AFFIRM; and Opinion issued February 27 2013.
In The court of ppeat fifth itrict of exa at OatLa No. 05-12-01352-CR No, 05-12-0131-CR______
JEREMY JASON CRESPIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-16205-W, F08-16204-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Murphy, and Fillmore Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Jeremy Jason Crespin appeals following the revocation of his community supervision and
adjudication of his guilt in these cases. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to support the revocation of his community supervision and adjudication of his guilt.
We affirm. The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the
parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion
pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is
well settled. FACTS
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child
younger than lourteen years oi age and indecency with a child under sevemeen years ol age. See
TEx. PINAI, CoDE ANN, § 21.11(a). 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). The trial
court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on five years’ community supervision in each case. The court assessed a $3,000 fine in the aggravated sexual assault case and a $2,500
fine in the indecency case. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt. alleging in an amended
motion that appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by: (1) failing to
register as a sex offender; (2) committing a theft of a motor vehicle offense: (3) failing to report:
(4) failing to give twenty-four hours’ notice of any change in home address; (5) traveling outside
of Dallas County without permission; and (6) failing to pay costs and fines. Appellant pleaded
not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motions.
During the adjudication hearing, at the State’s request, the trial court took judicial notice
of the entire contents of the court’s file, specifically noting the following: (1) the order
suspending adjudication of guilt and placing appellant on community supervision on June 15,
2010; (2) the terms and conditions of community supervision signed by appellant on June 15,
2010; (3) the sex offender admonitions signed by appellant on June 15, 2010; (4) page 6 of a certified copy of the transcript from that proceeding where the judge specifically denied
appellant’s request to suspend him having to register as a sex offender while he was appealing
the specific point of registration; and (5) that the mandate in that appeal was affirmed and
received by the trial court on July 2, 2011.
Regarding the registration allegation, Garland police detective Brian Younger testified
appellant came to his office to register on September 14, 2010. Appellant was initially told to
-2- register annually due to a discrepancy in the initial paperwork sent to the police department. On
May 10, 2011, Younger explained to appellant in person that due to the nature of his offenses, he
was required to register his address every ninety days. At that time, appellant signed a document
acknowledging he understood the ninetyday registration requirement. Younger testified he gave
appellant a card that stated his next registration date was August 9, 2011. Appellant did not
show up on that date. Instead, he left a telephone message and asked to reschedule the time to
register. Younger rescheduled the registration appointment time for August 16, 201 1. Appellant
did not show up on August 16, 2011. Appellant did call Younger on August 16th and asked tor
more time because he “had a warrant out for his arrest.” Younger gave appellant another week
and a half to get in touch with Younger, but he never heard from appellant again.
Appellant testified that he was given instructions on the sex offender registration
requirements when he was placed on community supervision, and he understood the requirement
to register his address every ninety days when he spoke with Younger on May 10. 2011.
Appellant said he was “in and out of jail” and could not make the appointments, but he always
tried to call to reschedule.
The trial court also heard testimony from several witnesses concerning the theft
allegation. The trial court found all of the allegations true and adjudicated appellant guilty in
each case. The court sentenced appellant to fifty years’ imprisonment in the aggravated sexual
assault of a child case and twenty years’ imprisonment in the indecency with a child case.
APPLICABLE LAW
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
-3- preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that WOUld
create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. id, at 76364.
A knding ot a single violation ol community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See
Sanchez v, State, 603 S.W2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. IPanel Op.j 1980). Thus, to prevail on
appeal, appellant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the revocation
order, See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, l9394 (Tex. Crirn. App. IPanel Op.J 1978).
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community
supervision and adjudicating his guilt because the evidence is insufficient to show he violated
any of the conditions alleged in the amended motion to adjudicate. Appellant asserts there is no
evidence he took a motor vehicle without the proper owner’s consent, changed his home address
or traveled outside of Dallas County without permission, or intentionally failed to pay costs and
fines. Appellant further argues that because he was never criminally charged with the offense of
failure to register as a sex offender and the State “merely created the allegation,” the evidence is
insufficient. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence
is sufficient to show appellant violated at least one condition of his community supervision.
Younger’s testimony shows appellant did not comply with the sex offender registration
requirements. Younger specifically testified that after he gave appellant additional time to
comply with the registration requirements on August 16. 2011, Younger never heard from
appellant again. Appellant admitted he knew about and understood the registration requirements,
but he was “in and out of jail” and always called to reschedule. It was the trial judge’s role, as
the fact-finder, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d
89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the
-4- evidence presented by either side See Dewherrv v. State. 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex, Crim. App.
1999).
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AFFIRM; and Opinion issued February 27 2013.
In The court of ppeat fifth itrict of exa at OatLa No. 05-12-01352-CR No, 05-12-0131-CR______
JEREMY JASON CRESPIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-16205-W, F08-16204-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Murphy, and Fillmore Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Jeremy Jason Crespin appeals following the revocation of his community supervision and
adjudication of his guilt in these cases. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to support the revocation of his community supervision and adjudication of his guilt.
We affirm. The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the
parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion
pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is
well settled. FACTS
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child
younger than lourteen years oi age and indecency with a child under sevemeen years ol age. See
TEx. PINAI, CoDE ANN, § 21.11(a). 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). The trial
court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on five years’ community supervision in each case. The court assessed a $3,000 fine in the aggravated sexual assault case and a $2,500
fine in the indecency case. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt. alleging in an amended
motion that appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision by: (1) failing to
register as a sex offender; (2) committing a theft of a motor vehicle offense: (3) failing to report:
(4) failing to give twenty-four hours’ notice of any change in home address; (5) traveling outside
of Dallas County without permission; and (6) failing to pay costs and fines. Appellant pleaded
not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motions.
During the adjudication hearing, at the State’s request, the trial court took judicial notice
of the entire contents of the court’s file, specifically noting the following: (1) the order
suspending adjudication of guilt and placing appellant on community supervision on June 15,
2010; (2) the terms and conditions of community supervision signed by appellant on June 15,
2010; (3) the sex offender admonitions signed by appellant on June 15, 2010; (4) page 6 of a certified copy of the transcript from that proceeding where the judge specifically denied
appellant’s request to suspend him having to register as a sex offender while he was appealing
the specific point of registration; and (5) that the mandate in that appeal was affirmed and
received by the trial court on July 2, 2011.
Regarding the registration allegation, Garland police detective Brian Younger testified
appellant came to his office to register on September 14, 2010. Appellant was initially told to
-2- register annually due to a discrepancy in the initial paperwork sent to the police department. On
May 10, 2011, Younger explained to appellant in person that due to the nature of his offenses, he
was required to register his address every ninety days. At that time, appellant signed a document
acknowledging he understood the ninetyday registration requirement. Younger testified he gave
appellant a card that stated his next registration date was August 9, 2011. Appellant did not
show up on that date. Instead, he left a telephone message and asked to reschedule the time to
register. Younger rescheduled the registration appointment time for August 16, 201 1. Appellant
did not show up on August 16, 2011. Appellant did call Younger on August 16th and asked tor
more time because he “had a warrant out for his arrest.” Younger gave appellant another week
and a half to get in touch with Younger, but he never heard from appellant again.
Appellant testified that he was given instructions on the sex offender registration
requirements when he was placed on community supervision, and he understood the requirement
to register his address every ninety days when he spoke with Younger on May 10. 2011.
Appellant said he was “in and out of jail” and could not make the appointments, but he always
tried to call to reschedule.
The trial court also heard testimony from several witnesses concerning the theft
allegation. The trial court found all of the allegations true and adjudicated appellant guilty in
each case. The court sentenced appellant to fifty years’ imprisonment in the aggravated sexual
assault of a child case and twenty years’ imprisonment in the indecency with a child case.
APPLICABLE LAW
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
-3- preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that WOUld
create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. id, at 76364.
A knding ot a single violation ol community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See
Sanchez v, State, 603 S.W2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. IPanel Op.j 1980). Thus, to prevail on
appeal, appellant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the revocation
order, See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, l9394 (Tex. Crirn. App. IPanel Op.J 1978).
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community
supervision and adjudicating his guilt because the evidence is insufficient to show he violated
any of the conditions alleged in the amended motion to adjudicate. Appellant asserts there is no
evidence he took a motor vehicle without the proper owner’s consent, changed his home address
or traveled outside of Dallas County without permission, or intentionally failed to pay costs and
fines. Appellant further argues that because he was never criminally charged with the offense of
failure to register as a sex offender and the State “merely created the allegation,” the evidence is
insufficient. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence
is sufficient to show appellant violated at least one condition of his community supervision.
Younger’s testimony shows appellant did not comply with the sex offender registration
requirements. Younger specifically testified that after he gave appellant additional time to
comply with the registration requirements on August 16. 2011, Younger never heard from
appellant again. Appellant admitted he knew about and understood the registration requirements,
but he was “in and out of jail” and always called to reschedule. It was the trial judge’s role, as
the fact-finder, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d
89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the
-4- evidence presented by either side See Dewherrv v. State. 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex, Crim. App.
1999).
We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial COWl’S tinding that appellant
failed to register as a sex offender, Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
appellant’s community supervision and adjudicating appellant’s guilt in each case. See Rickets,
2t)2 S.W.3d at 763; Sanchez. 603 S.W.2d at 871. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him.
because proof of one violation is sufficient to SupPOrt revocation, we do not address appellant’s
remaining complaints.
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
2CL€2 LANG-MIERS JUST19E
Do Not Publish Tux. R. App. P.47
121 352F.U05
-5- _______
Qtourt of Ztppeat jfiftl, itrict of exa at atta
JUDGMENT
JEREMY JASON CRESNN, Appellant Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr,Ct.No, No. 05-12-0 1352-CR F08- I 6205-W). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Murphy and Fillmore participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered February 27, 2013.
/
ELJZA1ETH LANG-MIER JUST’E / Qlourt of tppeat Jfitt Oitrict of exa at Oafta
JEREMY JASON CRESPIN, Appellant Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.CtNo. No. 05-12-01381-CR V. F08-16204-W). Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellec Justices Murphy and Fillmore participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIR11ED.
Jrn, )w ZIZ4BETH LANI-MIE S JUSyiCE /