O 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California
11 JEREMY HOLLAND Case № 2:20-cv-09672-ODW (JPRx)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [17] 14 LANKSHERMAN PLAZA, LLC; and DOES 1–10, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Jeremy Holland moves for entry of default judgment against Defendant 20 Lanksherman Plaza, LLC (“Defendant”). (Mot. Default J. (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF 21 No. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.1 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Holland is a California resident who requires the use of a wheelchair at all times 24 when traveling in public. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) He alleges that Defendant is the 25 real property owner, business operator, lessor and/or lessee of the real property for a 26 restaurant or liquor store (“Business”) located at or about 7208 Lankershim Blvd., 27
28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 North Hollywood, California.2 (Compl. ¶ 2.) Holland further alleges that when he 2 attempted to enter the Business on two separate occasions, in May and June of 2020, 3 he “encountered a number of barriers that interfered with his ability to use and enjoy 4 the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the Business.” (Id. 5 ¶ 12.) Specifically, Holland alleges that Defendant failed to provide accessible 6 parking because Defendant (a) failed to paint the ground as required, and (b) failed to 7 provide access aisles with level surface slopes. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 23, 25.) Holland asserts 8 these barriers denied him full and equal access to the Business and deter him from 9 returning until they are removed. (Id. ¶ 14.) 10 On October 21, 2020, Holland filed this action asserting claims under Title III 11 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California state law. (See 12 generally id.) On November 13, 2020, the Court declined to exercise supplemental 13 jurisdiction over Holland’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. 14 (Order Dismissing, ECF No. 13.) Holland served Defendant with the Summons and 15 Complaint on January 22, 2021. (Proof of Service, ECF No. 14.) Defendant failed to 16 answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, and on February 22, 2021, Holland 17 requested entry of default. (Req. Entry Default, ECF No. 15.) The Clerk entered 18 default the same day. (Default, ECF No. 16.) Now, Holland moves for default 19 judgment. (See Mot.) 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Plaintiffs seeking default judgment must meet certain procedural requirements, 22 as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and Central District of California 23 Local Rule 55–1. Once the procedural requirements are satisfied, “[t]he district 24 court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” See 25 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 26 27 2 Holland refers to the Business as a “restaurant” in his Complaint and Motion and as a “liquor store” 28 in his Declaration in Support of his Motion. (See Compl. ¶ 2; Mot. 1; Decl. Jeremy Holland ¶ 3, ECF No. 17-3.) In light of the Court’s disposition, this inconsistency is immaterial. 1 Generally, a defendant’s liability is conclusively established upon entry of 2 default by the Clerk, and well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are 3 accepted as true, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. See TeleVideo 4 Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing 5 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Still, “[a] defendant’s 6 default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” 7 PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 8 Rather, the court considers the “Eitel factors” in exercising its discretion: (1) the 9 possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive 10 claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake; (5) the 11 possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the defendant’s default 12 was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decision on the 13 merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 The second and third Eitel factors are dispositive here, so the Court begins with 16 them. These two factors address the merits of the claims and the sufficiency of the 17 complaint. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 18 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 19 1978) (“[F]acts which are not established by the pleadings . . . or claims which are not 20 well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.”). Although 21 well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted by a defendant’s 22 failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which 23 are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of 24 N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388). 25 Holland’s claim fails to include necessary facts and is legally insufficient; therefore, 26 default judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 1267–68. 27 Holland seeks injunctive relief under the ADA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 18–27.) To 28 prevail on this claim, Holland must show, among other things, that “the existing 1 facility at the defendant’s place of business or property presents an architectural 2 barrier prohibited under the ADA.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 3 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. 4 Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000)). “Architectural barriers” are defined by 5 reference to the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (the “ADAAG”). See Chapman v. 6 Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Relevantly, a public 7 accommodation need only provide accessible parking “[w]here parking spaces are 8 provided.” See 2010 ADAAG § 208.1 (emphasis added); see also id. § 208 9 (establishing accessibility requirements for parking spaces). 10 Here, Holland fails to establish the existence of architectural barriers at 11 Defendant’s property. Holland alleges two violations related to parking spaces 12 without first establishing that Defendant provides parking to the public. (See Compl. 13 ¶¶ 18–27.) As Holland does not sufficiently allege that Defendant provides public 14 parking, he fails to establish that Defendant did not comply with the parking 15 requirements of the ADAAG. See Grigsby v. Tecomate Corp., No. 2:19-CV-08735- 16 ODW (KSx), 2021 WL 134583, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
O 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California
11 JEREMY HOLLAND Case № 2:20-cv-09672-ODW (JPRx)
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [17] 14 LANKSHERMAN PLAZA, LLC; and DOES 1–10, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Jeremy Holland moves for entry of default judgment against Defendant 20 Lanksherman Plaza, LLC (“Defendant”). (Mot. Default J. (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF 21 No. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.1 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Holland is a California resident who requires the use of a wheelchair at all times 24 when traveling in public. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) He alleges that Defendant is the 25 real property owner, business operator, lessor and/or lessee of the real property for a 26 restaurant or liquor store (“Business”) located at or about 7208 Lankershim Blvd., 27
28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 North Hollywood, California.2 (Compl. ¶ 2.) Holland further alleges that when he 2 attempted to enter the Business on two separate occasions, in May and June of 2020, 3 he “encountered a number of barriers that interfered with his ability to use and enjoy 4 the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the Business.” (Id. 5 ¶ 12.) Specifically, Holland alleges that Defendant failed to provide accessible 6 parking because Defendant (a) failed to paint the ground as required, and (b) failed to 7 provide access aisles with level surface slopes. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 23, 25.) Holland asserts 8 these barriers denied him full and equal access to the Business and deter him from 9 returning until they are removed. (Id. ¶ 14.) 10 On October 21, 2020, Holland filed this action asserting claims under Title III 11 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California state law. (See 12 generally id.) On November 13, 2020, the Court declined to exercise supplemental 13 jurisdiction over Holland’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. 14 (Order Dismissing, ECF No. 13.) Holland served Defendant with the Summons and 15 Complaint on January 22, 2021. (Proof of Service, ECF No. 14.) Defendant failed to 16 answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, and on February 22, 2021, Holland 17 requested entry of default. (Req. Entry Default, ECF No. 15.) The Clerk entered 18 default the same day. (Default, ECF No. 16.) Now, Holland moves for default 19 judgment. (See Mot.) 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Plaintiffs seeking default judgment must meet certain procedural requirements, 22 as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and Central District of California 23 Local Rule 55–1. Once the procedural requirements are satisfied, “[t]he district 24 court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” See 25 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 26 27 2 Holland refers to the Business as a “restaurant” in his Complaint and Motion and as a “liquor store” 28 in his Declaration in Support of his Motion. (See Compl. ¶ 2; Mot. 1; Decl. Jeremy Holland ¶ 3, ECF No. 17-3.) In light of the Court’s disposition, this inconsistency is immaterial. 1 Generally, a defendant’s liability is conclusively established upon entry of 2 default by the Clerk, and well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are 3 accepted as true, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. See TeleVideo 4 Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing 5 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Still, “[a] defendant’s 6 default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” 7 PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 8 Rather, the court considers the “Eitel factors” in exercising its discretion: (1) the 9 possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive 10 claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake; (5) the 11 possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the defendant’s default 12 was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decision on the 13 merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 The second and third Eitel factors are dispositive here, so the Court begins with 16 them. These two factors address the merits of the claims and the sufficiency of the 17 complaint. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 18 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 19 1978) (“[F]acts which are not established by the pleadings . . . or claims which are not 20 well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.”). Although 21 well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted by a defendant’s 22 failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which 23 are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of 24 N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388). 25 Holland’s claim fails to include necessary facts and is legally insufficient; therefore, 26 default judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 1267–68. 27 Holland seeks injunctive relief under the ADA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 18–27.) To 28 prevail on this claim, Holland must show, among other things, that “the existing 1 facility at the defendant’s place of business or property presents an architectural 2 barrier prohibited under the ADA.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 3 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. 4 Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000)). “Architectural barriers” are defined by 5 reference to the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (the “ADAAG”). See Chapman v. 6 Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Relevantly, a public 7 accommodation need only provide accessible parking “[w]here parking spaces are 8 provided.” See 2010 ADAAG § 208.1 (emphasis added); see also id. § 208 9 (establishing accessibility requirements for parking spaces). 10 Here, Holland fails to establish the existence of architectural barriers at 11 Defendant’s property. Holland alleges two violations related to parking spaces 12 without first establishing that Defendant provides parking to the public. (See Compl. 13 ¶¶ 18–27.) As Holland does not sufficiently allege that Defendant provides public 14 parking, he fails to establish that Defendant did not comply with the parking 15 requirements of the ADAAG. See Grigsby v. Tecomate Corp., No. 2:19-CV-08735- 16 ODW (KSx), 2021 WL 134583, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2021) (finding the plaintiff 17 failed to establish noncompliant parking because he did not demonstrate the defendant 18 provided parking to its customers); Langer v. Kacha, No. 14-CV-2610-BAS (KSC), 19 2016 WL 524440, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2016) (finding the plaintiff failed to 20 establish an ADA violation because he showed only that defendants had, in the past, 21 temporarily provided parking, but not that they did so at the time of plaintiff’s visit). 22 Further, most of Holland’s Complaint follows a pattern of alleging violations 23 that lack any factual support. The majority of the Complaint is just a recitation of 24 various ADAAG or California Building Code (“CBC”) provisions coupled with 25 conclusions that a violation has occurred. For instance, in Holland’s first alleged 26 violation—inadequate paint on the ground—Holland lists several paint requirements 27 for parking spaces, citing CBC § 11B-502.3.3, and alleges vaguely that “there were 28 faded blue lines painted on the parking surface.” (Compl. ¶¶ 22–23.) However, he 1 || offers no authority that states faded paint is a violation. For Holland’s second alleged 2 || violation—non-level surface slopes—Holland lists several provisions of the 1991 and 3 || 2010 ADAAG relating to parking spaces and access aisles and alleges vaguely that 4|| Defendant’s “access aisles [we]re not level’; however, he fails to indicate what degree 5 || of slope is present at Defendant’s property, despite acknowledging that the ADAAG 6 || permits a minimal slope. (See id. §25 (citing 2010 ADAAG § 502.4 Advisory 7 || (‘Access aisles are required to be nearly level... .”) (emphasis added)).) 8 In short, even accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as 9 || true, Holland fails to state a claim under the ADA. See Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267. As 10 || the second and third Aite/ factors demonstrate default judgment is improper, the Court 11 || need not assess the remaining factors. See Brooke v. Sunstone Von Karman, LLC, 12 | No. 8:19-CV-00635-JLS (ADSx), 2020 WL 6153107, at*3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 13 | 2020). However, leave to amend is appropriate because Holland’s failure to state a 14 || claim is based on insufficient allegations which could theoretically be cured. See id. 15 Vv. CONCLUSION 16 In summary, Holland’s Motion for Default Judgment and accompanying 17 || request for attorneys’ fees are DENIED. (ECF No. 17.) The default previously 18 || entered against Defendant Lanksherman Plaza, LLC is hereby SET ASIDE. (ECF 19 | No. 16.) If Holland chooses to rectify the deficiencies identified herein, any amended 20 || complaint must be filed and served on Defendant within twenty-one (21) days of the 21 || date of this Order. Failure to timely amend will result in dismissal of this action. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 July 6, 2021 Ye Le ob 27 Ly hf 28 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE