Jeremy Cage a/k/a Jay a/k/a Jeremy Holmes a/k/a Jeremy Lamar Cage v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 2025-M-00828
• Status: Published

Opinion

Electronic Document Feb 10 2026 09:22:56 2025-M-00828 Pages: 6

Serial: 260767 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

No. 2025-M-00828

JEREMY CAGE A/K/A JAY A/K/A JEREMY Petitioner HOLMES A/K/A JEREMY LAMAR CAGE

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent

EN BANC ORDER Before the Court, en banc, is the Motion for Leave to File Post-Conviction Relief in Holmes County Circuit Court filed pro se by Jeremy Cage. Cage was convicted of statutory rape, and the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Cage v. State, 149 So. 3d 1038 (Miss. 2014). The mandate issued on November 20, 2014. The instant application for leave is Cage’s third. It is both time barred and successive. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2), -27(9) (Rev. 2020). Notwithstanding the bars, the Court finds the application is also without merit and should be denied. By previous order, the Court, en banc, warned Cage “that future filings deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions but also in restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) in forma pauperis.” Cage v. State, 410 So. 3d 1057 (Miss. 2024) (mem). We find that the instant filing is frivolous and that Cage should be restricted from filing further applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) that are related to this conviction and sentence in forma pauperis. See En Banc Order, Dunn v. State, No. 2016- M-01514 (Miss. Apr. 11, 2019). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Post-Conviction Relief in Holmes County Circuit Court is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jeremy Cage is hereby restricted from filing further applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) that are related to this conviction and sentence in forma pauperis. The Clerk of this Court shall not accept for filing any further applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) from Cage that are related to this conviction and sentence unless he pays the applicable docket fee. SO ORDERED.

TO DENY WITH SANCTIONS: RANDOLPH, C.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, AND BRANNING, JJ.

TO DENY: KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ.

KING, P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT.

DIGITAL SIGNATURE Order#: 260767 Sig Serial: 10001 1770 Org: SC /J'tt~ Date : 02/10/2026 David M. Ishee, Justice

2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

Jeremy Cage a/k/a Jay a/k/a Jeremy Holmes a/k/a Jeremy Lamar Cage

State of Mississippi

KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:

¶1. Today, this Court prioritizes efficiency over justice and bars Jeremy Cage from its

doors. Because the imposition of monetary sanctions against indigent defendants and the

restriction of access to the court system serve only to punish those defendants and to violate

rights guaranteed by the United States and Mississippi Constitutions, I strongly oppose this

Court’s order restricting Cage from filing further petitions for post-conviction collateral relief

in forma pauperis.

¶2. This Court seems to tire of reading motions that it deems “frivolous” and imposes

monetary sanctions on indigent defendants. The Court then bars those defendants, who in all

likelihood are unable to pay the imposed sanctions, from future filings. In choosing to

prioritize efficiency over justice, this Court forgets the oath that each justice took before

assuming office. That oath stated in relevant part, “I . . . solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will

administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich

. . . .” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 155. Yet this Court deems the frequency of Cage’s filings to be

too onerous a burden and decides to restrict Cage from filing subsequent applications for post-conviction collateral relief. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87, 109 S. Ct. 993,

997, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I continue to find puzzling the

Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to the poor are not abused, even when so doing

actually increases the drain on our limited resources.”).

¶3. Article 3, section 25, of the Mississippi Constitution provides that “no person shall

be debarred from prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or against him or herself,

before any tribunal in the state, by him or herself, or counsel, or both.” Miss. Const. art. 3,

§ 25 (emphasis added). Mississippi Code Section 99-39-7 provides that actions under the

Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act are civil actions. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7

(Rev. 2020). Therefore, this State’s Constitution grants unfettered access in civil causes to

any tribunal in the State. The Court’s decision to deny Cage’s filing actions in forma

pauperis is a violation of his State constitutional right to access to the courts.

¶4. The decision to cut off an indigent defendant’s right to proceed in forma pauperis is

also a violation of that defendant’s fundamental right to vindicate his constitutional rights,

for

Among the rights recognized by the Court as being fundamental are the rights to be free from invidious racial discrimination, to marry, to practice their religion, to communicate with free persons, to have due process in disciplinary proceedings, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. As a result of the recognition of these and other rights, the right of access to courts, which is necessary to vindicate all constitutional rights, also became a fundamental right.

2 Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of

Court-It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 474–75 (1997).

As United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall stated,

In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having “abused the system,” . . . the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here.

In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1571, 114 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1991) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting). Instead of simply denying or dismissing those motions that lack merit, the Court

seeks to punish Cage for arguing his claims.

¶5. Although each justice took an oath to do equal right to the poor and rich, this Court

does not deny access to the court defendants who are fortunate enough to have monetary

resources. Those defendants may file endless petitions, while indigent defendants are forced

to sit silently by. An individual who, even incorrectly, believes that she has been deprived

of her freedom should not be expected to sit silently by and wait to be forgotten.

“Historically, the convictions with the best chances of being overturned were those that got

repeatedly reviewed on appeal or those chosen by legal institutions such as the Innocence

Project and the Center on Wrongful Convictions.” Emily Barone, The Wrongly Convicted:

Why more falsely accused people are being exonerated today than ever before, Time,

http://time.com/wrongly-convicted/ (emphasis added) (last visited Aug. 13, 2025). The

Washington Post reports that

3 the average time served for the 1,625 exonerated individuals in the registry is more than nine years. Last year, three innocent murder defendants in Cleveland were exonerated 39 years after they were convicted—they spent their entire adult lives in prison—and even they were lucky: We know without doubt that the vast majority of innocent defendants who are convicted of crimes are never identified and cleared.

Samuel Gross, Opinion, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in America,

Washington Post (July 24, 2015), http://wapo.st/1SGHcyd?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.4

bed8ad6f2cc.

¶6. Rather than violating Cage’s fundamental rights by restricting his access to the courts,

I would simply find his petition for post-conviction relief lacked merit.