Jeremy Fabricio Rodas-Jara, Evelyn Esmaily Garcia-Pablo, David Ernesto Flores-Reyes v. Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, Joseph B. Edlow, in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JEREMY FABRICIO RODAS-JARA, : EVELYN ESMAILY GARCIA-PABLO DAVID ERNESTO FLORES-REYES, —_|

Plaintiffs,

MARKWAYNE MULLIN; in his official Civil Action No, 25-2744-TDC capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, OSEPH B. EDLOW, in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Defendants.

ee MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Jeremy Fabricio Rodas-Jara, Evelyn Esmaily Garcia-Pablo, and David Ernesto Flores-Reyes have filed a civil action against the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of United Siates Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), in which they allege violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, and the right to due process of law under the F ifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, based on the denial of their petitions for special immigrant juvenile status. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs have filed-a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, which are fully briefed. The □ Court held a hearing on the Motions on july 29, 2026. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for-Summary Judgment will be GRANTED.

.

“BACKGROUND ~~ :

I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework . . Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as relevant here, a special immigrant □ juvenile (“SIJ ”) is “an immigrant who is present in the United States”: . (i) who has been declared dependent ona juvenile court‘located in the United ~ States or whom such a court has legally. committed to, or placed under the — custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and . , whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; -

(ii) ‘for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings: . that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and

(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status .... 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). The INA further provides that “(visas shall be made available . . . to qualified special immigrants described in section 1101(a)(27),” id. § 1153(b)(4), and that “Ta|ny . alien .. . desiring to be classified under section 1 153(b)(4) . . . may filea petition with the Attorney General for such classification.” Id. § 1154(a)(1)(G)(i); see Mestanek v. Jaddou, 93 F.4th 164, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2024) (noting that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 generally transferred the Attorney General’s authority over federal immigration laws to the Secretary of Homeland Security). . _ An SIJ petitioner “may not be denied special immigrant status . . . based on age if the alien was a child‘on the date on which the alien applied for such status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(6). The INA generally defines a “child” as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” Id. § 1101(b)(1).

According to a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) regulation, a “petitioner is

eligible for classification as a special immigrant juvenile . . . if they meet all of the following

requirements”: a, □ J) : Is under 21 years of age at the time of filing the petition; (2) : Is unmarried at the time of filing and adjudication; □ (3) : Is physically present in the United States;

(4) Is the subject of a juvenile court order(s) that meets the requirements under. paragraph (c) of this section; and (5) Obtains consent from the Secretary of Homeland Security to classification as a special immigrant juvenile. , □ 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 1(b). Paragraph (c), as relevant to the fourth element, requires that a juvenile

_ court make certain specific determinations and also requires that, subject to certain exceptions not

applicable here, “Tt]he juvenile court order(s) must be in effect on the date the petitioner files the petition and continue through the time of adjudication of the petition.” Jd. § 204.1 1()G)4i). SI petitions are submitted using USCIS Form 1-360. For such petitions, the “filing date of [the] petition is the date it is properly filed and received by USCIS.” Jd. 5 204.1(b); see id. § 103.2(a)(7)@) (“USCIS will consider a benefit request received and will record the receipt dati as of the actual date of receipt at the location designated for filing such benefit request whether □ electronically or in paper format.”). Although USCIS permits electronic filing for certain other applications, it does not permit electronic filing of SIJ petitions. USCIS permits SIJ petitions to be submitted in-person at a USCIS field office, but ‘such submissions may occur only by

_ appointment and only within two weeks of a SIJ petitioner’s Ist birthday. USCIS Website at 2,

Reply Ex. 1, ECF No. 15-1; USCIS Website at 2, Reply Ex. 2, ECF No. 15-2. At the hearing, counsel for Defendants confirmed that USCIS field offices will not allow an in-person filing ofan |

petition without an appointment and do not have a drop box in which a petition can be deposited forfiling, □□ II. Jeremy Fabricio Rodas-Jara oe Plaintiff J eremy Fabricio Rodas-J ara was born on September 27, 2002 and is a native and citizen of Ecuador. ‘On or about October 12, 2022, Rodas-Jara entered the United States after fleeing both domestic violence from a parent and threats from corrupt police officers. On January □ 26, 2023, Rodas-Jara’s uncle filed a petition for custody of Rodas-Jara and a request for si findings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. On September 8, 2023, a magistrate judge of that court held a custody and SIJ findings hearing and recommended that □□□ court grant custody and make the requested SIJ findings. However, no orders were entered that day due to a ten-day waiting period for parties to lodge objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations, which the magistrate judge declined to waive. Based on the understanding that USCIS would consider Rodas-Jara’s SIJ Petition only if it received his F orm 1-360 before his 21st birthday, Rodas-J; ara’s counsel sent to USCIS by F edEx overnight delivery a Form 1-360 SI Petition on September 11, 2023, before the qualifying juvenile □ court orders had been issued. On September 15, 2023, USCIS issued a receipt for Rodas-Jara’s Petition, with an actual receipt date of September 12, 2023. On September 20, 2023, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued the qualifying juvenile court orders for Rodas-J ara. A week later, on September 27, 2023, Rodas-Jara turned 21. On September 29, 2023, Rodas-Jara’s counsel first received the USCIS receipt for Rodas-Jara’s Petition. That same day, Rodas-Jara’s counsel mailed the qualifying juvenile court orders to USCIS with the receipt number for the previously filed Petition. At the hearing, counsel stated

that in taking this step, he generally uses information on the receipt to identify the particular USCIS service center to which the petition was assigned and sends the court orders to that location. On December 18, 2023, USCIS issued to Rodas-Jara a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petition (“NOID”) on the grounds that:

To qualify for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status classification, the Court Orders must be in effect on the date the petitioner files the petition and continue through . the time of adjudication of the petition . . . [slee 8 CFR 204.11(c)(3)G@i) .. . [t]he . i. Court Orders you submitted came into effect on September 19, 2023, after you filed _ your Form J-360 on September 12, 2023; therefore they were not in effect on the . date you filed your petition . .. USCIS finds that you have not demonstrated that your Form I-360 petition should be approved.

Compl... 28, ECF No. 1. Rodas-Jara responded to the NOID on January 20, 2024, but USCIS denied the Petition on January 29, 2024 after finding that Rodas-J ara had not met his burden to

establish that he was “eligible for SIJ classification at the time [he] filed [his] Form I-360 petition.” Id. 4 29. Because Rodas-Jara’s Petition was denied after he turned 21 years old, he was unable to cure the deficiency by filing a renewed SU petition. Evelyn Esmaily Garcia-Pablo

Plaintiff Evelyn Esmaily Garcia~-Pablo was born on September 18, 2002.and is a native and ‘citizen of Guatemala. In March 2019, Garcia-Pablo and her mother fled Guatemala to escape her physically and verbally abusive father. On July 12, 2023, Garcia-Pablo’s mother filed a petition

_ for custody and a request for SIJ findings in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. □ The court scheduled a hearing for September 12, 2023, which was six days before Garcia-Pablo’s birthday. Knowing that USCIS would consider Garcia-Pablo’s SIJ Petition only if it received her Form I-360 before her 21st birthday, Garcia-Pablo’s.counsel sent her Form I-360 SIJ Petition "to USCIS by overnight FedEx on September 2, 2023, before the qualifying juvenile court orders

.

had been issued. USCIS issued a receipt for Garcia-Pablo’s Petition on September 8, 2023, with an actual receipt date of September 5 , 2023. On September 12, 2023, the Circuit Court for Anne: Arundel County held the custody and Sy findings hearing, and the judge granted custody of Garcia-Pablo to her mother and made the requested SIJ findings. These qualifying juvenile court orders were not docketed until September 13, 2023. On September 18, 2023, Garcia-Pablo’s counsel first received the USCIS receipt for Garcia-Pablo’s Petition. That same day, Garcia-Pablo turned a1. On September 21, 2023, Garcia- Pablo’s counsel mailed the qualifying juvenile court orders to USCIS with the receipt number for the previously. fled Petition, . ot

On January 10, 2024, USCIS issued an NOID relating to Garcia-Pablo’s Petition on the grounds that “[t]he court order must be signed and dated prior to the receipt of your Form 1-360... USCIS finds that you have not demonstrated that your Form 1-360 petition should be approved.” Id. 439. Garcia-Pablo’s counsel submitted a timely response to the NOID that was received on 8, 2024, but USCIS denied the Petition on March 12, 2024 for failing to respond to the NOID. USCIS granted a motion for reconsideration on the issue of whether Garcia-Pablo had timely responded to the NOID, but it ultimately denied her Petition on June 17, 2024 because

court order must be signed and dated prior to the receipt of your Form I-360.” Id. q 43. Because Garvia-Pablo’s Petition was denied after she turned 21 years old, she was unable to cure the deficiency by filing a renewed sv petition. — WV. David Ernesto Flores-Reyes

Plaintiff David Ernesto Flores-Reyés was born on August 11, 1999 and is a native and citizen of El Salvador. On June 13, 2016, Flores-Reyes entered the United States as inaccompanied minor after fleeing gang violence and having been abandoned by both of his

parents.” On February 21, 2019, Flores-Reyes’s counsel filed a third-party custody action in the

Circuit Court for Montgomery County requesting that the court award custody of Flores-Reyes to his aunt and make SIJ findings. On July 27, 2020, the court held a hearing at which it granted the requested custody order and made SIJJ findings, and it issued the qualifying juvenile court orders □ the same day. On August 6, 2020, F lores-Reyes’ s. counsel sent to USCIS by overnight courier a Form 1-360 SIJ Petition on behalf of Flores-Reyes, with supporting documents including: the juvenile court orders. USCIS received the Petition on August 7, 2020. Flores-Reyes tumed21

. four days later, on August 11, 2020. . On August 17, 2020, USCIS mailed to Flores-Reyes a rejection notice for failing to sign

his Petition. Although Flores-Reyes received this notice after he had turned 21, Flores-Reyes’s counsel refiled a corrected Petition on August 24, 2020 and requested that USCIS honor the □ original filing date of August 7, 2020. On January 15, 2021, USCIS issued to Flores-Reyes an NOID stating that his renewed Petition would be denied because it had been filed after he turned years old. Flores-Reyes responded to the NOID, but on February 11, 2022, USCIS denied the

Petition because it was filed after his 21 st birthday. After this case began, USCIS reopened Flores- Reyes’s Petition and approved it on October 3, 2025. Vv. Procedural History Plaintiffs allege two claims in the Complaint. In Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants □ violated their right to due process of law by failing to inform them of defects in their Petitions in a timely manner, which left them unable to cure their Petitions before they turned 21, and thereby rendered meaningless any notices sent by Defendants. In Count 2, Plaintiffs allege that the

regulation underlying USCIS’s denial of the Petitions, which requires that any qualifying juvenile court order bein effect at the time of the filing of an SIJ petition, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)(ii),

is arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law, in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In opposing Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiffs construed it as a Motion for Summary judgment on the APA claim and filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on the APA claim. At the hearing on the Motions, Defendants withdrew their argument that the due process claim in Count 1 should be dismissed because judicial review is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). oe DISCUSSION Defendants argue that the APA claim in Count 2 should be dismissed for failure to state a

_ claim on the grounds that 8 CER. § 204.11(¢)(3)(ii) is not arbitrary and capricious and □□□□ accordance with law because it is based on the plain language of the INA, courts have required qualifying juvenile court orders to be in effect prior to the curient version of that regulation, and individual cannot file a petition for an immigration benefit before becoming eligible for the benefit. Defendants also assert that Flores-Reyes’s claim should be dismissed as moot because his SIJ Petition has been approved. In their reply brief they argue for the first time that the due process claim in Count 1 should be dismissed for failure to state aclaim. —

In their Cross Motion for Summary: Judgment, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the APA claim because nothing in the SI statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)27)\J), requires that a qualifying-juvenile court order be in effect at the time of the filing of an SIJ petition, as is required by 8 CER. § 204.11(c)(3)(ii). Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal _ of Flores-Reyes’s claims. . .

Because Flores-Reyes’s SIJ Petition has now been approved and both parties agree to the dismissal of his claims, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion in part on that basis and dismiss - Flores-Reyes’s claims as moot. Further, because the Court will grant Plaintifts Motion as to the APA claim in Count 2 and award judgment to the remaining Plaintiffs on that basis, the Court need

. not and will not address the arguments relating to the due process claim in Count 1 OL Legal Standards . To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is’ plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Jd. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Albright v. Oliver; 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving arty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. - Catrett, 317, 322( 1986). In assessing the Motion; the Court views the facts in the light favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Yne., 477. U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in. the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v, Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome ofthe suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 USS. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine” 9 .

only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Jd. at 248-49, > APAClaim . Plaintiff argue that the denials of their Petitions were arbitrary, capricious, and notin accordance with law because USCIS relied on a requirement found only ina regulation that their juvenile court orders had to be in effect on the date of the filing of the Petitions. Under the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). When reviewing such an agency action, “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of - law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” Id. § 706. An agency rule or action will be deemed arbitrary and capricious if “the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed toa difference in view oF the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of US., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Previously, when courts interpreted statutes administered by federal agencies that were silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific question at issue, courts were required to defer to the agency’s interpretation if it was “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron

_ USA Ine. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US. 837, 843 (1984). However, the United States □

Supreme Court has overruled Chevron, and now courts “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.” Loper Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244,-2273 (2024). When confronted with a statutory

ambiguity, courts must “use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.” Jd. at 2266. Thus, when applying the APA, courts “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” Id at 2273.

. Here, the Court considers whether the USCIS decision to deny Plaintiffs’ Petitions based on the rule, as stated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)(i), that an Si) petition must be denied if the □□ juvenile court orders were issued before the petitioner turned 21 years old but were.notissued □□□ ‘in effect at the time of the filing of the petition is arbitrary and capricious or not in accordance with law. Plaintiffs correctly assert that none of the relevant statutory provisions include a requirement that the juvenile court orders must be in effect before the date of the petition’s filing, In particular, the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)() provides that an SIJ is an individual “who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States” and “for whom it has been determined

in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be.

_ returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality,” without any provision requiring that these determinations must be made before any particular event. Id. § 1101(a)(27)()@-G). When USCIS promulgated 8 CFR. § 204.1 1(c)(3)Gi) in 2022, it included a requirement that a qualifying juvenile court order must be in effect at the time of the filing of an SIJ petition, but such requirement appears in the language of the statute. See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 87 Fed. Reg. 13066, 13082 (Mar. 8, 2022). Notably, Congress included a statutory time-of-filing requirement in relation to a different SIJ requirement, the petitioner’s age, by: requiring that an SIJ petition may not be denied “based on age if the alien was a child on the date on which the alien applied for such status.” 8U.S.C.§ . 1232(d)(6). Where Congress included a provision that both permitted and required the age requirement to be satisfied as of the date of the filing of the petition, it demonstrated that it could

_ and would identify requirements linked to the date of filing, so the failure to do’ so in relation to the timing of the issuance of juvenile court orders signals that no such requirement exists. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (“[W here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another. . ., it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate. inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). Considering these SIJ provisions together, the Court concludes that the best reading of the □ statutory provisions is that petitioners meet all statutory requirements, and thus are eligible forSIJ status, if they submit their SI applications before turning 21 years old and can demonstrate that. their qualifying juvenile court orders were also issued before they turned 21 years old, While . imposing an additional requirement that the juvenile court orders must also be issued before the date of the filing of the petition may provide USCIS with administrative efficiencies when evaluating an SIJ petition, administrative ease cannot justify ‘reading an extra requirement into a □

statute. This is particularly true where such a reading can result in the denial of SIJ status for individuals who meet all of the statutory requirements, such as SIJ petitioners who, like Plaintiffs, filed their SIJ petition before turning 21 years old and had juvenile court orders issued before they turned 21 but after the date of filing.

Defendants’ reading is particularly problematic because an SIJ petition may not be submitted electronically but is not deemed to have been received until actually delivered to USCIS. □ See 8 C.F.R. 204.1(b) (“The filing date of a petition is the date it is properly filed and received by USCIS.”). Asa result, a petitioner whose juvenile court order is issued the day before that individual’s 21st birthday—such that all statutory requirements. would have been met—has

Virtually no ability to satisfy the requirements of (1) having juvenile court orders that are ineffect

before the date of filing and (2) filing the petition, which requires receipt by USCIS, while the petitioner is still under 21 years old. See In re 21st Birthday Denial of Special Immigrant Juv. Status Applications by USCIS, 637 F. Supp. 3d 23, 32-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (noting that although one United States Court of Appeals requires USCIS to accept SIJ petitions filed on the petitioner’s 21st birthday, USCIS, including through decisions of its Administrative Appeals Office, often

_ applies the opposite rule and rejects SIJ petitions received ona petitioner’s 21st birthday); cf Burey v. Blanche, _ F4th _, No. 25-1869, 2026 WL 2023807, at *1, *4 (4th Cir. July 14, 2026) □ (finding that an immigration courts denial of a motion to reopen as untimely violated due process where the immigration court had refused to accept the motion through either electronic or in-person filing on the stated deadline for filing). This scenario can occur without a lack of diligence by the

petitioner because, unlike for many other requirements underlying an immigration benefit, the petitioner lacks the ability to determine when the requirement of having a qualifying juvenile court . order will be satisfied because the state court, not the petitioner, controls when any hearing is held and when it ultimately issues a qualifying juvenile court order, as reflected by the fact that Rodas- Jara’s uncle applied for such a court order in January 2023 but did not receive a ruling until September 20, 2023.”

Finally, Defendants interpretation of § 1101(@a)(27)) -as requiring qualifying juvenile court orders to have been in effect before the date of filing, which would effectively narrow the field of noncitizens able to receive SI status, runs contrary to the general principle, as articulated

by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that a “narrow and restrictive

interpretation” of § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) is “generally incongruous with Congress’s efforts to expand eligibility for su status and increase protections for vulnerable immigrant children.” Perez v. Cuccinelli, 949 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (rejecting an agency interpretation that a

qualifying juvenile court order must be a permanent order, rather than a temporary order, as contrary to the text and purpose of § 1101(a)(27)()().

For ‘these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants regulatory requirement that an □□□□ petition will be denied if the qualifying juvenile court order was not in effect on the date of the of the petition is not in accordance with law, in that it denies relief to certain individuals who meet all of the statutory requirements. It is also arbitrary and capricious in that, in some instances, it leaves to chance whether petitioners are eligible for SIJ status based on factors outside of their

control, including the state court’s determinations on when to make rulings and issue juvenile court orders, and the vagaries of mailing and other delivery services that, in some circumstances, may impact the number of days that it would take for a petition to be received for filing. See Kirk v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 987 F.3d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious where it distinguishes between similarly situated claimants “based on circumstances entirely outside their control” (quoting Hicks v. Comm’r of Soe. Sec., 909 F.3d 786, (6th Cir. 2018))); Miller v. Bond, 641 F.2d 997, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that “(dlecisions based on luck” are arbitrary and capricious). “In particular, these special

considerations applicable to SIJ petitions constitute an “important aspect of the problem” that the _agency failed to consider. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass n of US., Inc., 463 U.S. at 43. Defendants ‘also failed to consider why an SIJ petition filed before the petitioner turns 21. years old,as generally "required, could not be amended to include a qualifying juvenile court order issued before the petitioner’s 21st birthday. :

_ Nevertheless, Defendants argue that their interpretation of the SIJ statute as including the . time-of-filing requirement set forth in 8 CFR. § 204.110)(3)(i) is entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and should be upheld because it is not inconsistent

oo. 14

with or contradictory of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Under Skidmore, which remains applicable even after Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2262, 2265, 2267, “an agency’s specialized experience may justify granting its statutory interpretation a degree of deferénce proportional to its power to ~ persuade.” Perez, 949 F.3d at 877 (internal citations omitted). “In applying Skidmore deference, |

‘courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative

expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”” Jd. (quoting United States v.

‘Mead Corp., 533 US. 218, 228 (2001)). An agency’s interpretation may be “especially informative” to the extent it rests on factual premises within an agency’s expertise, see Loper . Bright, 144'S. Ct. at 2267, or to the extent it was “issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue” and has “remained consistent over time.” Id. at 2262.

When promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)(ii), USCIS provided two rationales for its ‘time-of-filing requirement for qualifying juvenile court orders. First, “the wording of □□□ dependency requirement in the INA is meant to show that the juvenile court has done something in the past, but the focus is on the present time (the adjudication of the SIJ petition by USCIS).” Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 87 Fed. Reg. at 13082. Second, “longstanding USCIS regulations at 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1), in general, require an applicant or petitioner for any immigration benefit to establish eligibility ‘at the time of filing,’ and that eligibility ‘must continue’ through

adjudication. ‘Additionally, DHS agrees with commenters that this requirement ensures that SIJ classification is provided to those truly in-need of the benefit.” Id. □ When Defendants’ interpretation of § 1101(a\(27\(D) is considered in light of these rationales, the Court finds that it lacks the power to persuade and thus is not entitled to Skidmore deference, As to'the first rationale, that based on verb tense the juvenile court order must have occurred in the past, USCIS does not explain why the issuance of the juvenile court order must

have occurred before the filing of an SIJ petition, as opposed to before an SIJ applicant turns 21 and would become otherwise ineligible. See g U.S.C. § □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Indeed, USCIS. acknowledges that the assessment of eligibility still requires a “focus ... on the present time,” meaning the time of “the adjudication of the SIJ petition by USCIS,” so there is no reason that the past activity cannot be the issuance of a juvenile court order at a time when the petitioner met the requirement of being achild. Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 87 Fed. Reg. at 13082. As to the second rationale based on the more general time-of-filing provision in 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), which provides that “[a]n applicant or petitioner must establish that he or she is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the benefit request,” Defendants neither

_ explain why that provision is consistent with the text of 8 USC. § 1101(a)(27)(J) nor offer an explanation for why such a requirement “ensures that SIJ classification is provided to those truly in need of the benefit.” Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 87 Fed. Reg. at 13082. Rather, the effect of imposing such a time-of-filing requirement on SJJ petitions has been, as here, to prevent noncitizens who were otherwise eligible for SIJ status from receiving the benefit that Congress intended for them to. have. F urther, as-discussed above, the general time-of-filing requirement set

forth in 8 CFR. § 103.2(b)(1), even if consistent with other parts of the INA relating to other immigration benefits, is incompatible with the SIJ statutory provisions because of unique aspects . of the SU program, including that petitioners lack control over the timing of the issuance of a required juvenile court order and, in light of the filing procedures, over the specific date andtime_ when an application will be deemed to have been filed. . to the remaining considerations, the Court finds that Defendants’ interpretation of 8 USC. § 1101 @)27\(0), which relates to general timing issues rather than substantive issues. relating to iminigration matters, does not rest on factual premises within an agency’s expertise.

See Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2267. Moreover, Defendants’ interpretation as set forth in8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)(ii) was not promulgated until 2022 and thus was not issued contemporaneously with § 1101(a)(27)(J), which was enacted in 1990. See id. at 2262. Accordingly, the Court finds . that Defendants? interpretation lacks persuasive power and is thus not entitled to deference under "Skidmore. — . Of the cases cited by Defendants, only Alvarez Sosa v. Barr, 369 F. Supp. 3d492(E.D.N.Y. □

2019), and Calle v. Whitaker, No. 18-CV-1957(SIF), 2019 WL 447324 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019), address the issue presented here. Both Alvarez Sosa and Calle involved similar factual situations in which SIJ petitions were submitted without qualifying juvenile court orders, but the petitioners

_ ater received their court orders before they turned 21 years old. See Alvarez Sosa, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 503; Calle, 2019 WL 447324, at *1-2. In both cases, decided by the same judge, the court upheld’ USCIS’s decision to deny the SIJ petitions because the qualifying juvenile court orders were not included with the original SIJ petition, and in doing so upheld that validity of 8 C.F.R. § - 204.11. See Alvarez Sosa, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 503-04, 508-09; Calle, 2019 WL 447324, at *13- - 16. However, these cases fail to provide a basis to alter this Court’s conclusion for two reasons. First, both interpreted and upheld a prior version of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, not the current version at issue, which was promulgated in 2022. See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 87 Fed. Reg. at 13066. Second and more importantly, both cases, which pre-date Loper Bright analyzed the issue under Chevron deference and found that the regulation did not “contradict the statute” and was otherwise a “reasonable and permissible” construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Alvarez Sosa, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 507-09; Calle, 2019 WL 447324, at *14-16. Where this Court is tasked with determining whether the current version of 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 1(c) conforms with the best interpretation of the SIJ statute, not that it merely provides a reasonable or permissible construction

of the SIJ statute, see Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2266, the analysis in Alvarez Sosa and Calle is inapplicable. For the same reason, Defendants’ assertion that the relevant part of 8 C.F.R. §

'204.11(c)(3)(i) is not “inconsistent or contradictory to the relevant statute” is unpersuasive. Mot. Dismiss at 13, ECF No. 9-1. Finally, Defendants argue that a time-of-filing requirement for qualifying juvenile court . orders flows from 8 US.C. § 1361, which states that the burden of proof is on the noncitizen to _ that he is entitled to SI status. Section 1361, however, does not state that this burden must □ assessed only at the time of the filing of an SI petition. Rather, where in this case Plaintiffs submitted juvenile court orders that were issued before they turned 21 years old, they met the burden to show that they met all of the statutory requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)J) prior to reaching the age of 21. “Therefore, the Court concludes that to the extent that 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3)(ii) requires denial of SIJ petitions submitted by petitioners for whom qualifying juvenile court orders were issued before they turned 21 years old on the grounds that a court order was not issued before the petitioner filed an SIJ petition, the regulation is not in accordance with law because it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1101@27)() by denying SIJ status to petitioners who would otherwise be eligible. . Based on this conclusion, ‘ind also based on the unique aspects of si petitions, including petitioners’ inability to fully control when a qualifying juvenile court order will be issued and when a submitted petition will be deemed to have been filed, the Court also finds that the denials

_ of Plaintiffs’ Petitions based on Defendants’ interpretation of this regulation were arbitrary and capricious agency actions in violation of the APA. ‘Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to. Dismiss will be denied as to the APA claim in Count 2, and Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

as to that’ claim will be granted. : The Court will issue judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Count 2,

vacate Defendants’ denials of Plaintiffs’ I-360 SIJ Petitions, and remand the matter to USCIS for adjudication of the SIJ Petitions consistent with this ruling. Because the Court grants judgment to Plaintiffs on their APA claim, the Court need not and will not address Plaintiffs’ due process claim in Count 1. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in that the Motion will be granted as to Flores-Reyes’s claims but will be otherwise denied. Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED as to Count 2, and judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiffs. A separate Order shall be issued.

Date: August 5, 2026 Sa THEODORE D. CHUAN United States District Ju