1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMIAH MICHAEL CASTILLO, Case No. 2:25-cv-02116-DAD-CSK PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 APRIL WOODSON, (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Jeremiah Michael Castillo is representing himself in this action and seeks 18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF Nos. 1, 19 2.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be 20 denied, and the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,650.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 10 Here, Plaintiff filed an IFP application, but has not signed the form. (ECF No. 2.) 11 Plaintiff has also stated that he believes that “[b]eing forced to fill out such forms is an 12 unconstitutional barrier[.]” Id. at 2. Because Plaintiff has not signed the IFP application, 13 the Court will recommend the application be denied. See Arnold v. W. Cnty. Detention 14 Facility Medical, 2025 WL 1282623, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2025). Further, the Court will 15 additionally recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is 16 facially frivolous or without merit. “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma 17 pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the 18 action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th 19 Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); 20 see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) 21 (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed 22 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is 23 frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the 24 duty of the District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma 25 pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that 26 the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to 27 proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because Plaintiff has not signed the IFP application and 28 because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is frivolous or is 1 without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP 2 motion be denied. 3 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff’s Complaint 5 warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s required pre-answer screening. 6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 7 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 8 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 10 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 11 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 12 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 13 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 14 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27; 15 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 16 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 18 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal). 19 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 21 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 22 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 24 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 25 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 26 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 27 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 1 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 2 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 3 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 4 III. THE COMPLAINT 5 Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendant April Woodson, a “Clerk/Operations 6 Specialist” and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, in 7 her individual and official capacities. Compl. at 1, 2 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that on 8 June 30, 2025, he filed a notice of removal of a state criminal case under 28 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEREMIAH MICHAEL CASTILLO, Case No. 2:25-cv-02116-DAD-CSK PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 APRIL WOODSON, (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Jeremiah Michael Castillo is representing himself in this action and seeks 18 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF Nos. 1, 19 2.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be 20 denied, and the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,650.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 10 Here, Plaintiff filed an IFP application, but has not signed the form. (ECF No. 2.) 11 Plaintiff has also stated that he believes that “[b]eing forced to fill out such forms is an 12 unconstitutional barrier[.]” Id. at 2. Because Plaintiff has not signed the IFP application, 13 the Court will recommend the application be denied. See Arnold v. W. Cnty. Detention 14 Facility Medical, 2025 WL 1282623, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2025). Further, the Court will 15 additionally recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is 16 facially frivolous or without merit. “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma 17 pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the 18 action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th 19 Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); 20 see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) 21 (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed 22 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is 23 frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the 24 duty of the District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma 25 pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that 26 the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to 27 proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because Plaintiff has not signed the IFP application and 28 because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is frivolous or is 1 without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP 2 motion be denied. 3 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 Even if the Court were to grant Plaintiff’s IFP application, Plaintiff’s Complaint 5 warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s required pre-answer screening. 6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 7 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 8 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 10 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 11 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 12 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 13 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 14 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27; 15 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 16 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 18 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal). 19 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 21 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 22 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 24 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 25 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 26 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 27 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 1 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 2 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 3 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 4 III. THE COMPLAINT 5 Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendant April Woodson, a “Clerk/Operations 6 Specialist” and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, in 7 her individual and official capacities. Compl. at 1, 2 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that on 8 June 30, 2025, he filed a notice of removal of a state criminal case under 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1443(1) “on the grounds of ongoing and irreparable violations of federally protected 10 civil rights.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that the filing was accepted and stamped by the 11 Clerk’s office, and a notice of removal was filed with the Stanislaus County Superior 12 Court. Id. Plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, motion to dismiss 13 the removed case, and other filings. Id. at 10. On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff states he 14 received an email from Defendant stating that “criminal cases cannot be removed,” and 15 that his filing would be returned. Id. On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff received another message, 16 stated that only the United States Attorney’s Office may initiate criminal matters in district 17 court. Id. 18 Plaintiff alleges that he suffered multiple harms from the “improper rejection of 19 [his] lawfully filed federal removal.” Id. at 11. Those harms include that he was seized 20 due to a bench warrant on July 2, 2025, he was transferred to Stanislaus County jail on 21 July 3, 2025, he had his picture and fingerprints taken, he was denied toilet paper and 22 “subjected to surveillance via camera aimed at the toilet,” he was forced to take a TB test 23 against his will, he was denied a religious head covering, he was not taken before a 24 judicial officer until July 7, 2025, and he was held on $150,000 bail. Id. 25 Plaintiff asserts his rights under the First Amendment of the United States 26 Constitution and Article I, Section 3(b) of the California Constitution, and attempts to 27 bring claims for “ministerial overreach,” “obstruction of access to court,” “denial of due 28 process and redress,” “constitutional deprivation,” “administrative misconduct,” “criminal 1 and civil conspiracy” under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, “tampering with a 2 witness” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, “tortious interference with lawful remedy,” “intentional 3 infliction of emotional distress,” and “use of statute as a cloak for fraud.” Id. at 9, 12. For 4 relief, Plaintiff seeks enforcement and reinstatement of the June 30, 2025 notice of 5 removal, judicial oversight and review of Defendant’s actions, referral for administrative 6 discipline or investigation, “civil rights review” by a judge, and preservation and 7 production of all records and communications. Id.at 12-13. 8 On July 31, 2025, a separate case was opened in federal court, removing 9 Plaintiff’s criminal case from Stanislaus County Superior Court. See State of California v. 10 Castillo, Case No. 2:25-cv-02136-DAD-CSK PS. On August 1, 2025, District Judge Dale 11 A. Drozd related State of California v. Castillo with this case, and remanded State of 12 California v. Castillo to the Stanislaus County Superior Court. (ECF No. 3.) 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 A. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 15 1. Quasi-Judicial Immunity 16 The sole Defendant in this case is Ms. Woodson, sued in her individual and 17 official capacity as a Court Clerk for the Eastern District of California district court. See 18 Compl. at 1. Court clerks have “absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil 19 rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process,” 20 unless the tasks are done in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mullis v. U.S. 21 Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). This immunity 22 also bars declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief. Id. at 1394. 23 Here, Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant because she did not remove 24 Plaintiff’s state criminal case to federal court as Plaintiff requested. See Compl. at 10. 25 Plaintiff alleges he filed a notice of removal in federal court on June 30, 2025 and his 26 filing was accepted. Id. at 9. However, on July 1, 2025, he received an email from 27 Defendant informing him that criminal cases cannot be removed and that his filing would 28 be returned. Id. at 10. The conduct Plaintiff challenges relates to Defendant’s acts 1 related to her official duties (see Compl. at 9-10), and Defendant is absolutely immune 2 for these acts. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (“The commencement of an action by filing a 3 complaint or petition is a basic and integral part of the judicial process.”); Wills v. Barton, 4 2009 WL 1684722, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2009) (superior court clerk was immune 5 from suit for decision about whether to accept or file petitions for writ of mandate and 6 accompanying pleadings). Having his removal action filed is one of the remedies Plaintiff 7 seeks here. A case related to Plaintiff’s removal action was eventually opened, and the 8 District Judge remanded and closed the case. See ECF No. 3; State of California v. 9 Castillo, Case No. 2:25-cv-02136-DAD-CSK PS. Even if Defendant did make a mistake 10 by returning Plaintiff’s filing, “a mistake or an act in excess of jurisdiction does not 11 abrogate judicial immunity, even if it results in ‘grave procedural errors.’” Mullis, 828 F.2d 12 at 1390 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (9th Cir. 1978). Therefore, 13 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant should be dismissed. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390; 14 Sermeno v. Tang, 2025 WL 2722659, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). 15 2. No Cause of Action for Criminal Statutes 16 Plaintiff appears to seek relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1512. Compl. at 12. 17 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a federal criminal statute that makes it a crime for two or more 18 persons to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person” in the 19 exercise or enjoyment of their Constitutional rights or laws of the United States. 20 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is a federal criminal statute that makes it a crime to tamper with a 21 witness, victim, or informant. There is no private right of action for violation of a criminal 22 statute, which means that Plaintiff, as a private citizen, cannot bring a claim pursuant to 23 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 1512. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th 24 Cir. 2006); Rowland v. Prudential Fin., Inc., 362 F. App’x 596, 597-97 (9th Cir. 2010) 25 (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)) (finding district court’s 26 dismissal of claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 proper because it does not provide a private 27 right of action). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under these statutes should be dismissed. 28 / / / 1 3. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 8 2 The Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as 3 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims 4 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 5 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 6 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible 7 pleading policy, even a pro se litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the 8 elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 9 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 10 Here, the Complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal claim 11 against Defendant. Plaintiff states the following “violations” or “harms” allegedly caused 12 by Defendant: “ministerial overreach,” “obstruction of access to court” by returning the 13 removal filings, “denial of due process and redress,” “constitutional deprivation,” 14 “administrative misconduct,” “criminal and civil conspiracy,” “tampering with a witness,” 15 “tortious interference with lawful remedy,” “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” 16 and “use of statute as a cloak of fraud” all stemming from Defendant’s alleged rejection 17 of Plaintiff’s attempt to remove his case to federal court. See Compl. at 12. However, 18 Plaintiff only makes conclusory allegations as to each claim and fails to provide sufficient 19 facts to plead any claim against Defendant. The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim 20 on which relief may be granted and is subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 21 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot 22 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 23 enough detail to guide discovery”). 24 4. State Law Claims 25 Plaintiff also attempts to bring claims for “tortious interference with lawful remedy” 26 and “intentional interference of emotional distress,” which are state law claims. As 27 discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under federal law. Accordingly, the 28 Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. See 1 | 28U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association, 535 F.Supp.3d 2 | 913, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2021); Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 3 | (9th Cir. 1992). 4 B. Leave to Amend 5 The Complaint does not present a cogent, non-frivolous claim. In light of the 6 | Complaint’s deficiencies, including that Plaintiff's case is against an individual who is 7 | immune from suit, it appears granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint 8 | should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; 9 | Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 | V. CONCLUSION 11 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that: 12 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED; 13 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend; 14 and 15 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 17 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 18 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 19 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 20 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 21 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 22 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 23 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 24 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 26 || Dated: September 29, 2025 C iy S 27 CHI SOO KIM 28 | 5 cast2116.25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE