UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JEREMY D. JONES, Case No. 25-CV-3626 (PJS/DLM) Petitioner,
V. ORDER T. VAUGHT, Respondent.
Jeremy D. Jones, pro se. Ana H. Voss and Trevor Brown, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for respondent. This matter is before the Court on petitioner Jeremy D. Jones’s objection to the September 26, 2025 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko. Judge Micko recommends denying Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and dismissing this action without prejudice as
moot. ECF No. 5. The Court has conducted a de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Based on that review, the Court overrules Jones’s objection and adopts the R&R. Only one issue merits comment. Judge Micko found (and the Court agrees) that Jones’s request for restoration of good-time credits is moot because Jones has completed his prior sentence and any good-time credits he earned while serving his prior sentence
cannot be applied to the sentence he is now serving for a supervised-release violation. But the R&R does not address Jones’s request that the Court order the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to expunge two disciplinary reports from Jones’s record. ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 9 at 3. Jones lost good-time credits and received these disciplinary reports while serving his prior sentence. ECF No. 1 at 2. Jones seeks expungement of the reports from his record because, he says, (1) they were issued in a manner inconsistent with due process and (2) they will lead to the “collateral consequence” of “negatively impact[ing] Jones[’s] placement in [a] half-way house or Home Confinement pursuant to the First Step and Second Chance Act[s].” ECF No. 9 at 3. Typically, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to decide a challenge to discipline imposed on a prisoner when that challenge is brought after the prisoner completes his sentence and is released from custody. A discharged prisoner who challenges some aspect of his completed sentence bears the burden “of identifying some ongoing collateral consequence that is traceable to the challenged portion of the
sentence and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” United States v. Juv. Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (citation modified).’ In other words, when “a
‘By contrast, there is a presumption of continuing collateral consequences flowing from a wrongful criminal conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998); Beachem v. Schriro, 141 F.3d 1292, 1293-94 (8th. Cir. 1998). Because of this presumption, (continued...) -2-
petitioner, though released from custody, faces sufficient repercussions from his allegedly unlawful punishment, the case is not moot.” Leonard v. Nix, 55 F.3d 370, 372-73 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Leonard v. Nix is an example of a challenge to prison discipline by a discharged prisoner (Leonard) that was found not to be moot. The Eighth Circuit gave two reasons for its finding: First, Leonard had challenged the discipline in both a habeas action and in a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Expressing the view that “[a] successful habeas petition is a prerequisite to a section 1983 claim that hinges on a finding that the conviction was illegal,” the Eighth Circuit held that “Leonard's section 1983 action gives this [habeas] case life, for if Leonard wins this habeas action, the state becomes vulnerable to his section 1983 damages claim.” Id. at 373. Second, the Eighth Circuit noted that, after being released, Leonard had been convicted of a new crime and sent back to prison. According to the Eighth Circuit, “Leonard's return to custody dispenses with any doubt that may remain about the existence of collateral consequences in this case” because “[u]pon his return to ISP, Leonard's inmate status is marked by the previous rules violation, and if he commits
'(...continued) a challenge to a wrongful conviction is typically not dismissed as moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8. -3-
anyfurtherinfractions he faces more severe treatmentbecause of this prior disciplinary action.” Id.;see also Leiter v.Nickrenz,697F. App’x470(8th. Cir.2017) (percuriam)
(citingLeonard forthe propositionthatapetition“where challengeddisciplinaryaction hadcollateralconsequences”was notmoot). Bothof the grounds forLeonard’s mootnessholdinghave beenunderminedinthe
30years since the opinionwas issued. First, inSpencer v.Kemna,the Supreme Court dismissedas mootadefendant’shabeas actionchallengingthe revocationof his parole because,afterthe defendant’s parole hadbeenrevokedandhe hadbeenreturnedto prison,his sentencehadexpiredandhe hadbeenreleased. 523U.S.at3. The Court
rejectedthe defendant’s argumentthat, because he wouldbe foreclosedfrom pursuing a§1983actionunlesshe couldestablishthe invalidityof his parole revocationina habeas action, his habeas actionwas notmoot. Id.at17. The Supreme Courtsaid:
This is agreatnonsequitur,unlessone believes (as we do not) thata§1983actionfordamages mustalways and everywhere be available. Itis notcertain, inanyevent, that a§1983damages claim wouldbe foreclosed. If,for example,petitionerwere toseekdamages “for usingthe wrongprocedures,notforreaching the wrongresult” ... andif thatproceduraldefectdidnot“necessarilyimplythe invalidityof”the revocation...Heck [v.Humphrey] would have noapplicationall. Id.(quoting Heck v.Humphrey,512U.S.477,482–83,487(1994)). -4- Second, post-Leonard decisions have (at least implicitly) distanced themselves from Leonard’s reasoning that, because Leonard was sent back to prison, and because Leonard might commit another disciplinary infraction while serving his new term, and because Leonard might be punished more harshly for that infraction because of the discipline he received while serving his old term, his challenge to the prior discipline was not moot. This is a highly speculative chain of reasoning, and, as post-Leonard decisions have made clear, “speculation alone does not allow [a federal court] to retain jurisdiction over a moot case.” United States v. Corrigan, 6 F.4th 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified); see also United States v. L.C.D., 399 F. App’x 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Purely speculative collateral consequences cannot overcome a finding of mootness.”) (citation omitted). In this case, Jones argues that his request that the Court order the BOP to
expunge two disciplinary reports—one disciplining Jones for escape, the other for failing an alcohol test—is not moot because those reports “could negatively impact Jones[’s] placement in [a] half-way house or Home Confinement pursuant to the First Step and Second Chance Act[s].” ECF No. 9 at 3. In support of his argument, Jones cites provisions of two program statements issued by the BOP. Id. But Jones’s argument is, at best, entirely conjectural, and, at worst, demonstrably wrong. Jones has pending a second habeas petition in this District, and in that habeas petition, Jones
_5-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JEREMY D. JONES, Case No. 25-CV-3626 (PJS/DLM) Petitioner,
V. ORDER T. VAUGHT, Respondent.
Jeremy D. Jones, pro se. Ana H. Voss and Trevor Brown, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for respondent. This matter is before the Court on petitioner Jeremy D. Jones’s objection to the September 26, 2025 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko. Judge Micko recommends denying Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and dismissing this action without prejudice as
moot. ECF No. 5. The Court has conducted a de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Based on that review, the Court overrules Jones’s objection and adopts the R&R. Only one issue merits comment. Judge Micko found (and the Court agrees) that Jones’s request for restoration of good-time credits is moot because Jones has completed his prior sentence and any good-time credits he earned while serving his prior sentence
cannot be applied to the sentence he is now serving for a supervised-release violation. But the R&R does not address Jones’s request that the Court order the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to expunge two disciplinary reports from Jones’s record. ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 9 at 3. Jones lost good-time credits and received these disciplinary reports while serving his prior sentence. ECF No. 1 at 2. Jones seeks expungement of the reports from his record because, he says, (1) they were issued in a manner inconsistent with due process and (2) they will lead to the “collateral consequence” of “negatively impact[ing] Jones[’s] placement in [a] half-way house or Home Confinement pursuant to the First Step and Second Chance Act[s].” ECF No. 9 at 3. Typically, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to decide a challenge to discipline imposed on a prisoner when that challenge is brought after the prisoner completes his sentence and is released from custody. A discharged prisoner who challenges some aspect of his completed sentence bears the burden “of identifying some ongoing collateral consequence that is traceable to the challenged portion of the
sentence and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” United States v. Juv. Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (citation modified).’ In other words, when “a
‘By contrast, there is a presumption of continuing collateral consequences flowing from a wrongful criminal conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998); Beachem v. Schriro, 141 F.3d 1292, 1293-94 (8th. Cir. 1998). Because of this presumption, (continued...) -2-
petitioner, though released from custody, faces sufficient repercussions from his allegedly unlawful punishment, the case is not moot.” Leonard v. Nix, 55 F.3d 370, 372-73 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Leonard v. Nix is an example of a challenge to prison discipline by a discharged prisoner (Leonard) that was found not to be moot. The Eighth Circuit gave two reasons for its finding: First, Leonard had challenged the discipline in both a habeas action and in a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Expressing the view that “[a] successful habeas petition is a prerequisite to a section 1983 claim that hinges on a finding that the conviction was illegal,” the Eighth Circuit held that “Leonard's section 1983 action gives this [habeas] case life, for if Leonard wins this habeas action, the state becomes vulnerable to his section 1983 damages claim.” Id. at 373. Second, the Eighth Circuit noted that, after being released, Leonard had been convicted of a new crime and sent back to prison. According to the Eighth Circuit, “Leonard's return to custody dispenses with any doubt that may remain about the existence of collateral consequences in this case” because “[u]pon his return to ISP, Leonard's inmate status is marked by the previous rules violation, and if he commits
'(...continued) a challenge to a wrongful conviction is typically not dismissed as moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8. -3-
anyfurtherinfractions he faces more severe treatmentbecause of this prior disciplinary action.” Id.;see also Leiter v.Nickrenz,697F. App’x470(8th. Cir.2017) (percuriam)
(citingLeonard forthe propositionthatapetition“where challengeddisciplinaryaction hadcollateralconsequences”was notmoot). Bothof the grounds forLeonard’s mootnessholdinghave beenunderminedinthe
30years since the opinionwas issued. First, inSpencer v.Kemna,the Supreme Court dismissedas mootadefendant’shabeas actionchallengingthe revocationof his parole because,afterthe defendant’s parole hadbeenrevokedandhe hadbeenreturnedto prison,his sentencehadexpiredandhe hadbeenreleased. 523U.S.at3. The Court
rejectedthe defendant’s argumentthat, because he wouldbe foreclosedfrom pursuing a§1983actionunlesshe couldestablishthe invalidityof his parole revocationina habeas action, his habeas actionwas notmoot. Id.at17. The Supreme Courtsaid:
This is agreatnonsequitur,unlessone believes (as we do not) thata§1983actionfordamages mustalways and everywhere be available. Itis notcertain, inanyevent, that a§1983damages claim wouldbe foreclosed. If,for example,petitionerwere toseekdamages “for usingthe wrongprocedures,notforreaching the wrongresult” ... andif thatproceduraldefectdidnot“necessarilyimplythe invalidityof”the revocation...Heck [v.Humphrey] would have noapplicationall. Id.(quoting Heck v.Humphrey,512U.S.477,482–83,487(1994)). -4- Second, post-Leonard decisions have (at least implicitly) distanced themselves from Leonard’s reasoning that, because Leonard was sent back to prison, and because Leonard might commit another disciplinary infraction while serving his new term, and because Leonard might be punished more harshly for that infraction because of the discipline he received while serving his old term, his challenge to the prior discipline was not moot. This is a highly speculative chain of reasoning, and, as post-Leonard decisions have made clear, “speculation alone does not allow [a federal court] to retain jurisdiction over a moot case.” United States v. Corrigan, 6 F.4th 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified); see also United States v. L.C.D., 399 F. App’x 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Purely speculative collateral consequences cannot overcome a finding of mootness.”) (citation omitted). In this case, Jones argues that his request that the Court order the BOP to
expunge two disciplinary reports—one disciplining Jones for escape, the other for failing an alcohol test—is not moot because those reports “could negatively impact Jones[’s] placement in [a] half-way house or Home Confinement pursuant to the First Step and Second Chance Act[s].” ECF No. 9 at 3. In support of his argument, Jones cites provisions of two program statements issued by the BOP. Id. But Jones’s argument is, at best, entirely conjectural, and, at worst, demonstrably wrong. Jones has pending a second habeas petition in this District, and in that habeas petition, Jones
_5-
himself asserts that “[o]n October 28[,] 2025 [Jones] was referred to CCC placement and given a projected date of January 20, 2026 for RRC Placement.” Jones v. Vaught, Case No. 25-CV-4488 (JRT/JFD), ECF No. 1 at 4. The attachments to Jones’s later habeas petition confirm that the BOP intends to transfer Jones to a halfway house in January. Jones has provided no reason to believe that either of the two program statements he cites have in any way blocked or delayed his “placement in [a] half-way house or Home Confinement ....” ECF No. 9 at 3. Because Jones has failed to show that he currently “faces sufficient repercussions” from the challenged disciplinary reports, his request to expunge those
reports is moot. Leonard, 55 F.3d at 373. ORDER Based on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT Is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Petitioner Jeremy D. Jones’s objection [ECF No. 9] is OVERRULED. 2. The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 5]. 3. Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 4, Petitioner’s motions to add, amend, or supplement claims [ECF Nos. 6 and 8] are DENIED AS MOOT.
-6-
5. Nocertificate of appealability willissue. LET JUDGMENT BEENTEREDACCORDINGLY.
Dated: December19,2025 /s/PatrickJ.Schiltz PatrickJ.Schiltz,Chief Judge UnitedStates DistrictCourt
-7-