain Mr. Holloway or charge him with a crime. DSF ¶ 8. 6 The deputies then wished him a good night and left Holloway’s campsite. SS ¶ 21. 7 After the encounter with Mr. Holloway, Deputy Renegar went back to his vehicle and 8 drove to the entrance of the park, pulled over and ran Mr. Holloway through the system. DSF ¶ 9 9. Deputy Renegar discovered that Mr. Holloway was on formal probation and subject to search 10 and seizure at any time. Id. 11 Second Incident 12 As Deputy Renegar was driving back to his patrol area, he became aware of another call 13 for service at approximately 4:55 a.m. to O’Neill Park. Id. ¶ 9. The reporting party advised that 14 a male subject was walking from campsite to campsite looking for the individual(s) who had 15 called the police. Id. The dispatch was updated and communicated that “We have a male 16 yelling and a little girl screaming,” and the call was upgraded to a priority one. Id. ¶ 12. 17 Deputy Renegar returned to campsite 67. Id. ¶ 11. There, Deputy Renegar asked Joshua 18 Gomez “Where did he go? Where is he?” and Gomez responded, “He’s over that way.” 19 Pertinent Deposition Testimony of Gomez (Dkt. 128-2) at 103–104.2 20 Deputy Renegar approached Holloway for a second time on January 21, 2019. DSF ¶ 13. 21 The deputies approached Holloway with guns drawn. SS ¶ 59. The deputies, including Deputy 22 Renegar, commanded Holloway to get down on the ground multiple times. Id. ¶ 32. Holloway 23 did not comply with the command to get on the ground. Id. ¶ 33. There was a physical 24 altercation as deputies attempted to arrest Holloway. See id. ¶¶34–48. Deputy Renegar placed 25

26 2 Plaintiff disputes that Deputy Renegar spoke with Gomez during the second incident, citing Gomez deposition testimony indicating the same. See DSF ¶ 13. However, Gomez later clearly corrects himself and states that he spoke with the deputies 27 during the second incident. See Pertinent Deposition Testimony of Gomez at 103–104. Further, Patrol Vehicle Audio/Video 1 Holloway under arrest. Id. ¶ 51. Holloway suffered injuries from the physical altercation and 2 subsequently was treated by paramedics. Id. ¶ 62. During said altercation, based on Deputy 3 Renegar’s observations, Defendant Deputies Gunderson and Billinger had no physical contact 4 with Holloway. DSF ¶ 15. 5 B. Procedural History 6 Plaintiff asserts claims for (1) unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, false 7 arrest, and conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual 8 Deputy Defendants; and (2) unlawful custom and practice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 9 Defendant County of Orange and Individual Defendants. Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 10 (Dkt. 28) ¶¶ 8–23. 11 Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the instant action on August 6, 2019 (Dkt. 1). On 12 December 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed their SAC (Dkt. 28). On October 23, 2020, Defendant 13 County filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot. County”) (Dkt. 102). Plaintiff 14 opposed the County’s motion on November 30, 2020 (“Opp’n County”) (Dkt. 123). Also on 15 October 23, 2020, the Individual Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary 16 Adjudication (“Mot.”) (Dkt. 105). Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary adjudication on 17 November 30, 2020 (“Opp’n”) (Dkt. 125). Defendants collectively replied to Plaintiff’s 18 oppositions on December 8, 2020 (Dkt. 131). 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 21 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 56(a). Summary judgment is to be granted cautiously, with due respect for a party’s right to 23 have its factually grounded claims and defenses tried to a jury. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 24 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A court must 25 view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party. 26 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1992); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 27 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the 1 case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the non-moving party bears the burden of proving the 2 claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out that the non-moving 3 party has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of its 4 case. See Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). 5 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set 6 out specific material facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 7 248–49. A “material fact” is one which “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 8 governing law.” Id. at 248. A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by 9 making assertions in its legal papers. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter 10 Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, there must be specific, 11 admissible, evidence identifying the basis for the dispute. See id. The Court need not “comb the 12 record” looking for other evidence; it is only required to consider evidence set forth in the 13 moving and opposing papers and the portions of the record cited therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The Supreme 15 Court has held that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence … will be insufficient; there 16 must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the opposing party].” Liberty 17 Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 In the instant Motion for Summary Adjudication, Individual Defendants argue the Court 20 should grant summary adjudication because the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified 21 immunity regarding the arrest of Plaintiff, and because no material issues of fact exist. See 22 generally Mot. In the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant County argues that the 23 Court should grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim because Plaintiff has 24 failed to present evidence of persistent and widespread unconstitutional conduct. Mot. County 25 at 1–2. The Court will examine each cause of action and the parties’ arguments in turn. 26 A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure and False Arrest 27 Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim is meritless because 1 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff concedes that “due to the search and seizure conditions 2 as part of his probation, Jeremy cannot claim a Fourth Amendment violation for unlawful 3 detention and search for the first encounter with the deputies. Plaintiff concedes as part of this 4 Opposition, he has no illegal search claim for those reasons.” Opp’n at 14. Plaintiff then argues 5 that the arrest in the second incident was a false arrest, because the deputies did not have 6 probable cause. See id. 7 A warrantless arrest by a law enforcement officer “is reasonable under the Fourth 8 Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is 9 being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Whether probable cause 10 exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the 11 arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152 (citing Maryland v. 12 Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). 13 Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] 14 knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to 15 warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee had committed a crime.” Hart v. Parks, 450 16 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (modifications in original). A court must conclude that officers 17 had probable cause for an arrest if “under the totality of the circumstances known to the 18 arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that [the arrestee] had committed a 19 crime.” Valencia-Amezcua, 278 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Garza, 20 980 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1992)). 21 Here, Individual Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff mainly 22 argues that witnesses did not actually see the offensive conduct that they reported, and that the 23 deputies only assumed that Holloway was the subject of the complaints. However, an analysis 24 of probable cause does not depend on what the witnesses knew, but the “reasonable conclusion 25 to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” The deputies 26 here were initially responding to at least two reports of a man beating a woman. DSF ¶1–2, 27 Gomez Deposition. Deputy Renegar arrived at the park and was directed by witnesses to 1 campsite. The deputies left after being unable to find a woman in question. Deputies then 2 received further calls, stating that a man was walking from campsite to campsite looking for the 3 one who had called the police. Dispatch then updated to communicate that there was a male 4 yelling and a little girl screaming. When Deputy Renegar arrived at the scene for the second 5 time, he was again directed towards Holloway’s campsite. The second incident occurred around 6 five in the morning. Regardless of whether the witness accounts were based on what they heard 7 rather than what they saw, the Court finds that the information about a man allegedly beating a 8 woman was reasonably trustworthy to the Individual Defendants. “[T]he facts and 9 circumstances within [the deputies’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 10 information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee had 11 committed a crime.” Hart, 450 F.3d 1059. 12 Accordingly, because Plaintiff concedes the search and seizure provisions of his 13 probation, and because the Individual Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the 14 Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for unreasonable search and seizure 15 and false arrest. 16 B. Excessive Force Claim Against Deputies Billinger and Gunderson 17 Individual Defendants argue that Deputies Billinger and Gunderson did not use any 18 force on Holloway, let alone excessive force. Mot. at 16. Plaintiff argues that even in the 19 absence of excessive force, Deputies Billinger and Gunderson are liable under theories of 20 failure to intercede. Opp’n at 27–28. 21 “[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the 22 constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 23 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994) aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81, (1996). “[A]n 24 officer who failed to intercede when his colleagues were depriving a victim of his Fourth 25 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force in the course of an arrest would, like his 26 colleagues, be responsible for subjecting the victim to a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment 27 rights.” Id. Importantly, “officers can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they had an 1 Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 298 F.3d 1022, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding no 2 violation of duty to intercede where there was no evidence that the defendant was aware of the 3 constitutional violation as it occurred), aff'd sub nom. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 4 Here, neither deputy had a reasonable opportunity to intercede. While Deputy 5 Gunderson was present at the time of the altercation, the Court finds that there was no evidence 6 that Defendant Gunderson was aware of any constitutional violation as the altercation unfolded. 7 The Court has already found that the arresting deputies had probable cause. To Deputy 8 Gunderson’s knowledge, the deputies were properly arresting a suspect. The ensuing physical 9 altercation took place quickly and Gunderson testified that when he arrived, Holloway was 10 already on the ground and the deputies were attempting to handcuff him. DSF ¶ 15. Deputy 11 Billinger testified that he never saw guns being pointed and that he only assumed there was a 12 use of force because Billinger heard it over the broadcast. Id. There is no evidence to show that 13 either Deputy Gunderson or Deputy Billinger were in positions to intercede and prevent any 14 excessive force as it occurred. Plaintiff’s allegations otherwise are mere speculation. 15 Without discussing the severity of the force employed, the Court finds that neither 16 Gunderson nor Billinger had a reasonable opportunity to intercede during the physical 17 altercation. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s excessive 18 force claim against Deputies Gunderson and Billinger. 19 C. Monell Claims 20 Defendant County argues that Plaintiff’s Monell claims fail as a matter of law because 21 Plaintiff failed to present evidence of persistent and widespread unconstitutional conduct. Mot. 22 County at 1–2. 23 To hold a city liable under § 1983 for the violation of a constitutional right, a plaintiff 24 must establish liability under Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 25 (1978). “[M]unicipalities may be held liable as ‘persons’ under § 1983 ‘when execution of a 26 government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 27 acts may fairly be said to represent the official policy, inflicts the injury.’ ” Price v. Sery, 513 1 satisfied in order to establish municipal liability under Monell. The plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) 2 that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had 3 a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional 4 right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’ ” Van Ort 5 v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 6 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Ninth Circuit has identified several ways a section 1983 7 plaintiff can establish municipal liability: 8 First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the alleged constitutional 9 violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom 10 which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity. 11 Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual who committed the constitutional 12 tort was an official with “final policy-making authority” and that the challenged action 13 itself thus constituted an act of official governmental policy . . . Third, the plaintiff may 14 prove that an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's 15 unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. 16 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations 17 omitted). 18 As a preliminary matter, because the Court has now granted summary judgment as to the 19 majority of Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff’s Monell claim must be based on Plaintiff’s alleged 20 constitutional violation of excessive force by the remaining Individual Defendants. 21 Here, Plaintiff has alleged two discrete theories of Monell liability. Opp’n County at 3. 22 First, Plaintiff alleges a longstanding practice or custom: that the County and deputies 23 “promoted the code of silence that enables officers . . . to falsify the true version of events, use 24 excessive force in detention and fail to report the use of force to their superiors” pursuant to a 25 longstanding practice or custom of the County. Id. Second, Plaintiff alleges an official’s 26 ratification of an unconstitutional decision: that the County has ratified all actions be the 27 individual defendants. Id. at 6. The Court examines each theory in turn. 1 In support of Plaintiff’s theory of the practice of a code of silence, Plaintiff alleges that 2 the deputies “actively covered each other up in their efforts to justify their brutal actions 3 towards the Plaintiff.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff continued that Deputy Renegar justified the use of force 4 by baselessly claiming that Holloway placed Renegar in a chokehold. Id. at 4. Plaintiff argues 5 that the deputies authored false police reports or otherwise fully corroborated reports by other 6 deputies. Id. Plaintiff also claims that the shallow investigation that ensued is an ongoing and 7 widespread practice in police departments, citing several cases in other districts. Id. at 4–5. 8 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a pattern of “persistent and 9 widespread” unconstitutional conduct by the County’s employees that is so “permanent and 10 well settled as to constitute a custom.” Monell, supra, 436 U. S. at 690; see Sloman v. City of 11 Simi Valley, 21 F.3d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Customary practices ... are a sufficient basis 12 for municipal liability” only where they are “widespread among police employees.”); 13 Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[P]roof of random acts 14 or isolated events are insufficient to establish custom.”), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. 15 City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 981 (9th Cir. 2010). 16 Courts have repeatedly required Section 1983 plaintiffs to support their “custom” 17 allegations with multiple, similar past incidents. See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 18 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (Dismissing Monell “custom” allegation where plaintiff fails to 19 produce evidence of “widespread abuses or practices. . .[which] are so pervasive as to have the 20 force of law”); Meehan v. Los Angeles County, 856 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1988) (Two incidents not 21 sufficient to establish actionable Monell custom); Davis v. Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 22 1989) (Manner of one arrest insufficient to establish wrongful Monell policy). 23 Here, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has 24 failed to establish evidence of an unlawful custom or practice. At best, Plaintiff alleges the 25 instant, single incident of deputies falsifying reports following a use of excessive force. 26 Plaintiff’s allegations about the “code of silence” in other districts and states are inapposite to 27 Defendant County of Orange. 1 Plaintiff’s second theory of Monell liability also fails. Plaintiff argues that the County is 2 liable because Sergeant Rawlings ratified the deputies’ use of excessive force. Opp’n County at 3 5. In support, Plaintiff cites Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., where the Ninth Circuit found a 4 police chief liable for ratifying the use of excessive force by officers under his command by 5 signing a letter denying a plaintiff’s complaint, when expert testimony showed that the police 6 chief should have disciplined the officers and established new police procedures. 145 F.3d 7 1087, 1093. Here, however, Plaintiff has not produced an expert witness or evidence to 8 establish that Sergeant Rawlings or the County should have disciplined the deputies or 9 established different procedures. In fact, as previously stated, Plaintiff vigorously argues that 10 the deputies colluded to cover up this incident by writing false police reports or “fully 11 corroborat[ing] their fellow officers’ version of what happened to the arriving supervisor . . .” 12 Opp’n at 4. Thus, Plaintiff argues that Sergeant Rawlings and the County were presented with 13 reports indicating a justifiable use of force. 14 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant County’s motion for summary judgment as 15 to Plaintiff’s second claim for Monell liability. 16 IV. DISPOSITION 17 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ Motion for 18 Summary Adjudication and GRANTS Defendant County’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In 19 particular, the Court: 20 — GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT as to Plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable search 21 and seizure, Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest, and Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force 22 against Deputies Billinger and Gunderson; and 23 — GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT as to Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability 24 against Defendant County. 25 DATED: May 5, 2021 26 DAVID O. CARTER 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE